Table Of ContentThe Politics of Ballistic
Missile Nonproliferation
Wyn Q. Bowen
The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation
Southampton Studies in International Policy
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THE POLITICS OF THREAT
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US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
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EUROPE, 1945–1990s
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The Politics of Ballistic
Missile Nonproliferation
Wyn Q. Bowen
Lecturer
Department of War Studies
King’s College London
Foreword by Lawrence Freedman
in association with
THE MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
First published in Great Britain 2000 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world
Acatalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
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DOI 10.1057/9780333982280
First published in the United States of America 2000 by
ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-22618-3
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bowen, Wyn Q.
The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation / Wyn Q. Bowen.
p. cm. — (Southampton studies in international policy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-22618-3
1. Nuclear nonproliferation—Political aspects—United States.
2. Ballistic missiles—Government policy—United States. I. Title.
II. Series.
JZ5675.B69 1999
327.1'747'0973—dc21 99–16201
CIP
©Wyn Q. Bowen 2000
Foreword ©Lawrence Freedman 2000
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2000
978-0-333-75454-2
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00
To my Mother and Father
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Contents
Foreword viii
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
Part I Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the
American Response, 1950–89 11
Chapter 1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89 13
Chapter 2 The Pre-1989 Evolution of US Missile
Nonproliferation Policy 28
Part II The Politics of Ballistic Missile
Nonproliferation, 1989–93 51
Chapter 3 The Bush Administration and the Missile
Technology Control Regime 53
Chapter 4 Congress and Missile Nonproliferation 100
Chapter 5 Beyond the MTCR: Negotiating the Adherence
of Non-regime Suppliers to Nonproliferation
Norms 131
Conclusion 170
Notes 180
Select Bibliography 237
Index 264
Foreword
From the start of the nuclear age in 1945, with stunning demonstra-
tions of the destructive power of individual weapons, the
international community has wrestled with the problem of how to
prevent any further use. A large part of this effort was inevitably
geared to the burgeoning arsenal of the big powers, although its
impact was slight. It proved difficult to prevent growth in the size of
the inventories and improvements in the qualities of the systems. The
only relief was that a relationship of mutual deterrence developed.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union understood that they
could not escape dire consequences if they initiated nuclear war. From
the late 1950s attention began to focus on the problem of prolifera-
tion. The more nuclear powers, the greater the risk of weapons being
used in anger. International efforts to exert some control here were
more successful, culminating in the 1970 nonproliferation treaty.
Although a number of countries escape the net – there are now seven
declared nuclear powers and a couple undeclared – this is far lower
than many gloomy predictions, and still the weapons have not been
used in anger.
Part of the nuclear proliferation debate was always the issue of deliv-
ery. It was one thing to acquire mighty weapons, but how were they
to get to their targets? Missiles always seemed the optimum solution,
but the technology here was also extremely demanding – especially
over long ranges. From the 1960s, attempts to limit indigenous
programmes or prevent transfers of missiles to would-be nuclear
powers began to be part of the wider proliferation debate. By the time
the Cold War ended, missile proliferation had come to be seen as a
problem in its own right. It was obviously some comfort if missiles
were not carrying nuclear warheads, but chemical warheads offered a
viable, and much cheaper, alternative. Even with high explosives the
psychological impact of missile attack remained profound.
This was brought home to Western countries during the 1991 Gulf
War, when Iraqi attacks using SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi
Arabia seemed to produce a level of anxiety quite disproportionate to
their destructive yield. The technology of missile defence seemed
inadequate to cope with a sustained offensive attack. Because of this,
the question of the control of missile technology moved high up the
Foreword ix
international agenda.There was in place an informal agreement to
control the supply of pertinent technologies as well as completed
missiles known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
which had been negotiated during the 1980s as an adjunct to nuclear
nonproliferation efforts. After the Gulf War, the MTCR was given high
priority by the United States and its allies, and this resulted in a much
tougher and effective regime.
Wyn Bowen tells the story of how the administration of President
George Bush became increasingly conscious of this issue and moved
to handle it. He demonstrates with great clarity the nature of the polit-
ical problem this effort posed – both internally and internationally.
Internally it was necessary to prevent those who spoke for the inter-
ests of technology exporters to insist on procedures and standards that
were so lax that few items were contained. Internationally it was
necessary to persuade allies that they needed to demonstrate a far
greater commitment, and restrain their more enthusiastic exporters,
and also to persuade former enemies, such as the Soviet Union/Russia
and China, that it was in their interest to prevent the spread of strate-
gic missiles.
This account provides a valuable case study of American policy-
making, and in particular the interaction between different
government agencies, as well as a guide to the difficult issues raised by
any attempt to control military-relevant high technology. Wyn
Bowen also demonstrates the limits of the MTCR, while acknowledg-
ing those areas where it did make a difference. As with most non-
proliferation efforts, the best that can probably be said about the
MTCR is that without it, the situation could well have been worse.
King’s College London Lawrence Freedman
May 1999
