The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction

301 Pages·1986·7.2 MB·English

by  Peter Smith

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
An Introduction
PETER SMITH and O. R. JONES
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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© Cambridge University Press 1986
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and
to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1986
Reprinted 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997
Typeset in Sabon
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available
ISBN 0-521-32078-X hardback
ISBN 0-521-31250-7 paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2005
CONTENTS
Preface vii
Analytical Table of Contents ix
PART I: Dualism, For and Against 1
I Introduction 3
II Arguments for Dualism 16
III Descartes's Argument 31
IV Difficulties for the Dualist 45
V Assessing the Dualist Theory 62
PART II: Towards a Better Theory of the Mind 69
VI An Aristotelian Framework 71
VII Perception and Sense-Data 85
VIII Perception and the Acquisition of Beliefs 103
IX Action and Volition 119
X Two Theories of Belief 135
XI The Function of Beliefs 152
XII Functionalism and Folk Psychology 163
XIII Assessing the Functionalist Theory 177
PART III: Sensation, Thought and Freedom 191
XIV Sensations: The Phenomenological Theory 193
XV Sensations: Functionalism and Consciousness 207
XVI Thinking 223
XVII Reasons and Causes 237
XVIII Causality and Freedom 252
vi Contents
Chronological Table 269
Guide to Further Reading 270
Bibliography 275
Index 279
PREFACE
This book is aimed principally at undergraduates who are taking a
first course in the philosophy of mind, though it should be readable
by anyone with a serious interest in the issues we discuss. It has
developed from a course of lectures for complete beginners in
philosophy which we have given together for some years.
We have tried to keep our intended audience firmly in mind
without succumbing to the temptation of addressing our profes-
sional colleagues instead. We certainly haven't aimed to get all the
way to the 'frontiers'; our main concern is to present clearly some
introductory arguments in the philosophy of mind, in such a way as
to make them available to someone new to the area. Those who
think that these familiar arguments are to be vigorously criticised in
one way or another will still, we hope, welcome a book which
presents them frankly and perspicuously.
We can't pretend that the book is consistently an easy read, and
the discussions inevitably get significantly more difficult as the
book proceeds, particularly in Part III. Real philosophy in our
preferred analytical style requires following the twists and turns of
complex chains of argument, and to the uninitiated this process can
seem a little intimidating. But we have tried to keep the pace fairly
gentle, especially in Part I.
Instead of breaking up the text with cryptic section-headings, we
have provided a descriptive Analytical Table of Contents; this
rather old-fashioned device should prove much more helpful in
using the book. We have also appended a Chronological Table for
those hazy about the dates of the 'great dead philosophers' and a
brief Guide to Further Reading. Cross-references within the book
are by chapter and section: the system of references to other works
is explained in the preamble to the Bibliography.
We are extremely grateful to the friends and colleagues who have
generously commented at length on drafts of this book. We should
vn
viii Preface
mention in particular David Cockburn, Jonathan Dancy, Lucy
Littlehailes, Gregory McCulloch, Susan Mendus, Fred Stoutland
and Ian Tipton. John FitzGerald gave advice about translations and
George Botterill helped us to see what we meant in Chapter VIII.
We have had helpful comments from three (officially anonymous)
readers for C.U.P. And many first-year Aberystwyth students have
— less voluntarily — provided written comments on individual
chapters which have been very useful. Real thanks to everyone.
We are also grateful to Professor T.A. Roberts whose support
resulted in our being very well provided with word-processing
facilities, without which this project would undoubtedly have taken
very much longer and been considerably less enjoyable.
Last, but certainly not least, special thanks are due to our wives,
Patsie and Jean, who had to put up with us being even more
preoccupied with philosophy than usual.
Aberystwyth P.J.S.
April 1986 O.R.J.
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I: DUALISM, FOR AND AGAINST
Chapter I: Introduction
1 Questions about the nature of the mind arise very
naturally. 2 They are philosophical questions insofar as they
force us to re-examine critically what we ordinarily take for
granted. 3 We begin with the question: are we composed of
two distinct components, a physical body plus an immaterial
self? 4 On the two-component view, mental characteristics be-
long to our immaterial component, and physical characteristics to
the body. 5 This theory was defended by Plato and Descartes. 6
To dispute their theory is not to say that people don't have minds in
the ordinary sense. 7 The question whether dualism (as it will be
called) is true cannot be settled by searching to find our alleged
immaterial components. We cannot directly observe other people's
Cartesian Minds; nor, as Hume remarked, can we find our own by
introspection. We must resort to argument.
Chapter II: Arguments for Dualism
1 We examine eight arguments for dualism. (A) Mental properties
and physical properties are so different that they must be had by
different things. (B) Merely material things cannot think or feel
at all, so we are not merely material. (C) Material things cannot
have higher mental characteristics like the capacity to appreci-
ate art, so we are not merely material. 2 Argument (A) is
hopeless. 3 Arguments (B) and (C) also fail. 4 Underlying (B)
and (C) is the thought (D) that things made of physical stuff alone
IX