Table Of ContentTh e * Plfi 1osophi,e"srof Science
OPUS General Editors
Keith Thomas
Alan Ryan
Peter Medawar
R HARRÊ
The Philosophies of Science
An Introductory Survey
Oxford, New York Toronto Melbourne
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© Oxford University Press 1972
First published 1972
Sixth impression 1983
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Preface
IN THIS BOOK I have tried to introduce the philosophy of
science within wider philosophical contexts, in the attempt to
show how the problems which appear to be specific to science are
actually species of wider philosophical issues
There have been many attempts to make sense of: the methods
by which we acquire knowledge of nature, and to set that know
ledge within a more comprehensive metaphysics While I have
aimed at making manifest the variety of ways m which a rational
basis for science has been sought, I have also tried to show how in
the end two opposed positions seem to coalesce out of the apparent
variety There is the positivist position, which tends to treat
theories as il they are theorems m geometry, and to restrict
empirical knowledge to the passing show of sense experience
Over against this is the realist poirt of view which emphasizes the
work of the human imagination m leading to conceptions of the
realities behind sense experience, and which admits the content
of theories to the status of empirical knowledge
I have tried to present the case for positivism as fairly as possible,
though I believe the case against that point of view, on intellec-
tual historical, and moral grounds, to be overwhelming The
bibliography at the end of this, book contains suggestions for
further reading along both realist and positivist lines which I
hope will allow the reader to form his own opinions on these
difficult matters
Contents
LIST OF riCURES VUl
X The Philosophy of Science i
s The Forms of Reasoning m Science 35
3 Scientific Knowledge 62
4 Metaphysical Theories 100
5 The Corpuscularian Inheritance 140
6 Explanation 168
BIBLIOGRAPHY 184
INDEX 187
List of Figures
1
The Philosophy of Science
MOST PEOPLE SUPPOSE that philosophers think about very
general and very deep questions at the heart of which is the prob
lern of the relation of Man to the Universe Philosophers are
popularly thought to offer ideas about the general puiposes of
living, and even the more particular aims one should set one
self m one s ordinary life Philosophy of science m this sense would
be a discussion of the place of the scientific enterprise in the whole
pattern of life It would probably be concerned with providing
an ultimate justification for doing science, that is with whether
science was worth doing at all It might be digued, for instance
that the accumulation of scientific knowledge is destructive of the
conditions for living the best possible human life It might be
thought that the effort expended in the pursuit of scientific
knowledge might be better employed m the cultivation of artistic
sensibility, in the refinement of manners, and m the embellish
ment of the environment I am not going to pursue that kind of
discussion though I am very far from thinking that discussions of
such general questions have no value
In this book I shall be discussing a great many detailed ques
fions which, anse m the actual practice of science itself I shall
be trying to explain how our knowledge of the world and the
things m it is advanced I shall be trying to make clear what
principles are assumed in the use of time honoured methods of
acquiring knowledge We shall find that certain principles are
operative in scientific work It is the aim of this book to make
these principles manifest
THE PHILOSOPHY Ol" SCIENCE 10
Philosophy has four main branches logic, the theory of reason
mg. epistemology, the theory of knowledge, metaphysics the
theory of concepts and their relations, and ethics, the theory of
evaluation, particularly moral evaluation I shall not be concerned
here with ethics We begin in this chapter with a preliminary
account of the first three bi anclies of study, and briefly discuss
the relations between them By the study of examples of the
investigation of logical epistemological and metaphysical ques
tions our understanding of these branches of philosophy will
deepen
Logic
Logic is the study of the canons or principles of correct reason
mg To discover logical principles from the study of examples we
need to be able to recognize when a piece of reasoning is coirect
If we knew, only by reference to principles of logic, which argu
ments were valid and which invalid then we should have no need
to study examples of reasoning to try to discover principles, be
cause we should already know them In fact we are able to tell
whether some piece of reasoning is correct or mconect without
knowing or deliberatively applying any principles of logic that
is, without explicit reference to any canons of correct reasoning
The study of logic will enable us to say why some piece of reason-
ing is correct or incorrect However once the principles of logic
have been extracted from examples it is inevitable that they
should be used as canons, that is to express the standards to which
reasoning should conform
We must beware of supposing that the principles of correct
reasoning, say in mathematics, hold good for other subject matters,
say chemistry This would be like supposing that all languages
really have the same grammar Believing that, one might be
tempted to argue, for example, that English nouns really do have
case endings, but that these are implicit, or understood But it
would be just as reasonable an alternative to ask oneself whether
perhaps the application of the grammatical category 'case to Eng-
lish nouns is misplaced In this book I shall make no assumptions
whatever about the transferability of principles of logic from one
field to another In particular I shall not assume that the logical
