Table Of ContentTHE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN OF 1862
PENINSULA
THE
CAMPAIGN
OF 1862
A M I L I T A R Y A N A L Y S I S
KEVIN DOUGHERTY
J. MICHAEL MOORE
WITH
UNIVERSITY PRESS OF MISSISSIPPI I Jackson
Publication of this book was made possible
through the support of Dudley J. Hughes.
www.upress.state.ms.us
The University Press of Mississippi is a member of the Association
of American University Presses.
Charts courtesy of the Department of the Army
Maps courtesy of the Virginia War Museum
Photographs courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and
Photographs Division
Copyright © 2005 by University Press of Mississippi
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First edition 2005
(cid:1)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dougherty, Kevin.
The Peninsula Campaign : a military analysis / Kevin Dougherty ;
with J. Michael Moore.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-57806-752-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Peninsular Campaign, 1862. 2. Strategy—Case studies.
3. Tactics—Case studies. 4. Command of troops—Case studies.
I. Moore, J. Michael (James Michael), 1950– II. Title.
E473.6.D68 2005
973.7(cid:2)32—dc22 2004022378
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data available
CONTENTS
Preface vii
CHAPTER 1 THE STAGE IS SET 3
The Key Federals 3
The Key Confederates 19
Joint Operations at the Outset of the Civil War 33
CHAPTER 2 OPENING MOVES 36
McClellan’s Plan 37
The Monitorand the Merrimack(Virginia) 47
McClellan’s Suspicious Arithmetic 52
The Naval Support 54
The Movement 56
Fort Monroe 58
The Terrain 60
CHAPTER 3 THE PLAN BEGINS TO UNRAVEL 64
Allan Pinkerton’s Failed Intelligence 65
The Defenders 70
Yorktown 77
Williamsburg 85
Drewry’s Bluff 92
CHAPTER 4 THE TIDE TURNS 98
The Impact of Jackson’s Valley Campaign 98
Seven Pines 100
The Seven Days 109
CHAPTER 5 SO WHAT? 140
A Critical Review of McClellan’s Offensive 140
A Critical Review of Lee’s Defense and Counteroffensive 149
vi CONTENTS
A Critical Review of Jackson during the Seven Days 153
A Critical Review of McClellan’s Withdrawal 155
Aftermath 160
Chronology of Events 163
Touring the Battlefields Today 165
Tips for Conducting a Staff Ride 171
Bibliography 173
Index 177
PREFACE
On March 17, 1862, Major General George McClellan
launched an amphibious movement from Alexandria to Fort Monroe,
Virginia. His intention was to turn the Confederate defenses and to
advance on Richmond. Upon landing, the Federals enjoyed a four-to-
one numerical superiority over the Confederates. In spite of this initial
advantage, McClellan quickly ceased offensive operations and instead
endeavored to reduce Yorktown by siege.
While McClellan brought up his siege train, General Robert E. Lee, in
his role as military adviser to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, set
in motion a reconcentration of forces that would allow the Confederates
to block McClellan’s approach to Richmond. However, Lee’s plan
required time. The Confederate forces on the Peninsula would have to
fight a delaying action to gain this time.
General Joseph Johnston was in command of the Confederate field
forces in Virginia, and Major General John Magruder commanded the
Army of the Peninsula. On May 3, 1862, Johnston abandoned Yorktown
and fought a delaying action back toward Richmond. Major General
James Longstreet covered the withdrawal with a sharp rearguard action
fought at Williamsburg on May 5.
As Johnston withdrew up the Peninsula, Norfolk was isolated, and
the Confederate forces evacuated it on May 9. This left the CSS Virginia
without a home port and forced the crew to scuttle the ironclad. With
the Virginia out of the picture, the Federal navy was free to threaten
Richmond via the James River. The Federal gunboats got as far as
Drewry’s Bluff, within eight miles of Richmond, before being repulsed
on May 15.
While Major General Stonewall Jackson was keeping Federal forces
tied down in the Shenandoah Valley and keeping President Abraham
Lincoln worried about the safety of Washington, Confederates and Federals
clashed at Seven Pines on May 31 and June 1. The battle highlighted the
vii
viii PREFACE
dangers of misunderstandings that might arise from verbal orders, but
its most significant event was that Johnston was wounded and Lee
assumed command. With that, the nature of not just the campaign but
of the war itself changed.
Lee developed a bold plan to fix McClellan’s front while Jackson, hav-
ing completed his work in the Shenandoah, attacked McClellan’s rear.
The attack was planned for June 26. Jackson, however, exhausted from
his Valley Campaign, would be uncharacteristically slow, and McClellan
escaped the trap. The battles of this period are collectively known as the
Seven Days. During these battles, McClellan withdrew to Harrison’s
Landing under the protection of Flag Officer Louis Goldsborough’s gun-
boats. By August 16, the last units of the Army of the Potomac had left
Harrison’s Landing to meet transportation at Fort Monroe and embark
for new fields. The Peninsula Campaign was over.
The Peninsula Campaign’s historiography contains many excellent
works. Stephen Sears’s To The Gates of Richmond, Clifford Dowdey’s The
Seven Days,and Douglas Southall Freeman’s R. E. Leeand Lee’s Lieutenants
represent notable examples. However, none of these books analyzes the
campaign in the context of current and enduring military doctrine. This
book represents an effort to fill this void. As such, it is intended more for
a military than a historical audience. Background history is provided for
continuity, but the heart of the book is military analysis.
The Peninsula Campaign lends itself to such a study. It was the largest
campaign of the Civil War. It involved army, navy, air, and marine forces
and had the potential to be a truly joint operation. The lessons for the
student of the military art are many, spanning the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels of war. At the strategic level, there is the tension
between Lincoln and McClellan and McClellan’s inability to grasp
Lincoln’s grand strategic objective. At the operational level, there is the
failure of the Federal command structure to provide the unity of effort
needed for joint operations, the superiority of Confederate versus
Federal intelligence, McClellan’s forfeiture of the advantage initially
gained by his amphibious movement, and Lee’s difficulty in synchroniz-
ing his attacks. At the tactical level, there is the Confederate use of ter-
rain to trade space for time while Lee effected his reconcentration. There
is proof again of the superiority of the flank over the frontal attack
and the strength of the defense. Even McClellan’s withdrawal offers
an excellent example of a retrograde action. There are also numerous
PREFACE ix
lessons to be learned for staff officers, especially from the inability of the
Confederate staff to help General Lee effectively control the battle.
Moreover, the campaign is resplendent with lessons learned about
the personal dimension of war. There is McClellan’s overcaution, Lee’s
audacity, and Jackson’s personal exhaustion. All provide valuable
insights for today’s commanders.
History is most valuable when it is studied for the purpose of learning
lessons to be applied in current and future situations. This is the purpose
of this volume. It is designed to help today’s military leaders examine a
historical operation in light of current doctrine and see what may be
learned.
