The Partisan Next Door: Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Consequences for Polarization in America (Elements in American Politics)

96 Pages·2021·4.752 MB·English

by  Ethan C. Busby, Adam J. Howat, Jacob E. Rothschild, Richard M. Shafranek

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In the United States, politics has become tribal and
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personalized. The influence of partisan divisions has extended y
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beyond the political realm into everyday life, affecting t
relationships and workplaces as well as the ballot box. To help a
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explain this trend, we examine the stereotypes Americans . American Politics
have of ordinary Democrats and Republicans. Using data from
surveys, experiments, and Americans’ own words, we explore
the content of partisan stereotypes and find that they come
in three main flavors – parties as their own tribes, coalitions
of other tribes, or vehicles for political issues. These different
stereotypes influence partisan conflict; people who hold
trait-based stereotypes tend to display the highest levels of T The Partisan
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polarization, while holding issue-based stereotypes decreases e P
polarization. This finding suggests that reducing partisan a
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t Next Door
conflict does not require downplaying partisan divisions but is
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shifting the focus to political priorities rather than identity – a n
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turn to what we call responsible partisanship. e
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About the series series Editor
The Cambridge Elements Series in Frances E. Lee
American Politics publishes authoritative Princeton University
contributions on American politics. Ethan C. Busby,
Emphasizing works that address big,
topical questions within the American Adam J. Howat,
political landscape, the series is open to sse
all branches of the subfield and actively rP y Jacob E. Rothschild, and
welcomes works that bridge subject tisre
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domains. inU Richard M. Shafranek
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ElementsinAmericanPolitics
editedby
FrancesE.Lee
PrincetonUniversity
THE PARTISAN NEXT
DOOR
Stereotypes of Party Supporters
and Consequences for Polarization
in America
sse
rP y Ethan C. Busby
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vin Brigham Young University
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aC Oberlin College
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iln Jacob E. Rothschild
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h Reality Check Insights
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www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781009100311
DOI:10.1017/9781009086462
©EthanC.Busby,AdamJ.Howat,JacobE.Rothschild,
andRichardM.Shafranek2021
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception
andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,
noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten
permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublished2021
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
ISBN978-1-009-10031-1Hardback
ISBN978-1-009-07863-4Paperback
ISSN2515-1606(online)
sse ISSN2515-1592(print)
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tisre Additionalresourcesforthispublicationatwww.cambridge.org/busby
vin CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof
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dirb anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,
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The Partisan Next Door
StereotypesofPartySupportersandConsequencesfor
PolarizationinAmerica
ElementsinAmericanPolitics
DOI:10.1017/9781009086462
Firstpublishedonline:September2021
EthanC.Busby
BrighamYoungUniversity
AdamJ.Howat
OberlinCollege
JacobE.Rothschild
RealityCheckInsights
RichardM.Shafranek
HITStrategies
Authorforcorrespondence:AdamJ.Howat,[email protected]
Abstract:IntheUnitedStates,politicshasbecometribalandpersonalized.
Theinfluenceofpartisandivisionshasextendedbeyondthepolitical
realmintoeverydaylife,affectingrelationshipsandworkplacesaswell
astheballotbox.Tohelpexplainthistrend,weexaminethestereotypes
AmericanshaveofordinaryDemocratsandRepublicans.Usingdata
fromsurveys,experiments,andAmericans’ownwords,weexplorethe
contentofpartisanstereotypesandfindthattheycomeinthreemain
sse flavors–partiesastheirowntribes,coalitionsofothertribes,orvehicles
rP y forpoliticalissues.Thesedifferentstereotypesinfluencepartisan
tisre conflict;peoplewhoholdtrait-basedstereotypestendtodisplaythe
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in highestlevelsofpolarization,whileholdingissue-basedstereotypes
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eg decreasespolarization.Thisfindingsuggeststhatreducingpartisan
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irb conflictdoesnotrequiredownplayingpartisandivisionsbutshifting
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a thefocustopoliticalprioritiesratherthanidentity–aturntowhatwe
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yb callresponsiblepartisanship.
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d Keywords:partisanship,politicalparties,polarization,stereotypes,social
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6 ©EthanC.Busby,AdamJ.Howat,JacobE.Rothschild,andRichard
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80 M.Shafranek2021
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Contents
1 PartisanConflictandStereotypes 1
2 PartyImagesintheAmericanElectorate 7
3 TheContentofPartisanStereotypes 18
4 PartyImagesandPartisanPolarization 41
5 ResponsiblePartisanship 60
References 73
AfurtherOnlineAppendixcanbeaccessedat
www.cambridge.org/busby
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ThePartisanNextDoor 1
1PartisanConflictandStereotypes
PartisanconflictintheUnitedStatesisontherise.Politiciansbelongingtothe
DemocraticandRepublicanPartieshavegrownfurtherapartintheirideologies
and preferences. They have become more entrenched in their positions, less
willingtocompromisewithmembersoftheopposingpartytocreatepolicy,and
less likely to socialize across party lines (e.g., Dietrich, 2021). Increasingly,
theyevenopposeeachotheroverissuesonwhichtheyagree.Competitionover
poweroftentakesprecedenceoverpolicygoals,withlawmakersvotingalong
party lines even when the issues in question – for example, infrastructure,
government waste, or ethics oversight – have no clear ideological slant (Lee,
2009).Partisandivisionshavescarcelybeenstarkerduringthemodernera.
This conflict has seeped into the attitudes and behavior of ordinary people.
AgrowingnumberofAmericansreportseeingmajordifferencesbetweenthe
parties in the United States and say that partisans cannot agree on plans,
policies, and basic facts (Pew Research Center, 2019). Partisan conflict has
takenonadistinctlypersonalbent,influencingnonpoliticalareasoflife.People
reportarisingdislikefortheirpoliticaladversaries;manydescribetheiroppon-
ents as more immoral, unpatriotic, and closed-minded than other Americans
(Pew Research Center, 2019). Compared to earlier decades, individuals have
grown uncomfortable with romantic relationships between their family mem-
bers and supporters of political parties they disagree with (Iyengar, Sood, &
Lelkes,2012);thesameistruewhentheymaketheirownromanticdecisions
(Ballard,2019).Partisansmaydiscriminateagainstmembersoftheotherparty
in the workplace (Gift & Gift, 2015), within academia (Inbar & Lammers,
sserP 2012), and in everyday economic transactions (Engelhardt & Utych, 2020;
ytisre McConnell et al., 2018). Rank-and-file partisans seem increasingly unwilling
vin eventolivealongsideoneanother.
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eg Examplesofthiskindofpartisandivisionandconflictabound.Oneperson,
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irbm forexample,tookoutaroommateadonCraigslistthatwarned,“Alcohol,pets,
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C y andmeatproductsarenotallowedinthehouse.NeitherareTrumpsupporters”
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en (Rogers, 2017). Similarly, dating sites are becoming tinged with politics, as
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o d peoplelisttheirpoliticalviewsintheirromanticprofiles.Datingplatformshave
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silb sprunguptocatertodifferentpoliticalgroups,includingLiberalHearts(https://
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P 2 liberalhearts.com/), ConservativesOnly (www.conservativesonly.com/),
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46 DemocratSingles(www.democratsingles.com/),andRighter(https://wearerigh
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7 Republicansoftenfaceasmuchscornasadmiration,asdemonstratedina2019
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2 AmericanPolitics
Ellen’sownwords,peoplewondered,“whyisagayHollywoodliberalsitting
nexttoaconservativeRepublicanpresident?”(O’Kane,2019).
Thesedivisionsarisefrommorethanjustpolitics.Whenpeoplelearnsome-
one’s party identification, they often leap to a number of assumptions about
them. Thesecan be asmundane astheclothes partisanswearorthe carsthey
drive,ortheymightinvolvestereotypesaboutdeep-seatedvalues–potentially
the source of intense, bitter cultural conflict (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017;
Howat, 2019; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Many of these stereotypes
become reinforced during election campaigns, when epithets such as “latte
liberals” or “gun-toting conservatives” resurface.1 A well-known attack ad
sponsored by the conservative Club for Growth painted 2004 Democratic
presidentialcandidateHowardDeaninexplicitdetailasa“tax-hiking,govern-
ment-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-
reading,body-piercing,Hollywood-lovingleft-wingfreakshow”(Kelly,2014).
These phenomena illustrate what social scientists call polarization – the
widening of divisions between two groups. In the realm of partisan politics,
polarizationtypicallyreferstoideologicaldivergencebetweenpoliticalparties.
Ideological polarization in the United States has pushed the Republican and
Democratic Parties further and further from one another in their political
viewpoints and policy platforms. Political scientists generally agree that this
kindofpolarizationhasincreasedattheelitelevelintheUSoverthelastseveral
decades(Abramowitz&Saunders,2008;Fiorina&Abrams,2008).Suchelite-
levelpolarizationcanstronglyinfluencethepoliticalviewsandattitudesofthe
public (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013), but it remains a matter of
sse debate whether the ideological distance between the parties’ mass-level sup-
rP y portershasgrowntomatchtheirelitecounterparts.
tisre Evenifsuchdivergencehasnotoccurredamongthepublic,masspolarization
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U can result from greater homogeneity within groups. Ordinary citizens have
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dirb becomemoreideologicallysorted;liberalsincreasinglyidentifyasDemocrats
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a and conservatives as Republicans (Levendusky, 2009). Partisanship has also
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b e increasingly aligned with other identities such as race and religion, and this
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deh partisanconflict(Mason,2018;Mason&Wronski,2018).
silbu Moreover, the mere perception of larger group divisions may contribute to
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ThePartisanNextDoor 3
conflict–and,indeed,peoplehavecometoseepartyelitesasfurtherapartwith
respect to policy than they actually are (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016b).
Media portrayals of interparty conflict bolster these misperceptions, often
framingpartisandebatesasconflictsoverfundamentalvalues(Levendusky&
Malhotra,2016a;Robison&Mullinix,2016).Intheseways,talkofpolarization
betweenRepublicansandDemocratscanbecomeaself-fulfillingprophecy.
Scholarsandpunditsalikehavelamentedthesedevelopments,fearingtheir
implicationsforpoliticalcompromiseandfunctionalgovernance.Thepotential
repercussionsofsuchpolarizationextendbeyondpoliticsperseintothefabric
of American social life itself. Supporters of the Democratic and Republican
Partiesincreasinglyexpressafundamentaldislikeoftheirpartisanopponents,
even in the absence of overt ideological or policy-based disagreements. This
phenomenon, which political scientists have labeled affective polarization,
makes people more likely to registergut-level animosity toward outpartisans,
to avoid associating with them even outside political contexts, and to show
a willingness to act out against them – even, in rare cases, with violence. In
aword,contemporarypoliticshasgrownoverwhelminglytribal.
Whatexplainsthistroublingreality?Theanswermaylieinhowindividuals
think and feel about partisanship itself. A growing body of political science
researchindicatesthatpartyaffiliationhasbecomeasocialidentityinitsown
right, comparable in its nature and consequences to race, religion, or gender
(Green,Palmquist,&Schickler,2002;Greene,1999,2004).Itnotonlyshapes
political orientations and behaviors; it also constitutes, for many individuals,
akeycomponentoftheirself-concepts–and,byextension,howtheysocially
sse categorize others. This means that partisanship comes with a unique set of
rP y stereotypes – that is, generalizations about the characteristics of groups and
tisre their members (Allport, 1954; Bordalo et al., 2016; Lippmann, 1922). While
v
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U such mental images help simplify a complex social world, they also may
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dirb reinforcegroup-baseddivisionsandengenderprejudice(Ahler&Sood,2018;
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a Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). Extensive study of the nature and consequences of
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b e stereotypes provides stark examples of their negative potential. Stereotypes
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eh leadership(Galinsky,Hall,&Cuddy,2013),structurethewayspeopleinterpret
silbu thebehaviorofothers(Devine,1989),andinterferewithindividuals’imagesof
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6 themselvesandtheirperformanceinawiderangeofsettings(Steele,2011;Tine
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0 & Gotlieb, 2013). These effects align with the recent expansion of partisan
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4 AmericanPolitics
In the face of such increasingly tribal politics, what, precisely, do the
public’s mental images of partisans entail? We know that stereotypes predict
discrimination, prejudice, and negative actions toward outgroups (as evi-
denced by research on race, gender, and other social categories). In what
ways, then, do ordinary people envision the partisan next door, and how do
their ideas intersect with growing concerns about partisan conflict and polar-
ization? And, if partisan stereotypes do contribute to polarization, what can
be done about it?
InthisElement,weexploretheseveryquestions.Weseek,first,todocument
and describe the stereotypes of ordinary partisans held by the public. These
mental images can take a variety offorms, including personality traits, mem-
berships in social groups, political issue priorities, and more. Existing work
suggeststhatsomepeoplemayviewtheirpoliticalpartyasatribeinitself,with
associatedcharacteristicsandtraitsthatdefinethemandseparatethemfromthe
opposing party. We label this view of parties as their own distinctive groups
thepartisan-identityperspectiveonpartisanship.Incontrast,somemayseethe
parties as collections of other tribes. Avariety of groups have aligned them-
selvestothetwomajorpartiesintheUSforhistorical,instrumental,andother
reasons.Thus,onemaythink ofordinarysupporters primarilyasmembers of
othergroups(e.g., racial, economic, religious) pursuing group-based interests
throughtheirpartyattachments.Wecallthisthecoalitionalperspective.Finally,
other people’s stereotypes might emphasize the political issues that animate
partisans.Suchstereotypesdescribepartisansascaringaboutdifferentpolicies
ormodesofgovernment(andtheparties,byimplication,asvehiclesforthose
sse politicalpreferences).Thisviewappearsdistinctfromtheothertwo,asitlacks
rP y explicitly tribal components and, on a deeper level, involves some degree of
tisre internalization of the priorities and values of other people, copartisan and
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U outpartisan alike. Borrowing from other researchers (Huddy, Mason, &
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dirb Aarøe,2015),welabelthistheinstrumentalperspective.
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a Our analyses, using text-based data and machine learning, reveal all three
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b e kinds of partisan stereotypes among the public. All of these perspectives on
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iln partisanshipseepartisansasdividedinsomesignificantway.Weseeconsistent
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deh evidencethatpeopledoperceivemeaningfuldifferencesbetweenrank-and-file
silbu Democrats and Republicans, regardless of whether they hold predominantly
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