The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief

2018·2 MB·English

by  Jay J. Van Bavel

Opinion
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model

of Political Belief

Jay J. Van Bavel1,* and Andrea Pereira1,2

Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human Highlights

attractiontofakeanduntrustworthynewsposesaseriousproblemforhealthy Over2billionpeopleusesocialmedia

democraticfunctioning.Wearticulatewhyandhowidentificationwithpolitical everyday,andmanyuseittoreadand

discuss politics. Social media also
parties–knownaspartisanship–canbiasinformationprocessinginthehuman
facilitatethespreadoffakenewsand

brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political hyper-partisancontent.

reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory,
Online discussions of politicized
implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-
topics, including political events and
basedm odelofbel ieffo rund erstandingt heinfluence ofp artisansh ip onthese issues (e.g., sam e-sex m arriage , cli-
matec hange ,guncon trol),resem ble
cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party
an echo chamber. That is, posts on
loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de- the se to pics are s hared pr imarily by

biasinginformationprocessingtohelptocreateasharedrealityacrosspartisan people with similar ideological

preferences.
divides.
Politicalpolarizationismostlikelywhen

users employ moral/emotional lan-
guage .Thisma yreflectideologic aldif-
The Role of Identity in Political Belief
ferences between people on the left

versusrightorpartisanship.

The Party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears. It was their final, most
esse ntial c omm and .(G eorge Or well, 1984 ) Online partisan criticism that dero-
gates political opponents increases

politicalpolarization.
InOrwell’sfamousnovel,1984,hedescribedhowatotalitariangovernmentcouldmanipulate

the minds of its citizens through a state of perpetual war, government surveillance, propa- Liberalsaresomewhatmorelikelyto

ganda,andaggressivepolice.Themainprotagonistinthebookwasresponsibleforconstantly share cross-ideological content on
revising the historical r ecord ( i.e., activ ely creating fa lseh oods ) to e nsure that it w as always social media (i.e., inform ation po sted
by people with different ideological
consistentwiththecurrentpartyline.Thepartyultimatelydemandedthatcitizensabandontheir
beliefs).
own perceptions,memories, andbeliefs infavor of partypropaganda.

There is extensive evidence that political affiliations influence attitudes, judgments, and

behaviors. While it is widely accepted that identification with a political party – known as

partisanship (see Glossary) – shapes political judgments such as voting preferences or

supportforspecificpolitics,itislessobviouswhypoliticalaffiliationsmightshapeperceptions

offacts.Forexample,USDemocratsandRepublicansstronglydisagreeonscientificfindings,

such as climate changei [1] or economic issues (such that Republicans show much more

optimisticeconomicexpectationsthandoDemocratsaftertheelectionofDonaldTrumpin 1SocialPerceptionandEvaluation
2016ii[2]), andeveno nfactsthath avelit tle todowithpo litica lpo licy,such as crowd sizes.F or Laborat ory,NewY orkU niversity,NY
10003,USA
instance, supporters of Donald Trump were more likely than supporters of his political 2Social andOrganizationalPsychology
opponent (Hillary Clinton) or non-voters to mistakenly identify a photo of the inauguration Institute ,Le idenUniversity, The
ofPreside ntBarac kObam ain 2009asbe ing thatofthe Donald Tr umpina ug ura tionin2017iii. Netherlan ds

Theseexamplesmakeitclearthatpeopledonotrequireanauthoritarianstatetoignoretheir

owneyesandears:partisanidentitiesbiasabroadrangeofjudgments,evenwhenpresented
*Correspondence:
with facts that contradict them. [email protected](J.J.VanBavel).

TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004 213

©2018ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
The influence of partisan identities threatens the democratic process – which requires and Glossary

assumesthatcitizenshaveaccesstoreliableknowledgethatallowsthemtoparticipateinthe
Attention:astateoffocused

publicdebateandmakeinformedchoices[3,4].Inthecurrentpaperwedescribehowthetribal awarenessonasubsetofthe

nature of the human mind leads people to value party dogma over truth. Specifically, we availableperceptualinformation.

Belonginggoals:thepervasive
introduceanidentity-basedmodelofbeliefthatexplains(i)whypeoplewillinglyaligntheirbeliefs
drivetoformandmaintainlasting,
with political parties, and (ii) how partisan identities alter information processing linked to posit ive intera ctio nswitho ther

reasoning, memory, implicit evaluation, and even perception. This model describes why people.
party affilia tion exerts such a strongimpac t on peop le’s judgmen ts th at they often aban don Cognitivedissonance:the

psychologicallyuncomfortablestate
theircherishedvaluesandbeliefsinfavorofpartyloyalty[5].Althoughourtribalmotivesand
inducedbytheco-presenceof
cognitivestructureshaveexistedformillennia,increasesinpartisanship,thebehaviorofpolitical inconsis ten tatt itudes,beliefs ,or
elites, an dthe risei nsoc ial med iah elp to ex plainther ec ent surgeof fak enews.I n the final behaviors.
sectio n we dis cuss ( iii) stra tegies for d e-b iasing in form ation proce ssi ng to help t o crea te a Distinctiveness goals: the need for
uniquenessandindividuation.
shared reality across partisan divides. In addition to changing the goal – to value accurate
informa tion– weintro ducethe ideaof ap rocess-b as edinterve ntion ,targ e ted atthe stagein pErpeidsitcetmabiiclit yc,lodseucirseiv: etnhees dse,sire for

information processingat whichbiasisentering. preferencefororderandstructure,
anddiscom for twith amb iguity.

Executivefunctions:acollectionof
Why Political Identities Shape Belief
brainprocessesresponsiblefor
Politic alpartiest endtoreflec tpeople ’sideologies,namelyasystemofbeliefsandvaluesthat plann ing,cogniti veflexibility, abstract

represents one’s worldview. Ideologies stem from a combination of cultural influences and thinking,ruleacquisition,initiating
affinities, a nd are reflected in biological predis posit ion s and perso nal ity chara cteristics [ 6,7]. appropri ate a ctions and i nhibiting
inappropriateactions,andselecting
Theseideologicalorientationshaveastronggeneticbasis[8],emergeearlyinlife[9,10],and
relevantsensoryinformation.
manife stinbrains tructure[11,1 2].B ec auseid entificat ionwi tha political party isa vo luntary and Ideolog y:asyst emofbeliefsand
self-selec te d pro cess, pe ople are attracted to political parti es that al ign w ith t heir pers onal valuestha tr epresen to ne’s

ideology.Ind eed,thec orrelatio nbe tweenpo litic alideolo gyandp arty ident ificati onisv eryhigh, worldview.
Implicitevaluation:evaluative
andhasgrownstronginrecentyears(e.g.,identificationwiththeRepublicanpartyisveryhighly informati onthatisac tivated
corr elate d with conse rv ative id eolog y in th e USAiv). Th is re latio nship varies acro ss tim e and automatica lly,so m etimeswithout
place,but there isreasontob elievetha tp oliti calsyste msd ominatedby twoc ompetin ggro ups intentionoraw areness.
mayhe igh tenpa rt isanmo tiv esbeca use theyare particula rlyeffective in crea tingasense of‘us’ Partisan sh ip: identification with a
politicalparty.
versus‘them’[13]. Social identitytheory:aninfluential
theory claiming thatape rso n’ssense

Althoughideologyandidentityareoftencloselyaligned,thisisnotalwaysthecase.Attitudes of self is based largely on their group
membership(s).
atocwtuaarldas ligspnemceifinct poofltichieesp ooflitceyn wdiethpeonnde ’osni doenoelo’sg ipcoallitbicealli epfsar[t5y] .aFffiolirateioxna,m rpatleh,erin thaanse orine sthoef Sofypsteeompl ejutosttifiolcearattioe,nl:e tghiteim teizned,eanncdy

studies,theattitudeofparticipantstowardsawelfarepolicyreliedonthealignmentofthepolicy perpetuatethesystemtheylivein,
includingu nfair andun equa lon es,by
withtheirpersonalideology(generousforliberalparticipants,andmorestringentforconser-
endorsingthestatusquoand
vativeparticipants)onlywhennoinformationaboutpartyendorsementwasprovided.When
opposingattemptstochange.
suchi nformationw aspr ovided ,p articipantss trongly relied onitandpre ferre dthepolic ythat

aligned with their party rather than with their ideology [5]. Indeed, partisanship is one of the

strongest predictorsofvotingbehavior, regardless ofpolicyplatform [14,15].

Socialidentitytheory[16]canhelptoaccountforthisphenomenon.Accordingtothetheory,

people can define themselves according to who they are as individuals as well as their

membership in various social groups (defining themselves as a woman, parent, professor,

Democrat, or American). Likewise, evolutionary theory has argued that the brain evolved to

detect coalitional alliances [17], and neuroimaging research hasfound that the human brain

represents political affiliations, such as Republican or Democrat, similarly to other forms of

social identity [18,19]. However, the relevance of any given social identity varies with social

context. When a particular membership is made salient (e.g., at a political rally or election),

peoplearemorelikelytobehaveandexperienceemotionsinwaysthatarecongruentwiththe

activatedsocialidentity[20–22].Fromthisperspective,‘realityisalwaysinterpretedfromthe

214 TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3
perspectiveofasociallydefinedperceiver’[23].Indeed,socialidentitieshavebeenshownto

shapethewaypeopleinterpretinformation[23,24].Inturn,interpretationsoftheworldshape

politicalattitudes,judgments,andbehaviors.Becausepeoplebelievethattheyseetheworld

around them objectively, members of other parties who disagree with them are seen as

uninformed,irrational,orbiased[25].Thisphenomenon,knownasnaïverealism,canexacer-

bateintergroupconflict,andmakeitevermoredifficulttoresolvedisputesbetweenpolitical

groups [26,27].

Ourancientcapacityfortribalismexertsaprofoundinfluenceoncontemporarypolitics:modern

partisanidentities(alsoknownaspoliticizedidentities[28])motivateawiderangeofcognitive

processes, from reasoning to perception. This is especially likely when political parties are

tightly woven with political ideology and fulfill important social goals – which is common in

politicalcontexts.Socialgroupsfulfillnumerousbasicsocialneedssuchasbelonging[29],

distinctiveness[30],epistemicclosure[31],andaccesstopowerandresources[32],as

wellasprovideaframeworkfortheendorsementof(moral)values[33,34].Politicalpartiesfulfill

these needs through different means. For example, political rallies and events can satisfy

belongingneeds;partyelites,partisanmedia,andthinktanksprovidepolicyinformation;in-

groupmembersmodelnormsforaction;electoralsuccessconfersstatusandpower;andparty

policy provides guidance on the appropriateness of values [35]. To the extent that partisan

identitiesfulfillthesegoals(cf[36]),theycangenerateapowerfulincentivetodistortbeliefsina

manner that defies truth– especiallywhenthe net value of these goals outweighsaccuracy

goals (Figure 1). This is likely exacerbated when competing political parties threaten moral

valuesandaccesstoresources–twofactorsthatareknowntoincreasegroupconflict[32].

When different beliefs are in conflict with one another, people experience an uncomfortable

cognitive state – known as cognitive dissonance [37]. Because cognitive dissonance is

aversive,peoplearemotivatedtoreducethatexperience.Inafamouscasestudy,membersof

adoomsdaycultwereplacedinahighstateofdissonancewhentheirprophecythattheworld

wasabouttoendfailedtocometrue.Insteadofabandoningtheirbeliefinthecult,theyactually

Belonging goals
s
e
(cid:415) Epistemic goals
(cid:415)
n
e Existen(cid:415)al goals
d Value of Accuracy
i
n Status goals beliefs goals
a
s
(cid:415)
System goals
r
a
P
Moral goals
Figure1.AccuracyGoalsCompetewithIdentityGoalsToDeterminetheValueofBeliefs.Accuracygoalscan

promoteaccuratebeliefsaboutthesocialandphysicalworldunlessthenetvalueofalternativegoalsoutweighsthevalue

oftheaccuracygoal.Partisanidentitiescansubservenumerousgoals(including,belonging,epistemic,existential,status,
sy ste mjustific ation ,andm oralgoals )wh ichcand istortbelie fwhe ntheirnet valueoutw eighsaccu racygoals .

TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3 215
increasedtheircommitmenttothebeliefsystembyrationalizingthefailureoftheprophecyand

proselytizingothers[38].Wesuspectthatpoliticalbeliefsoftenoperatesimilarly–whenstrongly

identifiedmembersof apoliticalpartyareconfrontedwiththefailureoftheirpartyorleader,

manyofthemwillbemotivatedtodoubledownontheirsupportandmayeventrytorecruit

others tojointheir politicalparty.

Similarlytobeliefs,peopleoftenexperiencedissonancewhentheirgoalsareinconflict,and

theycanreducethisfeelingbychangingtheirgoals.Althoughpeopleoftenpossessaccuracy

goals,insomesituationsothergoalsmighttakeprecedence.Forinstance,ahighlyidentified

RepublicanobservingpicturesofPresidentialinaugurationcrowdsislikelytobemotivatedto

findevidencethattheirpartyleaderismorepopularthanthepreviousDemocraticpresident.

Reducingtheimportanceofbeingaccurate,orshiftingone’sassessmentofwhatconstitutes

accurateinformation,diminishescognitivedissonanceandthereforereconcilesthepersonwith

theiridentitygoals.Thegoaltoreducecognitivedissonanceislikelytobehigheramongpeople

who have high need for closure [39], which is modestly correlated with conservatism [7].

Conservatives also value group loyalty and deference to authority more than liberals [40],

factorsthatmayexacerbategroupcohesion[41].Furthermore,someworkhasfoundpolitical

differencesincredulity,such thatneoliberalsmay be moresusceptibletobullshit[42].

How Political Identities Shape the Components of Cognition

Overthepastcenturypoliticalpsychologistshaveprovidedextensiveevidencethatpartisan

identitiesalterpoliticaljudgmentandbehavior[14,15,43,44].Forinstance,partisanidentities

influence reasoning on political cognition [45], including beliefs about political figures [46],

politicalfacts[47],supportforpolicies[5],scientificissues[48],socialissues[49],andbeliefsin

theexpertiseofscientists[50].Buildingonneuroeconomicmodelsofdecision-making[51]and

self-regulation [52], weproposeanidentity-based modelof belief.Wesuggestthat different

beliefsunderconsiderationareassignedavaluebasedonthebenefitsthatarelikelytoresult

from each belief. Then, the values are compared in order to choose a belief. Finally, after

incorporating the belief (and possibly expressing it publicly or acting upon it), the brain

measuresthedesirabilityoftheoutcomesandupdatestheotherprocessestoimprovefuture

cognition.
Accordingtoourmodel,theorbitofrontalcortex(OFC)mayberesponsibleforcomputingthe

valueofcompetinggoals(e.g.,identitygoalsvsaccuracygoals)[51].Thisregionallowshighly

identifiedindividualstovaluetheoutcomesofin-groupmembersandengageincognitionand

actionconsistentwiththeiridentitygoals[52].TheOFChasrichfunctionalconnectionswith

brainsystemsinvolvedinreasoning(dorsolateralprefrontalcortex[53]),memory(hippocampus

[54]), implicit evaluation (amygdala [55]), and even perception (visual cortex [56]) (Figure 2).

Evidencefromcognitiveandsocialneurosciencesuggeststhatthesecomponentprocesses

are functionally dissociable in the human brain and engage in distinct computations while

generatingevaluations[55].Assuch,understandinganddecomposingtheseprocessesmay

becrucialfordesigninginterventionsthatwillalignbeliefswithfactsandallowtheendorsement

of asharedrealityfor everyoneacross thepolitical spectrum.

Researchershaveproposedtwomainperspectivestoexplaintheeffectofpartyaffiliationon

politicalreasoning[45,49].Accordingtooneperspective,partiesactasheuristics:peopleuse

information about party endorsement of particular attitudes, beliefs, or policies as cues that

guide their own position either directly through low-effort strategies (‘if my party holds this

positionthenitmustbetherightone’),orthroughdeductionsaboutthecontentofthepolicies

withhigher-effortstrategies(‘ifmypartyholdsthisposition,thenitmustsupportthiscorevalue

216 TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3
A(cid:425)en(cid:415)on
control
Execu(cid:415)ve
func(cid:415)on
Visual
Value of percep(cid:415)on
Memory
beliefs
Implicit
evalua(cid:415)on
Figure2.TheValueofBeliefsShapesDifferentCognitiveProcesses.Theidentity-basedmodelofbeliefassumes

thatpartisanidentitiesdeterminethevalueofdifferentbeliefsandcanthereforedistortbeliefatdifferentstatesofcognitive

processing,includingexecutivefunction,attentioncontrol,memory,implicitevaluation(correspondingtotheamygdala/

hippocampus,notvisiblefromthisperspective),andvisualperception.Thiscartoonroughlyillustratesthatthesecognitive

processeshavedissociableneuralsubstratesandcanbetreatedasbeingfunctionallydistinct.Inpractice,thefunctional

relationshipsbetweendifferentcognitiveprocessesareoftenbidirectional.

that I care about’). According to the alternative perspective, partisans engage in identity-

protective reasoning (e.g., endorsing the party position [57]). This perspective argues that

peopleoftencarelittleaboutthespecificpoliciesunderevaluationbecausetheserarelyhave

importantimplicationsfortheirconcretedailylives.However,theirpersonalpositionsonthese

policies orissueshavestrong consequencesfor theirsocial identity.Maintainingbeliefs and

judgments that are aligned with one’s political identity therefore is a higher priority than

achieving accuracy, and people with the highest reasoning abilities are better able to use

efficientstrategies to dothat,ascomparedto peoplewithlowestreasoning abilities.

In this vein, one study examined the relationship between math skills and political problem-

solving[58].Inthecontrolcondition,peoplewhowerestrongatmathwereabletoeffectively

solveananalyticalproblem.However,whenpoliticalcontentwasaddedtothesameanalytical

problem–comparingcrimedataincitiesthatbannedhandgunsagainstcitiesthatdidnot–

mathskillsnolongerpredictedhowwellpeoplesolvedtheproblem.Instead,liberalsweregood

atsolvingtheproblemwhenitprovedthatguncontrolreducedcrime,andconservativeswere

goodatsolvingtheproblemwhenitprovedtheopposite.Inshort,peoplewithhighnumeracy

skills were unable to reason analytically when the correct answer collided with their political

beliefs. This is consistent with research showing that people who score high on various

indicators of information processing, such as political sophistication ([59]; although see

[48]),scienceliteracy[60],numeracyabilities[58],andcognitivereflection[61],arethemost

likelyto expressbeliefs congruentwiththoseof theirparty.

TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3 217
Partisan identity has been shown to affect memory. People are more likely to incorrectly

remember falsehoods that support their partisan identity: Democrats were more likely than

RepublicanstoincorrectlyrememberG.W.BushonvacationduringtheKatrinahurricane,and

Republicans were more likely than Democrats to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama

shakinghandswiththePresidentofIran[62].Otherstudieshavefoundthatconservativesare

more likely to remember negative information about minority groups [63]. It is not yet clear,

however,ifthesepartisanbiasesareoccurringatencoding,retrieval,ormerelyatexpression.

Inrecentyears,psychologistshaveobservedthatpeoplemayholdpartisanbiasesoutsideof

theirconsciousawareness.Onepaperexaminedthepreferenceforpoliticalpoliciesexpressed

bypoliticalin-groupandout-groupmembersusingimplicitattitudemeasures[64].Consistent

with previouswork [5], people have an implicit preference for the policies proposedby their

politicalin-groupmember(DemocratorRepublican)—regardlessofwhetherthepolicycontent

isinlinewiththeirideology.Moreover,theseimplicitpartisanpreferencesmediatedtheeffectof

political affiliation on explicit measures of policy preferences. It seems then that partisan

identitiesgowellbeyondconsciousandexplicitjudgments,andinfluenceourimplicitevalua-

tionsaswell,suggestingthatinterventionstargetingconsciousorexplicitreasoningmaynot

fully addresspartisan bias.

Goingonestepfurther,thereisevidencethatpoliticalaffiliationsmayevenshapethewaywe

seetheworld.Inlinewithworkdemonstratingthatsocialidentitiesaltervisualprocessing[65],a

studyshowedthatpartyaffiliationshapedpeople’sperceptionsafterwatchingthevideoofa

politicalprotest,inotherwordsanidentity-relevantevent[66].Whenparticipantsthoughtthat

thevideodepictedliberallymindedprotesters(i.e.,opposingmilitaryrecruitmentoncampus),

RepublicansweremoreinfavorofpoliceinterventionthanDemocrats,whereastheopposite

emergedwhenparticipantsthoughtthevideoshowedaconservativeprotest(i.e.,opposingan

abortion clinic). Faced with the same visual information, people seem to have seen different

thingsanddrawndifferentconclusionsdependingontheirpoliticalaffiliations.Otherworkhas

foundthatRepublicansjudgetheskintoneofpoliticalleaders–suchasBarackObama–as

being darker than Democrats consider it to be, and these perceptions are associated with

voting behavior [67]. Similarly, identification with the police seems to direct visual attention

towardsinformationthatwillsupporttheirsocialidentitygoals[68].Theeffectsofpartisanship

on perception are important, but controversial, and warrant additional research. If vision is

affectedbypartisanship,itunderlinesthechallengeoftryingtocreateasharedrealityacross

partisan divides.

How Can We Reduce Biases Related to Partisanship?

Becausecitizensinademocracyareexpectedtomakeinformedchoices[4],eitherbyelecting

representatives who reflect their beliefs or by voting directly in referenda, it is important to

understand how to make them more receptive to facts and less receptive to fake news.

Developingasharedrealityisalsocrucialforhavingfruitfulpolicydebates.Inthissectionwe

proposestrategiesfromourframeworkthatarelikelytodiminishtheinfluenceofpartisanship

onbelief.Wefocusoninterventionsthattargetboththeantecedentsofpartisanship(why)and

the cognitiveprocesses thatunderliethe distortionof belief(how).

Aswenotedabove,partisanidentitiesserveimportantsocialgoalsforindividuals.Weassume

thatpeoplevaluegroupsbecausetheyfulfilloneormoregoals(cfFigure1)[28].Theweight(w)

theyplaceoneachgoalvaries(perindividualandasafunctionofcontext).Forexample,people

vary in the degree to which they value epistemic rationality, and those who are also high in

analyticalthinkingaremorelikelytorejectinaccurateinformation[69].Accordingly,whenthe

218 TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3
weightoftheaccuracygoaloutweighsthenetweightoftheseothergoals(S),peoplewillbe

more likely to value (V) accurate beliefs, insofar as they have access to factual information.

Whenthenetweightofthesegoalsoutweighstheaccuracygoal,peoplearelesslikelytovalue

accuratebeliefs,andinsteadaligntheirbeliefsofpartymembersandpartydogma.Asaresult,

twooutcomesarepossible:(i)whenpartybeliefsarefactuallycorrect,theseidentitygoalswill

generateaccuratebeliefs.(ii)Whenpartybeliefsareincorrect,theseidentitygoalswillleadto

misperceptions.Asaconsequence,differencesinaccuracybetweentwopartieswillincrease

the polarization of beliefs (in some cases, group identity is focused on generating accurate

beliefs,makingthemodeladditiveratherthansubtractive;forexample,theaccuracygoalsof

scientists, investigative journalists, and jurors are often aligned with their identity goals,

increasing the probability that they will generate accurate beliefs.) These computations are

instantiatedintheventromedialprefrontalcortex(vmPFC),withinputfromotherbrainregions

(described inthesection‘HowPolitical IdentitiesShapetheComponents ofCognition’).

V=w1Accuracy(cid:1)S(w2Belonging+w3Epistemic+w4Existential+w5Status+w6System

+w7Moral . .. wnOtherGoals)

According to this simplified framework, interventions that either fulfill social needs through

nonpartisanmeansormotivatepeopletosearchforthetruth,therebyincreasingthestrengthof

accuracy goals, will reduce partisan bias. For instance, reducing worldview or self-esteem

threats by affirming an individual can open their mind to otherwise threatening information

[70,71].Tomakethiseffectiveinapoliticalcontext,itisnecessarytodeterminewhichgoals

produce social value for an individual and fulfill those needs. When people are hungry for

belonging,theyaremorelikelytoadoptpartybeliefsunlesstheycanfindalternativemeansto

satiatethatgoal.Assuch,effectiveinterventionsshouldtargetsocialgoalsthatarerelevantto

each individual so as to decrease identitymotives. An alternative strategy is to enhancethe

accuracygoalbyincentivizingthisgoalorbyactivatingidentitiesassociatedwiththisgoal.For

instance,holdingpeopleaccountable[72]orpayingthemmoneyforaccurateresponses[73]

canreducepartisanbias.Likewise,primingalternativeidentitiesasscientists,jurors,oreditors

mightheightentheaccuracygoalandreducepartisanbias.Thesuccessoftheseinterventions

suggests that many reported differences in factual beliefs may stem more from motivated

reasoning (or simply motivated expression) rather than from memory, perception, or some

unconsciousprocess.Thesepossibilitiesshouldbetestableatthelevelofbehavioraswellas

theunderlyingneuralsystems(i.e.,motivatedreasoningshouldbemeasurablebyactivationin

the dorsolateral PFCand bedisruptedby factors,such ascognitiveload).

Another factor to consider is the potential threat to identity if the belief is wrong. People

generallyfinduncertaintyaversive[74],andlearningthatyouhaveafalsebeliefcanthreaten

your identity, and reveal a gap in your knowledge – which activates certainty needs. Thus,

corrective information that either affirms that identity or fills in the knowledge gap may be

helpful.Forinstance,onestudylookedatfavorabilityjudgmentsfollowingtheresignationofa

politician, and found that simply denying a false accusation did not change the favorability

judgments.However,denyingtheaccusationwhilealsoprovidinganalternativecausalexpla-

nationfortheresignationdid[75].Thissuggeststhataneffectivewayofcorrectingpeople’s

beliefsaboutfalsenewsstoriesmightbetoenrichthecorrectiveinformationsoastoprovidea

broaderaccount of thenews.

Prompting an accuracy goal to reach a correct conclusion can elicit greater cognitive effort

towardsthatgoal[59,76,77].Infact,partisanmotivatedreasoningisreducedwhenpeopleare

askedtoformaccurateopinionsaboutapolicy[78].Forinstance,arecentstudyfoundthat

curiositytowardsscience,namely‘adispositiontoseekoutandconsumescienceinformation

TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3 219
in order to experience the intrinsic pleasure of awe and surprise’ [57], reduces partisan

polarization.Peoplewithhighlevelsofsciencecuriosityseemtobemorewillingtoconsume

newsthatisnotinlinewiththeirpoliticalidentity(e.g.,Democratswithgreatercuriosityselected

more skeptical climate-change stories, and Republicans with greater curiosity selected less

skeptical climate-change stories). Interacting with these counter-partisan sources reduces

partisanbeliefs.Similarly,helpingpeopletorealizetheirownignoranceaboutpolicydetails–

known as the explanatory depth illusion – can reduce political polarization [79] (by contrast,

derogating your political opponents tends to increase polarization [80], possibly because it

activatescountervailingstatusandautonomyneeds).Futureresearchshouldaimtomeasure

the dynamic interaction of these social motives, visual attention, and neural activation as

partisans explore newssources.

Likewise, professional training and guidelines for evaluating evidence fairly can reduce the

effectofpersonalvalues.Forinstance,judgesreceivetrainingtomakelegaldeterminationsthat

areunrelatedtotheirpoliticalvalues,unlikemembersofthegeneralpublic[50].Weassumethat

theefficacyoftheserolesdependsontheextenttowhichpeopleidentifywiththesegroupsand

howtheyperceivethenormswithinthisgroup(thereislittledoubtthatjudgescanbepolitically

biased, but the group as a whole is often motivated to follow legal guidelines that increase

impartiality). Altogether, the evidence suggests that politically motivated cognition is indeed

malleableandcanbereducedwithincentivesandbyeducationthatfosterscuriosity,accuracy,

and accountability.

Anotherfactortokeepinmindwhilebuildinginterventionsistheimportanceofthesourceofthe

message(anexampleisgiveninFigure3).Thesocialinfluenceliteraturehasfoundthatpeople

resistinfluencefromout-groupstoprotecttheirin-groupidentity[81,82],andtheyarelesslikely

totrustpoliticalout-groupmembersandaremorelikelytodetectdodgingfromanout-group

politicianthanfromanin-grouppolitician[83].Thereisevidencethatcreatingasuperordinate

identitycanreducegroupbiasinimplicitevaluations[84,85] andpersonperception[86,87].

Therefore, interventions should aim at appealing to a superordinate identity that includes all

targetsofthemessage–suchasAmericansorhumanbeings–orfindatrustedsourcewithin

thepoliticalpartyofthetargettodeliverthemessage[88,89].Indeed,groupcriticismisreceived

less defensively when it is made by an in-group member than when made by an outsider

becausethe intentionsof the criticareperceivedasconstructive [90].

Adistinguishingfeatureofourmodelofthepartisanbrainisthatinterventionsshouldtarget

the relevant cognitive process where the partisan bias is entering (this stems from the

assumption that these processes are functionally dissociable in the human brain [55]). For

instance, if an individual is engaged in motivated reasoning, then presenting them with

additional factual information is unlikely to be of much value – they will either find a way

todismissthesourceorcounter-argueagainsttheevidence.Inthiscase,onemayneedto

affirmtheiridentitymotivesordisrupttheircapacitytoreason.Thissamestrategyisunlikelyto

be effective if the source of the bias is unconscious because these processes unfold

automatically, without motivation or cognitive capacity [91]. To change implicit partisan

evaluations,aninterventionshouldaimtochangetheunderlyingassociations[92]oractivate

analternative,orsuperordinate,socialidentity[93].Likewise,correctingdistortionsinmem-

orywillrequiredeepandrepeatedengagementwiththepoliticalcontentoreffectivecuesfor

retrieval [94]. In theory, these interventions could also involve selective stimulation or

impairmentofbrainregions(e.g.,usingtranscranialmagneticstimulationandlesionpatients).

We argue that designing targeted process-based intervention will increase the impact of

factual information on highly identified partisans.

220 TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3
(6)
A(cid:425)en(cid:415)on
control
‘That was the largest
audience to withness (5) Execu(cid:415)ve
func(cid:415)on
an inaugura(cid:415)on,
period.’(Press (1) Vbaeluliee fosf Implicit Memory peVrciseupa(cid:415)l on (3)
secretary Sean evalua(cid:415)on (4)
Spencer, 2017)
(2)
y
t Belonging
(cid:415)
n goals
e
d Epistemic goals
i

n Existen(cid:415)al goals Value of Accuracy
a
c beliefs goals
i Status goals
l
b
u System goals
p
e
R Moral goals
Figure3.A CaseWherePartisanIdentityAlteredReportedBeliefin CrowdSize.(1)ARepublicanpartymemberseespicturesofthecrowdsatthe

PresidentialinaugurationsofBarackObama(2009,rightpicture)andDonaldTrump(2017,leftpicture).(2)Thevalueofbeliefsiscomputedintheventromedialprefrontal
cortex(vmP FC)asafunct ion ofthe identityg oalsth atar eactive fort hatpers on.Th estate men tbythe Pre ssS ecret ar y–ane lit emember of the irparty–fulfil lsmultiple

goals(thewidthofthearrowsrepresentsthestrengthofthegoals),including:(i)belonginggoals,becausetheyareanin-groupmember;(ii)statusgoals,becausehe

saidtheinaugurationaudiencewaslargerthanthoseofPresidentsfromtheout-group;(iii)systemgoals,becausetheinaugurationisanimportantAmericanpolitical

tradition;(iv)moralgoals,becauseloyaltyisexpectedtothePresident.Othergoalsarelessrelevant.(3)Thevisualinformationisguidedbyattentionalcontrolinthe

parietallobeandisprocessedintheoccipitallobewithguidancefromthevalueofbeliefscomputedinthevmPFC.(4)Ifpromptedtorecallthatinformation,episodic

memoryofthecrowdsisconstructedviathehippocampus,withguidancefromthevaluesofbeliefscomputedinthevmPFC.(5)PartisanscanusethelateralPFCto

engageinmotivatedreasoningtojustifythesizeofthecrowdsordiscredittherelevanceofthephotographicevidence.(6)Partisansmightalsoreportaninaccurate

answer,despiteaccuratebeliefs,toavoidconcedingevidencethatviolatestheiridentitygoals.

Our model helps to explain why correcting misinformation is often ineffective. For instance,

correctiveinformationisfrequentlyunabletochangepoliticalmisperceptionsorfalsefacts([95];

seealso[96–99]).Anotherimplicationofourmodelisthatchangingfalsebeliefsaboutapolitical

candidate may not change evaluations because these are subserved by different cognitive

processes. For instance, correcting erroneous positive beliefs about Donald Trump was

sufficienttoshatterthosebeliefs.However,itdidnotchangesupportforDonaldTrumpamong

hissupporters.Thisunderscoresthatthedistortionofbeliefsisonlyoneelementof political

preference.
Concluding Remarks

Itisurgenttounderstandandaddresshowpartisanshipshapesbelief.Politicalpolarizationhas

increased dramatically in the USAv over the past few decades and is likely to continue to

increaseaspeopletuneoutideologically-incongruentnewsvi,curateechochambersontheir

TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3 221
socialmediaaccountsvii,andmovetoideologicallylike-mindedpartsoftheworld[100].Itis Outstanding Questions

thusamodernparadoxhowourincreasedaccesstoinformationhasisolatedusinideological How many differences in belief

bubblesandoccludedusfromfacts.AscomedianStephenColberthasnoted:‘Itusedtobe, betweenpartisansaremerelydueto

everyone wa s entitled to their own o pin ion, but no t their ow n facts . Bu t that’s n ot the c ase motivated expressions?

anymore. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything.’ Although cognitive scientists still Howearlyintheinformationprocessing
havealon gway togob efo re we solvethispr ob lem(seeOu tstanding Question s),thecur rent hiera rchyd o par tisanaffiliatio nsexertan
influence onb elief?Is motivated reaso n-
articleprovidesamodelforunderstandingwhypartisanidentitiesoftendistortperceptionsand
ingaconsciousprocess,asiswidely
beliefs, andoffers someplausiblesolutionsfor openingour mindsto ashared reality.
understood, or does partisan identity

alterunconsciousjudgmentsaswell?

Acknowledgments
Do partisan motives penetrate basic
TheauthorswouldliketothankmembersoftheNewYorkUniversitySocialPerceptionandEvaluationLaboratoryfor
perception or perceptual awareness
insightfulcommentsonthismanuscript.TheauthorsgratefullyacknowledgethefinancialsupportoftheNationalScience ofpolitical con tent?
Foundatio ngrant13 490 89a wardedtoJ .J.V. B.andM arieSkło dowska-Curie Pos tdoctora lFellows hi p70 3401aw ardedto

A.P. Canmethodsfromcognitiveneurosci-

encehelptodisambiguatemotivated

expression from biased reasoning,
Resources
memory,orperception?
ihttp://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/
iihttps://qz.com/823183/republicans-and-democrats-cant-agree-on-the-facts/ Howdoourtribalinstinctsinteractwith

iiihttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/25/ the messages from political elites to
shapepartisanbeliefs?
we-asked-people-which-inauguration-crowd-was-bigger-heres-what-they-said/?utm_term=.d7a50e4b6466
ivhttp://www.electionstudies.org/ Whatlevelofmonetarycostsarepeo-
vhttp://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ ple w illing to incur to maint ain their

vihttp://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/political-content-on-social-media/ partisanbeliefs?

viihttp://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed/
Are there ideological asymmetries

betweenconservativesandliberalsin
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222 TrendsinCognitiveSciences,March2018,Vol.22,No.3