The Paradoxes of Action: Human Action, Law and Philosophy

144 Pages·2003·2.37 MB·English

by  Daniel González Lagier (auth.)

THE PARADOXES OFACTION
Law and Philosophy Library
VOLUME67
Managing Editors
FRANCISCOJ. LAPORTA, DepartmentofLaw,
Autonomous University ofMadrid, Spain
ALEKSANDERPECZENIK, DepartmentofLaw, University ofLund. Sweden
FREDERICKSCHAUER, John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
Former Managing Editors
AULIS AARNIO, MICHAELD. BAYLESt, CONRAD D. JOHNSONt,
ALANMABE
EditorialAdvisoryBoard
AULIS AARNIO, Research Institute for Social Sciences,
University ofTampere, Finland
ZENONBANKOWSKI, Centrefor Law and Society, University ofEdinburgh
PAOLOCOMANDUCCI, University ofGenua, Italy
ERNESTO GARZONVALDES, Institutfiir Politikwissenschaft,
Johannes Gutenberg Universitiit Main:
JOHN KLEINIG, DepartmentofLaw,Police Science and Criminal
Justice Administration,John Jay College ofCriminalJustice,
City University ofNew York
NEIL MacCORMICK, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, European University Institute,
DepartmentofLaw,Florence, Italy
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, School ofLaw, Cornell University
CARLWELLMAN,DepartmentofPhilosophy, Washington University
THE PARADOXES
OF ACTION
Human Action, Law and Philosophy
by
DANIEL GONzALEZ LAGIER
Professor ofLegal Theory,
University ofAlicante,
Alicante, Spain
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.~
AC.LP.Cataloguerecordforthisbookis availablefrom the LibraryofCongress.
ISBN 978-90-481-6443-1 ISBN 978-94-017-0205-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8
Translatedfrom the Spanish
byRuth Zimmerling
Printedonacid-freepaper
All RightsReserved
©2003 SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht
OriginallypublishedbyKluwerAcademicPublishersin2003.
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover1stedition2003
No part ofthis workmay bereproduced,stored inaretrieval system,ortransmitted
inany form orbyanymeans, electronic,mechanical,photocopying,microfilming,recording
orotherwise,withoutwrittenpermissionfrom thePublisher,with theexception
ofanymaterial suppliedspecificallyforthepurposeofbeing entered
and executedon acomputersystem,forexclusiveuseby the purchaserofthework.
For Merche
TABLEOFCONTENTS
FOREWORDby ManuelAtienza
PREFACE 7
CHAPTERI.PRELIMINARIES
1. The ConceptofAction andtheTraps ofLanguage 11
2. The RelevanceoftheConceptofHuman Action forEthics and theLaw 13
3. Human FreedomasaPrerequisite 15
CHAPTERII:OURINTUITIONSANDTHE PARADOXESOFACTION
1. Introduction 17
2. FirstParadox: AreActionsNatural PhenomenoaorProductsofOur
Worldview? 19
3. Second Paradox:AreActionsBodilyMovementsorDescriptionsof
Bodily Movements? 19
4. Third Paradox: Can WeBeMistakenAbout OurOwn Actions? 20
5. Fourth Paradox: DoWePerform SeveralActions With One Single
Bodily Movement?(The 'AccordionEffect' ofActions) 21
6. Fifth Paradox: WhatArethe Limits ofOurActions? 22
CHAPTERIII:THEDEBATEINTHE PHILOSOPHYOFACTION
1. The ControversyAbout theIndividuationofActions 23
I.Theminimizingposition24/2.Themaximizingposition26
2. IndividuationFromtheAgent's PointofView (G.H.von Wright) 30
3. Individuation as Imputation (H.L. A.Hart) 32
4. Some Conclusions 36
VII
viii TABLEOFCONTENTS
CHAPTERIV: THEDEBATEINCRIMINALLAW
1. Introduction 39
2. TheDefinition of'Action' inCriminal-LawDoctrine 40
I.Thecausaltheoryofaction.Thetrilemmaofcausalism40/2.Theteleologicaltheoryof
action.Thepartialabandoningofteleology43/3.Thesocialtheoryofaction.Its
insufficiency44/4.Anewversionofthesocialtheory:thetheoryofactionasmeaning46
3. The TreatmentofAction inAnglo-SaxonLaw 49
I.Actrequirementandactusreusrequirement.Theorthodoxtheoryofaction50/2.
Objectivismvs.subjectivism52
4. Conclusions 53
CHAPTERV:THEDEBATEINTHE PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE
1. Introduction.GoodTimesfor Pragmatics 55
2. LanguageGames(Wittgenstein) 56
3. An IntentionalTheoryofMeaning(H. P.Grice) 58
I.Thereconstructionofsemanticconceptsfrompragmaticconcepts58/2.Theroleof
conventionsinthedeterminationofmeaning60/3.Searle'scritiqueoftheconceptionof
Grice61
4. HowTo Do Things With Words(1.L.Austin) 62
I. 'Constativeutterances'and'performativeutterances'62/2.'Locutionaryacts',
'illocutionaryacts',and'perlocutionaryacts' 64
5. An IntegrativeTheoryofSpeechActs (1.Searle) 69
I.Introduction69/2.Rulesandspeechacts.ThestructureofiIIocutionaryacts70/3.'A
taxonomyofillocutionaryacts'72/4.IntentionandiIIocutionaryacts76
6. Conclusions 77
CHAPTERVI: THEPARADOXES DISSOLVED
1. Recapitulation.The AspectsofAction 79
I.Naturalistic,subjectivist,andsocialtheoriesofaction79/2.Thecomplementarinessof
thethreegroupsoftheories.Basicact,result-actandconsequence-act. Actandaction80/3.
Theaspectsofactionandthedistinctionbetweenlocutionary,iIIocutionary,and
perlocutionaryacts81/4.Criteriaforthedistinctionbetweenthethreeaspectsofaction82
2. The ParadoxesofAction Reconsidered 85
I.Solutionofthefirstparadox86/2.Solutionofthesecondparadox86/3.Solutionofthe
thirdparadox86/4.Solutionofthefourthparadox87/5.Solutionofthefifthparadox87
TABLEOFCONTENTS IX
CHAPTERVII:THESTRUCTUREOFACTION
1. Introduction 91
2. The SequenceofBodilyMovements 91
I.Theroleofbodilymovements91/2.Anybodilymovement?92/3.Limitsofbodily
movements93
3. Changesinthe World 93
I.Doallactionsbringaboutachangeintheworld?93/2.'Action-internal'change93/3.
Naturalchangesandinstitutionalchanges94/4.Fromoneworldto theother94/5.Any
change?94
4. The LinkBetweenaBodilyMovementand aChangeinthe World 96
I.Causalrelations96/2.Conventional relations97/3.Relationsofimplication?97
5. Intention 98
I.IntentionalityandIntention98/2.Dointentionsexistinthemind?Volitionistsandanti
volitionists99/3.Intentionsandwants 101/4. Intentionpriortoaction,andintentionin
acting 103/5.Internal(subjective) intentionandexternal(objective)intention 104/6.
Voluntarinessandintention 106
6. The InterpretationorMeaningofan Action 107
I.Whatdoes'meaningofanaction' mean? 107/2.Theintentionalinterpretationofbodily
movements 109/3.Thenon-intentionalinterpretationofbodilymovements 112
CHAPTERVIII:OTHERKINDSOFACTIONS
1. Introduction 115
2. InstitutionalActions 115
I.JohnSearle'sdistinctionbetweennaturalandinstitutionalactions 115/2.Twokindsof
institutionalactions 116
3. Remarks onOmission 117
I.Omissionandbodilymovements 118/2.Omissionandchangesintheworld 119/3.
Omissionandlinks119/4.Omissionandintention 120/5.Omissionandinterpretation120
EPILOGUE 123
BIBLIOGRAPHY 127
INDEXOFNAMES 135
FOREWORD
Through the combined effects ofcertain natural facts (connected with the passage of
time), institutional acts (performed at various points within the university system) and
bondsoffriendship(forged overquiteanumberofyearsofacademic life),Ihavelately
become an occasional writer of forewords. It is certainly not a kind ofwork that dis
pleasesme;but itwould betoomuchtosaythatIhavelearnedtodoitwithease.Quite
tothecontrary!
Writingaforeword is,itseemstome,anexampleofarathercomplex action(al
though, ofcourse, much lesscomplex than writing the book itaccompanies). Infact,it
isnoteven an action; itisrather anactivity, carried outover a more or lessprolonged
period oftime and typically including something likethe following stages:deciding to
writetheforeword;carefully readingthebook; takingnotes;thinking aboutwhatwould
be appropriate aspects to be mentioned; sketching an outline; writing a first draft by
hand;writing several corrected versions;typing thelastofthem intothecomputer;dis
tributing it to several colleagues to see how they like it;correcting the text once more;
sending it to the author ofthe book;delivering itto the publisher. Ineach ofthese ac
tions(leaving aside foramomentpurely mentalactionssuchasthinking) wecaninturn
distinguish severalcomponents.Theseare,basically:bodilymovements,intentions,and
(intentionally orunintentionallyproduced) changes intheworld.
Forinstance, theactionofwriting the firstdraft(or,forsimplicity's sake, oneof
theparagraphs ofthefirstdraft)ofthepresent forewordconsisted, tobeginwith,incer
tain bodily movements (ofmyhand grabbing a pen and gliding over a piece ofpaper)
which I carried out voluntarily (no-one guided my hand). Secondly, there are some
changes inthe world which Iintended to produce andwhich also seem to formpartof
thataction:theappearance onthepaper(following certainlawsofphysics) ofinkspots
distributed in a certain pattern; or the production (by virtue of the syntactic and
semantic rules ofthe Spanish language) of a text with a meaning (or perhaps even
several meanings).And,finally,there may bestillotherchanges which Idid notintend
andtheproduction ofwhichIdidnotforesee, butwhich, nevertheless, alsoformpartof
thatsameaction.Forexample,because Iconcentrated sohardontheformulationofmy
text, I did not realize that I was writing on a piece ofpaper on which my son Miguel
had drawn a picture, with the effect that when he discovered my terrible mistake he
started crying desperately. Or perhaps (and that is actually partly true) because,
although Ihad wanted to write a foreword that would please Daniel and that he could
evenregard as a kind ofwedding present (as Ibegantowrite the first draft a fewdays
beforetheauthor ofthisbook,inajointaction withMercedes,setout tobringaboutan
- institutional- change intheworldconsisting inraising bytwo the numberofmarried
persons), what happened was that he was offended by the paragraph in question and
decidedthathisbookshouldbepublished withoutaforewordafterall.
2 FOREWORD
Seriously speaking, the example ofwriting a foreword can serve perfectly well
for a quick review ofthe kinds ofproblems and questions treated in this book: Are
actions (writing a foreword) phenomena that exist (and that we can observe)just like
physical objects,oraretheyrather a wayofseeingtheworld,a kindofinterpretation?
Shouldweregardactionsasbodilymovements(myhandgrabbingthepen),orratheras
descriptions of bodily movements (which vary from one observer to the next:
destroying a picture, scribbling on paper, writing a foreword, ...)? How could it be
possible that someonewhoperforms anaction doesnot know what heisdoing?Or do
we always know? How manyactions did Iperform when Iwrote the paragraph? Was
offending Danieloneofthem?AnddidIalsoperformtheactionofbringingaboutthat
theforeworditcostmesomuchefforttowritewillremainunpublished?
Gonzalez Lagier's strategy for answering these questions is, at the same time,
simpleandeffective.Hebeginsbygiving asummaryofthecurrent debateinthephilo
sophyofaction which leadshimtothe conclusionthatagood part ofthecontroversies
inthatfieldaremoreapparentthanreal.Asheseesit,thedifferenttheoriesaboutaction
he reviews (and which are, in fact, the most relevant) are not about the same subject;
rather,they refereachtoadifferent oneoftheseveralaspectswecandistinguishinac
tions,i.e.tobodilymovements(thenaturaldimension),towhat isintentionallydone in
carrying out those bodily movements (the subjective dimension), and to the socially
relevantconsequencesthismayproduce(thesocialdimension).
Ifoneexamines- asGonzalez Lagierdoesnext- thesituationinthefieldofcri
minal dogmatics, one can draw an analogous conclusion: the causal theory, the teleo
logicaltheory,andthesocialtheoryofactionallsharethecharacteristicofreducingthe
phenomenon ofactiontoonlyoneofitsthreebasicelements.Ratherthanasthreerival
theories,one can thereforeregard them ascomplementarytheories aboutdifferentsub
jects, namely,about whattheauthor callsthe 'basic act', the 'result-act',andthe 'con
sequence-act',respectively.
Finally,thethirdandlastofGonzalezLagier's theoreticalexplorationsconcerns
thephilosophy oflanguage,andinparticularAustin's distinction oflocutionaryact(the
actofuttering something:forinstance, 'Danielisgettingmarried onMay I'), illocutio
naryact(whatonedoesbyutteringsomething:tellingCarmenaboutit),andperlocutio
naryact(the consequencesofuttering something:provoking inCarmen- andmyself
a feeling of sadness for not being able to assist at the wedding). In his view, if
interpreted ina certain fashion,this distinction canbecarried over fromspeech actsto
actions in general, so that in the end we are back again at the distinction between
physicalmovements,theirintendedresults,andtheirsocialconsequences.
Startingfromthisschema,whichtheauthordevelopswithadegreeofdetailand
sophistication that Icannot dojustice to here, theanswer to the questions posedabove
isthe following:Ifbyanactionone understands the basic act, then actions are natural
phenomena. If, instead,anaction isunderstood asanact-result or anact-consequence,
then it is rather an 'interpretive attitude'. And that is why one and the same bodily
movement(basicact)cangiverisetodifferentactions(interpretations),andoneandthe
same kind ofaction (writing a foreword) can be performed through different bodily
movements (the movement of my hand grabbing the pen, or the movements of my
fingers hitting the keys ofa keyboard; in other cases, the differences between bodily
movements may even be much greater: one can kill another by firing a gun, by