The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements

432 Pages·1996·1.33 MB·English

by  Abram Chayes

  

The New
Sovereignty
Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements
 
  
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
1995
Copyright1995byAbramChayesandAntoniaHandlerChayes
Allrightsreserved
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Chayes,Abram,1922–
Thenewsovereignty:compliancewithinternationalregulatory
agreements/AbramChayes,AntoniaHandlerChayes.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-674-61782-7(cloth:alk.paper)
1.Treaties. 2.Compliance. 3.Sovereignty.
I.Chayes,AntoniaHandler,1929– . II.Title.
JX4165.C43 1995
341.3′7—dc20
95-21960
To each other

Contents
Preface ix
1 A Theory of Compliance 1
 
Sanctions 29
2 Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions 34
3 Membership Sanctions 68
4 Unilateral Sanctions 88
 
Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance 109
5 Norms 112
6 Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction 135
7 Reporting and Data Collection 154
8 Verification and Monitoring 174
9 Instruments of Active Management 197
10 Policy Review and Assessment 229
11 Nongovernmental Organizations 250
12 Revitalizing International Organizations 271
Appendix: List of Treaties 287
Notes 303
Index 405

Preface
Wedidnotstartouttowritethisbook.Westartedouttoteachtogether.The
only area in which we both had professional qualifications was arms con-
trol—Abe, starting in 1963 as Legal Adviser to the State Department, was
involved in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Toni, as Undersecretary of the
Air Force in the Carter administration, was involved in the MX missile
deployment. Our course, ‘‘Law, Doctrine, and Politics in Nuclear Weapons
Management,’’whichwetaughtformorethanadecade,increasinglyfocused
on the question of why, in an environment of inveterate ideological con-
frontation, mutual suspicion, and hostility, the two superpowers continu-
ously sought to negotiate arms control agreements—and substantially
complied with the obligations they assumed.
This question seemed to grow somewhat less urgent with the end of the
cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. So we began to ask our-
selveswhethersomeofthethingswehadlearnedwouldbeapplicabletothe
problem of treaty compliance in general. In particular, we had been
impressed with the work of a little-known body, the Standing Consultative
Commission (), established by the  agreements to ‘‘consider ques-
tions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related sit-
uations which may be considered ambiguous.’’ It is perhaps not surprising
that, as lawyers, we assumed that the question of compliance with legal
obligations would have something to do with the institutions for the settle-
ment of disputes about their interpretation and application. The  was
interestingbecause,althoughithadnoadjudicativeorenforcementauthority
andwaslittlemorethananegotiatingforum,itwastheinstrumentthrough
which some important issues between the treaty parties were resolved, even