The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War: Distrust and Decision-making in the Anglo-French Alliance

298 Pages·1959·10.53 MB·English

by  Brison D. Gooch (auth.)

THE NEW BONAPARTIST GENERALS
BRISON D. GOOCH
THE NEW BONAPARTIST GENERALS
in the
CRIMEAN WAR
Distrust and Decision-making in the
Anglo-French Alliance
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1959
ISBN 978-94-015-0398-3 ISBN 978-94-015-1001-1 (eBook)
DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-1001-1
Copytight 1959 by Martinus Nijhofj, The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
Softcover reprint ofthr hardcover 1s t edition 1959
PREFACE
This book is based on published correspondence. Thus it stands
in debt to the scores of persons who have edited and selected the
material referred to in the notes as well as to the authors of the
letters themselves. Literal translation from the French has been
this writer's responsibility.
The research was done in library collections at the University
of Wisconsin, Yale University, and Harvard University. Personal
thanks are due to Professor Emeritus Chester Penn Higby at
Wisconsin who encouraged my early interest in the Crimean War
and to Professor Chester V. Easum, also of Wisconsin, for under
standing and assistance at a time when both were sorely needed.
The typing of various stages of the manuscript was done by the
secretarial staff of the Humanities Department at the Massa
chusetts Institute of Technology, and also by my wife, Dorothy,
whose patient efforts in this project have been considerable.
While this book has something to say to the professional
historian, I hope that the general reader may also find interest in
these ambitious officers and their emperor.
Brison D. Gooch
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter One NOT ENOUGH TALENT 7
Chapter Two THE NEW MEN 18
Chapter Three WHILE EUROPE ACCEPTS A NEW EMPEROR,
AN OLD QUARREL BRINGS WAR 33
Chapter Four COMMANDERS FOR THE EXPEDITION To THE
EAST 41
Chapter Five THE EXPEDITION GETS STARTED 58
Chapter Six ALLIED FRICTION AND ACTION AT LAST 81
Chapter Seven INVASION AND A CLASH OF ARMS 105
Chapter Eight FIRST REBUFFS 133
Chapter Nine THE WINTER POLICY 153
Chapter Ten CHANGING OF THE GUARD 166
Chapter Eleven THE DECLINE OF CANROBERT 180
Chapter Twelve INITIATIVE AND INSUBORDINATION 202
Chapter Thirteen FALL OF THE MALAKOFF, KEY To
SEBASTOPOL 231
Chapter Fourteen THE WAR COMES To A CLOSE 252
CONCLUSION 264
BIBLIOGRAPHY 270
INDEX 284
INTRODUCTION
This is the story of an Emperor and his generals, how he found
them and how they served him in his first war.
This book outlines the problems which the French generals
faced during the Crimean War, explaining the factors behind
decisions made by Saint-Arnaud, Canrobert, and Pelissier - the
successive commanders-in-chief of the French Expedition to the
East - noting their relations with their subordinates, their British
ally, and their Emperor, Napoleon III.
Napoleon III was no soldier, and in this respect, he stood in the
greatest and most striking contrast to his uncle. The First Em
pire had been dominated by a military genius who never shrank
from doing battle on near and distant fields, seldom appearing to
worry about the number of foes to be faced simultaneously. While
Napoleon III lacked such personal military self-assurance,l never
theless his foreign policy prevented France from having to face
more than one powerful enemy at a time. Disaster came to France
in 1870 because, among other reasons, her army failed her. She
was defeated in battle; the issues of the day were settled, in the
language of Bismarck, by blood and iron; and success in the field
would have negated the Machiavellian subtleties of Prussian di
plomacy. Napoleon Bonaparte would never have failed, as the
French army did in 1870, in the field against only one powerful
enemy. After the defeat, the Second Empire became history and
Napoleon III, like Napoleon Bonaparte, became something of a
myth.
But how had this all happened? How could a military failure of
1 Ernest II, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Memoirs (4 vols., transl., London,
1888), III, 77.
2 INTRODUCTION
such proportions come to a nation historically well-equipped in
things military? These questions have a special urgency; since
France alone, of all the nations of Europe, was almost continually
engaged in military action during the period after 1815 and came
into the 1850's with memories of a grand tradition and the Na
poleonic Legend of success. This history of the French leadership
in the Crimean War is mainly concerned with the preponderant
role of French generals in the making of decisions once the allied
forces are in the field. The narrative provides an insight into the
French military mentality of the mid-nineteenth century and is
interestingly suggestive in the broader contexts of the Napoleonic
Legend and the Franco-Prussian War.
Usually the Crimean War is remembered for the dramatic
"charge of the light brigade," which Tennyson immortalized, and
for the humanitarian work of Florence Nightingale.1 The rest of
the war is either totally forgotten or exists only as a few bare
shadows in comparison.
In many cases this tendency to forget has been charitable. It is
surely more comfortable to recall the bravery and heroism of men
moving inexorably toward death than to think about the lack
of real military training in the man who was responsible! And how
much easier to remember the sacrifice and toil of a courageous
woman ministering to the sick and wounded than to reflect that
the need for her care was more the result of poor leadership than
enemy action! In the winter of 1854-55, the abysmal wretched
ness and virtual immobilization of the British contingent in the
Crimea was reported in the London press in a spirit of sarcastic
criticism, as Britain's poor showing then appeared as the most
striking general characteristic of the war.
Yet there were other aspects of the struggle which - thanks to
the easy wisdom of hindsight - can now be seen more readily. As a
result of the war's outcome, France returned to a position of
diplomatic dominance in Europe after having listened to others
decide the great questions of continental concern for neady forty
1 For recent popular studies of both these events, see Mrs. Cecil Woodham
Smith, Florence Nightingale 1820-1910 (London, 1950) and The Reason Why
(London, 1953). The best documented study of Florence Nightingale is Edward
T. Cook's The Life of Florence Nightingale (2 vols., London, 1913). For a critique
of The Reason Why, see Brison D. Gooch, "The Crimean War in Selected Docu
ments and Secondary Works since 1940," Victorian Studies, I, 3 (Mar. 1958),
272--275.
INTRODUCTION 3
years. In the power structure of Europe, the war made possible
the eventual expulsion of Austria from both northern Italy and
southern Germany and the subsequent unification of these areas
as nation states. There was also a significant advance in general
understanding of exactly what the rights of neutrals were to be in
wartime. In the application of science to military problems, the
Crimean War anticipated the Franco-Prussian War. The electric
telegraph and the submarine cable drastically changed the whole
field of military communication; the first direct use of the rail
road at the front lines also foreshadowed later development; and
in naval technology, the war represented a watershed in the transi
tion from sail to steam. The only soldier who really made a "name"
for himself in the war was unquestionably Totleben, the Russian
officer charged with the defense of Sebastopol. On the allied side,
the French generals played a part in leading the Anglo-French
armies which ironically was both significant and soon forgotten.
* *
*
Under the Bourbon Restoration, many of the Napoleonic offi
cers were purged, but the general structure of the army remained
unchanged. In 1823, at the instance of most of the rest of Europe,
France sent an expedition into Spain to put down a revolt. This
was little more than practice but for many it was a welcome break
in the monotony of garrison commands. During the 1820's, large
numbers of officers gained experience in the epic struggle of
Greek independence. The early 1830's saw French troops carry
through the siege of Antwerp and contain the Vendee insurrection.
These were all minor actions but they provided checks on
administrative procedure and problems of supply. Most impor
tant of all, however, for the post-Napoleonic army was the
conquest of Algeria, which was begun in 1830.
The first modern leader to consider seriously a French expedi
tion to Africa had been Napoleon Bonaparte. One of his engineer
ing officers, a battalion commander named Boutin, made a re
connaissance of Algiers in 1808 and drew up the general plan
which was followed in its essential features in the actual invasion
in 1830. The idea of giving the commanding general charge of both
land and naval forces was adopted and the French command set-
4 INTRODUCTION
up in 1854 followed this model. By and large, the major officers
in the expedition of 1830 were soldiers from the First Empire.
Most were finishing a career already long and distinguished. Few
of this generation gained new laurels in Africa. Indeed, at the
outset the prospective conquest of Algeria excited little enthu
siasm in France. Liberal journals presented it as a scheme either
to gain glory for an already discredited government (Charles X)
or to create a military force which could intimidate its political
opposition; and the reputation of the Count de Bourmont, select
ed as the general-in-chief, did nothing to make the undertaking
look more respectable. In 1815, three days before Waterloo, he
had left his division and gone over to the enemy. Later he helped
to bring about the death of his one-time commander, Marshal
Ney. Among the military, these facts had not been forgotten and
fostered dissension and mistrust; although, as it worked out, the
initial successes of the expedition were due in large part to his
"prudence and wisdom."l
In the military law of 1832, the government of king Louis
Philippe revised the whole military organization and recruitment
policies with the continuing conquest of Algeria in mind. There
were minor modifications in 1848,2 but essentially this law was in
effect until 1855.3 Conditions in Africa, never very good, were so
poor in November, 1839, that after an inspection the Duc d'Or
leans wrote a letter to this father (Louis Philippe) denouncing the
administration of the Ministry of War and deploring the fact that
French soldiers were being reduced to virtual wretchedness. In
addition to the problem of inadequate supplies, the contingents
in Mrica from time to time faced decimation by cholera. The
Duke's account foreshadowed literally thousands of letters which
were to be written from the Crimea during the worst of the winter
of 1854-1855.4
1 See Paul Azan, L'Al'mee d'Afl'ique de 1830 a 1852 (Paris, 1936), the first
good presentation of the whole subject. Prior works are limited to specific
campaigns or else are personal memoirs and souvenirs.
2 Among other changes, the designation of mal'echal de camp was changed to
genbal de bl'igade, and lieutenant genbal changed to genbal de division.
8 Camille Rousset, Histoil'e de la Guel'l'e de Cl'imee (2 vols., Paris, 1897), I,
viii-ix.
, Constant Germain Bapst, Le Mal'echal Canl'obel't: Souvenil's D'un Siecle (6th
ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1912), I, 477-478, III, 130-132; and Maurice Quatrelles
l'Epine, Le Mal'echal de Saint-Arnaud, 1798-1854, d'aPl'8s sa cOI'I'espondance et
des documents inedits (2 vols., Paris, 1928-1929), I, 134-135,491-492.
INTRODUCTION 5
Poor treatment and campaigns in a disease-ridden climate,
when coupled with traditions of men rising through the ranks,
could hardly avoid having an effect upon the feelings of the troops
for their officers. The result was that the French soldier in Algeria
looked up to his officer only while they were in direct contact and
their lives depended upon exact execution of his orders. While
there was a significant carry-over of favorable sentiment for Louis
Philippe and the Orleans family among the higher officers in
Mrica, there actually was no real core of aristocratic leadership,
that is, a leadership respected by the troops aside from its ability
in the field.1 When the field commander entered politics and
continued to make appeals to the troops, those pleas often fell on
deaf ears, as Generals Cavaignac, Changarnier, and Lamoriciere
discovered.2 On the other hand, republicanism made relatively
few inroads in the army of Africa. After all, a republic was "the
opposite of the army, for liberty, equality, and fraternity promote
dissension ... and nullification of hierarchical principles ... (and the
army of Africa) saw the (Second) Republic arrive not only without
enthusiasm but even with bad humor. Those who were attracted
"3
to the Republic proved to be motivated more often by ambition
than by principle.
By 1848 the continuing conquest of Algeria had provided France
with a number of heroes. Foremost among these was Marshal
Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, the Duc d'Isly.4 Born on October 15,
1784, he had been denied even an elementary education and had
wandered aimlessly as a vagabond in Limousin. He entered the
army in 1805. Memory of the battle of Austerlitz and its fields of
blood made him morose and melancholy. Under Marshals Lannes
and Suchet, he had been present at the sieges of Saragose and
Tarragone and after guerilla war against England in Aragon and
Catalonia in 1814, he had commanded a regiment at Conflans in
Savoy on the day after Waterloo. Here, in what he liked to call the
1 General DuBarail, Mes Souvenirs (3 vols., Paris, 1895), 1,438-439.
2 Charles Frederick Vitzthum von Eckstaedt, St. Petersburg and London, 1852-
1864 (2 vols., trans!., London, 1887), I, 126-127.
3 Du Barail, I, 332.
« The best biography of Bugeaud is by Lucas-Dubreton (Paris, 1931). Also
important are d'Ideville's Le Marechal Bugeaud d'apres sa correspondance intime
et des documents inUits, 1784-1849 (3 vols., Paris, 1881) and the Lettres inedites
du Marechal Bugeaud (Paris, 1923) edited by Mlle. Feray-Bugeaud d'Isly and
Captain Tattet.