The Nature of Intrinsic Value

288 Pages·2001·15.864 MB·English

by  Michael J. Zimmerman

The Nature
of Intrinsic Value
Michael J. Zimmerman
J
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Lanham Boulder New York Oxford
o o o
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Published in the United States of America
by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
4720 Boston Way, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www. rowmanlittlefield.com
12 Hid's Copse Road
Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ, England
Copyright© 2001 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission
of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Zimmerman, Michael J., 1951-
The nature of intrinsic value I Michael Zimmerman.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 978-0-7425-1263-4
1. Values. 2. Ethics. 3. Moore, G. E. (George Edward), 1873-1958. Principia ethica. I.
Title.
BD232 Z56 2001
171'.2-dc21
00-054440
Printed in the United States of America
IV\TM
'0 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSIINISO Z.39.48-1992.
Contents
List of Illustrations iv
Preface vi
1 Introduction 1
2 Defending the Concept of Intrinsic Value 15
3 The Bearers of Intrinsic Value 33
4 Analyzing the Concept of Intrinsic Value 75
5 Computing Intrinsic Value 131
6 Instances of Intrinsic Value 189
Appendix Extrinsic Value 251
Bibliography 261
Index of Names 268
Index of Propositions 272
Index of Subjects 275
About the Author 279
iii
Illustrations
Chart 1.1. Senses of "Value" and "Valuable" 3
Chart 2.1. Schema for a Taxonomy of Goodness 28
Figure 4.1. First View on the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Emotions 106
Figure 4.2. Second View on the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Emotions 107
Figure 4.3. Third View on the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Emotions 110
Figure 4.4. Fourth View on the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Emotions 111
Figure 4.5. Fifth View on the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Emotions 112
Figure 5 .1. Measurement in Inches 167
Figure 5.2. Measurement in Dinches 167
Chart 6.1. Various Views on the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure,
Indifference, and Displeasure 201
Figure 6.1. Grid for Plotting the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Pleasure, Indifference, and Displeasure 208
Figure 6.2. Partial View of the Correlation between Intrinsic Value
and the Appropriateness of Pleasure and Indifference 210
iv
Illustrations v
Figure 6.3. Complete View of the Correlation between Intrinsic
Value and the Appropriateness of Pleasure and Indifference 211
Figure 6.4. First Complete View of the Correlation between
Intrinsic Value and the Appropriateness of Pleasure, Indifference,
and Displeasure 213
Figure 6.5. Second Complete View of the Correlation between
Intrinsic Value and the Appropriateness of Pleasure, Indifference,
and Displeasure 214
Preface
Almost one hundred years have elapsed since the publication of G. E.
Moore's Principia Ethica. Unlike some other great philosophical works
including, perhaps most notoriously, David Hume's A Treatise of Human Na
ture, which Hume himself described as having fallen "deadbom from the
press"1-Principia Ethica had an impact on the philosophical community
that was immediate and profound. Both books were the fruits of young and
enthusiastic genius but, whereas Hume struggled long and hard for recogni
tion by his peers, Moore straightaway received lavish (though not unani
mous) praise.2 Matters have changed a good deal since. Hume's philosophi
cal star now shines exceedingly bright, while Moore's, though still luminous,
is perhaps not quite so brilliant. In particular, the influence of Principia Eth
ica has diminished considerably in the interim, now having generally fallen
out of favor. For many years it was the ethicist's bible, but by the middle of
the twentieth century its prestige had waned, and nowadays those who occupy
themselves with its contents and themes are assuredly in the minority among
moral philosophers. This, I believe, is a great pity. There is still much to be
learned from Moore's moral tour de force.
My purpose in this book is not to provide a comprehensive examination
of Moore's ethical views, for it is not so much a book about Moore as it
is one that is inspired by him. Although there will of course be some dis
cussion of Moore's views, my aim is to use Principia Ethica as a spring
board to a direct investigation of some, but by no means all, of the issues
that he dealt with in that book. I will focus on matters pertaining to intrin
sic value in particular. My goal is to arrive at a better understanding of the
nature of such value. I am convinced that Moore's work is indispensable in
this regard. Although I will frequently take issue with what he has to say,
my discussion will always be predicated on and aided by his insights. As
vi
Preface vii
the centenary of one of the great books of philosophy approaches, I can
think of no better way to pay homage to its author.
I won't give you an outline of this book here; I'll do that in chapter 1. I
want instead to ask you some rather personal questions. Does the concept
of an organic unity titillate you? Does the suggestion that intrinsic value is
additive give you goose bumps? Does the question whether the bearers of
intrinsic value are abstract or concrete set your pulse racing? Does the
thought that the concept of intrinsic value might be analyzable leave you
feeling weak in the knees? Do you swoon when someone mentions the iso
lation method? Do you tremble at the prospect of vicious pleasure? (Per
haps I'd better rephrase that last one. I mean: does the idea that a pleasure
might be vicious arouse your curiosity in any way?) If the answer to all
these questions is "yes," then I invite you to read on; I think that what I
have to say will interest you. But if the answer to any of them is "no," then
be advised that you proceed at your own risk; I refuse to be held responsi
ble for the consequences.
I'm joking, of course. But my point is serious. We must be realistic. This is
a difficult book. It was difficult to write. It will be difficult to read. And al
though it is a book on ethics, you should be aware that it does not address
such particular questions as whether it is better, from a moral point of view,
to make use of genetically engineered crops or to forgo such use, whether it
is better to permit or to forbid medical research on stem cells culled from dis
carded embryos, whether it is better to purchase only those products made at
home or to buy goods made on the cheap in Third World countries, whether
it is better to promote or to prohibit same-sex marriages, and so on. All of
these, and many more, are pressing questions about moral values that are con
fronted by many people on a daily basis, but they do not constitute the sub
ject matter of this book. On the contrary, this book deals only with certain is
sues that are highly general and abstract. The reason for this is that these
issues are absolutely fundamental to ethics. In my view, the more particular
questions cannot be resolved in a manner that is fully satisfactory unless and
until these fundamental issues receive an adequate treatment. If you do not
share this view, I fear that you may well grow impatient with what I have to
say in the pages that follow. But if despite, or even because of, my warning
you feel inclined to continue with the book, well then, I very much hope that
you will find your perseverance rewarded.
I have been working on the issues addressed in this book for a disconcertingly
long time. Over the course of the many years that I have done so, I have, in
one form or another, communicated with many people about these issues and
thereby accumulated a large debt that I have no hope of paying off. I take
viii Preface
pleasure in acknowledging my creditors here: Anonymous, Gustaf Arrhenius,
Robert Audi, Paul Bowen, Ben Bradley, Erik Carlson, Roderick Chisholm,
Earl Conee, Roger Crisp, Sven Danielsson, Fred Feldman, Irwin Goldstein,
Richard Henson, Joshua Hoffman, Thomas Hurka, Noah Lemos, Terrance
McConnell, Ingmar Persson, Philip Quinn, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Gary
Rosenkrantz, Toni R0nnow-Rasmussen, Fadlou Shehadi, Howard Sobel,
Ernest Sosa, Sarah Stebbins, James Waldo, and Jan Osterberg. Above all I am
indebted to Krister Bykvist, who provided lengthy and penetrating comments
on a draft of the entire book. Everyone I have mentioned tried hard, often re
peatedly, to prevent me from making all manner of mistake. It's certainly not
their fault if they haven't always succeeded. I am very grateful to all of them.
And to those among them who arranged for my visits to Sweden: thank you
for inviting me to the Land of Intrinsic Value!
The writing of this book was completed in large part while I was on sab
batical leave from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. I am in
debted to the university and to the National Endowment for the Humanities
for financial support during this period.
Several parts of this book incorporate portions of papers that I have re
cently written.3 I am grateful to the following for permission to use these pa
pers: the editors of Canadian Journal of Philosophy, the editor and publisher
(Edinburgh University Press) of Utilitas, the editor of Philosophy and Phe
nomenological Research, and someone who must for the time being remain
anonymous.
Finally, this book is dedicated to the memory of Roderick M. Chisholm, for
whom the depth of my respect and admiration cannot be adequately ex
pressed in words.
NOTES
1. David Hume, "My Own Life," in his An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
edited by C. W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 3-11. Originally published in
1739. The original is in italics.
2. See Tom Regan, Bloomsbury's Prophet (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1986), xii-xiii, 16 ff.
3. These are Michael J. Zimmerman, "In Defense of the Concept of Intrinsic Value,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1999): 389--410; "The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral
Goods and Evils," Utilitas 1l (1999): 1-15; "Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of
Organic Unities," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 653-66; "In
trinsic Value and Individual Worth" (forthcoming).
Chapter One
Introduction
One of the most important contributions made by G. E. Moore to the debate
on the nature of intrinsic value was his introduction and defense in Principia
Ethica of the Principle of Organic Unities. According to this principle, the in
trinsic value of a "whole" must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of
the intrinsic values of its "parts."1 This principle is the linchpin of the present
work. Moore thought the principle undeniable, and ever since his discussion
of it almost every writer on the subject appears to have accepted it, even
though Moore himself acknowledged that it was puzzling, indeed paradoxi
cal. A central theme of this book is that Moore was quite right to find the prin
ciple paradoxical and hence quite wrong to find it undeniable. The principle
makes a mystery of the computation of intrinsic value, one that can be
avoided by attending carefully to the question of what sort of thing can have
intrinsic value and to the question of what it is that such value depends on. In
the following pages I shall provide answers to these questions and pursue
some of the implications of these answers. In so doing, I hope to reveal the
true nature of intrinsic value.
In this chapter I'll provide a rationale for and a synopsis (actually, two syn
opses) of what's to come. First, though, I want to comment ~m the ambiguity
of "value" in order to fix on that sense of the term that is primarily at issue in
this book. Moore was as alive as anyone to the phenomenon of ambiguity, but
in Principia Ethica he paid little heed to it in his treatment of value, and in
later works on ethics he discussed it only in relation to the terms "good" and
"bad."2 But the various senses of "good" and "bad"-and there are many3-
constitute only one range of senses of "value," and I think it would be best to
begin by recognizing this fact.