The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power

242 Pages·2013·1.74 MB·English

by  Alison Pargeter

Alison Pargeter
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
From Opposition To Power
SAQI
Alison Pargeter is a writer and analyst specialising in the Middle East and North
Africa. She has held academic positions at the University of Cambridge and
Kings College, London, and is a senior associate at Menas Associates, an
international consultancy firm. Her other publications include Libya: The Rise
and Fall of Qaddafi and The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe.
‘Alison Pargeter has established a reputation as one of the best current analysts
of Islamic radicalism. This book – detailed, authoritative, sober, perceptive and
meticulously researched – shows why. It is an important contribution to our
understanding both of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, to the controversies that
surround the movement and to the broader phenomenon of political Islam. A
must read for scholars, students and anyone interested in the Middle East.’
Jason Burke, author of Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam
‘A tour de force … This well-written and much-needed book admirably traces
the origins and development, internal debates and frictions, geographical spread
– and abiding contradictions – of a movement that, despite its ambiguities and
shortcomings, remains very much a force to be reckoned with.’
Alan George, University of Oxford
‘This highly lucid and approachable analysis of the Brotherhood offers a
welcome degree of clarity. Alison Pargeter offers a global picture of the
trajectories the movement has taken in the Arab world and in Europe. Based on
important internal documents, and, crucially, a remarkable array of on-the-record
interviews with senior Brotherhood personnel, Pargeter allows the Brothers to do
much of the talking.’
Richard Phelps, Perspectives on Terrorism
‘Highly recommended, especially to those who see radical Islam, Jihadism,
Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism as one huge monolith and all equally to be
feared.’ New Statesman
Contents
Introduction
1. Conflicting Currents: The Egyptian Ikhwan in Opposition
2. From Diplomacy to Arms and Back to Diplomacy:The Evolution of the Syrian
Ikhwan
3. The International Tanzeem: Myth or Reality?
4. A School of Thought: The Ikhwan in Europe
5. The Ikhwan and Violence
6. The Arab Spring: From Opposition to Power
Conclusion: The Challenges Ahead
Acknowledgements
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Introduction
One of the unforeseen consequences of the Arab Spring has been the catapulting
of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) – one of the longest
surviving and most controversial of all political Islamist movements – from the
underground to the forefront of the Middle Eastern political arena. Despite the
fact that the popular uprisings that gripped parts of the Arab world in 2011 were
largely non-ideological in nature, driven largely by youth who came together
with no political agenda other than to oust the authoritarian regimes that had
gripped the region more or less since independence, it was the Brotherhood that
was to reap the advantages of the revolutions. In Egypt, the Brotherhood through
its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, emerged triumphant in both
parliamentary and presidential elections; in Tunisia, An-Nahda, which although
not officially part of the Brotherhood follows its broad ideological orientation,
won the largest majority in the elections to the constituent assembly and went on
to lead the government; in Libya, the Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction
Party may not have triumphed in the elections to the General National Congress
but it still became part of the government as well as a key political player; in
Syria, meanwhile, the Brotherhood is playing a major role in the opposition
platforms that have sprung up and looks set to have a stake in the country’s
future. The Arab Spring, therefore, turned out to be a triumph for the forces of
reformist political Islam.
This turn of events is all the more paradoxical given that the Brotherhood has
always been a movement that has shunned revolutions and that repeatedly
declared itself not to be interested in taking power. It preferred to work from the
bottom up, or so it proclaimed, educating society Islamically in order to prepare
it for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state. Yet when it came to it, the
Brotherhood rushed at the opportunity to get to power. The movement mobilised
its resources on an unprecedented level to manoeuvre its way through the
transition and to dominate the emergent political arena.
To those familiar with the Brotherhood, the movement’s behaviour during the
Arab Spring was not all that surprising. The Brotherhood has always been a
movement of controversy and contradiction that has proved near impossible to
pin down. Indeed, it has always represented a conundrum to those trying to
fathom it. It is a social movement that also functions as a political entity; it is a
transnational organisation that emphasises the independence of its national
branches; it projects itself as pacific yet some of its branches have been directly
involved in violent action; it broadly rejects the West and Western values yet is
increasingly anxious to be seen in Western eyes as a moderate organisation that
upholds progressive inclusive values. It is also a movement that has been
cloaked in ambiguity and that has comprised so many different strands and
currents that it has struggled to articulate a single stance on many key issues
including violence, the role of women and the role of non-Muslim minorities. It
is easy to understand, therefore, why observers and policymakers have found it
difficult to develop a coherent policy towards the movement. It is also easy to
understand why the Brotherhood’s shift into the political mainstream following
the Arab Spring has created such a challenge for policymakers, particularly those
in the West.
Yet now, it seems, is the Brotherhood’s time. It has certainly been a long
wait. The movement was first established in Egypt in 1928 where it emerged
partly as a response to the colonialist presence in the country, but also to the end
of the last caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. The Brotherhood came within the
tradition of the reformist school that emerged in Egypt in the late nineteenth
century through scholars such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abdu who
believed that the only way the Islamic world could meet the challenges posed by
Westernisation and modernisation was to return to the ‘uncorrupted’ values of
the Islamic past. The movement soon gathered momentum and by the 1950s had
also developed into a reaction against the modernising secular forces of Arab
nationalism that threatened to unseat traditional conservative religious values. As
a result, the Brotherhood drew much of its support from the classes that feared
change, namely the petty bourgeoisie and the trading and artisan classes. Indeed,
since its beginnings, it has been a largely reactionary movement, preoccupied by
issues of public morality and the preservation of traditional values.
Although the Brotherhood originated in Egypt as a result of a specific set of
social and political conditions, its ideology soon spread and branches began to
spring up in other countries. Syria and Jordan were perhaps the most important
branches in the early days but it was not long before most of the countries of the
Middle East had their own branch or equivalent of the Brotherhood. It was able
to spread in this way because it offered a simple ideology that corresponded with
the mood of the time and that seemed to represent a reassuring beacon of
constancy during a period of immense upheaval in the region. Indeed, its slogan
said it all: ‘Islam is the solution.’
Whilst it had started out primarily as a social and cultural movement, the
Brotherhood came to take on more of a direct political role and by the 1950s had
evolved into one of the most powerful opposition currents in the region. Like
many other groups operating at the time, its politics became increasingly radical
in the 1960s and 1970s, largely as a response to repression by the regimes in the
region, which viewed it as a potential challenge to their own hegemony. In the
1970s, caught up in the current of Islamic revivalism that swept the Islamic
world, the Ikhwan came to articulate its demands ever more forcefully. Perhaps
the most extreme example is that of the Syrian branch, which got involved in a
bloody conflict with the Ba’athist regime culminating in the deaths of thousands
of its members and supporters. As a result of this increasingly antagonistic
relationship to the state, a number of Ikhwani were pushed out of their home
countries. Some sought refuge in Saudi Arabia whilst others went to Europe.
The push into Europe broadened the scope of the Brotherhood setting in
motion the beginnings of its transnational ambitions through its international
organisation. However, as it became clearer that returning home would be
impossible, Europe-based Ikhwani began to establish their own organisations in
the continent. As a result, the Brotherhood succeeded in crafting a network of
branches and organisations across Europe, the Middle East and beyond,
becoming perhaps the most influential Islamist opposition movement in the
world.1 From its various centres, it worked to further the cause of Islam in the
hope that it would one day come to power and realise its dream of creating an
Islamic state.
The events of 9/11 were to alter the Brotherhood’s situation dramatically. As
the world woke up to the bombings in the United States, political Islamist groups
suddenly came under the harsh glare of a new spotlight. Attention inevitably
focused on the Ikhwan. In some quarters the movement was simply considered
part and parcel of the al-Qa‘ida phenomenon, whilst others accused it of acting
as an incubator for militancy on the grounds that some of those who formed part
of the global jihadist network had spent their formative years with the
movement. In the end, the Brotherhood escaped being branded as an
international terrorist organisation. Nonetheless, the threat of being made a
proscribed group continued to hang over the Ikhwan and its members found
themselves in the position of having to prove their ‘moderate credentials’ to the
world. However, the Brotherhood remained a potent force both in the Middle
East and beyond, able to capture and articulate the forces of conservative Islam
and to posit itself as a ‘pure’ and authentic alternative to the regimes in power.
Yet for all its strength, after almost eight decades in opposition, by the 2000s
the Brotherhood was coming to resemble somewhat of a spent force. Bogged
down in stasis and in-fighting, exhausted by the years of oppression and
seemingly resigned to the unchanging nature of the political landscape of the
Middle East, the Brotherhood looked to be resigned to its fate. In addition, it was
finding itself increasingly challenged by the growing power of the Salafist
currents that were expanding into its own constituencies and attracting the youth
in particular. As such the Brotherhood was coming to look as much part of the
creaking furniture of the Middle East as the very regimes it sought to challenge.
The Arab Spring was to change all that. The uprisings breathed new life into
the Brotherhood that finally saw its chance to realise the ambitions that had
eluded it for so long. Drawing on its years of experience and its organisational
skills, as well as its trademark pragmatism, the Brotherhood (and its counterpart,
An-Nahda) moved skilfully to outmanoeuvre the other players on the political
scene. However, the Brotherhood’s coming to power was not solely down to the
way in which it played the transition period. It was also because the movement
succeeded in reaching out to the masses and offering them a credible alternative.
This book analyses the evolution of the Ikhwan from its inception in Egypt in
1928 to its emergence into the political mainstream. It examines the aims and
strategies of the movement and assesses why, prior to the Arab Spring, the
Brotherhood seemed to be stuck in a rut, unable to move beyond its own
traditions and history or to engage in reform in any meaningful way. It also
analyses how the movement responded to the uprisings of the Arab Spring and
how, in the Egyptian case in particular, it manoeuvred itself into power. It looks,
too, at the complex dynamics between national and international concerns as
expressed through the relationship between the mother branch in Cairo and the
rest of this transnational movement.
First published in 2010, much of the material in this book is based upon
research conducted in 2007 and 2008 thanks to the generous support of the
Smith Richardson Foundation. It includes material drawn from interviews with
key members of the Brotherhood, past and present, and with those in the wider
Islamist movement, as well as from literature produced by the Ikhwan itself.
This updated edition includes a new chapter that deals with the Brotherhood and
the Arab Spring, focusing in particular on the Egyptian Ikhwan. This edition also
addresses some of the key challenges that the Brotherhood and its Tunisian
counterpart, An-Nahda, are grappling with now that they are in power.
Chapter One deals with the Egyptian Ikhwan, the mother branch of the entire
Muslim Brotherhood movement. Tracing its evolution from the days of its
founder, the chapter explores how the Egyptian brothers became so hampered by
their own traditions that they struggled to resolve their own internal
contradictions. Chapter Two looks at what was in its heyday the other major
Middle Eastern branch, the Syrian Ikhwan. This chapter examines the Syrian
Brotherhood’s shift into violence in the 1980s and its subsequent return to
diplomacy, something that makes it arguably one of the most progressive
Ikhwani branches today. Chapter Three deals with the highly controversial
subject of the Brotherhood’s international organisation. Whilst many Ikhwani
deny it even exists, this mysterious body has played a major role in the
Brotherhood’s evolution, especially during the 1980s. Its importance may have
declined in recent years, but it still has a role to play within the Ikhwan’s
international structures. Chapter Four examines the Brotherhood in Europe,
looking specifically at the UK, French and German branches and at the various
Ikhwani-oriented organisations and institutions that have been established there.
It assesses the challenges facing these organisations given the fact that they are
minority communities with limited influence living in a secular society. Chapter
Five offers an assessment of the Ikhwan’s relationship to violence. It explores
the attitudes within the movement towards the ideology of violence through key
scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and to jihad, including examining the role that the
Ikhwan played in the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Chapter Six offers an
examination of the Brotherhood’s shift from opposition movement to
mainstream political actor during the Arab Spring. Focusing primarily on Egypt,
it looks at how the Brotherhood responded to the revolution and worked its way
into power. Finally the conclusion addresses some of the key challenges facing
the Brotherhood now that power has finally become a reality.
1
Conflicting Currents
The Egyptian Ikhwan in Opposition
The Egyptian Ikhwan has always been considered to be the heart and the soul of
the entire Muslim Brotherhood. Not only is it the founding branch of the
transnational movement – something that gives it a particular historical
legitimacy – its Murshid (Supreme Guide) is spiritual guide to the Brotherhood
as a whole. Decisions made in Cairo reverberate around the movement’s other
branches with special significance and still carry a certain moral authority.
Indeed, the Egyptian branch is considered to be the vanguard of the entire
Brotherhood movement.
In many ways, the Egyptian brothers have lived up to this role. They
weathered the storm of the many decades of sustained and brutal repression at
the hands of the Egyptian state and despite being banned for almost a century,
succeeded in maintaining a substantive grass roots following across the country.
The Egyptian Ikhwan also succeeded in making its presence felt on the political
scene, manoeuvring itself into parliament without even having a political party
and dominating many of the country’s professional associations. The
Brotherhood proved successful on the financial front too, creating its own
Islamic financing networks that sustained the movement throughout the years of
hardship. As such, the Egyptian Brotherhood had established itself to such an
extent that by the time the Arab Spring reached Egypt, the Brotherhood was
poised to step out of the wings and into power.
Yet despite all these achievements, in the years leading up to the 2011
revolution, the Egyptian Ikhwan looked to be a movement in stasis. It was utterly
bogged down in introspection and indecision, unable to take a clear stance on
many issues, not least the extent to which it should reform. Indeed, the