The Moral Dilemmas of Fighting Terrorism and Guerrilla Groups

135 Pages·2023·1.062 MB·English

by  Jean-François Caron

Jean-François Caron
The Moral Dilemmas of Fighting Terrorism and Guerrilla Groups
Facing Contemporary Terrorism
Edited by
Jean-François Caron
Volume 2
Jean-François Caron
The Moral Dilemmas of
Fighting Terrorism and
Guerrilla Groups
ISBN 978-3-11-075748-4
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-075756-9
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-075758-3
ISSN 2749-1188
e-ISSN 2749-1196
Library of Congress Control Number: 2022946317
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Cover image: Lorado / iStock / Getty Images Plus
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
www.degruyter.com
Contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1
The Difficulty of Defining Terrorism 5
Chapter 2
Assessing the Morality of Guerrilla Warfare 30
Chapter 3
How to Combat Terrorism? 54
Chapter 4
The Status of Captured Terrorists 84
Chapter 5
Can Terrorism be Used in Exceptional Circumstances? 99
Conclusion 119
Bibliography 120
Index 127

Introduction
MostofuslivingintheWestbecameacquaintedwiththerealityofterrorismasa
clearandpresentdangeronlyinthelast20yearsafterthe9/11attackstriggered
numerousattacksagainstciviliansbyindividualswhohadpledgedallegianceto
AlQaedaortheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL).Inthisregard,wecan
thinkofthe2004attacksinMadrid’scommutertrainsysteminwhich193people
diedandaround2,000wereinjured;orsimilarattacksthattookplaceoneyear
later in London’s public transport system that killed 56 people and injured an-
other784andthe2015Parisattacksthatkilledandinjured130and416innocent
people, respectively.
However,itwouldbeamistaketoconcludethatterrorismisacontemporary
phenomenon.Ashighlightedbythemostfamousanalystofthistypeofpolitical
violence,WalterLaqueur,ifweareto thinkofterrorism as distinct fromregular
warfare(which is a mistake,but moreon this later), attacks bysmallgroups of
irregular fighters against state actors or civilians go back to time immemorial
(Laqueur & Wall, 2018, p. 27). As amazing as it sounds, it must be stressed
thatdespiteitslongevityandthefactthatithasbeenwidelydiscussed,terrorism
remains awidely misunderstood reality.The fact that the international commu-
nitystilldoesnotagreeonacommondefinitionofterrorismisprobablythemost
obvious testimony in this regard.The primary objective of this book is to shed
somelightonthenatureofterrorismbyexplaininghowdistinctiveitisfroman-
otherwell-knownformofirregularwarfarethatitistoooftenconfoundedwith,
namelyguerrilla.
Terrorismisusuallyassociatedwithbarbaricentitiesthathavenoconsider-
ationforinnocentpeople’slivesandwhoseactionsareoftenthoughttobeirra-
tional and commanded bydivinity.Guerrillawarfare is,for its part, linkedwith
groupsthathavemorenobleaims,suchasthosefightingfornationalliberation.
Asproofofthisdistinctivemannerofassessingthesetwoformsofpoliticalvio-
lence,manyindividualswholedandwereinvolvedinthelatterformofwarfare
arenowcelebratedasheroesinmanysocieties¹,whileterroristsdonotsharethe
same historical fate (for a reason that is far from being a subjective matter, as
I will discuss in this book). However, although tempting and rather common
in people’s viewpoint, this manner of distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla
byfocusingontheirrationalityoftheformerandthenoblecharacterofthelatter
 Inthisregard,wecanrefertoMichaelCollinswhoplayedapivotalroleinthecreationofthe
Irish Republicandwaspositivelydepicted in the 1996 award-winningbiographical movie, in
whichhewaspersonifiedbyactorLiamNeeson.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110757569-001
2 Introduction
ishighlyproblematic.Indeed, historyhasproventhattheresorttoterroristtac-
ticshassometimesbeentheresultofawell-thoughtrationaldecisionbygroups
thatwerealsofightingfortheirnationalliberation,whilemanygroupsanimated
byreligiousbeliefsrefusedtoresorttothistypeofviolence.Inreturn,terrorism
was also aprivilegedtacticof non-religiousgroups,whichmakesthe use of ra-
tional/irrational, barbaric/noble aims, and religious/non-religious dichotomies
inappropriatetoolsindefininganddistinguishingbetweenthesetwotypesofvi-
olence.
Another mistake would be to limit terrorism as an inherent tactic of non-
state actors. There is a common misconception in this regard which is largely
the result of the double standards used by states that have given themselves
the monopoly over legitimate violence as a mean to always find noble ways of
justifying their resort to war in opposition to non-state entities often presented
asrogue,criminal,andimmoralintheiraimsandmeansofaction.Additionally,
we should not forget that from an etymological perspective the word terrorism
derivesfromtheFrenchword‘terreur’whichwasaclearlyaffirmedpoliticaltac-
ticusedbyFrenchrevolutionarieslikeRobespierreorSaint-Just,thusmakingita
formofviolencethatisnotsolelyrestrictedtonon-stateactors².Furthermore,in
thepast,evencontemporarydemocraticstateshaveexplicitlychosentoresortto
indiscriminate tactics that aimed at terrorising their enemies, as was the case
with WinstonChurchill’sordertohisAirCommandtobombGermancities dur-
ingWWII.Consequently,thesecommonmisconceptionscallfor abetter assess-
ment of the uniqueness of terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
Withtheseclarifications,itwillbeeasiertounderstandtheinherentimmor-
ality of terrorism and how it differs from guerrilla warfare.Thus, the apparent
moral superiority of the latter over the former should not necessarily lead us
toconcludethatresortingtoguerrillaasaformofviolenceisalwaysmorallyac-
ceptable.Incontrast,iftheactofkillingcansometimesbejustifiedinthistype
ofwarfare,thiscanonlybealast-resortoptionandonlywhenthesituationhas
reachedacertainextreme.Asaresult,theco-calledsuperiorityofguerrillaover
terrorism doesnotgivecarte blanche to theformerwhenitcomestoviolentac-
tions.This type of violence also comes with its own string of moral questions
that cannot be ignored.The first two chapters will focus on the distinction be-
tween terrorism and guerrilla warfare as well as the moral limits of the latter.
Additionally,althoughitmaylooklikeastraightforwardaffairbetweengood
andabsoluteevil,thewaragainstterrorismorecomplexandbringsinitswake
many ethical dilemmas,that is, a confrontation between two moral categorical
 Initspeakperiod,laterreurledtotheexecutionofaround40,000peopleinasinglemonth.
Introduction 3
imperativesinwhichrespectforonewillinevitablyleadtoviolationoftheother.
Asarguedelsewhere(Caron,2014),battlefieldmercykillingisprobablythebest
exampleofsuchaclashbetweentwomoralnorms.Indeed,inthesesituations,
soldiersareforcedtochoose,ontheonehand,toabidebythemoralobligation
not to kill avulnerable human being; and on the other hand, not tolet this in-
dividualenduretheterriblesufferingresultingfromwhatappearstobealethal
wound.Insuchsituations,whateverthedecisiontakenbysoldiersconfrontedby
this dilemma will be, the outcome will necessarily be morally questioned by
somewhowillcometobelievethattheother alternativeshouldhaveprevailed.
Unfortunately,whenitcomestothesecategoricalmoralimperatives,peoplewho
arefacingthemarecaughtina“catch-22”asitisimpossibletohierarchisethem
and reach an agreement that one decision is better than the other based on a
rational assessment of the situation.
Inthecaseofterrorism,Iseethreedilemmasofthissortthatareappearing
tobeopposedtostates’obligationstoprotectthelivesoftheircitizens.First,itis
the responsibility of states to protect the lives of their citizens that are directly
threatened by terrorist organizations. Abiding by this obligation therefore calls
foractionontheirpart.Inreturn,asisevidentfromAfghanistanandIraq,fight-
ingterrorism seems tocomeat the expense of a disproportionate numberofci-
vilians’ lives abroad.This has led authors to argue that Western states simply
transfertheriskfromtheirowncivilianstothosewhohavethemisfortuneofliv-
ing in countries or areaswhere terrorists are operating.Consequently,this ‘risk
transfer’ishighlyproblematicfromamoralperspective(aswellasfromapolit-
icalperspectiveasthesemilitaryinterventionswereunabletoeveneradicatethe
terrorist threats they were promising to achieve) which seems to be creating a
situation where states fighting this sort of threat are condemned to violate a
moral imperative no matter what theydecide todo:either wait and let theirci-
vilians be killed first by terrorists or transfer that risk to civilians abroad as if
‘their lives’ are less important than‘our lives’.
Second,thestatusofcapturedterroristsraisesasimilardilemma.Again,for
the sake of respecting their obligation to protect the lives of their civilians, are
statesallowedtousemethodsoftortureagainstcapturedterroristswhomaypos-
sess sensitive information aboutupcomingattacks? It is not surprising that tor-
tureisanendemicrealityinmanyauthoritarianandtotalitarianstates,butthe9/
11attackshavealsoledLiberalstatestoengageinwhathasbeenlabelledas‘en-
hanced interrogation techniques’: a euphemism that poorly hides the fact that
thesemethodsarenothinglessthantorture.However,theresorttothesetechni-
queshas oftenbeen justifiedthroughthelens ofa‘tickingbomb scenario’,that
is,whenastateisfacingaterroristthreatthatcannotbepreventedinaconven-
tionalandlawfulmanner.Theethicaldilemmahereisthechoicebetweendoing