Table Of ContentThe Missing Dimension
THE MISSING
DIMENSION
Governments and Intelligence Communities in
the Twentieth Century
Edited by
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW
and
DAVID DILKS
M
MACMILLAN
©ChristopherAndrew,RobertCecil,David Dilks,
David Kahn,Ian Nish, Eunan O'Halpin,
Alasdair Palmer,HarryHoweRansom,Jiirgen Rohwer,
Jean Stengers,WesleyK.Wark 1984
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover Istedition 1984
Allrightsreserved.Nopart ofthispublication
may bereproducedor transmitted,inany form
orbyany means,without permission
Firstpublished1984by
Higherand Further Education Division
MACMILLAN PUBLISHERS LTD
LondonandBasingstoke
Companiesandrepresentatives
throughouttheworld
Typesetby
Wessex TypesettersLtd
Frome,Somerset
PrintedinGreatBritainby
CamelotPressLtd.Southampton
BritishLibraryCataloguingin PublicationData
Themissingdimension:governmentsand intelligencecommunitiesinthetwentieth
century
I. Secretservice-History
I. Andrew,Christopher II. Dilks,David
327.1'2'0904 HV7961
ISBN978-1-349-07236-1 ISBN978-1-349-07234-7(eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07234-7
Contents
Introduction
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW and DAVID DILKS
1JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND THE APPROACH
OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 17
IAN NISH
2 CODEBREAKERS AND FOREIGN OFFICES: THE
FRENCH, BRITISHANDAMERICAN EXPERIENCE 33
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW
3 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN IRELAND, 1914-1921 54
EUNAN O'HALPIN
4 BRITISH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTELLI
GENCE: ASSESSMENTS OF NAZI GERMANY
BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 78
WESLEY K. WARK
5 FLASHES OF INTELLIGENCE: THE FOREIGN
OFFICE, THE SIS AND SECURITY BEFORE THE
SECOND WORLD WAR 101
DAVID DILKS
6 ENIGMA, THE FRENCH, THE POLES AND THE
BRITISH, 1931-1940 126
JEAN STENGERS
7 CODEBREAKING IN WORLD WARS I AND II:THE
MAJOR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES, THEIR
CAUSES AND THEIR EFFECTS 138
DAVID KAHN
8 RADIO INTELLIGENCE AND ITS ROLE IN THE
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 159
JURGEN ROHWER
9 THE CAMBRIDGE COMINTERN 169
ROBERT CECIL
10 SECRETINTELLIGENCEIN THEUNITEDSTATES,
1947-1982:THE CIA'S SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY 199
HARRY HOWE RANSOM
11 THE HISTORY OF THE D-NOTICE COMMITTEE 227
ALASDAIR PALMER
NotesandReferences 250
Notes ontheContributors 286
Index 287
VI
Introduction
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW
and
DAVID DILKS
SECRET intelligence has been described by one distinguished dip
lomat as 'the missing dimension of most diplomatic history'.1 The
same dimension isalso absentfrom mostpoliticaland much military
history. Academic historians havefrequently tended eitherto ignore
intelligence altogether, or to treat it as of little importance. The
distinguishededitorofamajorvolumeofmilitarydiariespublishedin
1972failed to realise that the references to 'C' and 'C's information'
referred to the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS); the
authorofan important political history published in 1979confused
the head ofthe Special Branchwith the head ofthe SecurityService
(MI5). A.]. P. Taylor's brilliant 875-page survey ofEnglish History
1914-1945 finds space (quite rightly) for George Robey and Nellie
Melba but none for heads of the intelligence community. In this
respectat least,MrTaylormerelyfollowslong-establishedprecedent
among modern historians.
The great danger of any missing historical dimension is that its
absence may distort our understanding of other, accessible dimen
sions.The Franks Committee clearly felt it impossible to produce a
balanced assessmentofthe 1982Falklandsconflictwithoutaccess to
the intelligencefiles,even though they, ofcourse,containonly partof
the story. As some of the articles in this volume show, balanced
accounts ofearlier twentieth-century conflicts also require access to
intelligence files. Since 1973 the revelation of 'the Ultra secret' has
changedourunderstandingofthe SecondWorldWar. It isnowclear
thatintelligenceplayedamajor, perhapsdecisive, partin- notably
the turningofthe tide ofwarin North Africa, the winningofthe long
drawn-outnavalbattleofthe NorthAtlantic,andthe preparationsfor
the D-day landing. Professor F. H. Hinsley, the official historian of
2 THE MISSING DIMENSION
British intelligence in the Second World War, has hazarded the
estimate that the superiorityofAllied intelligenceshortened the war
by three years." Intelligence is, ofcourse, not usually so influential.
During many modern crises it has been misunderstood, not used or
simply wrong. But the historian of national or international
politics can never afford to ignore it.
Historians have a general tendency to pay too much attention to
the evidencewhichsurvives,and tomaketoolittleallowanceforwhat
does not. Intelligence has become a 'missing dimension' first and
foremost because its written records are so difficult to come by.
Despitethe revelationsaboutSecondWorldWarintelligenceoverthe
last decade, the official veil which shrouds the past history ofthe
intelligencecommunityhas been onlyslightlyraised.First, although
someofthe intelligencesuppliedtogovernmentdepartmentshas now
been released to the Public Record Office, all the records of the
intelligence services themselves remain completely closed. The
governmentrefuses even toset somefar distantdatefortheirrelease.
Secondly, what has been officially released so far is curiously
lop-sided.Athree-volumeofficialhistoryofBritishintelligencein the
SecondWorld Warisin courseofpublication but there isno present
prospectofan officialpeacetimehistory."Thesecretaryofthe cabinet
explained to a Commons select committee in February 1983 that
peacetime intelligence records are still considered much more secret
thanwartime records." Thisodddistinction, whichseems toreflect a
traditional embarrassment at admitting that Britain collects intelli
genceat all in peacetime, has produced a series ofcuriousanomalies
inthe recordssofar madeavailable.Thus,althoughmanythousands
ofinterceptedGermanwartime telegramsofthe early I940shave been
released,Sovietpeacetimetelegramsinterceptedtwentyyearsearlier
have not. Most scholarly research published over the last decade in
Britain has therefore concentrated on wartime rather than peacetime
intelligence.Theinterwarhistoryoftheintelligencecommunityisfar
less well known than its record in the Second World War.
The yawning gaps in the history of British intelligence left by
academic historians have to some extent been filled by more
adventurous non-academics. The important contributions of such
writers as David Kahn, Ronald Lewin and Patrick Beesly are well
grounded in publicly available source material. The contribution of
those writers who rely largely on inside information from the
intelligence community, past and present, is much more difficult to
INTRODUCTION 3
assess. The two authors who claim most inside information, Chap
man Pincher and 'Nigel West', disagree about such essentials as
whetherSir RogerHollis,director-general ofMI5from 1956to 1965,
was orwas not a Sovietagent."Oursympathieson this issueliewith
Nigel West and the much maligned Sir Roger Hollis. But Mr West,
the most prolific recentwriteron British intelligence history,himself
poses severe problems for other historians. His best-selling books
containmuch newinformation but almostnofootnotesor references;
even when free to divulge a source, heseems reluctant todoso.The
reader isthusbound togauge the reliabilityofwhat hecannotcheck
against the reliability ofwhat he can. When Mr West repeatedly
assertsthattheprimeministerin 1921was RamsayMacDonald (and
not,as previously believed, Lloyd George) or claimsthat Sir Horace
Wilson (previously believed to be Chamberlain's chief industrial
adviser and confidant) was in fact head of Indian political intel
ligence, the historian's confidence in other parts of his often
interesting narrative is bound to be shaken."
As well as being deterred from considering the intelligence
dimension by thegaps inthearchives and thedifficultyinevaluating
the 'inside information' ofMr West and others, academic historians
havealso beenrepelled by the evident absurdityofmanybest-selling
publications on the subject. The treatment of intelligence by both
mass mediaandpublishersoftenseemsideallycalculatedtopersuade
the academic world that it is no subject forscholars.The problem is
notanewone.Themostsuccessfuland prolificspy novelistbeforethe
First World War, William Le Queux, allegedly Queen Alexandra's
favouritewriter,claimed thatmanyofhisbookswere thinly-disguised
documentariesand that hehimselfhad 'imperturbablyrisked hislife
in countless exploits' as an unofficial British secret agent. His
fraudulent 'documentary' work German Spies in England, published
early in the First World War, purporting todescribeinteraliahow he
had obtained thetextofavital(andinfactnon-existent)secretspeech
by the Kaiser only to have it stolen by German intelligence, went
through six editions in three weeks and contained enthusiastic
endorsements from five gullible peers, two MPs, the Lord Mayor of
London, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, five national and four provincial
newspapers."
EchoesoftheLeQueux schoolofintelligencefantasylingeron.The
mostexpensiveintelligenceproductionshownonBritish television up
to the time ofwriting is the twelve-part Thames Television drama
4 THE MISSING DIMENSION
'documentary'seriesfirst broadcastinthe autumnofl983on 'Reilly
Ace ofSpies'.Itfeatures: 'Sidney Reilly. A rogue. Awomaniser. An
adventurer.Amanwhoseskillandaudacitychangedthefaceofworld
history.' According to ThamesTelevision the series is'the truestory
ofa man whoseexploitsdefied belief"."Theydo indeed;some ofthem
are fiction in the grand Le Queux tradition. There is probably no
otherhistorical seriesin which lTV has tolerated the samedegree of
dramatic licence. The lapse is significant. Intelligence is com
monly treated as a subjectexemptfrom normal criticalstandardson
which accuracy may be readily sacrificed to box-office appeal. One
TV critic counted in the first episode of'Reilly': 'two murders, two
executions, one earthquake, two strip-tease performances (difficult
with all that Victorian corsetry), one whorehouse scene, one seduc
tion and an endless amount ofdouble-dealing, betrayal and inter
national intrigue." Reilly's main female box-office rival is probably
'Cynthia', a British agent in the United States during the Second
World War. The publishers, if not the author, of a biography
detailing her 'Conquests on a Satin Battlefield' choose to begin the
storyofBritain's 'Most SeductiveSecret Weapon' thus:
Cynthia sprangfrom thecouchinthe darkened Embassy corridor,
and began unbuttoning her dress: 'What are you doing?' gasped
the bewildered man who had been on the couch withher. Now she
was naked. 'Your turn!' she hissed.J"
At leastin their professional lives,academic historians are curiously
ill at ease in such situations. They share the bewilderment of
Cynthia's companion on the couch when faced with a surfeit of
imaginative prose and a shortage ofdocumentary evidence. Alex
andreDumasoncesaidofawoefullyinaccuratehistoryofthe French
Revolution that it had 'raised history to the level ofa novel'. Many
writers on intelligence have achievedthe same feat.
But historians have been far moreputofTthe subjectofintelligence
than they need have been. One ofthe purposes ofthis volume is to
showwhat can be reliably based on existing archives and published
source material. Though the articles published here deal in greatest
detail with British Intelligencehistory in the twentiethcentury, they
also draw on American, French, German, Irish,Japanese, Polish
and Russian experience. Historians of twentieth-century Western
societiesaresoused tothe vast(andoftenexcessive)filesgeneratedby
