The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy

216 Pages·2008·1.49 MB·English

by  Kara Richardson

The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy

by

Kara Richardson

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

©Copyright by Kara Richardson 2008
The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy

Doctor of Philosophy, 2008
Kara Richardson
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

Abstract
This dissertation begins with the Islamic philosopher Avicenna, who transforms Aristotle’s
conception of the efficient cause in the Metaphysics of his Shifā’. Its first goal is to examine
the arguments which constitute Avicenna’s metaphysical account of agency. Its second
goal is to examine Scholastic disputes about the causal powers of natural agents that arise
in connection with his view. In its final chapter, it relates Medieval debates about efficient
causality to Descartes’ account of the causal powers of bodies.

One of the original features of Avicenna’s account of agency is his argument for the claim
that the existence of contingent things requires an efficient cause. This aspect of his view
was influential in the Latin West. Avicenna also holds that the cause of the existence of
contingent things is an incorporeal principle, which he describes as an agent who “bestows
forms”. I argue that Avicenna fails to resolve the tension between this claim and his
commitment to an Aristotelian account of generation. This failure sets the stage for
Avicenna’s role in Scholastic disputes about the causal powers of natural agents in cases of
generation.

Both Aquinas and Suarez attribute to Avicenna the view that generation requires the
creation of form. They argue that generation occurs through natural processes. Suarez’s
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view includes the claim that the substantial form of a substance is an immediate efficient
cause of its actions. Suarez defends this claim against other Aristotelians, who hold that a
substantial form gives being to a composite substance as a formal cause and that the actions
of substances depend directly on their accidents alone.

Descartes claims in his letter to Regius of January 1642 that it is absurd to hold that
substantial forms are immediate principles of action. He thinks that bodies act in virtue of
their modes. Here Descartes sides with those Aristotelians who hold that the actions of
substances depend directly on their accidents alone. I argue that this aspect of Descartes’
view tells against Daniel Garber’s claim that his denial of substantial forms deprives bodies
of causal efficacy.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors, Deborah Black and Marleen Rozemond, for their
engagement with this project and for their encouragement and support throughout my graduate
education. I would also like to thank Peter King and Martin Pickave for questions and comments
on the final draft of my dissertation.

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Table of contents

Abstract_______________________________________________________________ii
Ackowledgements ______________________________________________________ iv
Table of contents________________________________________________________v

Introduction___________________________________________________________1

Chapter 1 Avicenna’s metaphysical account of agency_______________________11
Section 1.1 Causality as an object of study in metaphysics _______________________13
Section 1.2 The “common” conception of agency_____________________________23
Section 1.3 What comes to be can’t persist through itself________________________32
Section 1.4 Agents are sufficient in themselves for their effects___________________46
Section 1.5 Avicenna’s hierarchy of agents___________________________________55

Chapter 2 Avicenna on the coexistence of agents and their effects ____________61
Section 2.1 True vs. accidental agents_______________________________________63
Section 2.2 The case of the building________________________________________66
Section 2.3 The case of the son ___________________________________________79
Section 2.4 Avicenna on potentiality and actuality _____________________________84
Section 2.5 Avicenna on causes of individuals and causes of species _______________93
Section 2.6 The case of elemental transformation _____________________________97

Chapter 3 Aquinas and Avicenna on efficient causality and generation________111
Section 3.1 Aquinas on God as the cause of the existence of contingent individuals __114
Section 3.2 Aquinas on natural agents as instrumental causes of generation_________118
Section 3.3 Aquinas on the causal powers of natural agents_____________________128
Section 3.4 Aquinas vs. the creation of form ________________________________133
Section 3.5 Avicenna on the substantiality of form, matter and the composite_______137
Section 3.6 Aquinas and Avicenna on substantial generation____________________143

Chapter 4 Suarez on substantial forms as efficient causes___________________146
Section 4.1 Suarez on natural agents as causes of generation: introduction__________150
Section 4.2 The instrumental role of accidents in generation ____________________156
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Section 4.3 The influence of substantial forms in generation ___________________160
Section 4.4 The action of separated accidents _______________________________168
Section 4.5 Suarez on natural agents as causes of generation: conclusion___________170
Section 4.6 The late Medieval conception of substantial form ___________________172

Chapter 5 Descartes on the causal powers of bodies without substantial forms_181
Section 5.1 Scholastic debates about the efficient causality of substantial forms______185
Section 5.2 Descartes’ account of the causal powers of bodies___________________187
Section 5.3 Can Cartesian bodies have causal powers? ___________________________192
Section 5.4 Causal powers as properties _____________________________________200

Conclusion _________________________________________________________203

Bibliography ________________________________________________________207

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Introduction

Readers of Aristotle are familiar with his account of the four causes in Physics 2.3
and Metaphyiscs 5.2. In both of these texts, Aristotle identifies four principles through
which we can grasp “both coming to be and passing away and every kind of natural
change”.1 One is “that out of which a thing comes to be”, e.g., the marble of the statue;
we call this the material cause.2 Another is the form or archetype of the thing made,
which Aristotle identifies with the definition of its essence; in the case of a statue of the
Virgin Mary, the formal cause is its Marian shape.3 The third is a cause “in the sense of
end or that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., the statue was made in order that
we might revere her Holiness; we call this the final cause.4 Fourth is the “the primary
source of the change or rest”, e.g., the sculptor who makes the statue; we call this the
efficient cause.5 Medieval philosophers retain Aristotle’s four causes, but they modify
his account of them and their relations with one another in various ways. This
dissertation examines efficient causality in the work of three Medieval philosophers,
namely, Avicenna, Aquinas and Suarez. In its final chapter, it relates Medieval debates
about efficient causality to Descartes’ account of the causal powers of bodies.
Medieval philosophers typically object to Aristotle’s definition of the efficient
cause on the ground that it encompasses only agents of change. This objection seems
odd, since Aristotle identifies and distinguishes his four causes in order that we may use
them to understand “both coming to be and passing away and every kind of natural

1 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 21. All quotations of Aristotle are from The Complete Works of
Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
2 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 24-5.
3 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 27-8.
4 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 33-4.
5 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 30-32.
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change”.6 Medieval philosophers reason that since scientific inquiry concerns existence
as well as change, it seeks causes of existence, as well as causes of change. Notice that
the claim that scientific inquiry concerns existence and seeks its causes does not entail
that existence stands in need of an efficient cause. An Aristotelian could hold that to
identify Socrates’ formal and material causes suffices to explain his existence. Roughly
speaking, this is Aristotle’s view, but not the view of Medieval Aristotelians.
The Medieval view that Socrates stands in need of an efficient cause of his
existence is born from their view that Socrates is a contingent thing. A contingent thing
is something actual whose existence is merely hypothetically necessary. The existence of
Socrates is hypothetically necessary if Socrates must exist given the existence of some
efficient cause or set of efficient causes. In other words, the hypothetically necessary is
not necessary in itself, but rather is necessary through its efficient cause or causes. Thus
understood, the claim that the existence of Socrates is merely hypothetically necessary
seems uncontroversial. It is compatible with our ordinary belief that if things had been
otherwise, e.g., if Socrates’ parents had not encountered each other, then Socrates would
not exist. The difference between our ordinary view of individuals as contingent beings
and the view upheld by many Medieval philosophers has to do with the distinction
between coming to be and existence. According to Medieval philosophers, our ordinary
belief that if things had been otherwise, then Socrates would not exist, is a belief about
the hypothetical necessity of Socrates’ coming to be, not his existence. And the fact that
Socrates’ parents encountered one another explains only his coming to be, not his
existence. On this view, the claim that the existence of Socrates is merely hypothetically
necessary is controversial. It is obvious that Socrates stands in need of an efficient cause

6 Aristotle. Physics 2.3 194b 21.
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or set of efficient causes in order to come to be. It isn’t obvious that his existence,
considered apart from his coming to be, stands in need of an efficient cause. One of the
goals of this dissertation is to show why some Medieval philosophers hold this
controversial view.
One important argument for this view draws a distinction between causes of
coming to be and causes of being. This distinction is perhaps best known to us from
Aquinas’ argument for the claim that God preserves all things in being in the Summa
Theologiae.7 Several scholars of Aquinas note that he borrows the distinction from
Avicenna.8 We will see that Suarez and Descartes also borrow this distinction to defend
the view that God is the cause of the existence of creatures. Avicenna develops the
distinction between causes of coming to be and causes of being in the course of his
account of efficient causality in the Metaphysics of his Shifā’. This dissertation begins with
Avicenna’s work on efficient causality.
The impact of Avicenna’s work on efficient causality on the Latin West has been
noted by several scholars. He is credited with supplying an account of creative efficient
causality within a basically Aristotelian philosophical framework, which influenced later
attempts to define agency, to distinguish divine and creative agents and to prove the
existence of a creative First Cause.9 This is perhaps one reason why Avicenna’s

7 Aquinas. Summa Theologiae 1.104.1.
8 See Doolan (2004), p. 399, n. 29, Fabro (1961), pp. 340-1, Meehan (1940), pp. 317f, Wippel
(2000), p. 202.
9 Étienne Gilson pioneered work on the influence of Avicenna’s account of efficient causality in
the Latin West. See especially Gilson (1958) and (1962). Several scholars of Aquinas note
Avicenna’s influence with respect to Aquinas’ account of different causal roles of natural agents
and God. See note 8 above. Druart (2002) relates Avicenna’s account of efficient causality to
Duns Scotus’ proofs for God’s existence. Avicenna’s proof for God’s existence is the subject of
many articles. See Davidson (1979), Marmura (1980b) and Menn (2003). These articles focus
for the most part on the proof’s reliance on Avicenna’s application of the modal concepts of
necessity and possibility to existence in Metaphysics 1.6. I discuss Avicenna’s application of the
modal concepts of necessity and possibility to existence in chapter 2. My focus there is not on
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treatment of efficient causality has received more attention from historians of
philosophy than his treatment of material, formal and final causality.10 But surely part of
the reason for scholarly focus on efficient causality in Avicenna is the intrinsic interest of
his treatment of this issue.
This dissertation examines aspects of Avicenna’s account of efficient causality
which have received little attention. In chapter one, I situate this account in the context
of Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Avicenna holds that the subject matter of the science of
Metaphysics is the existent as such. And he considers the efficient cause to be among
the things which “follow upon” or “attach to” the existent as such. I argue that to
investigate the efficient cause as a something which “follows upon” or “attaches to” the
existent as such is to investigate the efficient cause as it is in itself, regardless of its
relationship to matter and motion. The purpose of this investigation is to provide an
account of agency which is free from the concerns proper to any of the special sciences,
e.g., physics.
Avicenna pursues his metaphysical investigation of the efficient cause by
identifying and correcting flaws in the “common” conception of agency. I argue that the
“common” conception of agency to which Avicenna refers reflects the basic features of
the efficient cause in Aristotelian natural philosophy. So it is not surprising that
Avicenna’s account of the true nature of agency departs from the conception of agency
familiar to us from Aristotelian natural philosophy. This account includes two claims
which are controversial from an Aristotelian standpoint. The first is that a contingent

Avicenna’s proof for God’s existence but rather on his argument in Metaphysics 6.1 against the
common belief that things need efficient causes only to come to be.
10 This imbalance is beginning to be addressed by a new generation of Avicenna scholars.
Wisnovsky (1994) and (2002) focuses especially on final causality. Bertolacci (2002) focuses on
material and formal causality.