The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity

256 Pages·2012·2.731 MB·English

by  Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Marratto, Scott Louis

THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF
Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity
S C O T T L . M A R R A T T O
THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF

THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF
Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity
scott l. marratto
State University of New York Press
Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2012 State University of New York
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Marratto, Scott L. (Scott Louis), 1968–
The intercorporeal self : Merleau-Ponty on subjectivity / Scott L. Marratto.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-1-4384-4231-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908–1961. 2. Subjectivity. I. Title.
B2430.M3764M373 2012
194—dc23 2011027049
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
In memory of my mother, Melody McLoughlin

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Situation and the Embodied Mind 11
I. Mind, Self, World 11
Representation 13
Behavior 15
Situated Cognition 19
II. Perception 22
Sensation 22
Spatiality 28
III. Situated Subjectivity 34
Chapter 2: Making Space 39
I. Subjectivity, Sensation, and Depth 39
Affordance Depth 46
Spectral Depth 48
Spatial ‘Levels’ 54
Time, Space, and Sensation 55
The Depth of the Past 65
II. Learning 66
Chapter 3: Subjectivity and the ‘Style’ of the World 79
I. The ‘Subject’ and the ‘World’ of Situated Cognition 79
Sensorimotor Laws 80
Sensorimotor Subjectivity 85
Ecological Laws 88
Ecological Subjectivity 90
II. Perception and Subjectivity beyond Metaphysics 94
viii CONTENTS
Chapter 4: Auto-affection and Alterity 113
I. Presence 113
The ‘Privilege’ of the Present 118
Auto-affection 125
II. The Deconstruction of Presence 128
Derrida’s Appraisal of Husserl’s Phenomenology 128
Derrida on the Lived Body (‘Leib’; ‘le corps propre’) 133
Derrida’s Deconstruction of ‘Intercorporeity’ 139
III. Auto-hetero-affection in Merleau-Ponty 141
Intercorporeity and Intersubjectivity 141
Body Schema 148
Auto-hetero-affection as the Advent of the
Intercorporeal Body 155
Chapter 5: Ipseity and Language 165
I. Language and Gesture 165
The Tacit Cogito 169
Perceptual Meaning and Natural Expression 172
The Paradox of Expression 176
Institution 179
II. Diacritical Intercorporeity 181
III. Expression and Subjectivity 187
Conclusion 193
Notes 203
Bibliography 227
Index 235
ACkNOwLEdgmENTS
In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty remarks on the
strange manner in which we discover, in a kind of unending process, the
patterns of our own thinking only by letting it find its expression in the
context of our relations with others. He writes, “There is . . . a taking up
of others’ thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think
according to others which enriches our own thoughts” (PhP, 179/208). The
process of writing a book, which is inevitably a reflection of many con-
versations, collaborations, helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions, is
particularly exemplary of this philosophical insight.
There are a great many people to whom acknowledgment is due,
and any list is sure to be incomplete. I would like to express my particu-
lar gratitude to John Russon, who has been an inspiring and challenging
teacher, mentor, and friend to me. His comments and reflections on this
manuscript have been crucial to its development. I am grateful for John’s
work as a gifted philosopher and teacher, and also for his efforts in organiz-
ing an ongoing philosophical conversation among a group of scholars who
have been meeting, for a number of years now, a few days each summer,
in Toronto. It has been my privilege to participate in a number of these
‘Toronto Seminars’ to discuss the works of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Hegel,
Heidegger, Plato, and Fichte. The list of participants in these conversations
over the years includes Ömer Aygün, Don Beith, Noah Moss Brender, Susan
Bredlau, David Ciavatta, Peter Costello, Bruce Gilbert, Jill Gilbert, Shannon
Hoff, Kirsten Jacobson, Kym Maclaren, David Morris, Alexandra Morrison,
Gregory Recco, and Maria Talero. These conversations have shaped my
own approach to the practice of philosophy as well as my interpretation of
Merleau-Ponty, and I am grateful to all of them.
My exploration of the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology and Derrida’s ‘deconstruction,’ reflected in chapters 4 and 5 of this
book, began with a paper that I presented at the Collegium Phaenomeno-
logicum in Città di Castello, Italy, in 2006. I am grateful to the coordinator
of that year’s Collegium, Michael Naas, and to those participants and faculty
who have shared insights and helpful comments in the course of an ongoing
philosophical conversation. I am thinking, in particular, of Bryan Bannon,
ix