Table Of ContentTHE IDEA OF ORDER
HANS BARTH
THE IDEA OF ORDER
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHILOSOPHY
OF POLITICS
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT-HOLLAND
DIE IDEE DER ORDNUNG
BeitTiige zu eineT politischen Philosophie
First published by Eugen Rentsch Verlag AG
Erlenbach-Ziirich, Switzerland
Translated by Ernest W. Hankamer and William M. Newell
ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-3681-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-3679-5
001: 10.1007/978-94-010-3679-5
Copyright 1960 by D. Reidel Publishing Company
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1960
Dordrecht -Holland
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print,
photoprint, microfilm, or any other means
without permission from the publisher
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Translators' Note VII
Introduction I
I Philosophy and Politics 5
II Edmund Burke and German Political Philosophy
in the Age of Romanticism 18
III Antoine de Rivarol and the French Revolution 48
IV De Lamennais' Political and Social Philosophy 77
V Auguste Comte and Joseph de Maistre: The System
of Positivism as Theocracy 108
VI The Idea of Sanction: Jeremy Bentham and Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon I44
VII Historical and Natural Right and the Idea of Order
as a Problem of Political Philosophy 160
Postscript I94
Notes 195
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
It seems only fair to warn the reader that the style of this trans
lation will occasionally seem somewhat rough and unpolished;
this is true particularly of the first chapter of the present volume.
Lack of smoothness is, of course, not desirable, but it is, in our
opinion, preferable to alteration of meaning, particularly in a
philosophical work, in which exactness is indispensable if the
precision of the terminology is not to be impaired. We ask you
to bear with us, because we think it worth your while.
One specific matter deserves separate mention. We have avoid
ed footnotes wherever possible, at the cost of using several
English words in a rather specialized, or perhaps better, Ger
manized meaning. Thus, the word spiritual is our rendering of
geistig, which means of the mind, of the intellect, of the spirit, and
implies a number of related nuances. Readers who have a com
mand ofG erman or French will probably recognize other trans
lations of a similar nature.
Finally, a word of thanks to those friends and colleagues who
have assisted us in our efforts. Miss Annette Kuhn, of Heidel
berg, has rendered truly invaluable services throughout. Mr.
Gustav Kemperdick, of Munich, has given us the benefit of
his expert advice in the translation of the French passages in
the book. And Miss Frauke Kelch, of Hamburg, has made
many helpful suggestions and has been of great assistance in
the arduous task of correcting and proofreading the text.
Needless to say, for the shortcomings that remain we alone
are responsible.
E. W. HANKAMER
W. M. NEWELL
Munich, Germany, March, 1960
VII
INTRODUCTION
In these essays toward a political philosophy we shall be con
cerned with fundamentals. And because it is a question of
fundamentals, they will, we imagine, be of interest to many
readers. We should like to contribute to a clarification, histor
ically and systematically, of some concepts with which every
philosophy of society and the state has to deal. We shall admit
historical considerations for the sake of insights into the sys
tematic ones, and we trust that our inquiry into the systematic
will help us to understand the historical. For we are moving
in that circle exemplarily described by Johann Gustav Droysen
in his Vorlesungen fiber Enzyklopadie und Methodologie der Ge
schichte (§ 37) when he writes: 'Undoubtedly we only under
stand completely that which is, when we recognize and
make clear to ourselves how it came to be. But how it came to
be, we recognize only if we investigate and understand, as
exactly as possible, how it is. Our grasping that which came
to be and comprehending its becoming is only one form and
expression of our understanding of the present and existing.
And this becoming and having come to be can be derived only
by temporally conceiving and analysing the existing in order
to understand it.' We must, therefore, center our attention on
what may be called the structure and logic of social order.
Three things appear necessarily to belong to a doctrine of com
munal and social organization: the problem of consensus and
loyalty, the problem of sanctions in the broadest sense of the
term, and the problem of authority and its hierarchy. Every
doctrine of social order must deal with dynamic processes, with
unavoidable and possible conflicts. Only by calling upon in
tellectual history can we present the immanent structural prin
ciples of order. And only if we succeed in asking history mean
ingful questions, starting from the logic of order and the nec
essary interplay of its essential elements, will history give us
clarifying answers.
I
THE IDEA OF ORDER
Some short mention must be made of an assumption with
which we believe we must begin. A political philosophy must
necessarily contain a doctrine of truth. Or to put it more pre
cisely: we may under no circumstances fail to take into consid
eration that every political theory absolutely depends on a
theory of truth whether it makes it explicit or not. As a basis
for a program of action, it always conceals a theory of truth.
Injustifying any given type of state, to mention just one exam
ple, we must know of whom the recognition of truth in a social
body may be expected, and under what conditions it may be
possible. The problem of authority in social and political real
ity is inextricably tied up with the problem of knowledge.
Conversely, whatever the doctrine of truth may be, it has cer
tain inevitable and determinable consequences for political
theory. Philosophical investigations concerning the possibility
and range of true human knowledge directly affect the sphere
of social life. In other words, the difference between an absolute
and a relative theory of truth is not only a problem of philos
ophy; rather, this difference is of decisive, constitutive impor
tance in establishing institutions which form the public will.
Man has always justified unlimited coercion by rightly or
wrongly assuming and monopolizing the possession of some
absolute truth. And obviously all those political theories which
prepare and foster revolutions, and subsequently justify them,
are very closely associated with theories of truth.
We have said that these essays deal with fundamentals. It ap
pears that mankind, whose already highly artificial life is deter
mined by a universal, highly differentiated technical develop
ment and whose culture and civilization cannot keep pace with
this rapid technical progress, can only be brought to a recon
sideration of fundamentals by unusually strong inner or outer
pressures. We are undoubtedly exposed to such pressures and
thus beset by those questions which pertain to the conditions
of communal order. Giambatista Vico's work concerning the
one source and one end of law best explains what we mean.
In the 51st chapter of De uno universi iuris principio et fine uno
liber unus published in 1720, he summarizes our argument.
J
2
INTRODUCTION
For Vico, who is in the tradition of Roman law and Roman
political philosophy, society is founded on truth. The basic
demand that all action must be bona fide, that is, in good faith,
and based on mutual trust, can be expressed as the command
ment ofliving in and by the truth. The 'law of society' assumes
two forms. This lex societatis, whose two imperatives are ex bona
fide agito and ex vero vivito, constitutes for Vico natural law.
Cicero maintains in De officiis (1, 7) thatfides, that is, reliability
and truthfulness in word and promise, is the basis of justice.
But since truthfulness in word includes keeping one's word,
Vico holds that Cicero should have held truth itself, the mother
of faithfulness and all other virtues, to be the basis of justice.
Veritas dicti, veriloquium, veritas facti, and gestio rei sine dolo (doing
something without evil intent) - these constitute the essence
of natural law for Vico, as they did, according to him, for
Roman law. Of course, the assertion that truth is the basis of
justice and thus of society does not make the real and inevitable
problem of its recognition irrelevant. The commandment to
live in and by the truth can only be fulfilled by remaining
aware of precisely this problem of the knowledge of truth.
3
CHAPTER ONE
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS
It would not be surprising if our deliberate suggestion, indeed,
our intentional insistence that there is a connection between
the words philosophy and politics were to evoke suspicion and
dissent. Philosophy and politics - this combination gives the
impression that the hard-won and carefully nurtured separa
tion of the academic and political platforms is threatened with
extinction. This suspicion is based on the supposedly indis
putable fact that, by origin and nature, philosophy is con
cerned with knowing, politics with acting. As Goethe said, the
active man is always unscrupulous and recognizes no law other
than that of success, whereas the philosopher admits of no law
other than that of truth and consequently will not let himself
be concerned with any practical results. The disregard of the
vital laws of these two forms of human existence would lead to
an ominous mixture out of which would be born the absurdity
ofa political philosophy or the nonsense ofp hilosophical politics,
and thus the beginning of the end of autonomous philosophy
and purposeful politics.
To mention philosophy and politics in the same breath is to
reassert philosophy's basic interest in politics and politics' fun
damental concern with philosophy. Philosophy's interest in
politics, that is, in the state and its activities in the broadest
sense of these terms, is not difficult to understand, for it is
nothing more than a manifestation of philosophy's perpetual
desire to know what is. Philosophy and politics are thus related
by the very fact that philosophy sees the state and political
action as objects of knowledge. But what about politics' con-
5
THE IDEA OF ORDER
cern with philosophy? The answer to this question presupposes
a definition of the concept of political action. Political action
unfolds in the relationship between means and ends; it is mean
ingful action directed towards the attainment of certain goals.
Granted that the goals of political action arise from the inherent
needs of the social structure, in fact, even supposing that the
self-assertion of society were the goal of political action, it would
nonetheless remain true that this goal is but one among many
possible goals of human life and that its realization must com
pete with that of others. But assuming a plurality of goals, who
is to determine the goal of some concrete political action? Who
is to coordinate various possible goals, fix their hierarchical
order, or select some rather than others?
Indeed, political action cannot be described merely as purpose
ful or meaningful action. The conditions which owe their origin
and constitution to human nature and activity are never con
tent simply to exist and be as they are. The existence of the
conditions of social life is never an end in itself, but strives
beyond itself because it is in need of completion. It demands
justification of its factuality, it seeks legitimation. Factuality
requires philosophical foundation. Without this foundation it
lacks the guarantee of stability. The defense ofa merely factual,
existing order has always been felt to be precarious. Only a
well-founded order is an accepted and thus a binding order.
This becomes clear when we consider the ultimate motive of
political action. Political action is always an unfolding of power
ranging from psychological influence to sanction by force. Its
fundamental orientation is in the idea of the accumulation of
power; it uses this power to realize certain goals and further
to create and secure such institutions as serve to protect power.
If we understand power, with Max Weber, as the opportunity
of asserting one's will, the necessity ofjustifying the subjugation
or elimination of another will becomes apparent. In society,
the use of naked force is an extreme case. Usually, power
rules, or at least tries to rule, as justified power. What we must
remember is this: social order, even though it owes its origin and
concrete form to struggles for power, always presupposes some
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