The great riddle : Wittgenstein and nonsense, theology and philosophy

147 Pages·2016·0.7 MB·English

by  Mulhall

OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
The Great Riddle
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
The Great Riddle
Wittgenstein and Nonsense,
Theology and Philosophy
The Stanton Lectures 2014
Stephen Mulhall
1
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©StephenMulhall2015
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2015
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015942539
ISBN 978–0–19–875532–6
PrintedinGreatBritainby
ClaysLtd,StIvesplc
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand
forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials
containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
Contents
Preface vii
LectureOne NonsenseandTheology:ExhaustingtheOptions? 1
LectureTwo TheFlounderandtheFisherman’sWife:Tractarian
Ethics,theMystical,andtheReligious 23
LectureThree GrammaticalThomism:FiveWaysofRefusing
toMakeSense 42
LectureFour AnalogicalUsesandtheProjectivenessofWords:
Wittgenstein’sVisionofLanguage 61
LectureFive PerfectionsandTranscendentals:Wittgenstein’s
VisionofPhilosophy 81
LectureSix AuthorityandRevelation:PhilosophyandTheology 106
Epilogue 128
Bibliography 133
Index 137
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
Preface
It was a great honour to be invited to give the Stanton Lectures in the
PhilosophyofReligionintheLenttermof2014.Theinvitationwasalso
particularly well timed from my point of view; for it arrived soon after
IhadparticipatedintheAquinasColloquiumorganizedbyBlackfriarsin
Oxfordduring2012,whichhadbroughttomyattentionforthefirsttime
the theological school or movement named ‘Grammatical Thomism’,
and given me a real desire to understand it better, and in particular to
understand the legitimacy of its claims to inherit Wittgenstein just as
muchasAquinas.SoIwouldliketotakethisopportunitytoexpressmy
thanks to the organizers of the Colloquium, and in particular to David
BurrellandJanetSoskice,whoalsoparticipatedinit,andwereextremely
generous in their response to my initial attempts to get Grammatical
Thomismintofocus.InowappreciatefarmorethanIdidthenjusthow
influential and much-admired David’s work is by theologians whose
judgement I respect; and I would be very pleased if these lectures not
only bring his work to the attention of a wider philosophical audience,
butremindtheologiansandphilosophersofreligionthatlyingbehindhis
well-known writings on the monotheistic religions of the book, and on
Aquinas,isaverypowerfulanddistinctiveconceptionofphilosophy.
IwouldalsoliketothanktheElectors totheStantonLectureshipfor
providing me with the opportunity to take the further steps in my
theological education that are recorded in the following pages. Eamon
Duffy was the Chair of the Electors, and a genial host at the dinner
followingmyfirstlecture:he,togetherwithSarahCoakley,JanetSoskice,
Tim Crane, Catherine Pickstock, and Judy Lieu, also provided gracious
introductionstoeachofthesixlecturesintheseries.Despitemyfollyin
choosingtodeliverthelecturesduringafullteachingtermatmyhome
university,whichsorelytruncatedthetimeIcouldspendinCambridge
outsidethetwohoursinvolvedindeliveringthelecturesthemselvesand
answering questions from the audience, the Theology Faculty were
extremelygenerous hosts;andvariousmembersofthePhilosophyFac-
ulty also exerted themselves to make me feel at home. Amongst the
theologians, I would particularly like to thank once again Janet Soskice
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
viii PREFACE
andSarahCoakley,bothofwhomhelpedmewithusefulreferencesand
pertinentresponsesasthelecturesunfolded;IamparticularlyinSarah’s
debt,sinceshemadethetimetoreadandrespondinveryhelpfulwaysto
the initial drafts of the whole series. Amongst the philosophers, Tim
Crane, Arif Ahmed, Michael Potter, and Nicholas Boyle were welcome
faces among the regular audience members, and charitable in their
responses to my peculiar ways of doing philosophy, and of trying to
findfruitfulguidanceinthistaskfromtheologicalsources.Iwouldalso
like to thank Peter Harland, the Theology Faculty’s administrative offi-
cer,andhiscolleagues,whodealtefficientlyandcourteouslywithallthe
practicalmattersarisingfrommytenureasStantonLecturer.
Although each of the lectures has been revised, and in some cases
significantly expanded, I have tried to retain the style and tone of their
original mode of presentation. Amongst colleagues who have taken the
timetoreadandrespondtothetextofmylecturesoutsidethecontextof
theirdelivery,orhaveotherwisehelpedmetopursuelinesofthoughtor
references related to them, I would particularly like to thank Cora
Diamond, Judith Wolfe, Stanley Hauerwas, Brian Klug, David Burrell,
JoshuaFurnal,MartinKusch,andIainMcPherson.
LecturesOneandTwoincorporaterevisedversionsofportionsofmy
essay ‘Wittgenstein on Religious Belief’, first published in O. Kuusela
andM.McGinn(eds),TheOxfordCompaniontoWittgenstein(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,2012).
Aswithanyandallofmyacademicduties,Icouldnothavecarriedout
theresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththislectureship,oreffectedthetrans-
formation of the lecture texts into a short book, without the domestic
support of Alison Baker, and the willingness of our two children (Ellie
and Matt) to go without access to the study (and its computer) for
significantportionsoffartoomanydays.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,20/10/2015,SPi
Lecture One
Nonsense and Theology
Exhausting the Options?
The starting point of this series of lectures was the recent discovery on
my part of an approach to the task of reflectively comprehending
religioususesoflanguagethatgoes,orwent,bythenameof‘Grammat-
icalThomism’.Theideathattheremightbefruitfulpointsofcontact,or
even substantial areas of overlap, between Wittgenstein’s grammatical
investigationsofmindandlanguageandThomasAquinas’treatmentof
thosesametopics—callthis‘AnalyticThomism’—hadlongbeenfamiliar
to me, primarily through my familiarity with the work of Anthony
Kenny and Herbert McCabe. What was new (and deeply intriguing) to
me was the idea that a text such as the Summa Theologiae might be
fruitfully interpreted as, or at least controlled from the outset by, a
grammatical investigation of the nature and limits of (what McCabe
would call) the human capacity to know and name God, and that
McCabe’s way of carrying out this mode of reading Aquinas formed
part of a broader interpretative project to which the work of David
Burrell and Fergus Kerr (to name but two theological companions)
could be taken to contribute, with the groundbreaking work of Victor
Prellerasanacknowledgedinspiration.
It is my understanding that this project is now generally regarded as
being part of the history of theology rather than of its vital present—as
very much a project of the 1960s and 1970s, when Wittgenstein’s later
writings were at their most influential, and appeared to hold out to
philosophically minded theologians a sympathetic alternative to the
settled hostilityoflogical positivism—despite the factthatthoseassoci-
atedwithitcontinuedtheirworkwellbeyondthatperiod,andtheirbasic
orientation continues to receive occasional expressions of collective