The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value

257 Pages·2004·0.79 MB·English

by  Robert Audi

THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT
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THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT
A THEORY OF INTUITION AND INTRINSIC VALUE
Robert Audi
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD
Copyright2004byPrincetonUniversityPress
PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,
41WilliamStreet,Princeton,NewJersey08540
IntheUnitedKingdom:PrincetonUniversityPress,
3MarketPlace,Woodstock,OxfordshireOX201SY
AllRightsReserved
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Audi,Robert,date
Thegoodintheright:atheoryofintuitionandintrinsicvalue/RobertAudi.
p.cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN:0-691-11434-X
1.Ethicalintuitionism.2.Ross,W.D.(WilliamDavid),1877–1971.
Kant,Immanuel,1724–1804—Ethics.I.Title.
BJ1472.A832004
171'.2–dc21 2003051738
BritishLibraryCataloging-in-PublicationDataisavailable
ThisbookhasbeencomposedinElectra
Printedonacid-freepaper.∞
www.pupress.princeton.edu
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my family, with gratitude
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Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Chapter1.EarlyTwentieth-CenturyIntuitionism 5
1. HenrySidgwick:ThreeKindsofEthicalIntuitionism 5
2. G.E.MooreasaPhilosophicalIntuitionist 11
3. H.A.PrichardandtheReassertionofDogmaticIntuitionism 14
4. C.D.BroadandtheConceptofFittingness 17
5. W.D.RossandtheTheoryofPrimaFacieDuty 20
6. Intuitions,Intuitionism,andReflection 32
Chapter2.RossianIntuitionismasaContemporary
EthicalTheory 40
1. TheRossianAppealtoSelf-Evidence 40
2. TwoTypesofSelf-Evidence 48
3. ResourcesandVarietiesofModerateIntuitionism 54
4. Disagreement,Incommensurability,andtheCharge
ofDogmatism 60
5. IntuitiveMoralJudgmentandRationalAction 68
Chapter3.KantianIntuitionism 80
1. ThePossibilityofSystematizingRossianPrinciples 81
2. AKantianIntegrationofIntuitionistPrinciples 83
3. KantianIntuitionismasaDevelopmentofKantianEthics 105
4. BetweentheMiddleAxiomsandMoralDecision:
TheMultipleGroundsofObligation 113
Chapter4.RightnessandGoodness 121
1. IntrinsicValueandtheGroundingofReasonsforAction 122
2. IntrinsicValueandPrimaFacieDuty 134
3. TheAutonomyofEthics 149
4. DeontologicalConstraintsandAgent-RelativeReasons 151
5. TheUnityProblemforIntuitionistEthics 157
viii CONTENTS
Chapter5.IntuitionisminNormativeEthics 161
1. FiveMethodsinNormativeEthicalReflection 162
2. TheNeedforMiddleTheorems 165
3. SomeDimensionsofBeneficence 174
4. TowardaComprehensiveIntuitionistEthics 177
Conclusion 197
Notes 203
Index 239
Preface
THIS BOOK HAS DEVELOPED both from my teaching in ethics over many
years and from numerous exchanges of ideas in ethical theory on both
sides of the Atlantic. Particularly in recent years, intuitionism has re-
emergedasamajorpositioninethics.Appealstointuitionsindiscussing
moral questions have long been common—even if not always so de-
scribed—but there has also been renewed exploration of intuitionism as
anethicaltheorythatusesintuitionsasdataformoralreasoningandmakes
abasiccommitmenttothepowerofintuitionasarationalcapacity.
Bytheturnofthecentury,intuitionismhadbecomeboththeoretically
richerandmoreinterestingtostudentsofethicsthanmostrecentwriters
in the field have realized. It is also plausible and attractive to ethically
orientedprofessionalsoutsidephilosophy—forinstanceinbusiness,engi-
neering, journalism, law, and medicine. This emerged quite clearly in
a number of post-doctoral seminars I have directed since the 1980s for
professionalschoolfacultyinthoseandotherfields.Theseprofessorsteach
both ethics and their own specific subject to students in graduate or pre-
professional programs, and in their teaching and writing in ethics they
foundW.D.Ross’sintuitionismatoncetheoreticallystraightforwardand,
in many cases, more readily applicable to practical moral problems than
virtueethics,Kantianism,orutilitarianism.
Ifthosewhoteachethicsintheprofessionsandapplyethicalpositions
toconcretemoralproblemshavefoundRoss’sintuitionismaninvaluable
resource,manymoralphilosophershavetendedtofindittheoreticallytoo
thinevenwhereitisplausibleand,initsapparentlystrongepistemological
andmetaphysicalclaims,unacceptable.Inpart,theproblemisthatintu-
itionism in the twentieth century could not escape the shadow of G. E.
Moore,who,forinstance,positednon-naturalproperties,maintainedthe
indefinabilityofgoodness,andappealedtoastrongnotionofself-evidence
indefendinghismanyassertionsabouttheintrinsicallygood.Oneaimof
thisbook isto getRossas faras possibleout fromunderMoore’s shadow
and,tosomeextent,theshadowofH.A.Prichard.
Mywiderpurposeistwofold:torespondtothetheoreticalconcernsof
philosophicalcriticsofintuitionismandtodevelopanoverallintuitionist
positionthatrepresentsatheoreticaladvancebeyondRoss’sviewbutisat