The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War

209 Pages·1997·11.584 MB·English

by  Frank P. Harvey

The Future's Back
Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability
after the Cold War
Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the
future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide
effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past,
efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial.
The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and
evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.
Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence
theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of
empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns
of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis
management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet
Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that pro-
mote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data
set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one
nuclear state is threatened by another.
The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize
a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibil-
ity of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future
disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
FRANK P. HARVEY is associate professor of political science,
Dalhousie University.
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The Future's Back
Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory,
and Crisis Stability after
the Cold War
FRANK P. HARVEY
McGill-Queen's University Press
Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo
McGill-Queen's University Press 1997
ISBN 0-7735-1605-0 (cloth)
ISBN 0-7735-1606-9 (paper)
Legal deposit third quarter 1997
Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec
Printed in Canada on acid-free paper
This book has been published with the help of a grant
from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation
of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the
support received for its publishing program from the
Canada Council's Block Grants program.
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Harvey, Frank P. (Frank Paul), 1962-
The future's back : nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory,
and crisis stability after the Cold War
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7735-1605-0 (bound) -
ISBN 0-7735-1606-9 (pbk.)
i. Nuclear crisis stability. 2. Nuclear crisis control.
3. Deterrence (Strategy). 4. Security, International.
I. Tide.
1:264^368 1997 355.02'! 7 097-900545-0
Typeset in New Baskerville 10/12
by Caractera inc., Quebec City
To Kalli G
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Contents
Tables and Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction xiii
1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological
Constraints and Solutions 3
2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate
Testing 19
3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing 47
4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948—88 56
5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence 94
6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War 112
7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory:
Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War 121
Notes 145
Bibliography 171
Index 191
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Tables and Figures
TABLES
2.1 Classification of Deterrence Literature 21
2.2 Nuclear Constraints and Conflict Type 32
2.3 Classes of Deterrence/Compellence Encounters 34
2.4 Coefficients of Correspondence 37
3.1 Superpower Rivalry in Foreign Policy Crises,
1948-88 49
4. i Intermediate Payoff Combinations and Resulting Error
Levels 70
4.2 Superpower Bargaining Techniques: Provocation and
Retaliation 73
4.3 Trigger and Response in Foreign Policy Crises,
1948-88 74
5.1 Degrees of Geostrategic Importance 98
5.2 Degrees of Heterogeneity 98
5.3 Issues 99