The Functions of Language and Cognition

310 Pages·1979·27.85 MB·

by  Grover Whitehurst

The Functions of
Language and Cognition
EDITED BY
GroverJ. Whitehurst
Department of Psychology
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, New York
Barry J. Zimmerman
Ph.D. Program in Education
Graduate School and University Center
of The City University of New York
New York, New York
ACADEMIC PRESS New York San Francisco London 1979
A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers
COPYRIGHT © 1979, BY ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
NO PART OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE REPRODUCED OR
TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC
OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPY, RECORDING, OR ANY
INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT
PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER.
ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
Ill Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003
United Kingdom Edition published by
ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. (LONDON) LTD.
24/28 Oval Road, London NW1 7DX
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
The Functions of language and cognition.
Includes bibliographies.
1. Psycholinguistics. 2. Children—Language.
3. Cognition in children. I. Whitehurst, Grover J.
II. Zimmerman, Barry J.
BF455.F86 153 78-20004
ISBN 0-12-747050-6
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
79 80 81 82 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
List of Contributors
Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors' contributions begin.
Steven R. Asher (175), Department of Educational Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana, Illinois 61801
Irvin Brown, Jr. (141), Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Kathleen Corsale (199), Department of Psychology, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514
Kenneth Kaye (23), Department of Education, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637
Robert M. Liebert (229), Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony
Brook, New York 11794
Peter A. Ornstein (199), Department of Psychology, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514
Ted L. Rosenthal (265), Department of Psychology, Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee
38152
Robert S. Siegler (83), Department of Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsyl­
vania 15213
Grover J. Whitehurst (1, 115), Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, New York 11794
Barry J. Zimmerman (1, 57), Ph.D. Program in Education, The Graduate School and University Center,
The City University of New York, New York, New York 10036
[ix]
Preface
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1967) lists This led to several strategic decisions that shaped
several definitions of function. Closest in meaning the form of this book. First, we wanted an inte­
to our usage is "a thing that depends on and varies grated collection of chapters that would serve as a
with something else [p. 338]." In other words, the comprehensive survey of the field rather than as a
functions of language and cognition are the things disparate collection of reports of individual re­
on which linguistic and cognitive behavior depends search programs. To this end, we provided an
and with which it varies. organizational structure for each chapter as a guide
We initiated this book largely because we had to contributors. As a result, this work has a more
become increasingly disturbed by the preponder­ cohesive textbook character than most edited col­
ant influence of structural approaches to language lections, and we feel that it can, in fact, be used as a
and thought. Structure has been defined as "the ar­ text in graduate and upper-level undergraduate
rangement of all parts of a whole [Webster's, p. courses in developmental psychology, cognitive
871]." Whether represented by Chomsky, Piaget, psychology, clinical psychology, education, and
computer models of memory, feature models of rehabilitation. Second, we wanted each chapter to
meaning, or the like, we felt that attempts to des­ focus on explaining developmental changes in
cribe behavior by reference to its abstract pattern children's functioning. Third, we wanted to attract
and arrangement had inappropriately and unfor­ the widest possible readership. For this reason, we
tunately tended to supplant attempts at explana­ did not adopt a particular functional orientation.
tion through dependencies among variables. At a The contributors run the gamut of theoretical per­
more personal level, we were often dismayed at en­ suasions including radical behavioral, social learn­
countering supposedly authoritative and scholarly ing, information processing, and Brunerian. To our
reviews of topics in language and cognition that delight, a common functional theme emerged
completely ignored large bodies of evidence col­ clearly and cleanly from these sometimes fractious
lected by functional scholars concerning the expla­ points-of-view. Finally, we wanted a readable,
nation of these phenomena. Our primary concern, lively book. Our contribution to this end as editors
then, was to provide a forum for articulating a func­ was to select contributors who we felt wrote par­
tional approach to language and cognition. ticularly well and to encourage them to write at a
[xi]
[xü] Preface
level that would make their work accessible to an enjoys will be due to their efforts. Several of our
audience that was knowledgeable in psychology colleagues were helpful or encouraging during our
but perhaps had little background in the author's early planning. Duane Rumbough, in particular,
particular topic. We think the contributors suc­ was instrumental in bringing our plans to Academic
ceeded to a high degree. The chapters are lively Press. We are most grateful to him for his interest.
and clear and several of them stake out new We would also like to thank Evalyn Segal for her
theoretical ground. suggestions. Finally we would like to mention that
Now we come to expressions of gratitude and this book represented equal editorial and writing
acknowledgments. First and foremost, we wish to contributions by both of us, and thus senior author­
thank our contributors. Whatever success this book ship was determined randomly.
1
Structure and Function: A Comparison of
Two Views of the Development of
Language and Cognition
Barry J. Zimmerman
Grover J. Whitehurst
INTRODUCTION for her to be satisfied with her mother's explana
tion. The type of calculator knowledge shared by
Explanations have this in common, they satisfy us. Margie and her mother is functional; it focuses on
—TURNER (1967, p. 267) the correlations between what happens to the cal
culator (input) and what the calculator does (out
Margie had gotten one of those hand-held elec put). Margie and her mother have a functional
tronic calculators for her tenth birthday. "Show me theory of calculator behavior, if you will. Their
how it works, Mom," she asked. theory allows them to control current behavior,
"Well, to add two numbers you press the key for predict future behavior, and generalize to new in
the first number, then the key for the second stances; further, their theory satisfies them because
number, and then the sum appears up here in the it provides all the necessary knowledge to achieve
window," her mother replied. "To subtract, multi the goals in which they are interested. If we imag
ply, or divide you do the same type of thing but you ine a more complex, programmable calculator, our
press one of these keys instead of the plus-sign metaphor becomes richer by including historical
key." variables. Thus the calculator's current behavior is a
Margie played around with the calculator for a function of current key stroking as well as past
while and then said, "Thanks, Mom; I think I experience.
understand it now." In no sense does functional knowledge exhaust
In a very real sense, Margie did understand how the possibilities for explaining calculator behavior.
the calculator worked and there was good reason Most other approaches would be structural A di­
ll]
Copyright © 1979 by Academic Press, Inc.
The Functions of Language and Cognition All rights ofreproduction in any form reserved.
ISBN-0-12-747050-6
[2] Barry J. Zimmerman and Grover J. Whitehurst
cuit diagram, for example, is one answer to the within individuals across time. For example,
question, "How does it work?" Thinking of it as a logicomathematical and neurophysiological
sort of neurophysiological approach, the diagram analyses may predict the potential of a cal
would be much more satisfying for the person culator to derive the mean or the standard
constructing the calculator than would the deviation from a set of numbers, but only the
functional knowlege of the type held by Margie or functional analysis can predict which cal
included in the owner's instruction manual for the culator will do so and when, depending on
calculator. Or one might have a purely logico- whether the appropriate key strokes have oc
mathematical analysis of the properties of the cal curred.
culator's behavior; we might say that the products
These principles of compatibility and indepen
of the calculator's activities are additive, transitive,
dence coupled with the differential ability of
symmetric, etc.
functional and structural explanations to handle
These structural explanations also provide some
change versus state and individual versus collective
degree of prediction and control. A circuit diagram,
should provide a means for deciding when which
for instance, predicts what will be an operable
approach is best. Unfortunately, however, the cir
calculator and what will not. And a logicomathe-
cumstances are not so simple. What we must con
matical analysis will allow us to predict, in a general
sider now are the complexities of functional and
sense, what classes of outcomes the calculator will
structural explanations that are introduced when
and will not produce.
our subject is human behavior instead of cal
We do not intend to imply that human actions are
culators:
analogous to the behavior of pocket calculators, but
our metaphor may be useful in defining the issues 1. Most functional theories of human behavior
inherent in functional versus structural approaches have not been limited to relations among respond
by allowing us to consider the generic conse ing, current stimulation, and historical stimulation:
quences of these types of explanations, separated Intervening variables and hypothetical constructs
from human behavior. The following points seem have been added. Reasons for this are that histories
reasonable: of stimulation may be very long and complicated,
or unavailable for inspection, or a given output may
1. There is nothing incompatible among func occur as a function of many different histories of
tional, neurophysiological-structural, and stimulation.
logicomathematical-structural explanations. It has often seemed necessary to assume a cogni
There is no way that an accurate functional tive variable in the current situation as a substitute
explanation can violate the principles of a for the unavailable or complex or diverse history of
structural explanation or vice-versa. stimulation. For instance, Patterson and Mischel
2. Functional and structural explanations may be (1976) speak of the role of plans in resistance to
developed independently. That is, if one does temptation, and Bandura (1977b) states that all
not know how a calculator works, one may experiences that induce psychological change are
stroke keys and observe output and develop a mediated by feelings of self-efficacy. When such
set of functional relations; or one may take off variables are tied closely to specific histories of
the cover and construct a diagram of the cir stimulation and when there are measurement op
cuit; or one may observe the output and de erations that lead to the strong inference that these
scribe its logical properties. variables index real covert behaviors, then this
3. Functional explanations allow the prediction mediational approach falls within the functional
and control of changes in individual behavior tradition. But there are differences of opinion on
across individuals and within individuals the usefulness of substituting mediational variables
across time, whereas structural explanations for a historical account. As we shall see later, radical
predict and describe static behavioral states behaviorists tend to view explanations based on
that are common across individuals and mediating variables such as plans or self-efficacy
[3]
1. Structure and Function
feelings as incomplete at best since a cognitive plan, functional explanation and an accurate neurophys­
for instance, is something to be explained (a de­ iological explanation are always compatible, an ex­
pendent variable) rather than an explanation (an planation based on hypothetical constructs may be
independent variable). Cognitive behaviorists, on incompatible with an accurate neurophysiological
the other hand, argue that an individual's history of explanation. For example, though there is surely a
stimulation is seldom knowable and in any case neurological substrate that corresponds to a child's
affects current behavior by building cognitive oper­ ability to say a new word after hearing a parent use
ations that operate in the current situation. A plan, it, there would seem to be little reason for the phys­
then, is a dependent variable in the sense that it iological psychologist to search for the substrate of
derives from the individual's learning history, but it a construct like drive.
is also an independent variable in the sense that it 4. Structural-logicomathematical explanations
affects behavior in current and future settings. of human behavior often masquerade as functional
2. Some of the important stimulation variables in explanations. Thus, instead of recognizing that
a functional analysis of human behavior may be human speech has grammatical structure, we say
private. This is related to but not exactly the same that it is produced because of a grammatical struc­
issue as the one just raised above. Intervening ture. Instead of noting that conceptual behavior of
variables and hypothetical constructs need lay no 4-year-olds is characterized by certain regularities,
claim to physical existence (MacCorquodale and we relabel the regularities, treat them as hypotheti­
Meehl, 1948). Drive in Hullian theory, for instance, cal constructs, and use them to explain the same
may be a purely formal device in the same way as output from which they were derived. This is like
negative number may be a formal device in mathe­ saying that the arithmetic properties of the pocket
matics. The problem of privacy is different. Many calculator are caused by the principles of tran­
real events (dreams, headaches, private speech, sitivity, symmetricality, additivity, etc. When
proprioceptive feedback, visual images, etc.) may logicomathematical explanations are treated this
not be publicly available for measurement. The way they obscure the search for the functional
issue is how a functional analysis can include these relations that we have argued are necessary for the
events and still provide useful as opposed to illus­ development of neurophysiological-structural ex­
ory explanations. The problem is that in the ab­ planations, and that are, of course, valuable in their
sence of public veriflability, how can one be sure own right.
that the "private stimulation" is truly occurring We would conclude, then, that functional expla­
within the skin of the subject, rather than merely nations based on real events as opposed to fictional
within the skin of the theorist? constructions have a primary role to play in the
3. Structural-neurophysiological explanations prediction and particularly the control of human
of human behavior are often fictional; they are behavior. Neurophysiological theorizing will de­
developed as hypotheses about what the pend on a well-developed functional base, and true
neurophysiological structure might be like in order neurophysiological explanations can only comple­
to produce the functional relations that have been ment true functional explanations. Logicomathe­
observed. This means that the independence prin­ matical explanations are important in understand­
ciple of structural and functional explanations does ing the abstract patterns of response systems and in
not apply to human behavior. The development of predicting broad classes of behavior across individ­
neurophysiological-structural explanations de­ uals, but they have no utility in control of behavior
pends on a well-developed set of functional expla­ since no independent variables are identified, and
nations. One cannot make reasonable guesses they should not be confused with functional expla­
about what the circuit diagram might look like until nations. All of these approaches to explanation
one knows well what the input-output relations have important contributions to make to varieties
are. There is a historical affinity between the use of of understanding of human behavior, but only if
hypothetical constructs and neurologizing that is their differing utilities and interdependences are
ironically inappropriate. Whereas an accurate recognized.
[4] Barry J. Zimmerman and Grover J. Whitehurst
In the section to follow we will explore the origins to adapt to his environment. Structures are a
of functional and structural approaches to cogni­ hypothetical construct for Piaget. He inferred their
tion and language and some of the prominent cur­ presence by observing features common to a va­
rent theories. We will argue that the development riety of acts by a child. Structures are assumed to
of powerful explanations of cognition and language offer a parsimonious explanation for behaving and
will depend on research on functions that has been are often expressed in symbolic logic formulas.
ignored in the recent structural Zeitgeist. According to Piaget, structures emerge from ex­
perience as a result of two presumed innate pro­
cesses: organization and adaptation. Organization
CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURAL refers to the tendency for people to integrate infor­
THEORIES mation into a systematic form. Adaptation refers to
a person's mental reaction to information. Adapta­
Structural theories encompass much theoretical tion is, in turn, determined by two component
diversity and thus important differences as well as processes called assimilation and accommodation.
similarities exist among them. In general, however, Assimilation refers to circumstances where infor­
structural approaches all stress understanding the mation is altered to fit existing structures, and
general organization of knowledge as the best way accommodation refers to changes in structures that
to explain how people think. Behavior is given less are necessary before information can be organized.
attention in this account since it is assumed to In normal psychological functioning, however,
reflect imperfectly how knowledge is organized. Piaget believes that assimilation and accommoda­
No single structural theory has emerged that pur­ tion are always present to some degree but vary in
ports to explain all cognitive functioning. Instead, their mix, depending on the nature of experience.
each of the theories that will be described is limited Because of people's tendency to organize, Piaget
to a separate content domain such as language, assumes that incoming information constantly
intellectual development, moral growth, and creates situations of intellectual imbalance, or dis­
mnemonic functioning. The theories that were equilibrium. That is, new information by virtue of
selected for discussion are widely considered to be the fact that it is new taxes assimilatory processes,
the most important in their respective areas, and creates a state of disequilibrium, and compels ac­
each of these theories will be contrasted with commodation. These processes of assimilation and
functional accounts in subsequent chapters of this accommodation lead to the progressive develop­
volume. These include Chomsky's (1957) version of ment of new structures.
psycholinguistic theory, Piaget's (1952) theory of Structures are assumed to emerge in qualitatively
intellectual development, Piaget's (1948) and distinct phases termed periods and stages. These
Kohlberg's (1968) theories of moral development, periods and stages are assumed to be identical for
and a generalized model of information processing all people and are assumed to emerge in an invar­
and memory extrapolated from the work of Atkin­ iant sequence. A separate, qualitatively distinct
son and Shiffrin (1968) and Neisser (1967). structure is assumed to underlie performance at
each period and stage. Piaget discerned four major
periods during a child's intellectual development
Piaget's Theory of
and described the characteristic structure for each.
Intellectual Development
Piaget's theory has a strong maturational flavor
Piaget's view of human intelligence was shaped to it because of his assumption that all people form
by his interests and training in two quite disparate the same general structures and that these struc­
disciplines: biology (the study of life) and epis- tures always emerge in the same sequence. In addi­
tomology (the study of knowledge). From this tion, Piaget's utilization of the assimilation-
background, he synthesized a theory that de­ accommodation constructs requires that informa­
scribed intelligence in terms of mental structures tion must be at least partially understood (assimi­
that emerged in discrete stages as a child attempted lated) before it can promote structural development
1. Structure and Function [5]
(accommodation). This formulation led to the pre­ hypotheses (i.e., structures or transformation
diction that cognitive growth cannot be accelerated rules) about the meaning of observed language.
unless the children display some levels of "readi­ This mechanism was assumed to constrain the par­
ness." Piaget's theory does not allow for reversals ticular type of structures that children formed to
in cognitive functioning as a result of experience. that set postulated by Chomsky. Thus all children
Together these characteristics of Piaget's theory were assumed to innately have a deep structure
have led a large number of psychologists to con­ and an LAD—two constructs remarkably similar to
clude that it is basically nativistic (e.g., Baldwin, Piaget's notions or organization and adaptation. In
1967; Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966; Brainerd, both theories, as meaning is mapped onto experi­
1977). Many of these general conclusions appear to ence, a particular and inevitable set of structures
extend to structural theories of language as well. evolves.
Psycholinguistic Theories Moral-Development Theories
Chomsky's (1957) theory of transformational Piaget (1948) extended his general structural
grammar has directly or indirectly shaped almost formulation to moral development as well. The
all current structural accounts of language, particu­ same general set of psychological mechanisms is
larly those dealing with syntax. According to assumed to operate, and cognitive structural de­
Chomsky, linguistic functioning can be described velopment is assumed to affect moral reasoning
at two levels: a surface structure level, which is directly. Only two stages in children's moral
generally depicted using diagrams of the usual thought are identified. The first period, termed
parts of speech, and a covert, unobservable level objective morality, is evident in the moral judgments
called deep structure. Deep structure refers to the of children who are less than approximately 8 years
meaning level of language, and it is usually de­ of age. Piaget presented stories to children and
picted as a simple declarative sentence such as "The asked them to evaluate the relative culpability of
man accelerated the car." This meaning could be two protagonists for various misdeeds such as ly­
expressed in numerous ways, such as a passive ing, stealing, or accidents. Young children were
form—"The car was accelerated by the man"—or a found to make judgments on the basis of the
question form—"What was accelerated?" Chom­ amount of damage an action caused. These chil­
sky devised a number of transformation rules for dren thus concluded that a boy who accidentally
explaining the various ways that a single core struc­ broke many of his mother's dishes was more
ture could be converted into grammatically correct blameworthy than his brother who intentionally
surface structure sentences. Deep structures were smashed a single glass. Children who were older
assumed to be nativistically endowed for human than approximately 8 years tended to judge the boy
beings as a species. Children's progressive devel­ who intentionally smashed a single glass as more
opment in language reflects their learning of the guilty. Piaget called this subjective moral reasoning
surface structure realizations that are employed in since intentions were used as the criterion.
the native language. Kohlberg (1968) has offered an elaboration of
Chomsky (1965) believes that there must be some Piaget's theory. In this version, children's moral
innate mental limitations that constrain the struc­ reasoning is assumed to undergo three major
tural nature of the transformation rules that chil­ stages, each composed of two substages. The first
dren form. Apparently this assumption was made stage, termed preconventional, refers to moral jus­
because other rules that are not formed are theoret­ tifications based on whether an act avoided
ically possible. In order to explain why certain punishment or obtained rewards for the pro­
transformation rules or structures are formed, tagonist. Morality is described as purely self-
Chomsky postulated the existence of a language centered and oriented toward immediate conse­
acquisition device (LAD). The LAD was endowed quences for deeds. A second morality stage, re­
with the capability of forming and verifying ferred to as conventional, describes moral justifica-