the foreign office and policy-making in china 1945-1950. anglo-american relations and the ...

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THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND POLICY-MAKING IN CHINA 1945-1950.
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA.
ROBERT EMMERSON WATSON
~-
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.
THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MAY 1996
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been
given where reference has been made to the work of others.
11
ABSTRACT.
The thesis contributes to the broad body of literature which examines
the role of Great Britain in the origins of the Cold War. In particular it
focuses on the Foreign Office attitude towards the course of the Chinese
Civil War, and ultimately the establishment of a Communist government in
China between 1945 and 1950. It is a revisionist interpretation of cold war
history drawn from a study of Anglo-American relations with regard to
Chinese politics during this period. Traditional interpretations have
emphasised the unchallenged nature of American involvement in China
after the war. The thesis argues that during this period Britain actively
sought to compete for such a predominant position, and specifically that the
Foreign Office sought to replace the United States with Britain as the pre
eminent Western influence in post-war Chinese politics.
To this end, Britain gradually moved its policy from one of co
operation with the United States to one of competition. Whilst originally
seeking collaboration with Washington, the Foreign Office became
increasingly frustrated with the problems within the American policy
making machinery, and ultimately pursued a unilateral position in China.
This was most evident after 1948 when the rapid collapse of the
Kuomintang position forced Western states to closely consider their
relationship with the Chinese communists. Different views of Mao's
communism, and different policy objectives in China, consequently led the
British to move away from the American position. The thesis demonstrates
such differences had actually existed since 1945, and charts the gradual
breakdown of relations between that point and 1950. It specifically argues
that unilateral recognition was as much an attempt to demonstrate to the
Americans the error of their ways as it was to 'secure a convenience' of
limited trade with the communists. Source material is drawn primarily from
the Foreign Office 371 series, and Record Group 59 of the State
Department Papers.
111
Acknowledgements.
I would like to thank the following for their help and support during the writing of this
thesis. My archival research was greatly eased by the help of the staff of the Public
Records Office at Kew, London, and at National Archives II at College Park,
Maryland. Funding has been provided by the University of Leeds in my first year, and
thereafter by the British Academy.
Help has been forthcoming in various forms, particularly from Steve Hitchen,
Martin O'Rourke, Rob Walter and Jayne Rodgers. Melissa Bailey and Jenny
Greenhalgh offered tremendous hospitality during my research in London, and
William Forrest was truly generous in sharing his Washington home with me whilst at
College Park. My thanks is also extended to my supervisor, Dr. Caroline Kennedy
Pipe of the Institute for International Studies, both for her support in securing grants to
fund this thesis, and for her advice and guidance regarding its content. Nonetheless,
any errors contained within the text are entirely my own.
Table of Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1
Chapter One
Anglo-American Relations in China, 1945-1946: An Entent Cordiale? ........... 30
Chapter Two
The Civil War Intensifies: The British View of American Policy in 1947 ........ 78
Chapter Three
Decisions Approach: 1948 .................................................................................. 126
Chapter Four
The Collapse of the Kuomintang: January - June 1949 .................................... .186
Chapter Five
The British Move Towards Recognition: July 1949 - January 1950 ................ 223
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 263
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 286
1
Introduction
This thesis contributes to the broad body of literature which examines the role
of Great Britain in the origins of the Cold War. In particular it focuses on the Foreign
Office attitude towards the course of the Chinese Civil War, and ultimately the
establishment of a Communist government in China between 1945 and 1950. It is a
revisionist interpretation of cold war history drawn from a study of Anglo-American
relations with regard to Chinese politics during this period. Traditional interpretations
have emphasised the unchallenged nature of American involvement in China after the
war. The thesis argues that during this period Britain actively sought to compete for
such a predominant position, and specifically that the Foreign Office sought to replace
the United States with the United Kingdom as the pre-eminent Western influence in
post-war Chinese politics.
By examining the concept of competition between the pillars of the
transatlantic alliance, it becomes evident that the United States and Great Britain did
not naturally collude over policy, and that they were indeed frequently in conflict. In
China, the concept of a 'Special Relationship' between Britain and the United States
did not apply. British policy, formulated principally by the Foreign Office, evolved
from a practice of accomodating or counterbalancing an incohesive American
approach. Britain's unilateral recognition of the Chinese Communist Party's victory in
the Chinese Civil War in October 1949 came in the face of American opposition, yet
represented the culmination of long-standing British worries over the coherency of
American policy and was therefore an attempt to strike an independent course.
Washington's response to growing British assertiveness was often obstructive and
competitive, with different views expressed by diplomats, military staff and
2
politicians. This confused and ill-defined reaction to British initiatives confirmed
Foreign Office suspicions of dislocation and division within the American policy
making process. As such, recognition was as much an attempt bluntly to demonstrate
the error of American ways in their continued support for Chiang Kai-shek' s
nationalists as it was an attempt to create a stronger regional position.
Chapter One focuses on the British perspective of Chinese affairs immediately
after World War Two. This involves a consideration of American policy towards post
war China, the Foreign Office's interpretation of the American role, and the impact it
had on subsequent British policy. Chapter Two examines the development of a clearer
British policy during 1947 as separate issues emerged concerning the nature of
Chinese communism and the strength of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.
Similarly it assesses in closer detail the British interpretation of the American position
which had developed during and after the Marshall Mission in 1946. The third chapter
highlights growing British dissatisfaction with the direction of American policy in
China, and registers also a growing determination within the Foreign Office to offer
alternative policies rather than simply following the American lead. Chapters Four and
Five consider developments from January to June 1949, and from July to the British
extension of 'de jure' recognition in January 1950. Chapter Four observes a clear
reorientation of British policy away from the United States towards an acceptance of a
communist victory, and the fifth chapter examines the execution of that policy and the
final rift between Washington and London over the recognition issue. Through
establishing what constituted British foreign policy goals in China, and comparing
these with American policy, it will be possible to examine the extent and impact of
competition between London and Washington over the formulation, direction and
implementation of American policy. Whilst the Foreign Office perspective was pre-
3
occupied with a desire to trade with Communist China for as long as possible,
American foreign policy was also shaped by a long-standing commitment to Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalists, and a consideration of the strategic implications of a
Communist victory in China for Korea and Japan.
Through this narrative, a series of key questions are addressed. Whilst it is
evident that recognition by Britain was a short term remedy to promote a limited
period of trade with communist China, and hopefully in doing so preserve a longer
term position for Britain in the Far East, to what extent was it intended as an attempt
to direct American policy by demonstrating alternative, coherent policy options to
Washington's? Did the Foreign Office seek to guide a United States which it perceived
to be drifting and lacking in focus in the Far East? Did Britain seek to 'control'
American policy in order to limit potential conflict in the region, and thereby
safeguard its imperial position as its limited resources dwindled further? If it did, what
policies did the Foreign Office pursue to this end - ultimately, did they aim to replace
the United States with Britain as the pivotal Western power in China? The thesis
assesses whether it is tenable to suggest that Britain was capable of exercising
significant influence in regions where it had relatively little physical power. Was its
presence and diplomatic ability in China ever an important factor in the formulation of
American foreign policy, given strong Congressional support for Chiang's regime and
growing anti -Communist popular sentiment?
In order to address these issues, British archival research centres upon the
Foreign Office 371 series, lodged at the Public Records Office at Kew. This provides
the details of Foreign Office opinion and policy recommendations from 1945 through
to 1950, both at a general level and from within the China Department. Reference is
also made to War and Cabinet Office material from 1945 to 1949, when in late
December the policy of unilateral recognition of the Chinese Communist Government
was officially countenanced. The thesis is primarily concerned with Foreign Office
4
interpretations and advice to Attlee's Labour administration, and therefore the private
papers of Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of the time have also been consulted.
From an American perspective, the primary aim is to understand the State Department
view of British policy, and the reaction of American diplomacy to British initiatives.
This becomes of special significance in 1949 when high-level meetings between
Britain and America were convened to consider the China issue. Similarly, the Foreign
Office reaction to American policy can also be measured by examining the
information they received from Washington, most particularly with the details of the
Marshall Mission in 1946. Archival research has centred on State Department papers
contained in Record Group 59, and assorted NSC documents, all housed at National
Archives II at College Park Maryland, and the published texts of the FRUS series, the
Marshall Mission and the China White Paper. None of this material is recently
released, and all of the American archival sources have been the subject of fierce
debate within American academic circles, as will be outlined later in this chapter. The
importance from the British perspective is that whilst this material has been available
for a number of years, it has not been used to analyse Foreign Office perceptions of
American action in China in this period, or to search for evidence of British attempts
to compete with or to direct American policy in Great Britain's favour. Whether
London's focus was primarily on maintaining a British trading position in the Far East
and in China, or whether it held a wider strategic rationale, a consideration of British
views of American foreign policy is necessary, as is the need to examine how the
British sought to project and promote their own policy based on limited resources.
The need to reassess the origins of the Cold War in a European context has
gained momentum and emphasis in the last ten years. John Lewis Gaddis's comments
5
on American revisionism in 19721 and his observations in 1983 on the emergence of a
,
'post-revisionist synthesis' were amongst the first to irnply that both the 'traditional'
and 'revisionist' historiographical schools were too deterministic in their attempts to
portray one or other of the superpowers as the villain of the piece.2 Rather, it suggested
that a wider range of forces were at play, and that these did not preclude the
involvement of a combination of historiographical approaches. However, 'post
revisionism' in Gaddis's view is concerned primarily with reconciling certain aspects
of a historiography that is predominantly American, and concerned first and foremost
with American policy . The development of historical debate over American foreign
policy towards China will be outlined later in this chapter. Certainly it has already
moved through both a 'traditional' (or 'orthodox') and a 'revisionist' phase. Studies of
British policy have not undergone the same process. D.C.Watt argued in 1978, in his
'Letter to a British Historian', that British historical re-appraisals should not fall into
the American revisionist problem of being 'concerned essentially with guilt, not
understanding'.3 Gaddis's post-revisionism is in part an attempt to redress that
imbalance in American historical studies, and a re-appraisal of the role of the British in
the origins of the cold war is part of that process. Scholars have been primarily
concerned with examining the notion that the states of Western Europe played a far
more vital role in securing a political division of the area than historical orthodoxy
first ascribed to them. Yet whilst this is a key stage in developing a post-revisionist
IlL.Gaddis., The United States and the Origins o/the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia
1972).
2l L.Gaddis., 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', Diplomatic
History, Vol.7, No.3, Summer 1983, pp.171-190.
3D.C.Watt., 'Rethinking the Cold War: A letter to a British Historian' The Political Quarterly Volume
49 1978, p.448.
6
perspective it is essentially an application of a revisionist critique when viewed from a
British perspective.
This thesis tests the notion that Britain actively sought to exploit American
policy in order that the superpower could underwrite Britain's security interests in
China's post-war politics. Whilst both traditional and revisionist historiographical
theories have focused primarily on the formulation of foreign policy from an
American perspective, by examining a wider series of criteria it will be possible to
establish what determined British action in China, focusing particularly on the Foreign
Office assessment of American intentions in the formulation of their China policy.
British and American perspectives on China from 1945 to 1950 therefore need
to be viewed in their historiographical context. Examining the present state of the
debate over British and American interests in post-war China during that period, it is
evident that the main emphasis has so far rested with scholars' examinations of
American actions, and British assessments of London's policy objectives in the region.
There is little literature examining British perceptions of American policy towards
China and consequent attempts made by Great Britain to use American strength as a
vehicle for its own regional agenda.
This chapter will focus first on an examination of the orientation and
formulation of British foreign policy, identifying London's strategic concerns in the
Far East and its attitude towards China during the Civil War. The same approach will
be applied to American policy during the same period. An analysis of how British
policies developed will then aim to highlight Foreign Office perceptions of
inconsistencies in American attitudes and policy formulation, and the consequent
opportunities these offered for manipulation by the British. This will concentrate