The Federalist

562 Pages·2005·1.55 MB·English

by  Alexander Hamilton

A H
lexander AMILTON
J M
ames ADISON
J J
ohn AY
The
Federalist
Edited, with Introduction and
Historical Commentary, by
J. R. P
OLE
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
JAMES MADISON
JOHN JAY
The Federalist

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
JAMES MADISON
JOHN JAY
The Federalist
EDITEDWITHHISTORICALANDLITERARYANNOTATIONS,
ANDINTRODUCTION, BY
J. R. POLE
FBA, FRHISTS: EMERITUSFELLOWOFST. CATHERINE’SCOLLEGE, OXFORD;
EMERITUSRHODESPROFESSOROFAMERICANHISTORYANDINSTITUTIONS,
UNIVERSITYOFOXFORD; HON. FOREIGNMEMBEROFTHE
AMERICANHISTORICALASSOCIATION
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Indianapolis/Cambridge
Copyright © 2005 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
All rights reserved
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
For further information, please address:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 44937
Indianapolis, IN 46244-0937
www.hackettpublishing.com
Cover design by Abigail Coyle
Text design by Jennifer Plumley
Composition by Professional Book Compositors, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The federalist / Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay; edited with
historical and literary annotations and introduction by J. R. Pole.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-87220-711-0 (pbk.) — ISBN 0-87220-712-9 (hardcover)
1. Constitutional history—United States—Sources. I. Hamilton,
Alexander, 1757–1804. II. Madison, James, 1751–1836. III. Jay, John,
1745–1829. IV. Pole, J. R. (Jack Richon)
KF4515.F4 2004
342.7302'9—dc22
2004004523
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-711-0 (pbk.)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-712-7 (hardcover)
eISBN: 978-1-60384-005-7 (e-book)
In Memory
Roy Porter

CONTENTS
Editorial Note xi
A Note on the Text and Annotations xiii
Introduction xiv
A Brief Chronology xxv
Themes xlii
The Federalist
1. Introduction 1
2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence 5
3. The Same Subject Continued 9
4. The Same Subject Continued 13
5. The Same Subject Continued 17
6. Concerning Dangers from War Between the States 21
7. The Subject Continued and Particular Causes Enumerated 28
8. The Effects of Internal War in Producing Standing Armies 36
and Other Institutions Unfriendly to Liberty
9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction 41
and Insurrection
10. The Same Subject Continued 48
11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commerce and a Navy 55
12. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue 61
13. The Same Subject Continued with a View to Economy 66
14. An Objection Drawn from the Extent of Country Answered 69
15. Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation in Relation 74
to the Principle of Legislation for the States in Their
Collective Capacities
16. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Same Principles 82
17. The Subject Continued, and Illustrated By Examples to Show the 87
Tendency of Federal Governments, Rather to Anarchy Among
the Members Than Tyranny in the Head
18. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples 92
19. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples 98
20. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples 105
vii
contents
21. Further Defects of the Present Constitution 110
22. The Same Subject Continued and Concluded 115
23. The Necessity of a Government, at Least Equally Energetic 124
with the One Proposed
24. The Subject Continued, with an Answer to an Objection 128
Concerning Standing Armies
25. The Subject Continued with the Same View 133
26. The Subject Continued with the Same View 138
27. The Subject Continued with the Same View 144
28. The Same Subject Continued 148
29. Concerning the Militia 152
30. Concerning Taxation 159
31. The Same Subject Continued 164
32. The Same Subject Continued 168
33. The Same Subject Continued 172
34. The Same Subject Continued 176
35. The Same Subject Continued 181
36. The Same Subject Continued 186
37. Concerning the Difficulties Which the Convention Must Have 192
Experienced in the Formation of a Proper Plan
38. The Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections 199
to the Plan Exposed
39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: 206
An Objection in Respect to the Powers of the Convention, Examined
40. The Same Objection Further Examined 212
41. General View of the Powers Proposed to Be Vested in the Union 219
42. The Same View Continued 227
43. The Same View Continued 234
44. The Same View Continued and Concluded 243
45. A Further Discussion of the Supposed Danger from the Powers of 250
the Union, to the State Governments
46. The Subject of the Last Paper Resumed; with an Examination 255
of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and
State Governments
47. The Meaning of the Maxim, Which Requires a Separation of the 261
Departments of Power, Examined and Ascertained
viii
contents
48. The Same Subject Continued, with a View to the Means of 268
Giving Efficacy in Practice to That Maxim
49. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View 273
50. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View 277
51. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View, and Concluded 280
52. Concerning the House of Representatives, with a View to the 285
Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and the Time of
Service of the Members
53. The Same Subject Continued, with a View of the Term of 290
Service of the Members
54. The Same Subject Continued with a View to the Ratio 295
of Representation
55. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Total Number 300
of the Body
56. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Same Point 305
57. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Supposed 309
Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to Elevate the
Few Above the Many
58. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Future 314
Augmentation of the Members
59. Concerning the Regulation of Elections 319
60. The Same Subject Continued 323
61. The Same Subject Continued and Concluded 328
62. Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, with Regard to the 331
Qualifications of the Members, the Manner of Appointing Them,
the Equality of Representation, the Number of the Senators
and the Duration of Their Appointments
63. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard to 337
the Duration of Appointment of Its Members
64. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard 344
to the Power of Making Treaties
65. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Relation 349
to Its Capacity as a Court for the Trial of Impeachments
66. The Same Subject Continued 354
67. Concerning the Constitution of the President; A Gross Attempt 359
to Misrepresent this Part of the Plan Detected
68. The View of the Constitution of the President Continued, in 363
Relation to the Mode of Appointment
ix