The External World and Our Knowledge of It: Hume’s Critical Realism, an Exposition and a Defence

824 Pages·2008·4.39 MB·English

by  Fred Wilson

THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF IT:
HUME’S CRITICAL REALISM, AN EXPOSITION
AND A DEFENCE
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FRED WILSON
The External World and Our
Knowledge of It
Hume’s Critical Realism, an
Exposition and a Defence
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
Toronto Buffalo London
© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2008
Toronto Buffalo London
www.utppublishing.com
Printed in Canada
ISBN 978-0-8020-9764-4
Toronto Studies in Philosophy
Editors: Donald Ainslie and Amy Mullin
Printed on acid-free paper
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Wilson, Fred, 1937–
The external world and our knowledge of it : Hume’s critical realism : an
exposition and a defence / Fred Wilson.
(Toronto studies in philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8020-9764-4
1. Hume, David, 1711–1776. 2. Perception (Philosophy). 3. Knowledge,
Theory of. 4. Critical realism. I. Title. II. Series.
B1498.W45 2008 192 C2007-905822-1
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its
publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario
Arts Council.
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its
publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book
Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).
This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian
Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to
Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
to the memory of
Páll Árdal
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Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Note on References xiii
Introduction 3
1 Abstract Ideas and Other Linguistic Rules in Hume 21
A. Language and Hume’s Moral Theory 23
B. Introspective Psychology, Associationism, and Introspective
Analysis 47
C. How Thought Becomes General: Abstract Ideas, Images,
Learning, and Rules of Language 69
D. The ‘New Hume’ versus the ‘Old’ 88
Appendix: Hume and Cognitive Psychology 115
2 The Waning of Scientia 131
A. The Aristotelian Framework 132
B. Perception 138
I. The Problem of Perception 140
II. The Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Perception 144
III. Unsolved Problems 145
IV. What Next? 145
C. Montaigne 147
D. Descartes (i): The External World 151
E. Descartes (ii): Perception 158
F. Abstract Ideas Re-evaluated 163
G. Knowledge Re-evaluated 173
viii Contents
H. Berkeley (i): Antirepresentationalism 178
I. Berkeley (ii): Realism 181
Note: Why, Given Berkeley’s Realism, Are Some Appearances
Said to Be Real When Others Are Not? 198
J. Berkeley (iii): Idealism 204
K. Whither Minds? 212
L. Truth 241
3 Geometry as Scientia and as Applied Science: Hume’s Empiricist
Account of Geometry 254
A. Extension and Its Idea 257
B. Infinite Divisibility 265
C. Our Idea of Infinity 269
D. Real Extension out of Extensionless Points 272
E. Ideal Equality, Ideal Figures: Scientia Criticized 283
4 Hume’s Defence of Empirical Science 306
A. Hume against Rationalism 307
B. Hume’s Defence of Scientific Inference 315
Note: Hume’s ‘Rules by Which to Judge of Causes and
Effects’ 319
C. Science versus Superstition 321
D. Science as Cognitive Virtue 326
5 Hume on Testimony and Its Epistemological Problems 332
A. Testimony in Hume: Some Epistemological Problems 333
B. A Wrong Model of Empiricism 336
C. Autonomous Thinkers 340
D. Social Context: Language and Testimony 345
E. Testing Testimony 350
F. The Responsible Knower 360
6 Knowledge 367
A. After Scientia: What Knowledge Becomes and Problems with
It 375
I. Knowledge as Justified True Belief 375
II. Coherence and Justification 378
III. Objective versus Subjective 381
IV. Knowledge by Accident 383
B. Reliablism and Externalism 384
Contents ix
C. Coherentism 392
D. Experience and Justification (i): Radical Contingency 400
E. Experience and Justification (ii): Reasonable Acceptance 414
F. Experience and Justification (iii): Perception 436
7 Naturalism and Scepticism 447
A. Defending Common Sense 447
B. The Role of a Principle of Acquaintance in Ontology 455
I. Hume and PA 464
II. Moore and PA 472
III. Reid and PA 489
C. The Role of a Principle of Acquaintance in Epistemology 498
I. Logical Atomism 499
II. Truth Again: First Person and Third Person 510
D. Scepticism and Naturalism 518
E. The Dream Problem, Again 524
8 Hume’s Critical Realism 536
A. Once Again: The Charge of Scepticism 538
B. Realism New and Critical 542
C. Hume’s New Realism: The System of the Vulgar; or, Hume’s
Berkeleyan Realism 546
D. Continuity, Continuants, and Identity 562
I. Continuing Existence and Continuants 564
II. Filling Perceptual Gaps and Continuants 566
III. More on Identity 571
IV. An Analogous Case: The Missing Shade of Blue 575
V. Several Concluding Non-sceptical Remarks 578
E. Hume’s Causal Inference to Critical Realism 579
F. The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable, and
Reasonable 590
G. The World of the Philosophers 598
H. A Tentative First Conclusion 608
I. Hume’s Doubts 615
J. The Resolution of Hume’s Doubts 622
K. The Reasonableness of the System of the Philosophers 627
L. Four Objections 633
I. Inferring Unperceived Causes 633
II. Cleanthes 663
III. Lending a Hand to Hylas 673