Table Of ContentThe External Economic Relations of the EEC
By the same author
THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF FRANCE
EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION
(co-author with John R. Presley)
THE WORLD MONETARY CRISIS
The External Economic
Relations of the EEC
Peter Coffey
Senior Research Fello w and Head of the
Economics Section
Europa lnstituut, University of Amsterdam
© Peter Coffey I 976
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1976
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without pennission
First published 1976 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
r
Associated companies in New ork
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
ISBN 978-1-349-02711-8 ISBN 978-1-349-02709-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-02709-5
This book is sold subject
to the standard conditions
of the Net Book Agreement
Contents
List of T abies vu
Preface lX
Acknowledgements Xlll
PART ONE: TOWARDS A COMMON
COMMUNITY PERSONALITY I
I The Yaounde Agreements 3
2 Eastern Europe 8
3 The Mediterranean I4
4 The Atlantic Problem I 9
PART Two: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
AND AGREEMENTS 23
5 The Kennedy Round Negotiations 23
6 International Monetary Negotiations 30
7 The Generalised System of Preferences 35
8 The International Monetary Crisis 37
PART THREE: THE ENLARGED COMMUNITY 43
9 EEC and EFTA 43
10 Monetary and Energy Problems I973 46
vi Contents
11 Compensation Agreements 56
12 Energy and Monetary Problems 197 4-5 58
PART FouR: CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS 73
13 The Lome Agreement 73
14 The Tokyo Round Negotiations 82
15 Eastern Europe and China 84
Conclusions 89
Appendix: EEC Agreements with Third Countries as of
April1974: Tables showing EEC Trade and
EEC Natural Resources 97
Index 115
List of Tables
EEC imports from African associates 6
2 Trade between the EEC and African associates 6
3 Tariffs: before and after the Kennedy Round 31
4 Gross Reserves of gold and convertible currencies 33
5 Reserves of central banks 53
6 The Discount Rate in different countries 54
Preface
Some economists and political scientists, notably GALT UNG,
have viewed the European Economic Community as a kind of
economic and political superpower. Viner, writing in his famous
work, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endow
ment for International Peace, I 950 ), made reference (page 57)
to the movement which sprang up in Europe towards the end of
the nineteenth century for a 'United States of Europe', which
had arisen to a large degree from the belief that only through a
kind of European economic union could the 'American menace'
be dealt with. Viner also made reference to the doctrine of the
German historical school of economists which stressed the dis
advantageous position of small nations when negotiating sep
arately with large superpowers.
Certainly, the European Economic Community found its size
and unity to have considerable advantages when dealing with
the United States during the Kennedy Round negotiations. Also,
these qualities together with the trading importance of the
Community have encouraged both individual nations as well
as groups of countries to sign agreements with the Common
Market.
During the I g6os the Community started to develop a common
personality and to display a considerable degree of unity vis-a-vis
third parties. There were a number of reasons for this develop
ment. The Common Market was a group of six nations which
felt they had to succeed. Certain dynamic effects - outside the
basic considerations of trade creation and trade diversion - gave
X Preface
an impetus to the enthusiasm of the Six. They also had one
common interest which united them in one bloc - this was the
creation of a common agricultural policy. They were therefore
keen to protect this infant child against the incursions of out
siders - particularly the United States.
In four areas, it was possible to observe the evolution of a
distinct Community economic personality. These areas were the
attitude to the Third World - as demonstrated by the conclusion
of the Yaounde Agreements and the Generalised System of Pref
erences, the attitude to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean
and the Kennedy Round negotiations. In the case of Eastern
Europe and the Mediterranean, precise recommendations were
laid down. For the former, reference was made to Articles I I o-I 6,
inclusive, of the Treaty of Rome, whereby at the end of the
transitional period the Community would negotiate as a body
with Eastern Europe. In the latter case the Commission in
September I 972 sent a document to the Council calling for the
adoption of a 'global' economic policy towards the Mediterranean
countries. On 7 November of the same year the Council accepted
this recommendation.
It seemed to be much easier to adopt a common economic
policy in the case of the Six than in the case of the Nine. Mention
has already been made of the role played by the evolution of a
common agricultural policy in this field. But individual member
states also acted as motors in formulating a common policy. Thus,
France desired to link her former African colonies with the
Community whilst the Netherlands, Belgium and West Germany
were in favour of the adoption of a more open, generalised and
generous economic policy towards the Third World. Both France
and the Commission strongly insisted upon unity vis-a-vis the
Americans during the Kennedy Round negotiations, and here
the Community was very successful.
In the field of monetary affairs, however, it was much more
difficult to adopt a common policy. Frequently, fundamental
differences existed between the French on the one hand and the
Dutch and West Germans on the other.
