Table Of ContentTHE
EMPEROR’S
CODES
THE
EMPEROR’S
CODES
THE THRILLING STORY OF THE ALLIED
CODE BREAKERS WHO TURNED
THE TIDE OF WORLD WAR II
MICHAEL SMITH
Copyright © 2000, 2011 by Michael Smith All Rights Reserved. No part of
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Smith, Michael, 1952
May 1-The emperor’s codes: the breaking of Japan’s secret ciphers / Michael
Smith.
p. cm.
Original edition has subtitle: Bletchley Park and the breaking of Japan’s
secret ciphers. Originally published: London : Bantam Press, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-61145-017-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939-1945--
Cryptography. 2. World War, 1939-1945--Electronic intelligence. 3. Great
Britain. Government Communications Headquarters--History. 4. Machine
ciphers. 5. Cryptography--Japan. 6. Cryptography--United States. 7.
Cryptography--Great Britain. 8. ULTRA (Intelligence system) I. Title.
D810.C88S656 2011
940.54’8641--dc22
2011001771
Printed in the United States of America
For Ben, Kirsty, Louise, Leila and Levin
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am extremely grateful to all those former codebreakers and wireless
operators who wrote to me or agreed to be interviewed for this project. Whether
or not they are quoted in the book, their contributions played a major part in
providing the information and encouragement I needed to complete it. I am
particularly grateful to a number of people who went out of their way to help and
encourage me. These include Geoff Ballard; Edith Becker; Geoff Day; Joan
Dinwoodie; Joe and Barbara Eachus; Robert Hanyok; Margaret Henderson; Phil
Jacobsen; Dennis Moore; Joe Richard; Harry G. Rosenbluh; Hugh Skillen; Joe
Straczek; Jimmy Thirsk and Dennis Underwood. I am also grateful to Steve
Kelley for sharing his expertise in Japanese machine ciphers with me and to
Hilary Jarvis for her advice on the Japanese language. Special thanks are due to
Hugh Melinsky; Norman Scott; Alan Stripp and Maurice Wiles for allowing me
to quote from their own works and for their generous help and advice. I must
also thank Ron Bonighton, Director of Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate,
for kindly sending me a complete set of the Technical Records of the Central
Bureau (a uniquely generous example of openness from a signals intelligence
organization); Margaret Nave and the Australian War Memorial for allowing me
to quote from Eric Nave’s original manuscript; the Library and Department of
East Asian Studies of the University of Sheffield for permission to quote from
the diaries of Malcolm Kennedy; Christine Large and the staff of the Bletchley
Park Trust for their assistance and dedication to keeping the memory of the
codebreakers alive; and last but certainly not least Ralph Erskine whose
willingness to share his unrivalled knowledge of wartime codebreaking
operations with me provided a constant lifeline.
I should also like to thank Charles Moore, Editor of the Daily Telegraph,
for generously allowing me to take a sabbatical to write The Emperor’s Codes;
Sally Gaminara, Katrina Whone, Simon Thorogood and Sheila Lee at
Transworld for their painstakingly professional work on this project; my agent
Robert Kirby for his constant enthusiasm; and my wife Hayley for her patience
and encouragement. The Emperor’s Codes
‘I believe most experienced cryptanalysts would agree with me that
cryptanalysis is much closer to art than to science, and this is what makes the
personal factor so important.’
John Tiltman, Chief Cryptographer at Bletchley Park 1940–5
INTRODUCTION
The extraordinary achievements of the British codebreakers based at
Bletchley Park in cracking Nazi Germany’s ‘unbreakable’ Enigma cipher are
now widely known. This initially oddball collection of mathematicians,
classicists and musicians performed unexpected miracles in the hastily
constructed huts scattered around the grounds of an ugly mock-Tudor mansion
in the small Buckinghamshire market town of Bletchley. The location had been
selected in part because it was just far enough outside London to escape the
threat of German bombs. But perhaps more importantly, it was midway between
the ‘glittering spires’ of Oxford and Cambridge, from where most of the leading
codebreakers had come.
The apparently amateurish nature of these early beginnings was epitomized
by the actions of the codebreakers’ boss, Admiral Hugh Sinclair. His power over
the Government Code and Cipher School, as the codebreaking operation was
known, came from his role as ‘C’, the head of MI6. Perhaps surprisingly, this
was in fact no secret within the limited confines of what was then described as
‘polite society’. But Sinclair was far better known among his immediate circle of
friends for his reputation as a man with a taste for the high life. They christened
him Quex after the title character in Arthur Pinero’s popular play The Gay Lord
Quex, who was described as ‘the wickedest man in London’.
This passion for the high life, and the fact that he had the personal wealth to
fund it, dominated Sinclair’s dealings with the codebreakers – an earlier
headquarters had been based in the Strand in central London, apparently for no
other reason than that it was close to the Savoy Grill, one of his more favoured
haunts. Unable to persuade anyone in government to pay for the codebreakers’
new country mansion, he dipped into his own pockets to buy it, immediately
moving his favourite chef from the Savoy Grill to Bletchley Park to ensure that
the codebreakers were well fed.
The result was an atmosphere at the highly secret Station X not unlike that
of a weekend party at an English country mansion. The initial number of
codebreakers in what was known for security reasons as ‘Captain Ridley’s
Shooting Party’ was little more than 200. They lived in hotels in the surrounding
towns and all initially worked either in the mansion itself or in a neighbouring
boys’ school that had been commandeered for the purpose. When not breaking
codes, or if simply seeking somewhere to contemplate their cryptographic
puzzles, the codebreakers could wander through the lawned grounds of
Bletchley Park, which included a maze, a lake and a number of rose gardens.
This brief idyll was shattered in part when the chef, unable to cope with the
sometimes unusual demands of the more idiosyncratic ‘guests’ at Bletchley,
attempted to commit suicide. But other factors were far more crucial in the
transformation that was about to take place. As the Phoney War drew to a close
and Hitler turned his attention to Western Europe, Britain’s back was very much
against the wall. The need to break Enigma and to obtain a permanent source of
high-grade intelligence on German movements was paramount.
Bletchley Park was soon swamped by new recruits, some of whom had
experience within those British companies which were adopting more efficient
business practices pioneered in America. By the time the pre-war British
codebreakers such as Dilly Knox made the first British breaks into Enigma,
Bletchley Park’s operations were already turning into a production line. The
grounds increasingly resembled a building site. The maze and rose gardens
disappeared to be replaced by prefabricated wooden huts in which worked
thousands of people, the vast majority of them women.
The popular view of Bletchley Park, as an organization manned by brilliant
but amateurish eccentrics, is misleading. Certainly early on the organization was
dominated by eccentrics such as Knox and Alan Turing, but the incredible
progress made by some of them not just with Enigma but also with the
development of Colossus, the world’s first programmable electronic computer,
gives the lie to suggestions of amateurism. The vast majority of those working at
Bletchley Park were in fact neither amateurish nor eccentric, although many
were indeed brilliant.
The work they did to unravel the intricate workings of the Enigma cipher
machine is estimated to have cut around two years off the length of the war in
Europe. But that is only part of the story. The British codebreakers were not just
working on German codes and ciphers, they were breaking those of all of
Germany’s allies in Europe: Italy; Hungary; Romania; Bulgaria; and initially, of
course, the Soviet Union, as well as those of neutral countries such as Sweden,
Spain and Portugal. The codes and ciphers of a number of non-European
countries were also coming under the scrutiny of the British codebreakers, and
the most important by far of these was Japan.
Almost a year before Pearl Harbor, the British and the Americans had
agreed in principle to share their codebreaking resources. The two most
Description:In this gripping, previously untold story from World War II, Michael Smith examines how code breakers cracked Japan’s secret codes and won the war in the Pacific. He also takes the reader step by step through the process, explaining exactly how the code breakers went about their daunting taskmad