The Emergence of German Idealism (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy)

317 Pages·1999·1.41 MB·English

by  Michael Baur

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TheemergenceofGermanidealism / editedbyMichaelBaurand Daniel
O.Dahlstrom.
p. cm.- (Studiesinphilosophyand thehistoryof
philosophy;v. 34)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
1.Idealism,German. I.Baur,Michael. II. Dahlstrom,
DanielO. III.Series.
B21.S78 vol.34 1999
[B2849.13]
141'.0943-dc21
98-30101
ISBN0-8132-°928-5 (alk. paper)
Introduction
MICHAEL BAUR AND
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
Immanuel Kant's "critical philosophy," as he himselfcharacterizes it,
is rightly renowned for its criticism ofthe metaphysical pretensions of
reason unaided by experience. In the Critique ofPureReason, Kant goes
to considerable lengths to disestablish the sortofspeculative metaphys
ics thatiserected on the premise that the human mind can have a clear
and distinct, that is to say, a purely intellectual, nonsensory insightinto
the natures and causes of things. Yet, remarkably, within a generation,
Kant's own efforts give way to one putatively new system ofspeculative
metaphysics after the other, each claiming to complete his project by,
among other things, applying the principles of the critical philosophy
to that philosophy itself. Part of the reason for this development can
be found in Kant's own thinking. For by no means does his skepticism
aboutspeculative metaphysicsextend to allforms ofa priori knowledge
or to all nonempirical principles ofhuman experience. His critical phi
losophy is, again in his own terms, also a "transcendental philosophy,"
oneaimedatdetermining the principles thatrender a particularregion
ofhumanendeavor-knowing,acting,enjoying-possible.In theminds
ofKant's prominent critics, however, the task ofidentifying and recur
sively demonstrating these transcendental principles and their unity re
quires reintroducing speculative metaphysics or something closely akin
to it. Aredefined metaphysics accordingly takes shape in a German ide
alism that, nevertheless, sees its speculations, in the manner just de
scribed, as a consequence ofKant's transcendental philosophy.
The preceding account of German idealism's development from its
Kantian roots is, of necessity, highly abbreviated and, it must be con
fessed, abitpresumptuous. For, in truth, the exceedinglycomplexstory
ofthe criticalyetspeculativereaction to Kant's philosophyfrom 1786to
1807 (from the publication ofReinhold's LettersontheKantianPhilosophy
to the publication ofHegel'sPhenomenologyofSpirit) has neverbeenfully
2 MICHAEL BAUR AND DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
told and, indeed, with good reason since it is a story replete with the
thrusts, parries, and counterthrusts of a variety of thinkers, some of
whom historians have largelyforgotten or neglected,with theirown de
veloping and often divergentviews on the prospects ofphilosophyafter
Kant.Asaconsequence, suitablyinformedaccountsandphilosophically
reasoned assessments ofthe thought that led to the emergence ofGer
man idealismfrom Kant's transcendentalphilosophyhave beenin short
supply. Thepresentvolume cannotremedythislack, butitisan attempt
to contribute to an understanding ofsome ofthe lllajorfactors andcon
siderations thatled to orattended the metaphysicalspeculationsofGer
luan philosophersafterKant. In addition to ten newessays on the emer
gence ofGerman idealism, the presentvolume contains translations of
three significant German and French investigations of post-Kantian
thought, hitherto unavailable in English.
Before turning to the post-Kantian thinkers themselves, however, it
mayprove useful to review the parametersofKant's transcendental phi
losophy and, in particular, given subsequent concerns about the pur
ported lack ofunity to Kant's philosophy and about the inadequacy of
itsfoundation, to consider how Kant himselfconstrued the unity ofhis
philosophy. This issue is the subjectofthe opening essay, "The Unity of
Kant's Critical Philosophy" by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Taking his cues
from the three questions in which, in Kant's view, all the interests of
reason come together ("Whatcan I know? WhatshouldI do? Whatmay
I hope for?"), Dahlstrom surveys the basic arguments and conclusions
ofKant's critical writings. The aim of the survey is to indicate in what
sense Kant believed himself to have found in the principle of purpo
siveness, as elaborated in the CritiqueofJudgment, a principle capable of
mediatingbetween the principlesgoverning the theoretical orderofsci
ence and the practical order offreedom, in short, the principles ofna
ture and ofmorality, demonstratedin the CritiqueofPureReasonand the
CritiqueofPracticalReason, respectively.
Among the handful ofthinkerswho figured prominentlyin the early
reception of Kant's critical philosophy, arguably none is more central
than the intriguing ex-priest and Freemason from Vienna, Karl Leon
hard Reinhold. Probably no work, for example, is more responsible for
instilling and spreading not only interest in Kant's philosophy but also
the need for critical engagement with it than Reinhold's Briefe iiberdie
KantischePhilosophieof1786-1787.Yet, until recently, Reinhold'srole in
theemergenceofGermanidealismhasbeenlargelyignored. Inhisessay
"Karl Leonard Reinhold: '... Endeavoring to keep up the pace mitun
serem Zeitalter,'" Alexander von Schonborn takes some important steps
toward rectifying this situation by demonstrating how~~~~~~~_~1y_~~i!1:_
Introduction 3
hold's program ofElelnentarphilosophie,'Y'conceived as an attempt to com
plete the critical philosophy by grounding it in a single first principle,
shapes the philosophical projects of the post-Kantian idealists. But
Sch6nborn also dispels the neo-Kantian myth, concoctedon the basisof
thisinfluence, thatReinholdissignificantonlyasaharbingerof"thefall
into metaphysicallnysticism."In addition to tracing the several changes
Reinhold made to his system within the general ambitofGerman ideal
ism, Sch6nborn also recounts how Reinhold's turn to realism and con
cern with the philosophy of language provoked an intemperate reac
tion by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel that consisted in caricature rather
than careful consideration ofReinhold's reasoning. The result was yet
another n1yth, the neo-Hegelian myth that Reinhold's significance lay
n1erely in being a popularizer ofphilosophy and that, like the public,
he lacked the autonomy ofthought requisite ofa serious philosopher.
In the course ofdemolishing this myth and reviewing the development
of Reinhold's thought, Sch6nborn demonstrates that Reinhold is not
merely the initiator and knowledgeable reformer ofmuch that is pres
ent in post-Kantian philosophical systems, but also a profound critic of
them, someone both readyand able to move beyond them.
TheimportanceofReinholdfor theearlyreceptionofKant'sphiloso
phyis further corroborated by the next essayin the volume, "The Role
ofSkepticism in the Emergence ofGerman Idealism" by Michael Baur.
In thisessayBaurseeks to dispel the popularmyth thatthe post-Kantian
German idealists were uncritical speculative metaphysicians with little
concern for the skeptical problems that had first aroused Kant from
his dogmatic slumber. In fact, the development of thought from Kant
to Hegel is best described, Baur argues, not as a repudiation or n1itiga
tion of skepticism, but rather as a radicalization and deepening of it.
The radicalization of skepticism, however, does not mark a departure
from systematicphilosophy. The movementfrom KanttoHegelisparal
leled bythe emergence ofthe insightthatsystematicphilosophycan re
spondadequately to skepticism onlybydemonstrating the fundamental
identity-in-difference between skepticism and itself. Baur substantiates
theseclaimsbytracingsomeofthe crucialstepstakenon theintellectual
journey from Kant to Hegel, for example: the early skeptical attacks
upon Kant's philosophy; Reinhold's attelnpt to salvage transcendental
philosophybyreformulating itas a descriptive philosophyofconscious
ness; G. E. Schulze's skeptical assaulton Reinhold's attemptand on the
ideaoftranscendentalphilosophyingeneral;Fichte'screative appropri
ation of Schulze's critique; and finally, Hegel's transformation of the
Fichtean strategy and mediated return to the starting point ofthis pro
cess ofskeptical awakening: David Hume.
4 MICHAEL BAUR AND DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
Fichte'sphilosophy,inparticular,hisuniquebrandofrealismandthe
primacy he accords the practical, is the subject ofthe next two essays.
In "Fichte's Abstract Realism," Daniel Breazeale addresses the seeming
contradiction between Fichte's claim concerning the allegedly absolute
character of the self and Fichte's apparent admission that there is an
external "check" upon this very same self. Breazeale's resolution ofthe
difficulty emphasizes both the absoluteness ofthe selfand the irreduc
ibility of the "check" to the activity of the self. The label of "abstract
realism" appropriately captures both sides of the Fichtean position:
Fichte is a "realist" since the self's other is ultimately irreducible to the
activityofthe self; however, this realism is abstract, since itdoes noten
tail the actual existence ofanyparticularobjectoutside ofthe self. That
is, Fichte's realism does notimplythe givennessofanyparticular object
to the self, butonlythe (practical) givenness ofa task, namely, the self's
infinite taskofundertakinga determinationwithin itself. ForBreazeale,
it would be accurate to describe the Fichtean selfas a living contradic
tion. In orderfor the selfto be conscious ofits own finitude (and thus
inorderforittobeaselfatall), the selfmustrecognizesomelimitupon
itself. However, ifthe limitis a limitfor the self (as itmustbe), then the
selfautomatically transcends the limitin the very act ofacknowledging
it. Hence, the selfis simultaneouslyboth limitedandunlimited. Breaze
ale unpacks the variousways in which the selfcan be said to experience
the "check" by which it recognizes its own limitedness: as "feeling" on
animmediateandabstractlevel;asthe "summons"ofanotherfree being
within the richer context ofintersubjectivity; or (on an existential and
philosophicallevel) as an "affront"to a proudlyidealisticselfthatwould
denyits dependence on all givenness orcontingency.
Inhisessay"Fichte'sAppealToday:TheHiddenPrimacyofthePracti
cal," Karl Ameriks contends that the radical nature and the limitations
ofFichte's doctrine ofthe primacy ofthe practical have not been ade
quatelyappreciated, even byFichte's most ardent conten1poraryadmir
ers. Unlike Kant, Fichte held thatno theoretical philosophywhatsoever,
noteven a critical metaphysics oftranscendental idealisn1, is capable of
rescuing our ordinary beliefin our inner freedom. Fichte accordingly
arguedthatpurepracticalreason mustbemethodologicallypriortothe
oretical reason; only our prior commitment to freedom can save both
the existence ofaworld beyond mere representations and the claims of
the n10ral law upon us (neither ofwhich theoretical philosophywould
be able to deliver in any case). Ameriks argues thatFichte's radicalized
assertion of the primacy of the practical is problematic in several re
spects, accounting for the endeavor, undertaken by co~~~Y_O!~ry_~ol-_
Introduction 5
lowersofFichte, to provide a nonpractical, "neutralized"demonstration
ofthe absoluteness ofsubjectivity.According toAmeriks, such strategies
are ultimately inconsistent with Fichte's own argumentation, and they
fail toaddressthelatentambiguitiesanddifficultiesoftheFichteanposi
tion. Until Fichte scholars give greater attention to these problems, it
will not be possible, Ameriks concludes, to appreciate the full signifi
cance ofFichte's doctrine ofthe primacyofthe practical.
The aesthetic turn in post-Kantian thinking takes center stage in the
next collection ofessays as the import of the work ofSchiller, H6lder
lin, and the romantics for the development of German idealism is
addressed. In "Schiller and the Aesthetics of German IdealislTI,"John
McCumber aims to articulate the "n1iddle term" by which we might
understand how Schiller's aesthetics and ethics can be integrated with
the metaphysics of German idealism. As Hegel notes, Schiller is to be
praised for his intuition that the relation between sense and intellectis
notone ofindifference ordomination,butone ofharn10nyandaccord.
Butunlike Hegel, Schillerholdsthatitisaesthetics, andnotphilosophy,
that shows us how to achieve a proper harmony between intellect and
sense. Furthermore, Schiller's aesthetic theory depends on an accep
tance of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Thus it is not clear how Schiller's
aesthetics can be integrated with the metaphysics ofGerman idealism,
which requires no thing-in-itself. Even more problematically, it is not
clear why the elimination of the thing-in-itselffrom Gern1an idealistic
metaphysics does notlead to the viewthat truth consists in the domina
tionofreason oversense (asitdoesinFichte).AccordingtoMcCumber,
Schiller himselfsuggests answers to these puzzles. For Schiller, sensible
mattercan be reconciledwith reason andmoralitybecause itprefigures
both.Thus, inasense,Schillerdoesrejectthe thing-in-itself. Conversely,
Hegel does not reject the thing-in-itself per se, but only the view that
the thing-in-itselfisan indeterminable "something"beyondexperience.
Thatis, Hegel understands the real as necessarily en1bodied. Since lan
guage for Hegel is the mostperfectmaterial embodimentofthe intelli
gible, hismetaphysicsisperhapsbestunderstoodaslinguistic metaphys
ics. As McCumber shows, our understanding of Hegel and Schiller in
relation to one another enriches the meaning ofboth.
Anotherpoetwho figured prominentlyin the emergence ofGerman
idealism is the friend and classmate ofHegel and Schelling in the Tiib
inger Stift, Johann Christian Friederich H6lderlin. However, while ac
knowledgingH6lderlin'simportance to the genesis ofGermanidealism
(as evidenced by consideration of the fragment "The Earliest System
Progran1me ofGermanIdealism"), Karsten Harriesargues thatGerman
6 MICHAEL BAUR AND DAr~IEL O. DAHLSTROM
idealism could develop as itdid onlybeca}lse Hegel and Schellingwere
able to leave their former friend behind, rejecting his elevation ofaes
thetic intuition above theory and the attendant suggestion that philos
ophy is subordinate to poetry. Harries demonstrates how Holderlin
wrestles in his poetry with the question of the contrasting import of
Greek and Christian conceptions of divinity, a theme of great signifi
cance to theyoung idealists. Yet, as Harries points out, Holderlin could
not reconcile himself, as could Hegel, to the loss ofthe perfect media
tion ofsense and spirit ("paradigms ofbeauty") characteristic ofGreek
artandreligion.Asaresult, accordingtoHarries, Holderlin callsfor the
poet-not a philosopher, but a new embodiment ofChrist and Greek
gods-to assume "the essential task ofmediating between the Highest
and the people." From the point ofview ofan older Hegel, Holderlin
becomes the "beautiful soul" with an adolescent nostalgia for a world
that is no more, indulging in a melancholy typical of neoclassicism.
But Harries also shows how Holderlin's more tragic understanding of
historyprevents himfrom following Hegel'sreconciliatoryAujhebungof
history. In a concluding segment, Harries comments on Holderlin's
poemPatmos, inordertodemonstrate howthe poetbalances "theescha
tological understanding ofhistory common to both pietism and Hegel
with a Sophoclean openness to the abyss."
If the work of Schiller and Holderlin cannot be ignored in any at
tempt to understand the development ofpost-Kantian philosophy, nei
ther can that ofthe German romantics: A. W. Schlegel and his brother
Friedrich, Ludwig Tieck, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger, Novalis, and
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder. Yet, as Kenneth Schmitz shows in his
essay"TheIdealismoftheGermanROlnantics,"therelationshipisthorn
ier since, among other things, it concerns the relation, sometimes criti
cal, sometimes sympathetic, not ofa single writer, butofan entire liter
arymovementtothenewlydevelopingphilosophicaltradition. "Thereis
no typicalromantic," as Schmitz puts it, anymore than there isa typical
philosopherorevenatypicalidealistphilosopher. Nevertheless,Schmitz
demonstratesfourpost-Kantian themesinwhichromanticismandmeta··
physical idealism fruitfully intersect: first, the organic wholeness ofna-:
ture, expressed in the German conception of Geist; second, the under
standing ofhuman subjectivityas a free but nonetheless natural part of
that whole; third, an aesthetic and creative imagination as the power
behind that freedom, a power that fuses the real with the ideal; and
fourth, a critical attitude that takes its bearings from the oneness ofall
things, bothrealandideal. Inregardto thislastpoint, Schmitzdiscusses
how the metaphysics ofcreativity, embraced by the romantics and for-
Introduction 7
mulatedbytheidealists, differsfrom tradItionalmetaphysics.Thediffer
ence, he maintains, lies in the newmetaphysics' incorporation ofinfini
tude into its conceptofGeist, and, in conclusion, Schmitz explains how,
in the wake of Kant's critical philosophy, this incorporation became
credible to romantics and idealists alike.
The development ofthe thought ofSchelling and Hegel is the gen
eraltheme ofthelastfive essaysofthevolume, thefirstofwhichdemon
stratesthe distinctivelynl0ralbeginningofthatdevelopment, evidenced
by the contrastingways in which Kant's doctrine ofpostulates figures in
Schelling's and Hegel's earlymetaphysical projects.
Although Kant rejected the proofs presented by speculative meta
physics for the existence ofan immortal soul, freedom, and God, these
"ideas ofreason," as he calls them, resurface as postulates ofpure prac
tical (moral) reason. In other words, these metaphysical ideas have a
proper place for Kant and that place is ethics. According to Klaus Dus
ing, Schelling's and Hegel's criticisms ofKant's foundational principles
take place only in the wake oftheir response to the latter's doctrine of
postulates. Hence, inorderto appreciate theircriticismsandtheidealist
metaphysics generated by them, it is necessaryfirst to understand "The
Reception of Kant's Doctrine of Postulates in Schelling's and Hegel's
EarlyPhilosophicalProjects,"the subjectandtitleofDusing'sessay. This
essayrecounts in detail the differentways inwhich Schellingand Hegel
criticallyappropriate Kant's doctrine ofpostulatesand idea ofthe high
estgood in the course ofelaborating their diverse ethical theories. Dus
ing shows how both Schelling's and Hegel's reconstructions ofthe doc
trine ofpostulateswere shaped by, among other things, a dissatisfaction
with the way the doctrine had been transformed and put to use in the
theologiesofprofessorsatTubingen. More importantly, Diisingdemon
strates how the German idealists, taking to heart the ethical place ac
corded to metaphysical ideas by Kant, attempt in their early projects to
establish metaphysics on an ethicalfoundation.
Inhisessay"TheUnconditionedinKnowing: I-Identity-Freedom"
Hans Michael Baumgartner sets out to show how, from its inception,
Schelling's philosophyis not so much a transcendental philosophyas it
is a sustained attempt, using the concepts and argumentative strategies
of transcendental philosophy, "to do justice to the conception of the
absolute in the theoretical-philosophical realm." The absolute I, avail
able only through an intellectual intuition, is more fundanlental than
the sort of finite knowing and self-consciousness that generally frame
theeffortsoftranscendentalphilosophy.Atthesame time,Baumgartner
argues, this absolute I has a teleologically moral function in Schelling's
8 MICHAEL BAUR AND DANIELa. DAHLSTROM
thoughtthatbinds "philosophyand the historical process together"in a
11lanner that once again decisively departs from the parameters of the
transcendental philosophyofhis predecessors.
IfSchellingbreakswith transcendentalphilosophyin itsKantian and
Fichtean senses, Xavier Tilliette shows that transcendental philosophy,
in turn, castsalongshadowon Schelling'sattempts to constructa meta
physics of the absolute, the content of which is freedom, Tilliette
sketches howSchelling repeatedlywrestledwith "The Problem ofMeta
physics" (the title ofTilliette'spiece) notonlyafter Kantand Fichte but
after Spinoza aswell. The young Schelling moved, as Tilliette recounts,
from the Fichtean-transcendental completion ofphilosophyin practical
philosophythrough severalversions ofphilosophical systems to the sub
sumption oftheoretical philosophy by a philosophy ofnature in which
the "metaphysical illlpulse" is generally diminished. At thisjuncture, as
Tilliette puts it, "the serene and peaceful descriptions of Hen Kai Pan
leavenoroomforthe transcendental, andtestifytoa truceinSchelling's
restless thought." Nonetheless, Tilliette points out, the term "metaphys
ics" recurs in Schelling's maturer stages ofthought, albeitprincipallyas
anhonorific titlefor "eitherthe theoryofpotenciesor, possible, positive
philosophy, which in the last analysis resolves itselfinto the philosophy
ofreligion."
In his essay "Von Hegel bis Hegel: Reflections on the 'Earliest System
Programme ofGerman Idealism,'"MeroldWestphalexamines the "Ear
liest System-Programme of German Idealism" and its meaning for our
understanding of Hegel in particular and German idealism in gen
eral. Three "un-Hegelian" themes stand out in the "Earliest System
Programme": the primacy of practical reason, the irrationality of the
state, and the primacy of the aesthetic. These themes bear witness to
Hegel'searlyaffirmationofa1110ral-religious-ethicalform ofcommunity
thatcould provide a meaningfullink towhatiseternal, notwithstanding
the irrational politics ofthe mechanized modern state. Bycontrast, the
mature Hegel affirmed the primacyand autonomyoftheoryas the fun
damental meansfor achievingcontactwith an ultimate source ofmean
ing. In sketching the basic trajectory ofHegel's career, Westphal shows
how, in many ways, Hegel's development mirrors the development of
German idealism itself, ofwhich Hegel is so often seen to be the culmi
nation. Undoubtedly, Hegel's self-transformation from young Volkser
zieherto mature philosopher is deeply rooted in his own sense ofdisil
lusionment and resignation. However, this explanation may not suffi
cientlyaccountfor Hegel's later turn to philosophical speculation. And
ifthat is the case, Westphal suggests, then perhaps there is more to be
learnedfrom Hegel and German idealism.
Introduction 9
In "HegelonAbsolute Knowing," Martin De Nys offers three general
and interrelated observations that collectively illuminate Hegel's devel
opment, his relation to Kant, and the meaning ofhis absolute idealism.
First,DeNysshowshowHegel'searlymoralandreligiousthoughtaimed
to preserve yet transcend the limiting dichotomies and distinctions of
Kantian thought. In this earlyperiod, the concept of"love" emerged as
paradigmatic for Hegel's understanding ofhow moral autonomy111.ight
be reconciled with receptivity to otherness. Secondly, De Nys explains
how the account ofapperception in the First Critiqueboth presupposes
and problematizes Kant's own sharp distinction between the receptivity
ofsensible intuition and the spontaneity ofthe understanding. Finally,
DeNysshowshowHegel'saccountofabsolute knowingsettles the prob
lems thatHegel had leftunresolved in the 1790s, and reenacts, in a de
liberate and self-consciousway, Kant's simultaneouspreservingand can
celingofthedichotomybetweenspontaneityandreceptivity.Hegel'sdoc
trine of"absolute knowing" is thus surprisinglyKantian in its own way.
At the very beginning ofthe movement known as German idealism,
Hegel and his schoolmates at the TubingerStiftstruggled to understand
andactualize the hidden possibilitiesofK.ant'sphilosophy.Thisstruggle
is documented in the "Earliest System-Programn1.e of German Ideal
ism," a fragment written down in Hegel's hand, but the authorship of
which has been a source ofconsiderable controversy. Diising concludes
his study by arguing for Hegel's authorship of the "Earliest System
Programll1.e," based in part on the way in which the doctrine ofpostu
lates surfaces in that fragment; Westphal, too, accepts the contention
that Hegel is its author. Tilliette, on the other hand, affirms Schelling's
authorship, while Harries cites reasons to see the stamp ofH6lderlin's
thought in the work. A new translation of this important fragment is
contained as anAppendix to the presentvolume.