The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany's First Great Crisis of World War II

299 Pages·2012·4.71 MB·English

by  Niklas Zetterling

The Drive on Moscow 1941
Operation Taifun and Germany's First Crisis of World War II
By Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson
CONTENTS
PREFACE
PROLOGUE
1. THE SOVIET DEFENSE OF MOSCOW
2. OPERATION TAIFUNN—THE GERMAN PLANS
3. GUDERIAN ATTACKS
4. THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK BEGINS
5. THE OFFENSIVE CONTINUES
6. ENCIRCLEMENT
7. CUT OFF
8. STRATEGIC DECISIONS
9. VYAZMA-BRYANSK
10. ONE HUNDRED KILOMETERS TO MOSCOW
11. ON TO TULA
12. THE END OF OCTOBER—HALFTIME FOR OPERATION
TAIFUN
13. THE NOVEMBER 7 PARADE
14. THE ORSHA MEETING, NOVEMBER 13
15. THE FINAL ATTEMPT
16. AT THE GATES OF MOSCOW
17. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
APPENDICES
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
The German advance east during Operation Taifun went initially very good, but there were three factors that
could slow them down: the weather, supply problems, and of course the Red Army. When the Germans
began Operation Taifun, they knew they were in a race against the clock, but they did not know when their
time would run out.
PREFACE
M any battles have been described as turning points in World War II,
particularly El Alamein and Stalingrad. However, compared to many
battles of the war, El Alamein was a small affair. The decisive effects of it are
disputed, and in any case, it took place in an area of less than major strategic
importance. Operations conducted in the Middle east in autumn 1942 may have
been significant to British decision-makers, but involved only a very small share
of the German armed forces and no US or Soviet formations.
Stalingrad is a better candidate, as far larger forces were engaged and from
September 1942 to February 1943, the fighting in the city on the Volga attracted
much attention from both Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin. It can also be argued that
prior to Stalingrad the Red Army seldom possessed the initiative, but afterward
Soviet forces rarely allowed the Germans to dictate the course of events. Despite
these compelling arguments, and the library of words written about this costly,
well-known battle, the claims may have been exaggerated. We would argue that
by the time fighting began at Stalingrad, the Germans had already lost the war.
Admittedly, Hitler had launched a major summer campaign in eastern Ukraine in
June 1942, but it was not large enough to knock the Soviet Union out of the
conflict. Hence, the real turning point must be found earlier.
Launched in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa was a gamble. Hitler intended
to subjugate the Soviet Union in six months. War planning, including long-term
plans for the economy, was based on the assumption that the enemy in the east
would be defeated. However, Hitler had seriously underestimated the Soviet
capacity to wage war, and so German forces in the east were still battling against
the Red Army in September 1941. The Germans felt they had to end the
campaign before the winter came, preferably by a decisive victory at Moscow.
They made their final bid in late September/early October, when Operation
Taifun (Typhoon) was launched. This was the long-awaited attack on Moscow,
and the Germans initially recorded tremendeous success. However, after little
more than a week, they were stuck in mud and the prize of Moscow slipped out
of their grasp.
This was Hitler’s first major defeat. Admittedly the Luftwaffe had failed to
bring Britain to her knees in 1940, but Hitler was already devoting most of his
energy to planning the attack on the Soviet Union while air battles raged over
southern England. The invasion of the Soviet Union was his main project, and
the failure at the gates of Moscow meant that his plans had been irrevocably
thwarted.
The argument that Germany lacked the capacity to defeat the Soviet Union is
plausible; however, Hitler and his entourage seem not to have held that opinion,
and neither did many outside the Soviet Union. The German failure at Moscow
made clear to many observers that Germany might not emerge victorious from
the colossal struggle in the east.
The sheer scope of the battle of Moscow was exceptional. Both sides
committed more than a million men to the battle; the Red Army also lost nearly
a million men, but still the German forces were halted. This indicates the
resources, and the importance, assigned to the battle by the two dictators. We
hope the reader will enjoy our description and analysis of this important chapter
in the history.
PROLOGUE
I n the evening of September 26, 1941 it dawned upon German army surgeon
Hermann Türk that the day had been remarkable. He had not heard a single
shot fired in anger, nor a single bursting shell or bomb. While he had of course
experienced many such days previously in his life, they had been all too rare
since June 22, when the 3rd Panzer Division had crossed the border between
Germany and the Soviet Union.1
As an army surgeon, Türk was not expected to participate in combat, but he
was assigned to one of the division’s four motorized infantry battalions. This
meant that he was seldom far from the action and quite often found himself in
the front line assisting with the evacuation of wounded soldiers. During the past
three months, the division had suffered 4,375 casualties, of which around three-
quarters were wounded. The vast majority of these casualties had been incurred
by the four infantry battalions and Türk had had to patch up many soldiers so
they could be evacuated west to medical facilities.2
As the 3rd Panzer Division had been one of the spearheads in Panzer Group
2, which was commanded by Colonel General Heinz Guderian, Türk had
travelled many kilometers on Soviet roads. After crossing the border south of
Brest-Litovsk, the division had dashed east. Bobruisk had fallen to the 3rd
Panzer Division on June 28, after an advance of more than 400km. The fluid
German operations continued and the 3rd Panzer Division crossed the Dnepr
after hard fighting. Later, Türk and his comrades participated in the large
encirclement operation near Kiev. This time, Türk’s division was one of the
spearheads of the northern pincer.
The Kiev battle resulted in the encirclement of a huge Soviet force in
September and eventually more than 600,000 Soviet soldiers marched into
German captivity. However, with every passing day, the autumn drew nearer.
The encirclement operation was hardly over when the 3rd Panzer Division began
to regroup in a northeasterly direction. On September 25, Türk reached the area
where the division would rest and refit. He was assigned suitable quarters in a
village but he had to evacuate them after a few hours, as partisans were believed
to be active there. Under cover of darkness, his unit moved to another village
and spent most of September 26 on maintenance. To the great delight of many
soldiers, a mailbag arrived from Germany and letters from parents, fiancées, and
other relatives were sources of joy for the soldiers.
Hopes for a long period of rest contrasted with rumors of an imminent major
offensive. Türk was well aware that the vehicles were already badly worn and
many of the replacement soldiers were not as well-trained and experienced as
those they replaced. The division badly needed a period of rest, maintenance,
and training. So far, no order had yet indicated an offensive. Türk had only heard
rumors.3
On September 26, Türk was finally informed: an offensive was indeed
imminent. Few details were revealed, but he believed that the attack would be
launched on October 1 and the objective would be Tula. He did not know how
far away Tula was, but he hoped that the offensive would be over in two weeks.
However, there were ominous signs. On the night of September 26–27, the
thermometer showed -3°C. Nevertheless, preparations continued according to
plan. Türk thought that as the Germans had been enormously successful thus far,
another victory could be expected.4
Türk’s unit remained stationed at the same location through September 28,
enabling the chaplain to conduct a field service before regrouping on the
following day. The vehicles had hardly begun to move when rain started to fall.
After three months travelling on Russian roads, Türk knew full well how quickly
rain could render them impassable, but the late season did not allow the Germans
any further delays. They had to attack now or not at all.5
• • •
In late September 1941, the German units on the Eastern Front were mainly
composed of veterans who had fought since the launch of Operation Barbarossa
on June 22. In stark contrast, most of the Red Army soldiers in the western
military districts were either dead or in German captivity. However, this did not
mean that the Soviet commanders lacked soldiers; the vast reserves that were
moved forward during the summer and autumn sufficed to replace the destroyed
units.6
It was not just the rank and file that had suffered exceptionally high losses;
many senior commanders had also been lost. The rapidly created new armies
needed commanders, and the commanders needed competent staff and
specialists to assist them. On August 21, a young NKVD officer, Major
Shabulin, arrived in Moscow where he was soon assigned to the recently formed
Fiftieth Army. He immediately set out to equip himself for the task, but he was
delayed by the belated arrival of fuel and tyres for his car. By the evening of
August 25 his car was finally ready and Shabulin set out for Tula.7
In some ways, the NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, People’s
Commissariat for Internal Affairs) can be regarded as Stalin’s equivalent to
Hitler’s SS (Schutzstaffel, Protection Squadron), but the Soviet organization had
a longer history under other names. The NKVD was commanded by Lavrenti
Beria, who like Stalin originated from Georgia. The NKVD was the security
service, but Beria’s realm also included armed forces, for example the border
troops. Furthermore, NKVD officers were posted with every Red Army unit.
The organization also ran the Gulag, the Soviet forced labor camp system.
Shabulin slept in his car that night, the first of many spent sleeping in
uncomfortable positions, even after he arrived at Vyshkovitshi, a village near
Bryansk, where Fiftieth Army would be committed during the following weeks.
His appointment did not require him to regularly take part in combat, but
fighting was never distant.8
In September 1941, the Luftwaffe dominated the skies above the Soviet
formations. Just a few days after arriving, on August 28, Shabulin witnessed
Soviet antiaircraft defenses trying to shoot down German fighters, a taste of
what was to come. Shabulin’s position required him to travel frequently by car,
visiting the combat units attached to Fiftieth Army. His trips occasionally
brought him to Bryansk, where several blocks had been damaged or destroyed
by German air attacks.9
On some occasions, Shabulin found time for leisure. When he visited the
front on September 5, he availed himself of the opportunity to bathe in the river
Desna. However, the tranquillity was disturbed by the sight of a German aircraft
attacking a target in the distance. This was followed by a heavy Luftwaffe attack
on the forward Soviet defenses that lasted for two hours. As far as Shabulin
could see, all German aircraft departed undamaged after unloading their deadly
cargo.10