Table Of ContentNATIONALDEFENCEACADEMYSERIES
3/1995
STUDIESAND REPORTS
AntonZabkar
THE DRAMA IN
FORMERYUGOSLAVIA-
THE BEGINNING OF THEEND OR
THE END OF THE BEGINNING?
Vienna,February1995
ni
TABLEOFCONTENTS
DECEPTIVECALMINBOSNIA 1
1.Bywayofintroduction 1
2.TheenigmaofGeneralMladic" 1
3.Militaryfactorsthatcouldinfluence
futuredevelopmentofeventsinBosniaand
Herzegovina 3
4. ChangeinSerbianstrategyinB-H-
'proetcontra' 6
5.Conclusion,ofsorts 8
Sources 10
CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONSINTHE
SO-CALLEDFEDERALREPUBLICOF
YUGOSLAVIA 11
1 Introduction 11
2 AsDectsofnormativestandardisationof
cWIiTvi11l-1m11i1l1i11t*a11rjvrKeVIlUaLtliVo1n1xs7 12
3. (Dis)harmonybetweenstandardsandreality 24
4 f^nnHndiru*thnmrht^ 51
Sources 59
THESTRATEGICROLEOFTHEEASTERN
ADRIATICCOASTINTHE20thCENTURY 63
1.Introduction 63
2. AdriaticPoIi(tical)tectonicsinthe20thcentury 64
3.ThePlaceandRoleoftheAdriaticSeaandthe
CoastintheCollapseofFormerYugoslavia 69
4.GeneralConclusion 81
5.Summary 85
Sources 88
IV
BOaNlA-ribKZbGOVlNA- lnbbNDOr IHb
BEGINNINGORTHEBEGINNINGOFTHE
ENDOrWAR/ 99
1. OpeningRemarks 99
2.StrategicsituationintheBalkansandEurope
beforetheBosnia-Herzegovinauprising 100
3.ThecourseoftheBosnia-Herzegovina
uprising(1875) 103
4.RussiaentersthewaragainstTurkeyandthe
CongressofBerlin(1878) 106
5.Conclusions 109
Sources 119
-V-
INTRODUCTTON
ProfessorAntonZabkarhashadadistinguishednavalandacademiccareer
andisanadvisertotheGovernmentofSlovenia.Henowgivesusasecond
seriesofstudiesofaspectsoftheconflictintheBalkans.Thefirstvolume-
Analyses of the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia- was published in
April1994 and contained five extended essays. The dealt with: the
possibilityofthecreationofa"NewYugoslavia";changesinthedefence
doctrine of Serbia and Montenegro; the re-birth of the old Yugoslav
People's Army as the army ofthe Federal Republic ofYugoslavia; the
"Divoselo"operationmountedbytheCroatianarmyinautumn 1993;and
ithsMaslenicaadventureinJanuary1993.
Thecurrentvolumewhich,tothiswriter,seemsevenmoreincisive,deals
withfourmatters.Theyare:therealitiesunderlyingtheBosniansituation
asitstoodinlate1994(andwecannowseewithwhatinsightProfessor
Zabkarandidentifiedthemajorfactorsthere);civil-militaryrelationsinthe
FederalRepublicofYugoslavia(containingaremarkable"insideview"of
theinteractionofSerbpoliticsandpoliticianswiththeunstableYugoslav
armyandpoliceforce;andofcoups,andrumoursofcoups).Heconcludes
withtwoessaysoforiginality andbrillianceon, first,thesituationofthe
EasternAdriatic,havingregardtoitshistorical,economicandpolitical,as
well as strategic implications- not hesitating to bring forward some
disturbing prognoses. He concludes with a paper entitled "Bosnia-
Herzegovina-theEndoftheBeginning,orthe BeginningoftheEndof
War". In this, the author makes a persuasive comparison between the
conflictsituationwhichprecededandsurrounded the Berlin Congressof
1878, and the current situation in Bosnia; contemplating also the
differences,andhowthepresentscenariomightwellevolve.
Asthisbriefsummaryshows,ProfessorZabkar(whoalsoholdstherank
ofcaptainintheSloveniannavy)hasbroughtanunusuallybroadrangeof
talent and experience to his work. As even outsiders who have been
exposedtothemostrecentBalkantragediescanconfirm,itisdifficult,so
closetoevents, forthosewhohaveparticipatedtoretainobjectivity and
perspective.Yet, astheauthorparadeshiscastofcharacters, eachmore
vivid,largerthanlife,andmanipulativethanthelast,itisimpressivethat
onewith such close knowledge of recent events can also marshal and
deploy these personae so coolly. It is not always easy to be detached
concerningthegenocidalproclivitiesofsomeofthese protagonists. The
-VI-
reader should also be forewarned that the author does not waste a
sentence.Thus,whatfollowsisaconcise,tightly-reasonedworkmeriting
very careful study. It makes an invaluable contribution to what will
ultimatelybea largelibraryconcerningtheeventsofrecentyearsinthe
formerYugoslavia.
CedricThornberry
"
1
DECEPTIVECALMINBOSNIA
(military-strategicoutline)
Ljubljana,September 1994
"Ifthewaristobestoppedthroughpolitical
means,somethingmusthappenwithinthe
internationalcommunity.Untilsuchtimeonly
oneoptionremains,namely,atotalmilitary
defeatofCetniksinthisregion.
FadilHusakovic,Commanderofthe
operationalgroup"Bosna"
1.BYWAYOFINTRODUCTION
ThemediaattentiongiventosucheventsasthePope'svisittoZagreb,the
escalation ofthe political conflict between KaradiiC and MiloSevid, the
numerousincidentsinKosovo(wheretherewere9recordedarmedattacks
against Serbian police and soldiers by September ofthis year), and the
worsening relations between Greece and Albania (Greece has already
deported approximately 30,000 Albanians who are only the first ofthe
300,000AlbanianworkersthatGreecehasannounceditwilldeport),aswell
asthefirstcasualtiesinincidentsontheMacedonian-Serbianborder,pushed
the September news reports dealing with the events in B-H into the
background. The reports were reduced to brief descriptions of local
skirmishestakingplaceindifferentpartsofB-H,thecontinuationofethnic
cleansing,andothersimilartopicsinthesorryday-to-dayrealityofBosnia,
which iswhymanyhavebeguntothinkthatthesituationontheBosnian
battlefieldshasfinallybegantocalmdown.
Theaimofthisreportistogiveanbroadaccountofcertainchangeswhich
tookplaceinthepastfewdaysattheheartofthecrisisareaoftheformer
Yugoslavia,andthuscontributetoabetterunderstandingofpossiblefuture
developmentsintheshort-term.
2.THEENIGMAOFGENERALMLADIC
AtthetimeoftheescalationoftheconflictbetweenKaradiid-who isan
adamantdefenderoftheprojectestablishingaGreaterSerbia(theunification
ofall Serbsunderonestateandretentionof70% ofB-Hterritory)-and
Milosevic"-whonowseemstobesatisfiedwithaminimalversionofthis
project (49% oftheB-H territoryshouldbesufficient)-theSerbianand
Montenegrinpublicbegan speculatingon whatstand wouldbetaken by
2
GeneralMladiC.BothMilosevic"andKaradZiCsupportersconsideredthathis
personalstance,coupledwiththemilitaryinfluencewhichheexercisesover
thearmiesunderhiscommand,wouldbethedecidingfactorintippingthe
balanceofpowerinthecontestofpoliticalstrengthbetweenthetwoSerbian
leaders. This rather idealised and simplified approach did not take into
accountthatthestructureofSerbianauthorityinB-H isdifferentfromthat
currentlyineffectinSerbiaand Montenegro. BothKaradliCand General
Mladic"aretoalargeextentdependentonlocalpoliticalandmilitaryleaders
(whoeachfacespecificcircumstancesintheirownareas, andwhogained
all theterritoriescurrendyunderoccupationthroughtheirownskillsand
militaryforce),unlikeMilosevic,whohasuntilnowoftenshownandproved
thathecaneasilyeliminateallthosewhotrytoopposehim(orstandinhis
way), even personalities such as Prime Minister Milan PaniC, Dobrica
CosiC,his"naturalally"DrVojislavSeSelj,theChiefoftheGeneralStaff
RadojeAdliCandZivotaPaniC.EventhoughKaradzic"andMladiCareonly
firstamongequals,theirpoliticalandmilitaryinfluenceonthefutureturn
ofevents should notbe disregarded. This is especially true for Mladic",
becauseifthemilitarysituationinB-Hbeginstodeteriorate,Karadiic"and
hissupporterswillbecomeincreasinglydependentonthedecisionsmadeby
theBosnianSerbmilitaryelite.
As an illustrationof the speculations about Mladic" outlined above, the
reportscarriedbytheBelgradetabloidpress, which lastmonthpublished
"classified information" on the preparations for a coup d'etat against
MiloSeviC, canbecited. Theinformationwas based onthereportthatin
Serbia, ontheslopesofMtKosmaj, a "SerbianNationalArmy" isbeing
formed (consistingofmembers oftheCetnik's "WhiteEagles" units,the
Serbian Cetnik Movement, the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian
People's Renewal Party), with a leadership comprising its commanding
officer, the retired YNA General Andrija BiorCeviC (who was the
commanderoftheNoviSadcorpsandisknownforhisradicalviews)and
itsChiefoftheGeneralStaff,theretiredGeneralRadovanRadinoviC(who
was the head of the Centre for Strategic Studies, and is known for
supportingtheideaofestablishing"patriotcells"intheArmyofYugoslavia,
representingakindof"patrioticsubstitute"fortheformerorganisationof
theLeagueofCommunistsofYugoslavia).Itwasalsoannouncedthatafter
thecoupa"DuchyofSerbianLands"wouldbeformedundertheleadership
ofTomislavKaradzordzeviC, aprimeminister, Radovan KaradiiC, and a
ministerofdefence,theinevitableGeneralRatkoMladiC.
3
withthepolice)inordertodiscredittheRadicalsamongsttheSerbianpublic
byexposingthemastraitors,thusexoneratingtheirelimination.Theytried
tosubstantiatethisassertionbysayingthattheSerbianpolicehaveoflate
placedtheRadicalsunderinvestigation,confiscatingweapons(whichwere
partofthe"warbooty"takenfromthefront)duringhousesearches,and
puttingmanyofthemontrialfortheft,smuggling,illegaldealingandother
similaractivities.
Therumours aboutthepracticesand thebehaviourofRatko MladiCalso
suggestedthathewouldbelikelytobeofferedahighpostinthehierarchy
oftheAY.Withhis"transfer"totheAYhewouldevadeprosecutionasa
war criminal (which would instead fall on Karadzic" and his remaining
followers). But because none of this is true, since Ratko Mladic" has
remainedwithKaradiid,itcanbeconcludedthattheyhavestayedtogether
becauseofcommonintereststhatbindthemeven afterthebreakupofthe
associationbetweenKaradzic"andMilosevic"(whoishimselfbackedbythe
ChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheAY).Thissymbiosisbetweenthesymbol
of"Serbianresistance"inB-Handthe"architectofmajorSerbianvictories"
leadstoaconclusionthatasthesituationinB-Hgrowsmorecriticalandthe
militaryfactortakesonamoresignificantrole,Mladi<5'sinfluencewillalso
increaseaccordingly(orvice-versa).
3. MILITARY FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTOFEVENTSINBOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA
3.1 Militarybalanceofpower
The Army of the "Srpska Republika" (SR) has approximately 100,000
membersin50to60brigades.Theyinturnformsixarmycorps(eachcorps
deploystwotothreeoperationalunits)operatingwithindistinctzones. As
Serbianarmies control approximately35,000km2ofBosnianterritory, it
couldbeconcluded thatanaverage corps controls5000to6000km2. In
practice,however,thecorpsdiffersubstantiallyintheirmilitarystrength-
theBanjaLukacorpsconsistsof15brigades,theRomaniacorps(whohold
Sarajevo under siege) has 10 brigades, the Drina corps 9 brigades, the
Semberija corps 8 brigades, the Drvar corps 7 brigades, and the
Herzegovinacorps5brigades.Threecategoriesofsoldiersareemployed:
theprofessionalswhoarepermanentlyunderarms;theconscriptswhoare
called tothefrontlinesfor 14days,aregiventwotothreeweeks' leave
fromactivedutyandarethensentbacktothefrontlines;andparamilitary
4
unitsfromSerbiaproperwhoareformallyundertheauthorityoftheArmy
ofthe SR, but often conduct operations independently. In view ofthe
substantial Serbian casualties to date (estimated at 100,000dead, mostly
soldiers) and the fact that approximately 300,000 people have left B-H
(includingprospectivearmy conscripts), Serbianmanpowerresources are
lowerthanthetheoreticalnumbersbeingprovided. Asaconsequence, the
periodsofleavegrantedtosoldiersarebecomingshorter.
AkeystrategichandicapoftheArmyoftheSRisthatthemilitarycorpsare
ableto manoeuvreonlyoverthegeographical regionswithinwhich they
wereconscripted,beingtiedtotheirhomeareasbecausetheyhavetodefend
the "liberated territories" against their neighbours. General Mladic" -
following the example of the Croatian Army which formed eight
professionalbrigades-failedinhisattempttoformasimilarstrategiccore
thatwouldbeabletofightinanyregion.
Inaddition,theweaknessoftheBosnianSerbarmyalsomanifestsitselfin
lowfightingmorale, alackofactiveofficers atthefrontlines (they are
usually stationed at headquarters and behind the front lines), a lack of
discipline,andotherproblems.AlthoughtogethertheBosnianArmyandthe
CroatianDefenceArmy(HVO)arestrongerinnumbers(outnumberingthe
Serbianforces 2:1), theSerbshavebetween a2:1 and 3:1 advantage in
armourandsupportartillery.
Furthermore,theBosnianSerbshavealargenumberofanti-aircraftguns
andmissileswhichcanalsobeusedtoattacktargetsontheground,further
increasingtheir firepower. They also possess FROG surface to surface
missiles (which can alternatively be deployed at the Banija bases in the
SerbianRepublicofKrajina(SRK)forattacksonZagreb),30planesforair
support (which due to "Operation Deny Flight" are grounded) and
approximatelythesamenumberofhelicopters.
ItisevidentfromtheabovethattheArmyoftheSRhassofarshownthat
theyhaveonlyalimitedcapabilityforconductingextensiveoffensiveaction,
forinstancetheyarenotabletodeploymobileforces largerthanacorps
and transfer them from Banja Luka to Herzegovina. However, they are
strong in defence where they can rely on fortified front line positions,
numerousminefieldsandotherbarriers,aswellasthestrongfiringpower
oftheirgroundandanti-aircraftartillery.
