The dictator's army : battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes

319 Pages·2015·4.92 MB·English

by  Caitlin Talmadge

The Dictator’s Army
A volume in the series
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
The
Dictator’s Army
Battlefield
Effectiveness in
Authoritarian Regimes
Caitlin Talmadge
Cornell University Press
Ithaca and London
Copyright © 2015 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing
from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press,
Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 2015 by Cornell University Press
First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2015
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Talmadge, Caitlin, author.
The dictator’s army : battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes / Caitlin
Talmadge.
pages cm — (Cornell studies in security affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8014-5347-2 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-5017-0029-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Authoritarianism. 2. Military policy—Decision making. 3. Politics and
war. 4. Vietnam War, 1961–1975—Political aspects. 5. Iran-Iraq War,
1980–1988—Political aspects. I. Title. II. Series: Cornell studies in security affairs.
JC480.T35 2015
355'.0335—dc23 2015007580
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and
materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials
include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled,
totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further
information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Cover photograph: Iraqi troops celebrate on September 27, 1980, following an
advance of more than ten miles inside Iranian territory. Photo courtesy of
Bettmann/Corbis.
For my family

Contents
List of Maps viii
Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations xii
Introduction: The Puzzle of Battlefield Effectiveness 1
1. A Framework for Explaining Battlefield Effectiveness 12
2. Threats and Military Organizational Practices in
North and South Vietnam 41
3. Battlefield Effectiveness in North and South Vietnam 71
4. Threats and Military Organizational Practices
in Iraq and Iran 139
5. Battlefield Effectiveness in Iraq and Iran 179
Conclusion: Threats, Military Organizational Practices,
and the Battlefields of the Future 233
Notes 251
Index 293
[vii]
Maps
2.1. French Indochina 44
2.2. The Republic of Vietnam 51
3.1. The Battle of Ap Bac, 1963 76
3.2. The Tet Offensive, 1968 86
3.3. The Citadel at Hue, 1968 89
3.4. Operation Lam Son 719, 1971 99
3.5. ARVN defensive lines in Military Region 1, 1972 110
3.6. The withdrawal from the highlands, 1975 124
4.1. Iran and Iraq 143
4.2. The Shatt al-Arab 144
5.1. The Iraqi invasion of Iran, 1980 183
5.2. The Battle of Basra, 1982 198
5.3. Iranian offensives, 1984–1987 202
5.4. Iranian offensives, 1986–1987 206
5.5. Iraqi offensives, 1988 218
[viii]
Acknowledgments
Writing a book is the ultimate embodiment of the paradox “You have
to do it yourself, but you can’t do it alone.” This book is much better than
it otherwise would have been thanks to the help and support of many
people.
Chief among these are the mentors with whom I have had the good
fortune to work at every stage of my education and career. Aaron Tim-
mons, Alex Pritchard, Jonathan Cassie, and Mark Crotty fostered my in-
terest in research and writing early on at the Greenhill School. At Harvard
College, Steve Rosen taught me in my first courses on war and strongly
encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. (and, later, to keep pursuing it). With-
out him, I probably would have gone to law school.
Instead, I landed at the MIT Security Studies Program, where I had the
privilege of learning from Harvey Sapolsky, Cindy Williams, Owen Cote,
Ken Oye, Barry Posen, Roger Petersen, and Taylor Fravel. These latter
three deserve especially emphatic thanks for the many hours they spent
reading the earliest incarnation of this book and helping me improve it.
I am so grateful to have benefited from the insights, patience, and gener-
osity of each.
During my time at the George Washington University, Steve Biddle,
Alex Downes, Charlie Glaser, and Jim Lebovic have continued to advise
and mentor me. Each read this manuscript in its entirety—in some cases,
more than once—and played a pivotal role in my ability to transform it
into a book. I thank them all.
I owe tremendous thanks to my peers as well. Brendan Green read the
manuscript an unreasonable number of times and offered countless
suggestions that both improved the final product and steadied my per-
sonal equilibrium. Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland also each read the
[ix]