The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941

162 Pages·2002·15.26 MB·English

by  Thomas Greer

SPECIAL STUD1 ES
The Development of Air Doctrine
in the Army Air Arm
19 17- 1941
Thomas H. Greei
New Imprint by
Office of Air Force Histo ry
United States Air Forct
Washington, D.C., 198:
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Greer, Thomas H.
The development of air doctrine in the Army air arm, 1917-1941.
(Special studies)
Reprint. Originally published Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF
Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955. (USAF
historical studies: no. 89)
Bibliography: p. 142
Includes index.
1. United States. Army-Aviation-History. 2. Aeronautics, Military-
United States-History. 3. Air power. 4. Military art and science-United
States-History-20th century. I. Title. 11. Series: Special studies (United
States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History)
UG633.G73 1986 358.4'00973 85-21378
ISBN 0-912799-25-0
This volume is a reprint of a September 1955 edition original-
ly issued by the USAF Historical Division, Research Studies
Institute, Air University.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offlce
Washington. D.C.2 0402
FOREWORD
y h i s monograph recounts the development of air doctrine in
the Army air arm from 1917 to 1941. It includes concepts, both
strategic and tactical, that emerged during World War I and
the period following, up to the entry of the United States into
World War 11. The study is based primarily on official Air Force
records and upon interviews with officers of the air arm who
have been especially associated with air doctrine. It was pre-
pared for the USAF Historical Division by Dr. Thomas H. Greer,
formerly a member of the Division and presently associate
professor of humanities, Michigan State College. A number of
changes in, and additions to, the original draft have been made
by members of the Historical Division, notably Mr. Robert T.
Finney and Dr. Albert F. Simpson. All such changes and addi-
tions have been based upon Historical Division studies and data
not available to Dr. Greer when he prepared the basic draft.
Both the original draft and the final version were edited by
personnel of the Division.
Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject
to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections
will be welcomed.
iii

Contents
INTRODUCTION .. .. . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . . . . .. .. . . vii
, , , , , , , , , , ,
I THE AIR SERVICE IN WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918 ....... 1
Prewar Organization and Concepts 1
American Participation in World War I .. .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. 3
, , ,
General concepts of warfare and air employment . . . 3
Over-all air operations, organization, and control . . .. . . .. .. .. 4
Pursuit aviation . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . . .. . . 7
Bombardment aviation . . .. . ._.,.. . _.. . . ... . . . ... . ... . .. . .... . . . .... . 9
, , ,
12
12
1926 .................................................... ..................................... 14
Diverging Views of the Nature o .................................... 14
The War Department view . . . .. . . . . . . .. . 14
Views of Air Service leaders ..................................... 15
The Struggle for the Control o er ................................ 20
20
21
22
25
Evolving Doctrines of Air Employment 30
The general fun 30
33
36
38
Attack aviation .. .............. 39
Comparative sum ...................... 40
I11 DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR FORCE IDEA, 1926-1935 44
44
44
Successful development of two-engine bombers : the B-9
................. 45
46
47
and Douhet ................................................................ 48
The employment of airpower ........ 52
Bombardment aviation; the preci
escort problem ........................................................... 57
Pursuit aviation .. 60
Attack aviation ....................... ...................................... 66
The Impasse with the Navy Regarding Land-based Bom-
bardment ... .......................................... 67
Establishment Air Force (1935) ........................ 70
IV REFINEMENT AND SUBSTANTIATION OF THE LONG-
RANGE BOMBARDMENT CONCEPT, 1935-1939 76
Hemisphere Defense Policy as a Factor in Strat
cepts and Air Doctrine ........................ .............. 76
Elaboration of Air Theory at the Air Corps Tactical School 77
The nature of war and the employment of air 77
Bombardment aviation ... . ... . . ... ... . ... . . . . . . ... ..... ... ... 80
Pursuit aviation . . .. . . . .. ........................................ 83
,
Attack aviation ................................... ....... ........ 87
The 'Crucial Fight for Production and Development of the
Long-range Bomber ............ ...................... 89
Bomber program related to 89
Andrews presses for exclusive procurement of four-
engine bombers , . .. . , . . ,. , ...................................... 91
development of the
bomber . . .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . ............................................ 93
The General Stail b 94
100
The Influence of Foreign Wars upon Americ 101
102
............................................................. 102
Spain . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . .................................... 102
, ,
Munich . . . . .. . . , .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . , . . . .. .. 103
I......I..,,....,...........,,..
Adjustments in Air Organization ............................................ 103
V PREPARATION OF AIR DOCTRINE FOR WORLD WAR 11,
1939-1941 ........................................................ 107
General Influence of the European War upon the Theory
and Position of Airpower ... ............................ 107
Tactical Lessons from the Air War Abroad ................... 108
Final Shaping of Air Doctrines on the Eve of Ame
Involvement .. . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . .. ....................... 110
, , ,
Purpose and nature of warfare .............................. 110
The role and employment of airpower in war .................. 111
Bombardment aviation . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . 115
Pursuit aviation ...................................................................... 120
Attack and light bombardment aviation . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. 121
Blueprint for action: AWPD/l .................. 123
Establishment of Army Air Forces (1941) ........................ 126
VI CONCLUSIONS ................... 128
FOOTNOTES ............... 131
BIBLIOGRAP 142
APPENDIX
1. Organizational Charts 144
2. Redesi-g nations of the Army Air Arm, 1907-1942 .............. 149
INDEX .............................................................................................. 151
vf'
INTRODUCTION
w h e n t he debacle at Pearl Harbor thrust The history of civilized mankind shows
.
the United States into a war for survival, us but three.. revolutionary nlilitary in-
the nation marshalled its forces on land ventions, or discoveries: discipline, gun-
and sea and in the air. And although land, powder, and the airplane . . . The airplane,
sea, and air forces all played vital roles in for the first time in the long and bloody
securing the triumph, the part of the air history of human conflict, has given tq
warfare the means of striking, not only
arm was unique. For the first time in the
at the army or navy of the opponent,
history of war, airpower was employed as a
but directly at the seat and source of his
major striking force, drastically altering
Power-at his citizenry, at his capital city,
the course and nature of the struggle and
at his industrial, commercial, and political
decisively influencing the outcome.
centers-without flrst having to overthrow
American airpower was the product of
the armed forces with which he seeks to
men and machines-and something more. protect them.'
Like every other kind of military force it
depended basically upon ideas-ideas both The story of the development of air doc-
of practicable and of potential employment. trine is the story of an unprecedented in-
But unlike the time-honored forces of land tellectual achievement. It involves bold
and sea, the air force had neither traditions flights of imagination, stern logic, and new
nor theories developed over long centuries patterns of thought. It was achieved, as
of experience.' Fighting on land dates back most new ideas are achieved, in the face
to the dawn of human society; fighting on of fierce opposition compounded of inertia,
water must be nearly as ancient. Through vested interest, and rigid thinking. But
the tortuous history of warfare, men had when the crucial test came in 1941, Amer-
time-lots of it-to devise the weapons, tac- ica had the makings of airpower-both the
tics, and strategy of surface combat. Air men and machines and a carefully devel-
warfare, on the other hand, came with dra- oped doctrine which could readily be trans-
matic suddenness. It presented, within an lated into a plan of military action. That
incredibly short time, awesome and revo- the doctrine was sound is affirmed by the
lutionary weapons of destruction. Man's results of America's air war.
imagination was staggered, or should have But air doctrine is a dynamic thing, and
been, by the possibilities of this new me- the ideas of 1941 will not serve the needs
dium, and he strove to envision its optimum
of the present and future. We must keep
use for defense and offense. Here, indeed,
searching for and developing ideas in order
was a challenge to the power of man to
to keep pace with the continuous techno-
think and plan-and the stakes were high
logical and strategic changes. In that im-
in terms of national power and survival.
The importance of this new medium as seen portant task we can receive inspiration
in the long view of history, has been force- and guidance by examining the doctrinal
fully put by a contemporary military ob- steps and missteps of the air arm during
server, Major George Fielding Eliot: its formative period, 1917-1941.

C H A P T E R 1
THE AIR SERVICE IN WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918
As a preparation for the major role it was tactics, but a great row had already started
to play in World War 11, the American concerning organization. The subject of this
air arm found its experience in the first argument was, of course, a matter of mili-
World War was brief and limited. That war tary doctrine; for organization relates to
had an important bearing, however, upon the control and purposes of any military
the development of air doctrine in the in- component. The intimate connection be-
terval between wars, because it was the only tween concepts of the use of aviation and
actual combat test to which American air- the manner of its organization may clearly
men and equipment had been put. Theories be seen in the early debates upon the issue.
and practice maneuvers might be worked One might have suspected that agitation
out in the light of later trends in technology to make aviation a separate branch would
and methods of warfare, but one fact always have begun among the airmen themselves.
remained: the only battle test up to 1941 It was from the outside, however, that such
had been the action in World War I. Natu- proposals were first made. Rep. James Hay,
rally, the conclusions drawn from that chairman of the House Committee on Mili-
action gave initial direction to thought tary Affairs, in February 1913 proposed a
about the employment of airpower and bill which would have created a separate
continued during the following years to ex- Air Corps as one of the line components of
ercise a substantial, though declining, in- the Army. But legislative hearings and cor-
fluence upon it. respondence relating to the bill showed that
most military men, including flyers, were
PREWAR ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPTS
opposed to it at the time. Assistant Secre-
The American air arm was an infant in
tary of War Henry S. Breckenridge saw mili-
almost every respect when it was called
tary aviation as “merely an added means
upon to meet the challenge of World War I.
of communication, observation and recon-
Established by military order as the Avi-
naissance,” which “ought to be coordinated
ation Section of the Signal Corps in August
with and subordinated to the general serv-
1907,* it had not achieved statutory recog-
ice of information and not erected into an
nition as such until July 1914, shortly be-
independent and uncoordinated service.”
fore the outbreak of war in Europe.’ Before
Breckenridge emphasized the point that
and after that time there was agitation to
aviation was still in its infancy, that it was
raise the air arm to the status of a separate
destined for a long time to be an auxiliary
branch of the Army, but this movement did
of the line, and that its immediate future
not meet with success until June 1920.2 In
would therefore best be handled by the
the prewar years and during the conflict
Signal Corps.3 Col. George P. Scriven, Act-
itself, American airpower was the “baby”
ing Chief Signal OfRcer, upheld this view.
of the Signal Corps.
He also stressed the fact that the Signal
The question of the proper place and or-
Corps had the technical information and
ganization of the air arm was, in fact, the
qualified personnel to handle aviation
most discussed problem relating to military
aviation during the prewar years. Before needs-in his view aviators were young
-1~91 4 little was heard of types of planes and men without the requisite scientific knowl-
edge and mature judgment.‘
*See Appendlx 1.
1
-
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War I
Although many flyers resented this sort service and the duties of an officer.” Scriven
of reference to them, they appeared virtu- imputed further that there was deliberate
ally unanimous in their opposition to the motive behind the friction which had been
Hay bill. Outspoken were such future created. Behind their “unmilitary, insubor-
leaders of American airpower as Benjamin dinate, and disloyal acts,” he charged, was
D. Foulois, Henry H. Arnold, and William a burning ambition to set up a new and
Mitchell. Lieutenant Foulois thought it was independent organization for aviation.6
too early for a separate Air Corps, but con- The growing personal bitterness and the
ceded that separation was only a matter of rising demand for separation of the air arm
time. Lieutenant Arnold felt that since the from the Signal Corps compelled the atten-
Signal Corps was doing all it could for avia- tion of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker,
tion, the situation was satisfactory. Cap-
who in April 1916 directed the General Staff
tain Mitchell went so far as to assert that to launch a thorough investigation of the
creation of a separate branch would retard
matter. At the same time he took special no-
the development of aviation as a branch of tice of the impatient attitude of the youth-
reconnaissance. In fact, there is only one
ful aviators toward their nonflying supe-
officer on record in favor of the Hay bill. He riors. Baker contended that what was
was Capt. Paul Beck, who insisted that avi-
needed was not a separate service, not a
ation was not logically a part of the Signal
new corps but a new man in command-
Corps since sf its four functions, recon-
man of mature and severe judgment, who
naipnce, Are control, aggressive action,
could restrain with discipline the exuber-
and transportation, only one pertained to
ance of youth.? Secretary Baker apparently
signals. He disagreed with the contention had such a man in mind, for in February
that separation should be postponed, charg-
of the following year he appointed Brig.
ing that the longer the Signal Corps con-
Gen. George 0. Squier to replace General
trolled aeronautics, the smaller would be
Scriven as Chief Signal Officer.s
the possibility that aviation would ever
come into its own.5 The change in commanding generals rep-
resented no solution to the underlying prob-
The attitude of Captain Beck toward con-
lem. secretary Baker himself admitted, in
trol by the Signal Corps foreshadowed a
the same month in which he ordered the
widening rift between the aviators and their
investigation of military aeronautics, that
nonflying military superiors. This personnel
the experience of World War I showed that
friction was at least as important as theo-
the air arm was no mere auxiliary service.
retical differences in bringing about even-
Aviation was capable of action as an offen,
tual separation of the air arm from the Sig-
sive arm, in addition to its function of
nal Corps. The basis for the difficulty
scouting, carrying messages, and control-
seemed to lie in the special restrictions
ling gunfire. In the near future, he pre-
placed on flying officers with respect to age
dicted, the United States would add
and marital status. The aviators resented
armored and armed planes to its air fleet,
such treatment and also chafed under what
and this development required the creation
they regarded as the apathetic attitude of
of a new fighting arm. Specifically, the
the Chief Signal Officer and the General
time had come for a change in the relation
Staff toward military aviation. The “high
of the Aviation Section to the Army. But
brass,” for its part, found the aviators too
Secretary Baker made no move for im-
outspoken and too indifferent toward con-
mediate change, and the initiative once
ventional military customs. As the Chief
more was left to Congress. In March
Signal Offfcer, Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven,
1916 Representative Charles Lieb of Indiana
explained in February 1916, the trouble had already gone beyond earlier proposals
stemmed from the “aviation officers. .un-
, for a separate aviation branch of the Army,
balanced as to grades, young in years and by introducing the first of a long series of
service, and deficient in discipline and the
bills providing for a wholly autonomous De-
proper knowledge of. the customs of the partment of Aviation.9