Table Of ContentDionyssis Dimitrakopoulos
Argyris Passas
The Depoliticisation
of Greece’s
Public Revenue
Administration
Radical Change and the Limits of
Conditionality
’
The Depoliticisation of Greece s Public Revenue
Administration
(cid:129)
Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos Argyris Passas
The Depoliticisation
’
of Greece s Public Revenue
Administration
Radical Change and the Limits
of Conditionality
DionyssisDimitrakopoulos ArgyrisPassas
DepartmentofPolitics DepartmentofInternational
Birkbeck,UniversityofLondon EuropeanandAreaStudies
London,UK PanteionUniversityofSocialandPolitical
Sciences
Athens,Greece
ISBN978-3-030-23212-2 ISBN978-3-030-23213-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23213-9
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Despite being classified as an advanced economy by virtue of its euro
area membership, by all accounts Greece’s institutional capacity in
the judicial process, tax administration, expenditure control, and
statistical services was below that in practically any other European
economy
(Kopits 2016, 24)
‘Wespendalotoftimeontherevenueadministration,tryingtodragit
out of the 1930s’ (statement made at a meeting held in London in
January 2018 under the Chatham House rule)
‘We certainly cannot say that these people (i.e. the EU and IMF staff)
came here to destroy paradise’ (interview, Athens, 9 November 2016)
‘I must say that, were it not for the Troika’s major pressure, it might
have never materialised’ (interview, Athens, 2 June 2017)
We dedicate this book to Katerina
Papakonstantinou, Maria Zampara and, in
particular, Alkis A. and Yiorgos A. Passas
hoping that at least the latter two will
experience Greece as a country where paying
and collecting tax fairly will be the norm. If
thathappens,itwillbeinnosmallpartdueto
the reform that we examine in this book.
Preface
Whenwestartedworkingonthisproject,wehadnoideawewouldendupmakinga
bookoutofit.Ourmuchmoretimidobjectivewastowriteanarticleforanacademic
journalandeventhatfeltlikeabitofastretchfortwopoliticalscientistswhodonot
normally write about public revenue administrations. What sparked our interest in
thereformofGreece’spublicrevenueadministrationwasthefactthat,asPresident
Obama’schiefofstaffrightlynoted,‘youneverwantaseriouscrisistogotowaste’,
i.e.acrisis‘isanopportunitytodothethingsthatyouthinkyoucouldnotdobefore’
(Emanuel2008).AsanyonewhohasencounteredthemodernGreekstate’sappara-
tuswouldtestify,attheonsetofthecrisisitwasindesperateneedforreform,butthe
country’s public revenue administration in particular stood out in that respect.
Having grown accustomed to reading, hearing or even experiencing stories about
its legendary ineffectiveness, heavy-handedness, opacity and corruption (all of
whicharesociopoliticalconstructs),coupledwithourdeeplyheldbeliefthatpaying
and collecting tax fairly is first and foremost a basic civic duty, a matter of social
justice—since none of the public goods that need protecting and none of the
resources and opportunities that need to be redistributed in unequal societies can
beprotected,fundedorredistributedwithouttaxjustice—wedecidedtotrytolook
intoitbyparticipatingintheannualcompetitionforsmallresearchgrantsconducted
by the Hellenic Observatory at the European Institute of the London School of
EconomicsandPoliticalScience.
We did so after reading the surprising (to us at least) news in the press that the
Greek government was going to establish an independent public revenue authority
thatwasmeanttooperateatarm’slengthfromthegovernmentoftheday.Tous,this
soundedlikenothingshortofarevolutionsincewewereawareoftheGreekpolitical
establishment’s aversion to genuinely independent authorities, the problems that
extant authorities were facing, the academic literature on Greece’s limited reform
capacityaswellasthepervasiveviewamongstGreeksthatacknowledgestheneed
for deep reforms ‘because the country could not go on as it was’ as long as these
reformsstartfromothersocialgroupsfirst.
ix
x Preface
When we decided to participate in the Hellenic Observatory’s competition, we
didsowith adegree oftrepidation that was duenotonly tothehighlycompetitive
nature of the process. The reasons for our trepidation were threefold. First, we
believe that independent authorities pose particular challenges to democracy.
Detachment from the exigencies of the electoral cycle implies that voters are
necessarilyasunwillingtohearunpopulartruthsbeingsaidasunwillingpoliticians
vying for office are to tell them. Although it is true that far too many citizens in
advancedliberaldemocracieseithertakedemocracyforgranted—astherampantrise
of populism shows—or construe democracy only in terms of rights, we do not
believethat theuseofindependentauthorities acrosstheboard isalwaysasneces-
sary as their proponents purport it to be while they remain rather silent (often
deafeninglyso)withregardtothematerialluresofthemarketaswellastheproblem
of‘revolvingdoors’.Asforthemeaningofindependence,ifonetakesasociological
perspective,onewillnoticethatinmanycasestheseniorofficialsoftheseauthorities
haverathersimilarbackgroundsintermsofclass,education,gender,etc.tothoseof
many leading politicians. The strength of isomorphism is significant, as are its
pitfalls. One of the most significant pitfalls is the potential for blame avoidance.
Independent authorities offer this potential especially in a country such as Greece
where politicians (and senior officials) often show excessive aversion to the very
ideaofresigningfromoffice.
Second,shiftingthefocusofpoliticalaccountabilityfromintra-departmentalhier-
archies to accountability to parliament poses particular challenges in the case of
Greece since the Greek parliament is characteristically docile. Its key weakness,
which isalso one that permeates the country’s entire political system, isaversion to
evidence-baseddebates.Thisisunsurprisingsincegatheringandinterpretingevidence
isacumbersomeandchallengingactivityandGreekparliamentariansarenotaccus-
tomed to it. This is not due to the lack of means (itself a political construct). Their
offices remain handsomely funded by the state budget. Rather, they are culturally
keenerontheuseofslogans,asaremuchoftheGreekpressandbodypolitic.Thefinal
reasonforourtrepidationwasourfear—basedonpastexperience—thattheinterview-
intensivenatureofthisresearchprojectwouldbeunderminedbytherelativeabsence
of the culture of research interview from large segments of both the political and
administrative élite. On that front, and with only a handful of (anyway telling)
exceptions,weendedupbeingpleasantlysurprised.
Carryingoutthisresearchprojectwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithoutthefinan-
cialsupportprovidedbytheHellenicObservatory.Wearegratefulforit.Wearealso
gratefultoMsEvaKatakalou,doctoralcandidateatPanteionUniversityofSocialand
Political Sciences, for the excellent research assistance that she has provided; the
34individualswhohaveagreedtobeinterviewedforthepurposeofthisprojectand
for help with tracking down obscure documents; as well as Georgette Lalis, Nikos
ErinakisandMichalisPsalidopoulosforthehelptheyhaveprovidedintrackingdown
key officials. Our work has benefitted from the comments offered by Tryfon
Alexiadis, Nikos Karavitis, Fragiskos Koutentakis, Georgette Lalis, Antonis
Papayannidis,PhilipposSachinidis,CalliopeSpanou,HarryTheoharisandTheodore
Tsekos during the presentation of an earlier paper at the Jean Monnet Chair’s
Preface xi
workshop on administrative reform in Greece at Panteion University, Athens, on
5 April 2017. We have also benefitted from the comments made by Dr Ali Burak
Güven,ProfessorDeborahMabbett,ProfessorE.C.PageFBA,DrDavidStyanand
ProfessorTheodoreTsekosinthecontextofthe‘bookclub’ofBirkbeck’sPolitics
Department.Theusualdisclaimerapplies.DionyssisG.Dimitrakopoulosgratefully
acknowledges the research funding and time off from routine duties granted by
Birkbeck’s Politics Department while working on this project. We would also like
to thank the team at Springer, especially Johannes Glaeser, for the professional
handlingoftheproductionprocess.
London,UK DionyssisDimitrakopoulos
Athens,Greece ArgyrisPassas
April2019
Contents
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
TaxCollectioninGreece:TheMagnitudeoftheProblem. . . . . . . . . . . 2
Greece’sPublicRevenueAdministrationattheOnsetoftheCrisis. . . . . 4
Greece’sLimitedReformCapacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ModelsofPublicRevenueAdministrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
ThePuzzle,CoreArgumentandStructureoftheBook. . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Non-majoritarianInstitutions,ConditionalityandDomestic
Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
TheConceptofDepoliticisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ThePurposeofNon-majoritarianInstitutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
NMIs,ExecutiveAgenciesandtheIssueofAccountability. . . . . . . . . . 39
Conditionality. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . 42
TheLogicofConditionality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
ConditionalityandtheEuropeanUnion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3 TheFirstMoU:PiecemealChangeandExternalAssistance
inConditionsofCrisis.. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 59
TheOnsetoftheCrisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
TheFirstMoUandtheReformoftheGreekPublicRevenue
Administration:TimidAdHoceryinConditionsofCrisis. . . . . . . . . . . 61
TheProvisionofTechnicalAssistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4 TheSecondMoU:ExternallyImposedChangeDespiteDomestic
Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
TheIntroductionofSemi-Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
TheImplementationandLimitsofSemi-Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
ConcludingRemarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
xiii
