The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership

392 Pages·2014·4.55 MB·English

by  Barbara Elias

UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff PPeennnnssyyllvvaanniiaa
SScchhoollaarrllyyCCoommmmoonnss
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2013
TThhee CCrriittiiccaall AAllllyy:: CCooeerrcciioonn aanndd DDeefifiaannccee iinn CCoouunntteerriinnssuurrggeennccyy
PPaarrttnneerrsshhiipp
Barbara Elias
University of Pennsylvania, [email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons
RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn
Elias, Barbara, "The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership" (2013). Publicly
Accessible Penn Dissertations. 751.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751
For more information, please contact [email protected].
TThhee CCrriittiiccaall AAllllyy:: CCooeerrcciioonn aanndd DDeefifiaannccee iinn CCoouunntteerriinnssuurrggeennccyy PPaarrttnneerrsshhiipp
AAbbssttrraacctt
In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in-
country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies
dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign
interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses
both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in-
country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-country allied compliance with (or
defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of "power" in international relations and moving
beyond underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures
inherent in this type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies.
Specifically, the study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with
foreign allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the
requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host
government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables
interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In
particular, the study argues that whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy
interacts with the unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied
preferences converge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an
incentive to free-ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally
can implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in order to
avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found remarkable consistency
across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests complied with, 1/3 complied with
in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled.
DDeeggrreeee TTyyppee
Dissertation
DDeeggrreeee NNaammee
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
GGrraadduuaattee GGrroouupp
Political Science
FFiirrsstt AAddvviissoorr
Avery Goldstein
KKeeyywwoorrddss
Alliances, Coercion, Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Intervention, Power
SSuubbjjeecctt CCaatteeggoorriieess
International Relations | Peace and Conflict Studies | Political Science
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751
THE CRITICAL ALLY:
COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS
Barbara Elias
A DISSERTATION
in
Political Science
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2013

Supervisor of Dissertation
_____________________
Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science

Graduate Group Chairperson
_____________________
Nancy Hirschmann, Professor, Department of Political Science

Dissertation Committee
Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science
Edward Mansfield, Professor, Department of Political Science
Michael Horowitz, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
Alex Weisiger, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science

!
!
THE CRITICAL ALLY: COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
PARTNERSHIPS
COPYRIGHT
2013
Barbara Elias

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License

To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Turns out, this is harder than it looks. I am enormously grateful to my professors,
Avery Goldstein, Ed Mansfield, Mike Horowitz and Alex Weisiger. Avery who was
patient, smart and incisive, Alex who invested enormous energy reading every draft and
challenging important details. I owe Alex a debt I can never repay for converting me
from a one-trick national security document researcher to a proper political scientist
complete with quantitative tools (amazing!). Thank you also to Mike who gave me
perspective and Ed who, after listening to the initial proposal, asked, “wait, can you
actually do this?” He was not convinced, but let me try anyway. Thank you.
In addition, I am grateful to the Department of Political Science at the University
of Pennsylvania for an incredible opportunity and education, as well as Brown University
for my first education in international relations under Jim Blight and janet Lang.
Enormous thanks are due to the National Security Archive, where badass academics and
intellectual troublemakers go to dig up evidence and do great research. Several
institutions were wonderfully supportive of this project. I would like to thank the Browne
Center for International Politics, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Wharton Risk
Management and Decision Processes Center, GAPSA, the Teece Family, and the Jewish
Family Service Association of Cleveland for honoring me with funds and encouragement.
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my family. I am grateful to my mom, dad, and
poppou, Cameron, Aimee and Mary. Yia-yia, who taught me that you could be very small
and very strong, much like clever political actors in international relations. Thank you to
Anna and my other sisters Rosella Cappella, Kim Turner and Johanna Lacoe who picked
me up, dusted me off and were my flashlight in the dark. Finally, thanks to Nathaniel
who set this project back a few months, but made it better because he made me better.
"""!
!
ABSTRACT
THE CRITICAL ALLY:
COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS
Barbara Elias
Avery Goldstein
In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under
what conditions do in-country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening
forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining
thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions Vietnam,
Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both
qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies
to their in-country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-
country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of
“power” in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of
alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of
counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the
study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign
allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to
implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the
capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute
enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives
for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied
interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability of
"#!!
!
intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and
the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-
ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can
implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in
order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found
remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests
complied with, 1/3 complied with in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled.

#!!
!
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................ IV
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................. IX
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................ XI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1
The Central Argument ............................................................................................. 4
Why Examine These Alliances? ................................................................................ 8
CHAPTER 2: THEORY, ARGUMENT, AND LITERATURE ................. 14
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 17
Military Studies—Counterinsurgency Warfare ............................................................................. 17
International Relations .................................................................................................................. 19
Re-conceptualizing Ideas in International Relations on Allied Commitment,
Dependency, and Interests .................................................................................... 26
Commitment ................................................................................................................................. 26
Dependency .................................................................................................................................. 30
Interest .......................................................................................................................................... 33
Variables and Hypotheses ...................................................................................... 35
Independent Variables – What Determines Compliance? .......................................................... 37
Control Variables—Other Important Factors .............................................................................. 45
A Note on the Interaction Between Variables .............................................................................. 48
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .......................................................... 51
The Reliability of U.S. Department of State Cables from Wikileaks ........................ 59
The Foreign Intervening Force—Selecting Requests to Allies ................................. 66
The Dependent Variable—Compliance ................................................................... 67
Independent Variables ........................................................................................... 74
CHAPTER 4: VIETNAM ..................................................................... 91
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Vietnamese Compliance ..................... 92
Summary Findings ................................................................................................. 93
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance ................................................. 100
Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 100
Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................ 104
Interests ....................................................................................................................................... 111
Conditions of War, Internal Politics and External Threats ....................................................... 128
The End of the War and U.S. Withdrawal .............................................................. 137
#!"!
!
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 142
CHAPTER 5: IRAQ .......................................................................... 144
Summary Findings ................................................................................................ 144
The U.S., Coalition Provisional Authority and the Government of Iraq ................ 146
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ................................................................................. 147
The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) .......................................................................................... 153
The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and Permanent Government of Iraq (GOI) ............ 155
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Iraqi Compliance .............................. 161
Data on Iraqi Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary .................................... 165
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance .................................................. 171
Capacity ........................................................................................................................................ 171
Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................. 173
Interests—Costs and Benefits ...................................................................................................... 181
Conditions of War and Internal Politics ..................................................................................... 191
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 195
CHAPTER 6: THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN ...................................... 199
Summary Findings ............................................................................................... 200
Hamid Karzai and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan ......................... 202
The U.S. Civilian Advisory Effort ............................................................................................... 209
Methodology - Tracking U.S. Demands and Afghan Compliance ........................... 211
Data on Afghan Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary ................................. 213
Independent Variables – Explaining Compliance ................................................. 219
Capacity ........................................................................................................................................ 219
Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................ 222
Interests—Costs and Benefits ..................................................................................................... 237
Conditions of War and Internal Politics .................................................................................... 242
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 245
CHAPTER 7: THE U.S.S.R. IN AFGHANISTAN ............................... 247
Summary Findings ................................................................................................ 247
The KGB Factor .................................................................................................... 251
The Soviet Bureaucracy ........................................................................................ 253
Finding a Scapegoat ............................................................................................. 256
Strategy and the Soviet Intervention in the Afghan Regime, 1979-89 ................... 258
Methodology ........................................................................................................ 262
Afghan Compliance with Soviet Demands ............................................................ 266
#"!"!
!
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 273
Other Counterinsurgency Interventions by Non-Democratic States
Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, Syria in Lebanon ........... 274
Vietnam in Cambodia ................................................................................................................ 274
Egypt in Yemen ........................................................................................................................... 277
Cuba in Angola ............................................................................................................................ 279
Syria in Lebanon ......................................................................................................................... 284
CHAPTER 8: INDIA IN SRI LANKA ............................................... 286
Summary Findings ............................................................................................... 286
Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Insurgency (LTTE)—A Briefing ............................ 288
Methodology—Tracking Indian Demands and Sri Lankan Compliance ................ 296
Data on Sri Lankan Compliance with Indian Demands—Summary ....................... 297
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance ................................................. 304
Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 304
Dependency & Unilateral Action ................................................................................................ 305
Interests ...................................................................................................................................... 309
Conditions of War and Internal Politics ..................................................................................... 317
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 324
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION .......................................................... 328
APPENDICES ................................................................................. 340
Appendix A: METHODOLOGY—EXAMPLES ....................................................... 340
Appendix B: CHART COMPARING TYPES OF DEMANDS MADE BY FOREIGN
ALLIES ACROSS COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS ................................................ 349
REFERENCES ................................................................................. 352

#"!""!
!