The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory

433 Pages·1996·8.21 MB·English

by  David J. Chalmers

THE
Conscious
Mind
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND SERIES
Series Editor: Owen Flanagan, Duke University
SELF EXPRESSIONS
Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life
Owen Flanagan
DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND
Stephen P. Stich
THE CONSCIOUS MIND
In Search of a Fundamental Theory
David J. Chalmers
THE
conscious
Mind
IN SEARCH OF
A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY
David J. Chalmers
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Copyright © 1996 by David J. Chalmers
First published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 1996
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1997
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chalmers, David John
The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory
p. cm. (Philosophy of mind series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-510553-2
ISBN 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.)
1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Consciousness. 3. Mind and body.
4. Dualism. I. Title. II. Series.
BD418.3.C43 1996
128'.2—dc20 95-36036
9 10
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper.
Acknowledgments
Ifirst became excited by consciousness and the mind-body problem as
an undergraduate studying mathematics at the University of Adelaide.
Conversations with a number of people, especially Paul Barter, Jon Bax-
ter, Ben Hambly, and Paul McCann, helped form my ideas. Even then, the
subject seemed about as fascinating a problem as there could be. It seemed
faintly unreasonable that somebody could be occupied full-time thinking
about something that was so much fun.
Later, as a graduate student at Oxford, I found that the mind was always
occupying my thoughts where mathematics should have been, and I decided
to switch fields and eventually to switch continents. Many people were pa-
tient and supportive during this difficult time, especially Michael Atiyah,
Michael Dummett, and Robin Fletcher. Thanks also to all those who were
subjected to hearing about whatever my latest theory of consciousness hap-
pened to be; the ideas in this book are a distant descendant.
My decision to move to Indiana University to gain a grounding in philoso-
phy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence was one of the best that I
have made. I owe special thanks to Doug Hofstadter; it was his writing that
first introduced me to the mysteries of the mind when I was young, and it
was the stimulating and comfortable environment of his research lab, the
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, that allowed these ideas
to develop. Although he disagrees with many of the ideas in this book, I
would like to think that at some level what I have written remains true to
the intellectual spirit of his work.
I wrote the first version of this work (then known as Toward a Theory of
Consciousness) in a heady six-month period in 1992 and 1993.1 had useful
discussions with a number of people at Indiana around this time: everybody
at CRCC, especially Bob French and Liane Gabora, and many in other
departments, including Mike Dunn, Rob Goldstone, Anil Gupta, Jim Hett-
mer, Jerry Seligman, and Tim van Gelder. Thanks also to members of the
consciousness discussion group in the back room at Nick's for many enjoyable
Monday afternoon conversations.
A two-year McDonnell fellowship in philosophy, neuroscience, and psy-
chology at Washington University has provided another stimulating environ-
ment, as well as a chance to experience Zeno's paradox in finishing this
vi Acknowledgments
book. I am grateful to the James S. McDonnell Foundation for their support,
to all the participants in my graduate seminar on consciousness for discus-
sions that helped to refine the book, and to a number of people for conversa-
tion and comments, including Morten Christiansen, Andy Clark, Jason Clev-
enger, Peggy DesAutels, Pepa Toribio, and Tad Zawidzki.
In the last couple of years, I have had an enormous amount of helpful
conversation and correspondence about the material in this book. Among
many others, thanks are due to Jon Baxter, Ned Block, Alex Byrne, Francis
Crick, Dan Dennett, Eric Dietrich, Avi Elitzur, Matthew Elton, Owen Flan-
agan, Stan Franklin, Liane Gabora, Guven Giizeldere, Chris Hill, Terry
Horgan, Steve Horst, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Christof Koch, Martin
Leckey, Dave Leising, Kerry Levenberg, Joe Levine, David Lewis, Barry
Loewer, Bill Lycan, Paul McCann, Daryl McCullough, Brian McLaugh-
lin, Thomas Metzinger, Robert Miller, Andrew Milne, John O'Leary-
Hawthorne, Joseph O'Rourke, Calvin Ostrum, Rhett Savage, Aaron Sloman,
Leopold Stubenberg, and Red Watson. I am grateful to too many others to
mention for interesting conversations about consciousness in general. A
special note of thanks to Norton Nelkin, who returned his copy of the
manuscript covered with many helpful comments not long before he died
of lymphoma. He will be missed.
My broader philosophical debts are many. I developed my initial views
on consciousness largely on my own, but these have been greatly enriched
by my reading on the subject. One discovers quickly that any given idea has
likely been expressed already by someone else. Among recent thinkers,
Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, and Joseph Levine have done much to empha-
size the perplexities of consciousness; their work covers much of the same
territory as my early chapters. My work also overlaps with work by Ned
Block, Robert Kirk, and Michael Lockwood at a number of points. The
metaphysical framework that I develop in Chapter 2 owes much to the work
of Terry Horgan, Saul Kripke, and David Lewis, among others, and Frank
Jackson has independently developed a similar framework, presented in
his marvelous 1995 John Locke lectures. The ideas of Daniel Dennett,
Colin McGinn, John Searle, and Sydney Shoemaker have provided stimulat-
ing challenges throughout.
My greatest debts are to Gregg Rosenberg, for memorable conversations
and valuable feedback; to Lisa Thomas, for a book on zombies and moral
support; to Sharon Wahl, for expert editing and warm friendship; and above
all, to all three of my parents, for their support and encouragement. And
thanks to all my qualia, and to the environment responsible for producing
them, for constant inspiration.
As I was finishing this book, I received a fortune cookie in a restaurant,
saying "Your life will be full of delightful mysteries." So far it has been,
and I am very grateful.
Contents
Introduction: Taking Consciousness Seriously xi
I FOUNDATIONS
1 Two Concepts of Mind 3
1. What is consciousness? 3
2. The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind 11
3. The double life of mental terms 16
4. The two mind-body problems 24
5. Two concepts of consciousness 25
2 Supervenience and Explanation 32
1. Supervenience 32
2. Reductive explanation 42
3. Logical Supervenience and reductive explanation 47
4. Conceptual truth and necessary truth* 52
5. Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical* 71
II THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
3 Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained? 93
1. Is consciousness logically supervenient on the physical? 93
2. The failure of reductive explanation 106
3. Cognitive modeling 111
4. Neurobiological explanation 115
5. The appeal to new physics 118
6. Evolutionary explanation 120
7. Whither reductive explanation? 121
viii Contents
4 Naturalistic Dualism 123
1. An argument against materialism 123
2. Objections from a posteriori necessity* 131
3. Other arguments for dualism* 140
4. Is this epiphenomenalism?* 150
5. The logical geography of the issues 161
6. Reflections on naturalistic dualism 168
5 The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment 172
1. Consciousness and cognition 172
2. The paradox of phenomenal judgment 177
3. On explaining phenomenal judgments 184
4. Arguments against explanatory irrelevance 191
5. The argument from self-knowledge* 192
6. The argument from memory* 200
7. The argument from reference* 201
8. The content of phenomenal beliefs* 203
III TOWARD A THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
6 The Coherence Between Consciousness and Cognition 213
1. Toward a nonreductive theory 213
2. Principles of coherence 218
3. More on the notion of awareness 225
4. The explanatory role of coherence principles 233
5. Coherence as a psychophysical law 242
7 Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia 247
1. The principle of organizational invariance 247
2. Absent qualia 251
3. Fading qualia 253
4. Inverted qualia 263
5. Dancing qualia 266
6. Nonreductive functionalism 274
Contents ix
8 Consciousness and Information: Some Speculation 276
1. Toward a fundamental theory 276
2. Aspects of information 277
3. Some supporting arguments 287
4. Is experience ubiquitous? 293
5. The metaphysics of information 301
6. Open questions 308
IV APPLICATIONS
9 Strong Artificial Intelligence 309
1. Machine consciousness 309
2. On implementing a computation 315
3. In defense of strong AI 320
4. The Chinese room and other objections 322
5. External objections 328
6. Conclusion 331
10 The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 333
1. Two mysteries 333
2. The framework of quantum mechanics 334
3. Interpreting quantum mechanics 337
4. The Everett interpretation 346
5. Objections to the Everett interpretation 351
6. Conclusion 356
Notes 359
Bibliography 391
Index 405