The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory: Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism

247 Pages·2017·7.816 MB·English

by  Matthew Fluck (auth.)

The Concept of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
MatthewFluck
The Concept
of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism
MatthewFluck
UniversityofWestminster
London,UnitedKingdom
ISBN978-1-137-55032-3 ISBN978-1-137-55033-0(eBook)
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-55033-0
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A
CKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Much of the research for this book was conducted in the Department of
International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Thanks are due to the
Department and to the Economic and Social Research Council for their
support, as well as to colleagues at Aber for providing a stimulating
atmosphere in which to develop the project. I owe a particular debt to
Hidemi Suganami and Howard Williams, whose insight and guidance
were essential to the development of the argument presented here.
Thanks are also due to Milja Kurki and Nick Rengger for helpful com-
ments and advice concerning the ways in which the project might be
developed.
IhavealsobenefittedfrommanyproductiveconversationswithDaniel
R.McCarthy,withwhomIlookforwardtofurtherpursuingissuesidenti-
fiedinthisresearch.ThebookwascompletedintheDepartmentofPolitics
andInternationalRelationsandCentrefortheStudyofDemocracyatthe
University of Westminster – my thanks to Westminster colleagues for
providingacollegialenvironmentinwhichtofinishtheproject.
Special thanks are due to my wife, Ann-Marie Olden, without whose
unstinting love, patience, and support this book could never have been
completed. I must also express my deep gratitude to my father, Mike
Fluck,fora lifetime ofinvaluablesupport and encouragement.
This book is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Ann Fluck.
vii
C
ONTENTS
1 Introduction:A PoliticalQuestion 1
PartI Post-PositivismandTruth
2 The Parameters of Post-Positivism 23
3 Truth, Violence,and Difference 67
4 Truth andCommunication 105
PartII TruthandObjectivity
5 CriticalRealism andTruth-BasedCritique 147
6 Adorno, Truth,and InternationalRelations 181
7 Conclusion 225
Bibliography 231
Index 243
ix
CHAPTER1
Introduction: A Political Question
Thepoliticalquestion ... istruthitself.
MichelFoucault1
1 MODERN ANXIETIES
Attitudes to the concept of truth in modern politics are increasingly char-
acterisedbycontradictionandconfusion.ThelastdecadeofBritishpolitics
has,forexample,seenwidespreaddemandsthatsupposedlyhiddenfactsbe
revealed – most notably those relating to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The
samedesireforatruthwasapparentintherun-uptotheUKreferendumon
membershipoftheEuropeanUnion,when membersofthepublicrepeat-
edlylamentedthefailureofpoliticianstoprovidethemwithhardfactsupon
the basis of which they could decide how to vote. Such demands are
expressed, however, in a context in which the availability of a position
from which to identify the truth is increasingly in doubt. Modern liberal
politicsareoftenpresentedasinvolvingnegotiationbetweendifferentsocial
perspectivesorthefreedomtocreateorchooseanidentityforoneself.There
islittleplaceinsuchapoliticalsystemforstraightforwardtruthclaimsor,say,
for the identification of and fidelity to hidden truth about society which
characterisednineteenth-andtwentieth-centurysocialism.2Atagloballevel,
the‘universal’truthsoftheWestareregularlychallengedfromelsewherein
internationalsociety.3Anincreasedabilitytoshareinformationappearsonly
to add to the confusion. For some it points to the possibility of a more
‘transparent’politics,butithasalsoprovidedtheconditionsofpossibilityfor
‘weaponised relativism’ – propaganda of the kind deployed by the Putin
©TheAuthor(s)2017 1
M.Fluck,TheConceptofTruthinInternationalRelationsTheory,
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-55033-0_1
2 THECONCEPTOFTRUTHININTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY
governmentinRussia,whichaimsnottopersuadetheworldofaparticular
truth but to cast doubt on the possibility of their being any truth of the
matteratall.4
BernardWilliams summarisesthissituationasfollows:
Ontheonehand,thereisanintensecommitmenttotruthfulness–or,atany
rate,apervasivesuspiciousness,areadinessagainstbeingfooled,andeager-
ness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie
behindthem ... Togetherwiththisdemandfortruthfulness,however,or
(toputitlesspositively)thisreflexagainstdeceptiveness,thereisanequally
pervasivesuspicionabouttruthitself:whetherthereissuchathing;ifthere
is, whether itcan be more than relative or subjectiveor something of that
kind; altogether, whether we should bother about it, in carrying on our
activitiesoringivinganaccountofthem.5
In philosophy and social theory the confrontation between these two
attitudes sustains a conflict which rages more fiercely than anywhere.
Supporters of a ‘common-sense’ attitude to truth portray the doubters
andscepticsasmonkishoccupantsofivorytowers.6Forexample,Williams
isscathinginhiscondemnationofthe‘frivolity’ofthoseinthehumanities
who cast doubt on everyday truths, labelling them ‘émigrés from the
world of real power, the Secret Agents of literature departments’.7
Sceptics about truth, meanwhile, portray their detractors as, at best,
adherents to an outdated faith in a God’s-eye view of the world and very
often as unwitting enemies of freedom.8 Such philosophical confronta-
tions are, of course, not entirely new; at different points in the history of
philosophyPlatocriticisedthesophistsandRussellthepragmatists,whilst,
ontheotherside,theancientscepticsadvocatedthesuspensionofjudge-
ment,andNietzsche questionedthe very valueof truth itself.9
Moral and political concerns are seldom far from view in such discus-
sions.Thus,thephilosopherSimonBlackburncanbefoundassertingthat:
thereissomethingdiabolicalintheregionofrelativism,multiculturalismor
postmodernism, something which corrupts and corrodes the universities
and the public culture, that sweeps away moral standards, lays waste to
youngpeople’sminds,androtsourpreciouscivilizationfromwithin.10
In contrast, one of the best-known Anglophone critics of the desire for
truth,RichardRorty,arguesthatthepotentialofWesternliberalsocieties
1 INTRODUCTION:APOLITICALQUESTION 3
canonlybefulfilledifwestopworryingabouttruthandembraceaformof
‘liberalironism’.AccordingtoRorty,weshouldacknowledgethatthereis
nohopeof‘mirroring’theworldinthought,ofidentifyingthewaythings
reallyare,andgetonwithconstructingasocietyinwhicheachmemberis
free to‘create’ themselvesasthey see fit.11
The discipline of International Relations (IR) has not avoided this
conflict. The early 1980s saw the beginning of a sustained critique of the
Positivisttheorywhichhadpreviouslydominatedthediscipline.Positivism
isdefinedbyafaithinthenaturalsciencesaccordingtowhichthescientific
method, based on empirical observation and the identification of laws,
could be deployed in the pursuit of the truth about the social world.12
In IR this led to an emphasis on the ‘facts’ of a world of states, and to
attempts to identify and explain the law-like regularities apparent in rela-
tions between them in a manner reminiscent of the natural sciences.13
A number of dichotomies are central to the Positivist position; facts are
separatedfromvalues,theoryfrompractice,andfactsfromtheories.InIR
these distinctions drove the supposedly detached scientific pursuit of the
objective truth about world politics, free from political or normative
considerations.Behindthedichotomiesliestheassumptionofaseparation
of the knowing subject from the objective world, according to which the
scientiststandsapartfromtheworldsheexamines;hertheorisingplaysno
role in shaping it, and she is free from any distorting influence which it
might exerton heridentificationof the facts.
One of the main targets of the ‘Post-Positivist’ critique in IR was this
assumptionthatthesocialscientistcouldoccupyanArchimedeanposition
abovehersubjectmatter.14Farfrominvolvingsomevantagepointabove
thefray,thesocialscientificpursuitoftruthcannotbeseparatedfromthe
norms, practices, and institutions of which world politics consists. For
Post-Positivists, knowing subject and object known merge, and with this
distinctions between facts and values, theory and practice begin to blur
and collapse. Early Post-Positivists like Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and
AndrewLinklater–andmanyothersfollowingthem–arguedthat,despite
theirclaimtoscientificdetachment,PositivistIRtheoristsplayedarolein
preserving certain practices and institutions whilst helping to repress
others.15 In particular, the scientific pursuit of truth tended to obstruct
consideration of normative questions concerning the desirable forms of
international political practice and of the nature of change within world
politics.16 As a result, far from being neutral observers, Positivists were
conservative supporters of an often violent and unjust status quo; they