Table Of ContentCOLD
WAR IN
BIOLOGY
CARL C. LINDEGREN
THE COLD WAR IN BIOLOGY
Carl C. Lindegren
Professor
Biological Research Laboratory
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Illinois
box 644, ann arbor, michigan 48104
Copyright 1966 by Carl C. Lindegren. All rights reserved
including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in
any form. Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-29217
First Printing.
It is one of the very real advantages of capitalism
that the individual entrepreneur is free to sponsor cre
ative activity in any field. It is a pleasure to dedicate
this book to the late Mr. James Diego Veron of Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., who assumed the responsibility of sponsoring
yeast genetics during a most crucial period.
Preface
The history of science like the history of nations is a history of conflict. Just as nationalists
often try to rewrite history to the credit of their nations, scientists with specific prejudices try to
justify their intolerance of those who dissent from what they believe to be the "correct" or "true” point
of view. Creative science can thrive only in an atmosphere of tolerance, but scientists are often fa
natically intolerant of dissent. In biology, where basic principles are far from having been established,
where even the definition of living matter is currently subject to debate, the same questions which were
argued in the distant past are currently being debated and one observes frequent reversals of opinion.
Biologists have never agreed unanimously on the relative importance of heredity versus environ
ment in determining the characteristics of an individual living thing or the characteristics of its off
spring. At the present time in the U.S.A., the younger biochemists, and a majority of the geneticists,
favor the view that genes control both the characteristics of the living individual and those of his off
spring. They have emphasized the significance of one component of genes, the nucleic acids, which are
remarkably stable substances relatively unaffected by the environment, and they hold that nucleic acids
alone are the hereditary materials. Biochemists and geneticists employ specific languages which in
timidate other biologists and make communication difficult. Although most other biologists have gen
erally deferred to the geneticists and biochemists, there is a rising tide of interest in the structural
(as opposed to the chemical) aspects of hereditary materials developing from the extensive work of
Bungenberg de Jong on coacervates. Coacervates are considered by some to be hereditary substances
which, unlike nucleic acids, owe their significance in heredity to spacial and structural relations (rather
than to chemical specificities) and which are significantly affected by the environment. It is commonly
thought that the chief protagonists in the controversy concerning the respective importance of the genes,
with their nucleic acids, and the cytoplasm, with its coacervates, are the American-Mendelists and the
Russian-Michurinists, but this over-simplification is incorrect; actually there are more disagreements
and conflicts and a greater variety of attitudes among the scientists of the Western World than have
been generally recognized.
Tolerance would ease many of the tensions characteristic of biological controversy and would
hasten the exposure of indoctrination, but tolerance is difficult to achieve in biology because humans
are themselves living animals and, hence, are inclined either to oversimplify their complexities and to
consider themselves "machines,” or to consider themselves beyond the scope of the ordinary laws of
chemistry and physics. If a biologist could define himself simply as a "mechanist" or a "vitalist," and
could define the extent of the idealism present in his concepts, the lines of controversy could be clearly
drawn and one might be able to classify himself and his opponent without ambiguity. But vitalistic con
cepts are often concealed in the philosophy of one who considers himself a mechanist and vice versa.
It is clear, therefore, that no one can be free from the taint of error and that nothing is more hazard
ous nor more liable to reversal than a judgment on the relative merits of a biological controversy. It
is equally true that only by attempting to study the evidence and by attempting to come to a final judg
ment can one justify his career as a biologist, and it is from this viewpoint that the writer has under
taken to describe the different points of view of the various protagonists and to attempt to assess the
validity of their claims.
C. C. L.
Carbondale, Illinois
June, 1966
TABLE OF CONTENTS
v
Preface
1
Chapter 1. The Game of Science
2. The Architects of Morganism-Mendelism 11
3. The Principles of Morganism-Mendelism 17
4. The Indescribable, Indefinite, Undefined Gene 30
5. The Autonomy and Interaction of Genome and Plasmone 44
6. Michurinism as a Biological Philosophy 55
7. The Inadequacy of the Cell Theory in its Current Form 66
74
8. Concerning the Origin of Life
9. The Various and Disparate Theories of Biological Evolution 85
10. Speculations Concerning the Living State 106
CHAPTER 1
The Game of Science
What Is Science?; Philosophy Versus Doctrine; The Rules of the
Scientific Game; The Importance of the Political and Religious Be
liefs of Scientists; "Pure" Science; Scientific Integrity; "Facts";
Scientific Theories; Instruction by Indoctrination; The Control, Support,
and Application of Science; Academic Freedom and Creative Science;
Factors Limiting the Freedoms of Thought and of Expression of the
Scientist; The Fundamental Problems of Biology; The Conflict in
Genetics.
What Is Science?
It is the purpose of this book to discuss a series of "scientific" controversies in biology, but a
paradoxical aspect of such controversies is that each side usually calls the other "unscientific." Hence,
before one can form a judgment concerning the merits of the disputes, he must first form a judgment
of what is comprised under the label "scientific." Everyone is agreed that science involves knowledge,
but not all knowledge is considered to be scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is said to be "or
ganized" knowledge, but the nature of the organization is not specified. For example, few persons
today consider astrology to be a science, although only a few centuries ago it was a highly reputable
science, and many still consider it to be a scientific exercise. These facts suggest that there is a
matter of subjective judgment involved in the designation of an activity as scientific. Science is some
times considered to be the opposite of superstitition, but this definition poses somewhat of a problem
since the highest level of what is undeniably science is practiced by Christian gentlemen who believe
in Heaven and Hell with capital H's and a God and a Devil, both of whom have an apparently unlimited
capacity to perform miracles. Hence, science and superstitition can obviously live side by side in
perfect (or almost perfect) harmony. It appears that one must be satisfied to conclude that scientific
knowledge is almost any kind of organized knowledge and that scientists are those who occupy them
selves with organized knowledge.
Now, what do people do with organized knowledge? Well, to begin with, some people learn it.
The learner is generally classified as a "student" as long as he confines his activity to learning. When
one begins to teach what he has learned, he begins to earn the title of "scientist" because he usually
finds that he can improve the current organization of the subject, and he begins to reorganize what he
has learned to be better able to teach it. Others apply organized knowledge to useful ends, and they
are considered to be practitioners of "applied" science. The layman usually considers that the func
tion of science is to improve the lot of mankind, and whenever laymen control research activity, they
try to direct it toward this end. And many scientists also make the application of science their chief
aim. But there are many other scientists who look upon science as an escape from society rather
than a service to society; as an opportunity to dream about possible worlds—or impossible ones—
rather than a means of assistance in this world; as a means of pleasure to themselves, rather than
a benefit to humanity. In this context, science is an intellectual exercise, a separate, dedicated way
of life that is not easy to share with, or explain to, an outsider except to say that it is pleasurable.
The pleasure is derived from an exercise which has the different aspects of solving a puzzle, of build
ing a structure, and, beyond these, of discovering something entirely new. It tends to be a solitary
and a secret activity; this activity is tolerated, and even supported by society, because it is the source
of many benefits, but the scientist himself is often a more or less asocial, if not an antisocial, animal.
Philosophy versus Doctrine
Every scientist (1) is guided by a personal philosophy and (2) is the proponent of some doctrine.
These attributes are, in a sense, antithetical. A scientist's philosophy tends to make him a free man
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