Table Of ContentTHE COGNITIVE TURN
SOCIOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES
A YEARBOOK
Managing Editor:
R. D. Whitley
Manchester Business School. University of Manchester
Editorial Board:
G. B(jhme. Technische Hochschule. Darmstadt
N. Elias, Amsterdam
Y. Ezrahi, The Hebrew University ofl ersusalem
L. Graham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
T. Lenoir, University of Pennsylvania
E. Mendelsohn, Harvard University
H. Nowotny,Institutfur Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung. Vienna
Claire Salomon-Bayet, Paris
R. Schwartz-Cowan, State University ofN ew York at Stony Brook
T. Shinn, Groupe d' Etude des Methodes de ['Analyse Sociologique. Paris
P. Weingart, University ofB ielefeld
VOLUME XIII - 1989
THE COGNITIVE TURN
Sociological and Psychological
Perspectives on Science
Edited by
STEVE FULLER
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, U.S,A.
MARC DE MEY
Rijksuniversiteit Gent, Belgium
TERRY SHINN
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France
and
STEVE WOOLGAR
Brunei University, u.K.
Springer Science+Business Media, B.Y.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
The Cognitive turn: Sociological and psychological perspect1ves on
SClence / edited by Steve Fuller ... [et al.].
p. CII. -- (SOCiology of the sciences ; v. 13)
Selected papers of the Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook
conference, held at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Nov.
23-25, 1987.
Bibliography: p.
Includes 1ndex.
ISBN 0-7923-0306-7 <U.S.J
1. Science--Soc1al aspects--Congresses. 2. Science--Psychologlcal
aspects--Congresses. 3. Cognitlon--Congresses. 1. Fuller, Steve.
II. Serles.
Q175.4.C64 1989
303.48·3--dc20 89-34245
ISBN 978-90-481-4049-7 ISBN 978-94-015-7825-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-7825-7
printed an acid free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 1989 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1989
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1989
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction ix
PART ONE
Mapping the Study of Scientific Cognition
RONALD N. GIERE - The Units of Analysis in Science Studies 3
WILLIAM R. SHADISH Jr. and ROBERT A. NEIMEYER - Contributions of Psychol-
ogy to an Integrative Science Studies: The Shape of Things to Come 13
PART TWO
Models for Studying Scientific Cognition
MICHAEL E. GORMAN - Error and Scientific Reasoning: An Experimental Inquiry 41
PAUL THAGARD - Scientific Cognition: Hot or Cold? 71
STEPHEN TURNER - Tacit Knowledge and the Project of Computer Modelling
Cognitive Processes in Science 83
PART THREE
The Modularity of Scientific Cognition
BEATRICE DE GELDER - Granny, the Naked Emperor and the Second Cognitive
Revolution 97
TERRY SHINN - Cognitive Process and Social Practice: The Case of Experimental
Macroscopic Physics 119
PART FOUR
Language as an Indicator of Scientific Cognition
DONALD T. CAMPBELL - Models of Language Learning and their Implications for
Social Constructionist Analyses of Scientific Belief 153
DAVID BLOOR - Professor Campbell on Models of Language-Learning and the
Sociology of Science: A Reply 159
EDWARD MANIER - Reductionist Rhetoric: Expository Strategies and the Develop-
ment of the Molecular Neurobiology of Behavior 167
vi Contents
PART FIVE
The Prospects for an Integration of Approaches
STEVE WOOLGAR - Representation, Cognition and Self: What Hope for an
Integration of Psychology and Sociology? 201
THOMAS NICKLES - Integrating the Science Studies Disciplines 225
Participants at the Yearbook Conference 257
Index 259
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The participants of the 1989 Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook conference would
like to thank the University of Colorado at Boulder for serving as host, 23-25 Novem
ber 1987. In particular, Steve Fuller, who was Assistant Professor of Philosophy at
Colorado from 1985 to 1988, wishes to acknowledge the many divisions of the Uni
versity that generously provided funds, making possible the room and board, and in
some cases travel, of twenty-two individuals, representing several nations and dis
ciplinary orientations: the Office of the Chancellor, the Graduate School, the Com
mittee on Science Policy, and the Department of Philosophy. In addition, Virginia
Tech has provided generous assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication.
Special thanks to Jackie Hamblin and Debra Harmon. Last but not least, the
Yearbook editorial board is to be thanked for undertaking what at first seemed to be
a rather risky conceptual venture into the new frontiers of Science Studies.
Papers by participants not represented in this volume are published in vol. 3, no.
2, of the journal, Social Epistemology (1989).
vii
INTRODUCTION
If nothing else, the twelve papers assembled in this volume should lay to rest the
idea that the interesting debates about the nature of science are still being conducted
by "internalists" vs. "externalists,"" rationalists" vs. "arationalists, n or even
"normative epistemologists" vs. "empirical sociologists of knowledge." Although
these distinctions continue to haunt much of the theoretical discussion in philosophy
and sociology of science, our authors have managed to elude their strictures by
finally getting beyond the post-positivist preoccupation of defending a certain division
of labor among the science studies disciplines. But this is hardly to claim that our
historians, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have brought about an "end
of ideology," or even an "era of good feelings," to their debates. Rather, they have
drawn new lines of battle which center more squarely than ever on practical matters
of evaluating and selecting methods for studying science. To get a vivid sense of the
new terrain that was staked out at the Yearbook conference, let us start by meditating
on a picture.
The front cover of a recent collection of sociological studies edited by one of us
(Woolgar 1988) bears a stylized picture of a series of lined up open books presented
in a typical perspective fashion. The global shape comes close to a trapezium, and
is composed of smaller trapeziums gradually decreasing in size and piled upon each
other so as to suggest a line receding in depth. The perspective is stylized too. It
is not the fully developed central perspective with all receding lines converging upon
one vanishing point, but rather one in which the lines come together at the median
line of the picture. Nevertheless, the trick works, and some illusion of depth Is ob
tained and enhanced by a combination of straight lines depicting a series of embed
ded frames and suggesting a (white) rectangular hole in which the line of books
might seem to enter. Both the receding lines and the frames are highly schematic
applications of standard (rhetorical) devices used by painters even before the ge
ometric theory of perspective was proposed by Alberti in 1435. The end result,
however, looks fashionable and contemporary and is, as such cover illustrations re
quire, sufficiently ambiguous to allow the viewer his own interpretation. Is this col
lection transgressing a barrier in order to offer a new vista upon a previously
entangled group of questions? The suggestion of an infinity of books might seem
mistaken at first, since the addition of still another volume to an already uncountable
number of books on the same subject might discourage rather than encourage a po
tential reader. But in combination with the title (Know/edge and Reflexivity), it
changes into a provocative questioning of the fundamental meaning of "represen
tation": books about books about books in an endless loop.
In an intriguing way, this cover illustrates the theme that another one of the editors
took as the prototypical question for the Yearbook conference. In line with earlier
indications in that direction (De Mey 1982, Fuller 1987), it was argued in the final
session that the analysis of linear perspective as a major innovation in fifteenth cen
tury pictorial representation could be seen as an illustration of the range of problems
that one encounters in the psychology of science.
Art historians have approached the discovery of linear perspective as a cognitive
achievement involving the coordination of various representational devices, including
optical theories, cartographic techniques, and painters' practices (Edgerton 1975).
As such, it is a cognitive achievement in the orthodox sense: a specific mental re-
ix
x Introduction
organization qualifying as a discovery in Its own right. It Is also compatible with the
traditional view of science as the successful combination of mathematics and expe
rience, with linear perspective as its first genuine product, Indicative of the start of
the Scientific Revolution. While it might seem hopelessly naive to the sociologist of
science, some cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists in artificial Intelli
gence (AI) research might still work along these lines, Interested in seeing how sci
entific achievements arise as new and productive combinations or recombinations
of this kind.
But the same art historians come closer to a viewpoint that a sociologist of science
might take more seriously when they stress the rhetorical effect of perspective over
its cognitive structure. The importance of linear perspective is then said to reside in
its specific power to impress viewers rather than in its structural qualities. The con
text of use Is more important than cognitive structure, though the rhetoric of cognitive
structure might contribute to the overall dramatic effect. The cognitive thus plays but
an incidental role in the social strategem. Control over others Is obtained by im
pressing them in such a way that they are "moved" in certain directions. A low
viewpoint perspective on a religious scene "moves" the viewer in the direction of
more respect and devotion. Latour's (1985) reconstruction of Pasteur's scientific
achievements follows this line of analysis. Pasteur's experiments are ·spectacular
views" which make him move his viewers in a certain direction.
The difference between the two orientations should be apparent from a compar
ison with two rhetorical techniques that would not normally be considered compara
ble: the scientific experiment and the television commercial. The first orientation
would tend to take these as radically different. The scientific experiment has a sound
cognitive methodology which guarantees the solidity of its outcome, whatever the
result, while the television commercial has a tricky nature, representing products in
such an attention-captivating way as to move the viewer in certain directions. The
second orientation would consider the scientific experiment as just a specific kind
of commercial: the technique of a specific group to move specific audiences. For the
first, ·cognitive" is a quality label indicating the soundness of the knowledge claims.
For the second, "cognitive" is part of a jargon of seduction, a fashionable label added
to knowledge claims in the way commercials add classical music to the advertise
ment of shaving soap. The first orientation comes close to the position of the psy
chologist; the second is more in line with the inclinations of the sociologist. Viewed
in this way, psychology of science and sociology of science are far apart from each
other, if not diametrically opposed.
But the example of perspective suggests the possibility of further exploration. We
can pursue the idea that it is not entirely accidental that perspective played some
pivotal role in the development of both and science. Ultimately, it is a technique for
representing the location of the viewer, a subtle way to include some of the maker's
individuality into the picture. The selection of a position, as revealed in a specific
point of view, also reveals, in prinCiple, some aspect of the self of the viewer. This
changeable relation between representation and its maker constitutes the heart of
the matter in discussions of cognition: who is representing what to whom. How a
·self' elaborates itself by constructing a specific representation of the world? On this
basic level and for this central issue of representation as self-elaboration, psychology
and sociology of science can meet.
Another way to characterize the scope confronted by cognitive studies is to indi
cate how they range from the simplest issues of ambiguous pictures to the deepest
question representation which Wittgenstein brings together in his Philosophical In
vestigations. Ambiguous pictures are well known in science studies as prototypes
Introduction xi
of alternative Interpretations for a single set of data. Cognitive psychology has much
to offer nowadays to trace the detailed path of eye movements and fixations in such
Gestalt shifts, as from duck to rabbit, or from old woman to young woman (Gale &
Findlay 1983). The insights obtained from these very simple Gestalt switches in the
analysis of scientific discovery. But sociologists would indeed be entitled to skepti
cism, if cognitive psychology's representation itself, i.e., what it means to construct
an experience as seeing a duck, not so much in relation to its alternative, the rabbit,
but in relation to the agent co-constructing himself in the experience: the active self.
The papers in this volume represent only a small selection of studies aiming at
understanding science through some inspiration by cognitive psychology or cognitive
science. The pivotal term in the new debates is cognitivism, and the question asso
ciated with it which joins our authors in debate is this: Is there something special
about the cognitive processes of scientists that is, in large part, responsible for the
special sort of knowledge that science produces?
Half of the answer to this question lies in its unpacking, wherein also lies the se
lection of a methodology for studying science. The two papers which open the vol
ume, by Ronald Giere and by William Shadish & Robert Neimeyer, survey the
available options. Giere sketches the interconnected histories of the science studies
disciplines, arguing that, for all their differences, both philosophers and sociologists
have equally failed to capture the distinctiveness of the scientific enterprise by pro
posing ·structural" accounts that abstract too much away from the level at which
science actually occurs, namely, among individual cognizers. Giere sees a more
realistic approach to science in an evolutionary epistemology, grounded in historical
case studies, experimental psychology and cognitive science. Shad ish & Neimeyer
fill in the details of psychology's past, present and future contributions to the study
of science, and in so doing bring out some methodological tensions hidden in Giere's
ecumenical approach. In particular, Shadish & Neimeyer note that whereas exper
imenters strive to understand the statistically average scientist, historians have
tended to focus on the mental lives of superior scientists. This difference in empha
sis makes the integration of findings difficult, especially as it reflects a difference of
opinion over the relative causal significance of average vis-a-vis superior individuals
in the history of science. Finally, Shad ish & Neimeyer remind us that psychology can
playa major role in making sense of science, even if scientists turn out not to have
any distinctive cognitive processes; for it may be that scientists are distinctive in their
emotional lives or forms of social organization, topics equally amenable to psycho
logical investigation.
The papers by Michael Gorman, Paul Thagard, and Stephen Turner highlight the
strengths and weaknesses of the leading paradigms in the study of scientific cogni
tion. Gorman is interested in how subjects analyze possible and actual error in data
from which they have been instructed to infer a testable hypothesis. His paper is the
purest case of experimental cognitive psychology to be found in this volume. As with
other researchers in this paradigm who take science and engineering students as
their experimental subjects, Gorman presumes that whatever may be special about
the cognitive processes of mature scientists is certainly not unique to them. In ad
dition, since experiments of this sort tend to demonstrate that subjects are rather
inept individually but improve when working in groups, Gorman's research may be
seen as suggesting that the special sort of knowledge that science produces may be
the result of the ways in which scientists are allowed to monitor and correct each
other's errors. Thagard, by contrast, provides a computer simulated approach to
scientific cognition. Whereas Gorman manipulates the problem presented to sub
jects in order to gain insight about the cognitive processes that ensure their attempts
