Table Of ContentTitle Pages
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New
Philosophical Perspectives
John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos
Print publication date: 2015
Print ISBN-13: 9780198738916
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001
Title Pages
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception The Cognitive Penetrability of
Perception
(p.iv)
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Title Pages
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Dedication
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New
Philosophical Perspectives
John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos
Print publication date: 2015
Print ISBN-13: 9780198738916
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001
Dedication
(p.v) This book is for Fred Dretske and Jonathan Lowe
Page 1 of 1
Contents
Go to page:
Front Matter
Title Pages
Dedication
Preface and Acknowledgements
List of Figures
List of Contributors
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
Athanassios Raftopoulos and John Zeimbekis
Part I Definitional and Methodological Issues
Chapter 1 Cognitive Penetrability
Edouard Machery
Chapter 2 Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration
Dustin Stokes
Part II Modularity, Encapsulation, and Impenetrability
Chapter 3 Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment
Jack C. Lyons
Chapter 4 Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration
Daniel C. Burnston and Jonathan Cohen
Chapter 5 Multisensory Perception and Cognitive Penetration
Ophelia Deroy
Part III Substantive Impenetrability and Penetrability Claims
Chapter 6 Perception versus Conception
Fred Dretske
7 Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
Robert Briscoe
8 Cognitive Penetration of the Dorsal Visual Stream?
Brad Mahon and Wayne Wu
9 Attention and Cognitive Penetration
Christopher Mole
Part IV Cognitive Penetrability and the Phenomenology of Perception
10 ‘Looks the Same but Feels Different’
Jérôme Dokic and JeanRémy Martin
11 Cognitive Penetrability and Consciousness
Athanassios Raftopoulos
12 Seeing, Visualizing, and Believing
John Zeimbekis
Part V Cognitive Penetrability and Nonconceptual Content
13 Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content
Fiona Macpherson
Part VI Cognitive Penetrability and Realism
14 Perceptual Content, Cognitive Penetrability, and Realism
Jonathan Lowe
15 Cognitive (Im)Penetrability of Vision
Costas Pagondiotis
Afterword
Susanna Siegel
End Matter
Author Index
Subject Index
Preface and Acknowledgements
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New
Philosophical Perspectives
John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos
Print publication date: 2015
Print ISBN-13: 9780198738916
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001
(p.vi) (p.vii) Preface and Acknowledgements
The idea for this book emerged after a book symposium on Athanassios Raftopoulos’s
Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy?
organized by John Zeimbekis at the University of Grenoble in June 2011. Most papers at
the symposium argued for or against the cognitive penetrability of perception. For some
time, it had been evident that how cognitive states influence perception affects the
outcomes of debates on high-level perceptual contents, the nature of perceptual warrant,
and issues surrounding non-conceptual content, cognitive phenomenology, and the
phenomenology of late vision. This was a new set of questions compared to those posed
by the computationalist theories of mind that originally formulated hypotheses about
penetrability and impenetrability. The new questions were connected to the old ones, and
many of the original problems were still being discussed, especially modularity and the
question of how cognitive architecture affects issues in epistemology. At the same time,
the number of philosophers working on cognitive penetrability was getting larger and
more diversified.
The time seemed ripe for a book to connect the multiple strands of the cognitive
penetrability debate—the recent philosophical developments, the psychological findings,
the computationalist background, and the epistemological consequences of cognitive
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Preface and Acknowledgements
architecture—by gathering papers from as many as possible of the most important
players in the field. In contacting potential contributors, we sought to cover as many
areas as possible in which the ramifications of cognitive penetrability were being
discussed, in order to properly represent the emerging philosophical agenda of the
debate.
During the time it took us to put together the final version, the project was
overshadowed by the loss of Fred Dretske and Jonathan Lowe. This book is dedicated to
them. Fred Dretske immediately responded to our request to contribute a chapter,
sending us his contribution to the book early on and subsequently revising it. Jonathan
Lowe was among the original Grenoble participants and an enthusiastic supporter of the
project; his contribution to this volume is a revised version of the paper he presented at
that meeting. We are very fortunate that this book includes a chapter on the
perception/cognition distinction by Fred Dretske, and a chapter on perception, realism,
and the individuation of objects by Jonathan Lowe.
We would like to thank the contributors for sending us original material, even before it
was clear that the book would come to fruition; Peter Momtchiloff for his encouragement
and handling of the project; and the readers at Oxford University Press for their
thought-provoking and constructive comments. Thanks are due to the Department of
Philosophy of the University of Grenoble for hosting the original workshop; to the French
National Research Foundation (CNRS) and the Rhône-Alpes (p.viii) regional authority
for funding at early stages of the project; and to our wives, Alex and Ali, for putting up
with us throughout and in general.
The editors and publisher gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproduce
the copyright material in this book. Every effort has been made to trace copyright
holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The publisher
apologizes for any errors or omissions and would be grateful if notified of any corrections
that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.
Page 2 of 2
List of Figures
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New
Philosophical Perspectives
John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos
Print publication date: 2015
Print ISBN-13: 9780198738916
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001
(p.xi) List of Figures
5.1 A shared assumption: modules correspond to non-overlapping encapsulated
processing units, and their outputs feed directly into the central system 148
5.2 Two ways in which multisensory audiovisual processing can be reconciled with
modularity 150
6.1 Triangulation 168
6.2 Duck/rabbit 169
6.3 Figure–ground ambiguity 170
7.1 Adapting texture density versus adapting numerosity. Reproduced, with
permission, from Durgin (2008) 185
7.2 Faces and their corresponding anti-faces. Reproduced, with permission, from
Leopold et al. (2001) 187
9.1 Category task paradigm, illustration of the stimuli and task conditions.
Originally published as fig. 6 in Kravitz and Behrmann (2011). Reproduced with
kind permission from Springer Science and Business Media 227
12.1 Visually driven picture perception 300
12.2 J. M. W. Turner, Approach to Venice, oil on canvas, 1844; detail. Courtesy
National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC 302
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List of Figures
12.3 Opaque cube 309
12.4 Ambiguous experience of volume 314
12.5 John Pugh, Siete Punto Uno. Reproduced by kind permission of the artist:
artofjohnpugh.com 322
14.1 Topology of two-dimensional surfaces 372
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