The centre and the frontier: Ottoman cooperation with the North African corsairs in the sixteenth

40 Pages·2010·0.42 MB·English

by  Emrah Safa Gürkan

Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163 brill.nl/thr
Th e centre and the frontier: Ottoman cooperation
with the North African corsairs in the
sixteenth century
Emrah Safa Gürkan *
Abstract
Sixteenth-century North Africa, the “Forgotten Frontier” between two rival empires, the
Habsburgs and the Ottomans, came into the latter’s orbit with the incorporation of the North
African corsairs into the Ottoman empire. Th e employment of these corsairs and the incorpora-
tion of their lands created opportunities as well as problems. Th is article aims to highlight the
reasons behind and the limits of the cooperation between North African corsairs and Istanbul
when the importance of the former for the latter reached its zenith, in tandem with the Ottoman-
Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean. It furthermore tries to demonstrate the details of the
relationship between the imperial centre in Istanbul and the frontier provinces of North Africa
with its centrifugal elites. Th us it reveals the diversity of Ottoman administrative practices as well
as the pragmatism and fl exibility of the Ottoman government. Finally, it delineates the role that
the corsairs played in the shaping of the Mediterranean strategy of the Ottoman empire.
Keywords
Corsairs , r azzia , Algeria , Tunisia , Tripolitania , d erya beyi , Barbaros Hayreddin , Turgud Reis ,
Uluç Ali , Ottoman navy , Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry , Ottoman frontier administration , s alyaneli
eyalet , Ottomans in the Mediterranean , Ottoman grand strategy
One of the neglected subjects of sixteenth-century Ottoman political his-
tory is the relations between Istanbul and North Africa after the latter was
incorporated into the Ottoman empire as a result of the cooperation between
the Ottomans and the Muslim corsairs who operated in the western
Mediterranean.
North Africa, “the forgotten frontier”1 between two rival empires, the
Habsburgs and the Ottomans, had an important place both in Mediterranean
* Department of History, Intercultural Center 600, Box 571035, 3700 O St., NW,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057-1035, USA, [email protected].
1 Th e term is coined by Andrew Hess. Th e Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century
Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187754610X538609
126 E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
and Ottoman history. For the student of the former, it is a battleground
between two colossal empires as well as two distinct civilizations, Christianity
and Islam.2 For the Ottomanists, it is a frontier where the basic institutions
of Ottoman administration were not established and the omnipotent
presence of the Ottoman capital was not directly felt; hence the occasional
tension between the centralizing tendencies of Istanbul and the centrifugal
refl exes of the North African elites. Th e diversity of Ottoman administra-
tive practices and the pragmatism of Ottoman government in dealing with its
provinces could not have been more apparent than it was here. North Africa
also constitutes one of the t erra incognita of Ottoman administrative histori-
ography since a study that combines the Ottoman documentation with the
vast knowledge provided by European historiography and archives has still not
been undertaken by the Ottomanists.3
Th is study4 will fi rst explain the basic rationale behind the cooperation
between corsairs and Istanbul, a voluntary one not imposed by conquest, by
delineating the political changes that forced both sides to cooperate. Both
sides’ expectations from each other and the extent to which these expectations
were fulfi lled determined the tone of this cooperation. It had its limits which
only a thorough study of sources can explain.
Th e article will also try to delineate the main characteristics of the power
struggle between Istanbul and its North African provinces, one which owes
its fl uctuations to the greater political events of the sixteenth-century
Mediterranean as well as the fi nancial, logistical and strategic impediments
2 Cf. Hess, Th e Forgotten Frontier which defends the division of the Mare Nostrum between
two civilizations and Braudel, Fernand, L a Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de
Philippe II , 2 vols. (Paris: Librarie Armand Collin, 1966), which accentuates its geographic and
socio-economic unity. For both points of view, North Africa is of central importance.
3 Th ere are works on the North African corsairs of the sixteenth century, written by
Ottomanists, none of which, though, directly engages the relationship between North Africa and
Istanbul. Mantran, Robert, “L’évolution des relations entre la Tunisie et l’Empire Ottoman du
XVIe au XIX e siècle”, Les Cahiers de Tunisie, 26-7 (1959), pp. 319-34; Soucek, Svat, “Th e rise of
the Barbarossas in North Africa”, T urcica, 7 (1975), pp. 238-50; Bostan, İdris, “Garp Ocaklarının
Avrupa Ülkeleri ile Siyasi ve Ekonomik İlişkileri”, İ stanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih
Enstitüsü Dergisi, 14 (1988-94), pp. 58-86.
4 Th e sources for this study consist mainly of archival material from the Ottoman archives, in
particular from the M ühimme Kalemi of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA). Th ese
Mühimme Defterleri (M D ) and M ühimme Zeyli Defterleri ( MZD ), which registered the summa-
ries of outgoing orders, give us an ample picture for the relationship between Istanbul and North
Africa. Th e often unreliable Ga zavat-ı Hayreddin Paş a, relevant chapters of T uhfetü’l-Kibar fi
Esfari’l-Bihar and Ottoman chroniclers were also consulted, as were archival collections of less
direct relevance such as the R u’us Defterleri . In addition to Ottoman material, the author made
use of material from the Archivo General de Simancas ( AGS ), and the Archivio di Stato di Venezia
( ASV ), as well as published European primary sources.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163 127
that separated Ottoman North Africa from Istanbul and reinforced the for-
mer’s autonomy. After all, North Africa was western Mediterranean, while the
Ottoman empire was Levantine. Could the structural western/eastern division
of the Mare Nostrum that Braudel so well accentuated5 be overturned by the
strategies of decision-makers? Could political will prevail over geography,
logistics and technology?
Th e relationship between Istanbul and North Africa is also important for
the study of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean as the North
African provinces and the corsairs would soon become the main agents with
which the Ottomans attacked the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean.6
Before beginning, it is necessary to defi ne the term corsair. By this the
author means anybody who went on a c orso by participating in the r azzia,
regular raids that the North African sailors undertook at the expense of
Christian shores and ships, encouraged and fi nanced at times and protected
always by a political body, be it local rulers, Ottoman governor-generals, or
Istanbul. A corsair was a privateer who operated under a universal set of laws,
rules, and customs (which regulated exchange of prisoners, safe-conducts, ran-
soming, passports, and so on) that had been valid since antiquity. 7 In the
specifi c context of this article, the term corsair is used to denote the Muslim
corsairs who operated mostly, but not exclusively, in the western Mediterranean,
and excludes the Christian corsairs in Malta, Livorno and Senj or Habsburg
Naples, Mesina and Trapani.
Th ese corsairs did not come from a homogeneous ethnic, cultural or reli-
gious background; what united them was their profession. Some of them, the
Levantine corsairs, mostly Muslim Turks or Greek converts, migrated from
the eastern Mediterranean. Some were Christians who changed their religion
( farsi turco ) and became renegades or, as contemporaries would say, t urco de
profesión . Most of these renegades were ironically Habsburg subjects from the
poor islands of the western Mediterranean such as Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily;
hence several Habsburg projects to bribe them back to Christianity and to
obedience to their former monarch. Th ese men found little economic oppor-
tunity due to the rigid seigneurial order8 of these overpopulated islands which,
5 Braudel, La Méditerranée , I, pp. 123-4.
6 Th e corsairs’ role in Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and Ottoman strategy has not been given
due scholarly attention by Ottomanists, with the exception of Hess, Th e Forgotten Frontier.
7 Braudel, La Méditerranée, II, pp. 191-3. A corsair (Ottoman levend or gönüllü reis ) was a
legal as opposed to a lawless pirate (Ottoman harami levend ), a word which our documents
almost never use.
8 Sola, Emilio, Los que van y vienen: Información y fronteras en el Mediterráneo clasico del siglo
XVI (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2005), pp. 199-200.
128 E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
colonized from the continent, were already facing economic diffi culties
because of the imposed export agriculture.9 Th ere was also a native element
among North African corsairs, which was further reinforced by the infl ux of
the Moors who chose to leave Spain after 1492, and whose knowledge of the
Spanish coasts rendered them useful.
Other groups in these North African provinces, such as the Ottoman p aşa s,
local janissaries, provincial garrisons, local urban elites and auxiliary Arab cav-
alry, even though not labelled as corsairs, were irreversibly linked with the
razzia as this was what justifi ed their presence in the region, paid their salaries
and maintained the vitality of North African ports. After the incorporation of
Algeria into the Ottoman empire and the expansion of these corsair states into
the hinterland, these non-corsair elements gained further political relevance.
From that point on, the relationship was not only between Istanbul and cor-
sairs, but also between Istanbul and the North African provinces, in which
corsairs were the dominant but not the only element.
Coming into orbit: the incorporation of Algeria, 1519 or 1533?
Th e Ottomans made it a policy to employ irregular military units on the bat-
tlefi eld especially in the Balkans. Th ese akıncı s were instrumental to the early
Ottoman success in Europe and played an important role in the foundation of
the Ottoman empire as proven by the paralysing eff ects of their defection in
the 1440s.1 0 On the one hand, the Ottomans were eager to make use of their
military contribution, while on the other they gradually tried to institutiona-
lise and therefore centralize these irregular forces in an eff ort to impose a more
strict control.1 1
One can observe a similar picture behind the cooperation between the
Levantine corsairs and Istanbul. Th e Ottomans had resorted to the service of
important corsairs such as Kemal Reis and Burak Reis during the hard times
of the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1499-1503. A similar confrontation facili-
tated the employment of another generation. With the ignition of the
Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, the cooperation between the Ottoman empire
and the Levantine corsairs, who established themselves in the western
Mediterranean, gained a special importance which deserves some scrutiny.
9 Braudel, L a Méditerranée , I, pp. 139-46.
10 See İnalcık, Halil, F atih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler ve Vesikalar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınevi, 1954).
1 1 See Radoushev, Evgeniy, “Ottoman border periphery (serhad) in the Nikopol vilayet, fi rst
half of the sixteenth century”, E tudes Balkaniques, 3-4 (1995), pp. 140-60.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163 129
Th e appearance of the Barbarossa brothers, Hızır and Oruç, as well as sev-
eral other less-known but equally dangerous Levantine corsairs, in the western
Mediterranean provided an opportunity for the Ottomans. What rendered
their services more important for the Ottomans was that, unlike the previous
examples of Kemal Reis and Burak Reis, they managed within a couple of
years to build themselves a power base in North Africa. After operating at fi rst
under the aegis of local rulers, for example of Tunis and Djerba, the two broth-
ers managed to overcome the Spanish garrisons in coastal p residio s and the
Habsburgs’ ineffi cient local allies and conquered Djidjel, Algiers, and Cherchell
in 1516, and Tènés and Tlemcen in 1517.
Th e modus operandi of the corsairs was to ravage the Christian shores by
relying on their superior navigation skills, lighter and faster ships, and the
Moors’ expertise of the western Mediterranean shores. North African port cit-
ies not only provided them with suitable markets where they could sell their
goods, but also safe harbours and necessary craftsmen. Th ere, they fi rst oper-
ated by giving a share of the booty to the local ruler in exchange for his hospi-
tality. When this was no longer an option, they built their own kingdom by
employing a careful strategy which took advantage of the divided nature of
local North African politics.
What were the reasons that prompted these independent-minded corsairs
to come under the aegis of the Ottoman sultan and submit their vassalage to
Istanbul? What kind of cooperation was envisaged by both sides, and to what
extent were these expectations fulfi lled? Before we go into details and try to
answer these questions, let us try to determine when exactly this cooperation
actually started.
Th e incorporation of the province of Algeria into the Ottoman empire for-
mally took place in 1519 when Hayreddin was appointed (albeit nominally)
the governor-general (b eylerbeyi ) of the province of Algeria (C ezayir-i Garb ) by
the Ottoman sultan, Selim I. Only a few years later, in 1533, Hayreddin
would be appointed as the grand admiral, k apudan-ı derya , of the Ottoman
navy. Th e Ottoman chronicles, all of which follow the famous piece of propa-
ganda, the Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa almost v erbatim,1 2 do not, however, relate
12 Yıldız, Mustafa, G azavât-ı Hayreddîn Paş a: (MS 2639 Universitä tsbibliothek İstanbul) :
kommentierte Edition mit deutsche Zusammenfassung (Reihe Orientalistik, Aachen: Shaker, 1993).
Th is source is a propaganda piece and often unreliable. One has thus to use it with caution. Th e
author had to rely on it exclusively at certain times, such as here, when the chronology of diplo-
matic relations between the two is discussed, since he could not locate other sources save for the
Ottoman chroniclers, which themselves used the G azavat. He furthermore consulted the
Gazavat when its propagandistic nature did not seem to interfere, that is when there is no gaza
(holy war) rhetoric.
130 E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
the events between 1519 and 1533. Th is calls into question the assumption
that Hayreddin operated as nothing short of an Ottoman vassal and kept close
ties with the Ottoman centre during this time.
Th e fi rst ambassador Oruç sent from Tunis to Istanbul was a famous cor-
sair named Muhyiddin Reis in 1514.1 3 A second envoy met the Ottoman
sultan in Egypt in 1517. 14 Th e third envoy, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, arrived in
1519, off ering the submission of the corsairs and the Algerian notables to the
sultan and receiving in return Hayreddin’s appointment to the b eylerbeyilik
of the province of Algeria.1 5 Between 1519 and 1533, the Gazavat records
two more embassies. Th e famous Aydın Reis (known as Cacciadiavolo in
Italian and Cachidiablo in Spanish sources) visited Istanbul twice,1 6 and
enjoyed a warm welcome. According to the Gazavat, however, not much of a
cooperation seems to have taken place between Algiers and Istanbul, apart
from these two embassies. Ottoman chronicles did not record any event
related to North Africa before 1533, save for the fi rst three envoys. Th ey did
not mention several important events, which their European contempo-
raries did not miss, such as Hayreddin’s loss and then re-conquest of Algiers,
the conquest of the strategically important Spanish fortress facing Algiers, le
Peñon d’Alger (1529), and Aydın Reis’s victory over a Habsburg squadron
off the Baleares Islands (1529). If Algeria truly became an Ottoman province
and Hayreddin an Ottoman governor-general in 1519, how shall we explain
this total indiff erence to the fate of the capital of the Ottoman province of
13 He had an audience with the Ottoman sultan, enjoyed his favours and returned with two
new galleys that were constructed in Istanbul, G azavât, f. 63a-66b, pp. 76-8.
1 4 Müslihiddin Reis Kurdoğlu and his apprentice Deli Mehmed whose destination was
Cyprus, learning that the Ottoman sultan was in Egypt, decided to pay homage and joined the
Ottoman fl eet which was heading for Alexandria, G azavât, f. 83b-85a, pp. 87-8.
15 Gazavât, f. 135a-136b, pp. 114-5. Th ere is a letter that survived, written by the Algerian
notables to the Ottoman Sultan on behalf of Hayreddin, in 1519. Its existence partly supports
the reliability of the G azavat in details of early correspondence between Algiers and Istanbul.
Temimi, Abdeljelil, “Lettre de la population algéroise au sultan Selim I er en 1519”, Revue
d’Histoire Maghrebine, 5 (January, 1976), pp. 95-101.
1 6 According to the G azavât f. 267b-271a, pp. 181-2, the fi rst visit occurred at a time when
Süleyman I had recently ascended to the throne and was preparing for a Hungarian expedition,
which suggests the date 1521. However, the fact that Aydın Reis joined Hayreddin in 1523
(Galotta, A., “Khayr al-Dîn (Khıdır Pasha), Barbarossa”, in Th e Encyclopaedia of Islam , 2 nd . edn.,
H.A.R. Gibb et al . (ed.) (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2006) [hereafter EI 2 ], vol. IV, p. 1155) rules it out.
Possibilities other than 1526 are 1529 and 1532. Th e latter is more likely, since Gazavat men-
tions this embassy after Aydın Reis’s other embassy, which should be sometime between 1529
and 1531. G azavat records the second one sometime between Aydın’s victory over the Habsburg
admiral Portundo (1529) and Andrea Doria’s attack on Cherchell (1531). It should be born in
mind, however, that G azavat ’s chronology may not be reliable.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163 131
Algeria? Th e fact that the Ottoman chroniclers neglected to record even the
loss of a capital of an Ottoman province demonstrates to us the triviality of
North African politics for the Ottoman decision-making and ‘grand strategy’1 7
before 1533. It suggests that the incorporation of Algeria and the appoint-
ment of Hayreddin were only symbolic until he was summoned to Istanbul.
Ottoman chronicles probably mentioned these three embassies prior to 1519
only because Hayreddin later became an infl uential fi gure whose origins they
could not overlook.
It was probably both sides’ intention to cooperate in the fi rst place in 1519,
but this proved impossible because of a series of events, prompted by the
quickly changing nature of North African politics. Hayreddin had already
found himself in trouble when Oruç Reis died in Tlemcen while fi ghting
against the Spaniards (1518). Although storms had saved the corsairs from
two ill-planned Habsburg naval expeditions,1 8 he still faced serious local
opposition with the breakdown of a fragile system of alliances that his brother
had built with great eff ort. Th is local opposition forced Hayreddin to leave
Algiers in 1520 and settle in Djidjel, in no way comparable to Algiers, either
as a harbour or political centre. Even though he consolidated his power fur-
ther by conquering a number of places including Collo, Constantine and
Bone in 1521-22 and recruiting other corsairs, such as Aydın Reis and Sinan
Reis “the Jew”1 9 who joined him in 1523, still the overall political impor-
tance of the Levantine corsairs and Hayreddin declined rapidly in the 1520s.
Th is is also evident from the silence of the Habsburgs over the corsair threat.
With the death of Oruç Reis in Tlemcen, and the withdrawal of Hayreddin
17 By this the author means a well-formulated set of priorities in Ottoman decision-making
after a careful review of several diplomatic, logistical, technological and fi nancial factors. Th e
Ottoman ‘grand strategy’, once formulated, only changed very slowly. It is not a coincidence that
the Ottomans attacked the same targets consistently. Cf. the siege of Rhodes (1480), another one
planned in 1519, its fi nal conquest (1521); the conquest of Otranto (1480) and the Corfu expe-
dition (1538); the triple-conquest of Tunis (1535, 1569, 1574) and attempts to conquer Malta
(1551, 1565); and several plans on Cyprus before 1571. For a detailed study of the Ottoman
‘grand strategy’ in the Mediterranean, see my, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti Çerçevesi’nde
Osmanlıların Akdeniz Siyaseti (1516-1580)”, in A kdeniz’de Savaş ve Barış, Haydar Çoruh et al.
(ed.) (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2010), forthcoming.
18 One in 1516, led by Diego de Vera and Juan del Rio, and another in 1519 led by Hugo de
Moncada.
19 He was not named so because he was Jewish. According to Gomara, the reason was that he
once ran from an encounter with Christian ships. See de Gomara, Francisco Lopez, C rónica de
los Barbarrojas , in Memorial histórico español: Collección de documentos, opúsculos y antigüedades
(Madrid: la Real Academia de la Historia, 1853), pp. 388-9. Th e editor of the book suggests, on
the other hand, that his interest in astrology earned him this nickname, Ibid., p. 389, fn.1.
132 E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
from Algiers, the Habsburgs had already achieved all the political objectives
that they intended to reach with the naval expeditions of 1516 and 1519, and
the reconquest of Tlemcen in 1518. Th e very threat that the corsairs posed to
the Habsburgs’ “o ccupation restreinte ” 20 faded when there were no longer cor-
sairs in Tlemcen who upset the channels of provisioning from the hinterland
to the most important Spanish presidio in North Africa, Oran (Ottoman
Vahran). Hayreddin was no longer in Algiers, threatening the Spanish garrison
located on an islet facing the city, le Peñon, nor in Tunis, dangerously close to
Habsburg Sicily, which he had had to leave after a disagreement with the
Hafsid ruler.
Hence, corsairs could off er little to the Ottomans, whose ‘grand strategy’
hardly covered the western Mediterranean in the 1520s. Ottoman objectives
in the 1520s were to secure the communications between Istanbul and the
newly conquered provinces of Syria and Egypt, and to consolidate its position
in Hungary, the main theatre of the Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation. Th e
corsairs, who could not help in any of these objectives, were of no interest to
the Ottomans, especially with the former’s diminishing infl uence in a distant
geography of secondary strategic importance. Th e lack of an Ottoman inter-
est, hand in hand with the corsairs’ decreasing political relevance for the
Habsburgs in the 1520s, doomed the prospects of a functioning alliance.
A series of events between 1529 and 1533 eliminated these impeding fac-
tors. First of all, the corsairs managed to re-consolidate their position in the
region. Hayreddin returned to Algiers in 1525 after pacifying the local opposi-
tion, and furthermore conquered the Spanish fortress of le Peñon d’Alger in
1529.2 1 Th e same year, Aydın Reis infl icted a noteworthy defeat on the cap-
tain-general of the Spanish fl eet, Rodrigo de Portundo who was returning
from Genoa where he had disembarked Charles V. Th ese developments
prompted the Habsburgs to acknowledge the threat which, they presumed,
had ended and forced them to react; hence, Andrea Doria’s failed expedition
to Cherchell (1531). Secondly, Ottoman priorities had also changed. Th e
stalemate reached in central Europe became more obvious for the Ottomans
after the campaigns of 1529 and 1532. Furthermore, the Habsburg navy, rein-
forced by the v olte-face of Andrea Doria from the French to the imperial camp
in 1528, became a primary concern for the Ottomans. In 1532, Doria attacked
20 Ricard, R., “Le Probleme de l’occupation restreinte dans l’Afrique du Nord (XVe -XVIIIe
Siècles)”, A nnales d’Histoire Economique et Sociale, 8 (1936), pp. 426-37.
2 1 Hayreddin had the fortress demolished and built a breakwater linking the islet to the shore
in order to build a safe harbour for his fl eet, Haëdo, Diego de, Histoire des rois d’Alger , De
Grammont, H. D. (trans. and ed.) (Alger: Adolphe Jordan, 1881), pp. 41-4.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163 133
the Ottoman coasts and conquered Coron and Patras, while the Ottoman
army was in Hungary, and the Ottoman navy could off er no relief.2 2
Th e Ottomans realized both the threat and the opportunity. A Spanish
garrison in a strategically important place like Coron could result in the bou-
leversement of the Ottoman control over a region populated by a rebel-
lious Christian population. Hence, the Ottomans considered the cooperation
with the corsairs an opportunity which could provide them not only with a
chance to improve the quality of their navy, no match for that of the Habsburgs
under the command of Andrea Doria, as proven in 1532, but also a new the-
atre of war where they could challenge the Habsburgs at no additional
cost: the western Mediterranean. Taking these factors in consideration, the
Ottomans invited Hayreddin to Istanbul in 1533, the date for the real incor-
poration of Algiers and the corsairs into the Ottoman system as well as the
commencement of a half-a-century long cooperation with important political
repercussions.
Ottomans’ expectations from the corsairs
To challenge the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans
needed bases that only the corsair establishment in North Africa could pro-
vide. Th e immediate outcome of the cooperation, the siege of Tunis (1534),
and later operations of the imperial navy could only be made possible by
the sine qua non condition that the Ottoman fl eet had secure fortifi ed ports
nearby from where it could get its provisions. Th e military technology of
sixteenth-century Mediterranean naval warfare allowed galleys a rather limited
radius of operation because of their large crews, and little hull space as a result
of which they had to go to shore often.2 3 If the Ottomans wanted to penetrate
to the western Mediterranean, they could only rely on corsair ports in North
Africa before the French opened theirs to the Ottomans in 1543.
22 According to Admiral Gravière, if Ahmed Paşa had arrived on time with his 24 galleys, he
would have been able to break the siege, de la Gravière, Jurien, D oria et Barberousse (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1886), pp. 203-5. Th e ineptitude of the Ottoman admiral is also criticized by
Lütfi Paşa who labels him as “stupid” and “a frequenter of taverns and a drinker of wine” (“Lakin
baş ve buğ olan kimesne harabat ehli ve şaribü’l-hamr olub gemilerin tedarikin idemeyüb
hamakatından gemileri bozub kendü İslambola dönmüş idi. Ana binaen kafi r dahi meydanı hali
bulub bu hadiseleri itdi”, Lütfi Paşa, Tevârih-i ‘Âlî ‘Osmân (İstanbul, 1341), p. 343.
2 3 Guilmartin, Francis Jr., G unpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean
Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 96-7.
134 E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
Furthermore, having operated in these waters for years, and relying on the
exiled Moors’ knowledge of the Iberian coasts, the corsairs’ expertise of the
western Mediterranean was crucial for the Ottomans. Th e Gazavat itself
records that the reason why the Ottomans called Hayreddin was because they
were in need of “experts in naval aff airs who knew the Spanish lands.”2 4 A
good example of such an expert is the famous corsair Turgud Reis’s contribution
to the conduct of the imperial fl eet that sailed in the Tyrrhenian Sea in 1552
under the command of the enderun (palace school) educated Sinan Paşa who
owed his title of kapudan-ı derya not to his naval skills, but to his brother
sadrazam Rüstem Paşa. Turgud advised Sinan to anchor near the island of
Ponza and Palmerola. Th e 40-mile wide canal between the Neapolitan coast
and a group of rocky islands was the route generally used by the ships sailing
between Genoa and Naples. When Andrea Doria chose to use this route rather
than to sail close to the land, Turgud’s intervention proved critical and the
Ottomans ambushed the Habsburg fl eet off the Neapolitan coast.2 5
Th e information that the North African provinces provided the Ottomans
with was invaluable. Istanbul repeatedly ordered their governor-generals to
develop a reliable information-gathering network.2 6 Th e threatening tone of
the Ottoman documents when Istanbul did not receive information proves
that the Ottomans highly appreciated the news that arrived from North
Africa.2 7 Apart from the irregular information gathering, thanks to the advan-
tages of geographical proximity to and close trade relations with western
Europe, these governor-generals took the initiative by sending corsair ships
to spy on the enemy, 28 and interrogating the slaves that arrived after each
year’s razzia .2 9 Th is regular fl ow of information kept Istanbul up-to-date about
24 “İspanya semtlerin bilür derya umurında sahib-i tedbir bir adamumuz olaydı didükde…”,
Gazavât , f. 291a, p. 192.
25 de la Gravière, Jurien, L es corsaires barbaresques et la marine de Soliman le Grand (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1887), pp. 228-33.
2 6 For orders sent to the governor-general of Algeria, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [hereaf-
ter BOA], M ühimme Defteri [hereafter MD ], VI, nos. 561 (29 Cemaziyelevvel 972/ 2 January
1565), 904 (22 Şaban 972/25 March 1565); XLIV, no. 287 (c. 23 Muharrem 991/16 February
1583), to the governor-general of Tripolitania; VII, nos. 653 (6 Receb 975/6 June 1568), 1060
(c.14-16 Ramazan 975/13-15 March 1568), 1472 (25 Zilkade 975/22 May 1568).
27 See, for instance, the order sent to the governor-general of Algeria, BOA, M D, XLIV,
no. 297 (c. 28 Muharrem 991/21 February 1583).
2 8 Gazavât, f. 280b-281a, p. 187; 296b, p. 195.
2 9 According to the Gazavat, Hayreddin made a habit of interrogating the leading captives
as soon as they arrived in Algiers. “Bellü başlu söz anlar kafi r var ise huzurına getürüb kafi r
yakası havadislerinden dahi ne var ise su’al idüp her şeyden haberdar olurdı”, G azavât,
f. 233b-235a, p. 164; also see f. 238b, p. 166. Th e Habsburg viceorys did the same. L egajo s in
Nápoles and Sicilia sections of A rchivo General de Simancas [herafter AGS] are fi lled with reports