Table Of ContentT
H
THE CAUSES OF The Causes of Human Behavior
E
Implications for Theory and Method
C in the Social Sciences
HUMAN BEHAVIOR
A
Lawrence B. Mohr
U
S
Acknowledging that, though the
E
disciplines are supposed to be cumulative,
S
there is little in the way of accumulated,
O
general theory, this work opens a dialog
F
about the appropriate means and ends of
H IMPLICATIONS social research based in analysis of funda-
U mental issues.
FOR THEORY AND METHOD IN THE Two root issues in the methodology
M
of explanatory social research are examined
A SOCIAL SCIENCES in this book—the meaning of the idea of
N causation in social science and the question
of the physiological mechanism that gener-
B
ates intentional behavior. Conclusions on
E
these as well as on several derived problems
H
emerge through the analysis. Among the lat-
A
ter, the analysis shows that neither universal
V
nor probabilistic laws governing human
I
O behavior are possible, even within the posi-
tivist or empiricist traditions in which laws
R
are a central feature. Instead, the analysis
reveals a more modest view of explanatory
social theory and what it can accomplish. In
this view, the kind of theory that can be
produced is basically the same in form and
content across quantitative and qualitative
research approaches, and across different
disciplines. The two streams of analysis are
M combined with resulting implications for
large-sample, small-sample, and case study
o
Lawrence B. Mohr
h research design as well as for laws and
r
theory.
Written for the practicing empirical
researcher in political science and organiza-
tion theory, whether quantitative or qualita-
tive, the major issues and findings of The
Causes of Human Behaviorare meant to
hold as well for history, sociology, and
other social science disciplines.
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1996
All rights reserved
Published in the United States of America by
The University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
c Printed on acid-free paper
1999 1998 1997 1996 4 3 2 1
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mohr, Lawrence B.
The causes of human behavior : implications for theory and method
in the social sciences / Lawrence B. Mohr.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN0-472-10665-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Psychology. 2. Human behavior. I. Title.
BF121.M5794 1996
300’.1—dc20 95-52492
CIP
ISBN13 978-0-472-10665-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN13 978-0-472-02205-2 (electronic)
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
Chapter
1. Factual Cause 13
2. Physical Cause 41
3. The Causes of Intentional Behavior 57
4. Design and Method 97
5. Explanation, Laws, and Theory 131
6. Rationality and Fitness: Two Broad Theories
of Intentional Behavior 151
References 167
Index 175
Preface
Several related premises addressing problems in modern explanatory
social science underlie this work. The disciplines are supposed to be
cumulative, but there is little in the way of accumulated, general the-
ory. Much scholarly work strives toward generalizations, but true,
broadly applicable laws have proven elusive. At the same time, the
more qualitative approaches to the explanation of behavior have
seemed limited in their applicability and general usefulness. Such
apparent problems need to be viewed both realistically and rigorously;
a dialogue about the appropriate means and ends of social research,
based in an analysis of the fundamental issues, has long been war-
ranted.
In prior empirical work, much of it centered around explaining
innovation in organizations, I had arrived at the conclusions (a) that
people’s motives or reasons for undertaking certain behaviors could
not form part of general laws governing those behaviors, but (b) that
these same motives or reasons could, in the individual case, cause the
behaviors to be carried out. Both of these conclusions seemed at the
time, and still do in fact, seem sensible and reasonable, and perhaps
even true. The more I thought about them, however, the more contra-
dictory and generally puzzling they became, and the more I realized
that much in both of them was essentially vague. The present treatise
grew out of the attempt to clear up the dozen or so issues of puzzle-
ment and vagueness resident in those positions so that I might evaluate
them properly. From the very beginning, I was asking questions about
explanatory research rather than doing it, and as I continued, this
departure became ever more pronounced. I felt, however, that it would
be somehow worthwhile to push on, and the present volume is the
result.
Whether my intuition about worthwhileness was correct is for
readers and critics to judge, but I can take the opportunity of this pref-
viii Preface
ace to report, at any rate, what appeared to me to result. My approach
was to single out for special attention two of the issues that seemed pri-
mary—causation and the behavior-generating mechanism—hoping
that these would give me some purchase on the others. After a few
years, with some disappointment, I felt that I was working on a number
of intriguing but fairly independent questions. Still another year into
the project, however, I perceived quite suddenly, and with surprise,
that the pieces did indeed fall together. For me, at least, they had devel-
oped to form an interlocking whole—one that promised to address a
broad range of methodological issues with definiteness and that essen-
tially forced a kind of worldview of the place of social research in sci-
ence and society. Merit aside, the outcome still seems to me serendipi-
tous.
As a whole, the project has been the most enjoyable of my profes-
sional career, but it came with a sense of dismay and frustration over
one dilemma. Rightly or wrongly, I felt that I could not get the help I
needed in addressing my questions without detouring sharply into
other disciplines, particularly philosophy and physiological psychol-
ogy. I was essentially an amateur in both but, with some relish, set
about trying to learn as much as I could in the areas that seemed criti-
cal. When I began the writing itself, I felt I had no choice but to impart
what seemed to be the important lessons from these other disciplines,
interwoven with those from my own fields of social research. Trial reac-
tions to the initial outcomes, however, reinforced beyond a shadow of
a doubt what had begun to become apparent during the process itself,
namely, that these are not simply different disciplines, but different
cultures. What I wrote held almost no interest for natives of the other
tribes because I spoke to theirissues without showing an appreciation
of a large proportion of the connectionsthat, in their culture, are essen-
tial for the treatment of those issues. At the same time, the more of these
connections I tried to include in order to strengthen my use of the mate-
rials—and I never did become acculturated enough to be thoroughly
successful at this—the more I left the members of my own tribe dazed,
bored, negative, and often resentful. The problem was compounded by
the shared nature of much of the subject matter; all three of these cul-
tures deal extensively with the issue of the determinants of human
behavior, but from different and, as I became increasingly aware,
mutually unintelligible perspectives—especially between philosophy
and empirical social research. I could not find a totally successful mid-
Preface ix
dle ground. I tend to think that there is none and can be none, but I
would welcome an exemplar more adroit than my own.
In attempting to resolve the dilemma, my intended primary audi-
ence was clear—practicing empirical social researchers, whether of the
quantitative or qualitative stripe, and especially those with at least a
passing interest in methodological self-examination. I came to give up
all intention of appealing to the interests of philosophers, political the-
orists, or brain scientists. In the end I therefore included as little of the
borrowings from these other disciplines as I could while still showing
some inescapable grounding for my essential arguments and conclu-
sions, but I fear that what is left will still be a liability for the treatise in
the eyes of some of my intended audience. This aspect of the experience
has been almost purely a source of difficulty, but there is perhaps one
potentially constructive residue, and that is an empirical research inter-
est for the future in the crossing of cultural boundaries.
Many friends and colleagues have taken the trouble to read parts
of this manuscript in its various incarnations and their criticisms and
advice have been invaluable. This was particularly true when I was
dipping into fields whose culture was strange to me. I am especially
grateful for the time and trouble taken by Eugene Bardach, Bill Broder,
Douglas Dion, Daniela Gobetti, Richard Hall, George Julnes, Louis
Loeb, and Jack Meiland. Valuable directions also arose out of conversa-
tions on the developing ideas with Paul Boghossian, Nancy Burns,
Michael Lewis-Beck, Daniel Lucich, Mortimer Mishkin, Rick Mohr,
Kim Scheppele, and David Velleman. I am grateful to my wife, Eliza-
beth Hawthorne, for maintaining the faith. And lastly, I want to express
a special debt of gratitude to Colin Day and Malcolm Litchfield of the
University of Michigan Press, in part for their comments and criticisms
on portions of the written text, but especially for standing with me
throughout the long and arduous process of shaping an awkward man-
uscript into an acceptable book.
