The British Army in the Far East 1941-45

100 Pages·2005·37.43 MB·English

by  Alan Jeffreys

The British Army in
the Far East 1941-45
I I I
x x X
47th 123rd 55th
Indian Indian Indian
10th 211st
Lanes Punjab
1nth 8110th 1/17th
Rajput Balueh Dogra
5/Sth 1/15th 816th
Punjab Punjab RajputanaRifles
ALANJEFFREYSisacurator
attheImperialWarMuseum,
London. Hehaspreviously
writtenWarrior66:British
InfantrymanintheFarEast
1941-45forOsprey.Alanhas
aspecialinterestinthetactics
ofandtrainingforjungle
warfare,andthedevelopment
oftheseintheBritishArmy
intheFarEast:hisMPhii
dissertationfromKings
College,London,provideda
detailedexaminationofthese
themes.HelivesinSurrey
withhiswifeandson.
OSPREY
Battle Orders · 13
PUBLISHING
The British Army in
the Far East 1941-45
I I I
x x X
47th~ 123rd~ 55th~
Indian Indian Indian
1stROYaIIl~ 1OthII~ 211sItI ~
InniskillingFus Lanes Punjab
1nthII~ 811OtIIh~ 1117tIIh~
Rajput Balueh Dogra
II II II
5/8th~ 1/15th~ 8/6th~
Punjab Punjab ", RajputanaRifles
AIan Jeffreys ·
Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson
Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2005 byOspreyPublishing, Acknowledgements and image credits
ElmsCourt,ChapelWay,Botley,OxfordOX29Lp,United Kingdom.
443 ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY 10016,USA
Iwould liketothankMikeTaylor,DrDaniel Marstonand my
Email:[email protected]
editor,Nikolai Bogdanovic,foralltheirhelp.Iamparticularly
©2005OspreyPublishingLtd. indebtedto myMPhil supervisor,DrTim Moreman,forall his
adviceand helpoverthe lastfewyears.Finallythankyouto my
Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivate family,Lorraineand Michael.
study,research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,
DesignsandPatentsAct,1988,nopartofthispublication maybe The photographsmarked IWMarecourtesyofthe ImperialWar
reproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformorby Museum,and can beorderedfrom the IWM'sFilmand
anymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical,photocopying, PhotographArchivein London.
recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofthe
copyrightowner.EnquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers.
Author's note
ISBN I841767905
Inthetreediagramsand mapsin thisvolume,theunitsandforces
EditorialbylIiosPublishing,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com) aredistinguished bythefollowingcolours:
Design:Bounford.com
MapsbyBounford.com,Royston,UK
British Brown
IndexbyAlisonWorthington
Japanese Red
OriginatedbyPPS-GrasmereLtd,Leeds,UK
Indian Blue
PrintedandboundinChinathrough L-RexPrintingCompanyLtd
Australian Green
05 06 07 08 09 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I African Orange
IndianState Forces,Malays, Grey
ACIPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. and Burmese
Foracatalogueofall bookspublishedbyOspreyMilitaryandAviation Forakeytothesymbols usedinthisvolume,seebelow.
pleasecontact:
OspreyDirect,2427BondStreet,UniversityPa,:k,IL60466,USA
E-mail:[email protected]
OspreyDirectUK,P.O.Box 140,Wellingborough,Northants,NN82FA,UK Frontcovermain imageA BritishArmycorporal advances
E-mail:[email protected] cautiouslyatNgakyedyaukPass,with hisSMLErifleatthe'port'.
www.ospreypublishing.com (Martin Brayley)
Keyto militarysymbols
XXXX xxx xx X III II I •••
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D
Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion Company/battery Platoon
•• • a rn
0 0 C8J ~ 8 GJ
Section Squad Infantry Cavalry Artillery Mountain Airborne Parachute
G ~ G §J 00 [Q] C2J c::;J
Engineer Sappers/miners Pioneer Bridging Transport Armour Reconnaissance Signal
rn
0 ~ 0 ~ 0 Keyto unitidentification
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Machinegun Medical Anti-tank Anti-aircraft CombinedAA/AT SpecialService Unit Parent
identifier unit
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(+)withaddedelements
(-)lesselements
Meteorological Veterinary Service
Contents
Introduction 4
Combat mission 6
Doctrine and training 10
Preparingforjunglewarfare• MajorIan StewartandtheArgylls •The lessonsfrom Burmaand Malaya
TheJune 1943 InfantryCommittee•TheJungle Book, 1943•Theformation oftrainingdivisions
Divisional organisation 21
BritishArmydivisions• IndianArmydivisions
8thAustralian Division •Westand EastAfrican divisions
Tactics 59
Patrolling• Inthe attack• Inthe defence
Weapons and equipment 64
The Lethbridge Mission, 1944
Command, control, communication, and intelligence 69
Combat operations 74
The BattleofKohima,March-May 1944•Thefightingaround Imphal
Lessons learned 85
Chronology 90
Bibliography 92
List of abbreviations 94
Index 95
Introduction
From December 1941 to May 1942 the British Empire suffered the most
humiliating series of defeats in its history, as Hong Kong, Malaya, Borneo,
Singapore and Burma fell in rapid succession to the Imperial Japanese Army.
The Fall of Singapore in February 1942 was considered by Winston Churchill
'the worst and largest capitulation in history'. The Japanese had overrun the
numericallysuperiorCommonwealthforces inMalayain justovertwo months,
resulting in 130,000 troops entering captivity. However, three years later the
Japanese Army suffered defeat at the hands of the British and Commonwealth
14th Army at the Battles of Kohima and Imphal and in the battles for Burma.
This transformation in the fortunes ofthe Commonwealth troops, in particular
the Indian Army, was in a large part due to the development of jungle warfare
doctrine and the resultingimprovements in training, tactics andequipment.
These campaigns were largely fought in the jungle, an alien environment
for most Commonwealth troops. The word 'jungle' is Indian in origin and
means 'wasteland' but it has been used to describe anything from sparsely
wooded areas to tropical forest. Until World War II the jungle was usually
described as bush or forest in military circles. Generally there were two types
of jungle: primary jungle, usually defined as natural jungle growth with poor
visibility and little undergrowth, and secondary jungle, which was cleared
jungle that had re-grown and consisted of very dense undergrowth, severely
limiting movement. The jungle was filled with the problems of difficult
climate, terrain, vegetation, wildlife and tropical disease such as malaria.
Added to these were the tactical limitations imposed by the jungle, with its
limited observation and fields of fire, communication problems, lack of
mobility and long lines of supply. David Wilson, writing to his mother,
commented on the jungle in Malaya:
You can have no idea how thick the jungle is here, after one has left the
roadfor ten ortwentypaces, youcannotseethe roadatallandyouhave
to rely entirelyonyour map to getyou to the place thatyou are making
for; a map is almostuseless. The whole place is steamingwet, and one is
soakedto the skinwiththe effortofpushingthroughthebush. Abeastly
place to have to fight in, ifyou didn't know itwell.1
Troops could easily become bewildered, depressed and frightened in the jungle
due to the strangeness of the terrain, emphasised by the limited visibility, the
strangenoises,thedifficultyofmovementandthesenseofisolationinthejungle.
This,incombinationwiththeexhaustingclimate,madetheconditionsinMalaya
andBurmaextremelytryingforthetroops.Thesedifficultieshadtobeovercome,
beforecomingintocontactwiththe enemy, throughtrainingandexperience.
Thisbookexaminesthetraining, tactics, organisationandequipmentofthe
British Army in the Far East from 1941 until 1945. It mainly covers the
conventional forces in theatre rather than the special forces such as the
Chindits, V Force and Force 136. The development. of the Commonwealth
Armies in the Far East will be examined through the training manuals and
pamphletsproducedbyGHQIndia.Thisbookalsoexaminesthedissemination
ofdoctrine, the infantry divisions engaged in this theatre, and the tactics and
equipmentthat theyused, as well as the lessons learnt from the campaigns.
4 ILettertohismother,14September1940,WilsonMss.,PapersofBrigadierA.D.R.G.Wilson,IWM.
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Combat mission
During the 1920s and 1930s British strategy in the Far East centred upon the
naval base at Singapore. Originally, the defence of Malaya and Singapore had
beentheresponsibilityoftheRoyalNavy. Itwasintendedthatintheeventofan
attack, the Navy would send a force from Britain and relieve the garrison of
Singapore in 42 days; it was felt that any invading Japanese force could not
overrunMalayain this space oftime. Asfar backas 1918,beforethe decisionto
build the naval fortress at Singapore had been taken, the question oflandward
defence oftheMalayanmainlandhadbeenbroughtupbythethen GOCofthe
Straits Settlement, Major-General Sir DudleyRidout, in response to the growing
Japanese purchase ofland in the Malayan peninsula. The War Office took note
of Ridout's report and recognised that further joint military and naval
reconnaissanceoftheeastcoastofMalaya, andJohoreinparticular, wasneeded.
The final paper propOSing the development of the base at Singapore in 1921
stressed defence against alandwardinvasion as well as seaward attack. By 1924,
however, The War Office took the view that the terrain was too difficult to
traverse and as a result thought that there was no need for landward defences.
Lord Louis Mountbatten,Supreme
Allied Commander,readsthe order
ofthe dayfrom the stepsofthe
municipal buildingin Singaporein
1945afterthe surrenderhasbeen
6 signed bytheJapanese.(IWM)
This remained the official view until 1938 when the naval base was finally
completed. The only role envisaged for the garrison was local defence and it
trainedaccordinglyusingstandardtrainingmanualstailoredforcoastaldefence.
This dominant view about the impracticality of an overland invasion
through the jungles, swamps and plantations was challenged following the
appointment of General Dobbie as GOC Malaya Command in 1935. In
reference to the defence ofSingapore, a report written in 1936 by Lieutenant
ColonelS.WoodburnKirby,thefutureBritishofficialhistorianofthecampaign,
notedthatthe Malayan peninsulawas neglectedin militaryconsiderations. He
wasalsocriticalofinfantrytraininginSingapore,believingitsufferedduetothe
climateandterrain. ColonelArthurPercival, GS01 Malayain 1936,commented
in a further report that training was along similar lines to the UK, where
individualtrainingwasconductedfrom OctobertoMarchandunittrainingwas
given from April to September. No mention was made of jungle training and
nothingaboutthe importance ofacclimatisation.
The growing concern about landward defences was shared by other officers
during the 1930s. Brigadier Vinden, who took up the post of GS02 Malaya in
1937, challenged the idea that an invasion in the north of Malaya during the
Monsoonseasonwasimpossible.HesailedupthecoastandfoundChinesejunks LEFTIn 1941 III Indian Corps
formed partofMalayaCommand,
and had itsheadquarters in Kuala
III IndianCorps,6 November 1941 Lumpur.Inadditionto its key9th
and IIth Indiandivisionsandthe
XXX
III~ LinesofCommunicationtroops,
itsorganisation comprised Corps
Troops,Federated MalayStates
Heath VolunteerForces,and RoyalArmy
I Medical Corps subunits.Theother
9~ components ofMalayaCommand
besides III Corpswere Singapore
LOfCAreaD
Fortresstroops,the British
Barstow Murray-lyon 18thDivision,andtheAustralian
8th Division.
Thechainofcommand in IndiaGHQand South-EastAsiaCommand,April 1944
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Nonweiler Messervy Davies Lomax Festing Woolner
landing on the east coast to avoid Malaya's immigration quotas. He also
destroyed the myth ofthe impenetrable jungle by conducting an exercise with
three British battalions and the Johore Defence Force against an attacking
battalion of Gordon Highlanders. The Gordon's commanding officer had had
jungle experience in West Africa. Vinden described how 'he sent his attack
throughthe jungleconsideredimpenetrable, andcaughtthe defenceintherear.
Another Malayan myth was destroyed.' To counteract this threat Vinden
suggestedanincreasein the numberoftroopswho 'wouldhave tobetrainedin
jungle warfare' about which even he knew little, he admitted. (Brigadier EH.
Vinden, ByChanceaSoldier, unpublished memoir, IWM 96/36/1, pp.69-72, 77.)
The War in the Far East, which usually refers to the British and Common
wealth part of the larger Pacific War, began with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941, together with the attacks on Malaya, Hong Kong
andthe Philippines. TheJapanesepre-emptivestrikesenabledthe captureofthe
natural resources they reqUired from the European colonies of South-East Asia.
In addition, the Japanese professed they wanted to create a Greater East Asia
Co-ProsperitySphere.
Theoutbreakofwar meantthatthe defence ofSingaporeassumedfar greater
importance,sinceitformedthemainbastionoftheBritishEmpireintheFarEast
againsttheJapanese threat. However, the time ofreliefhadbeenextendedfrom
40to 180daysby 1941 andithadbecomeclearthatitwas increasinglyunlikely
8 that the Royal Navy would be able to send out a fleet to Singapore while the