The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws

192 Pages·1975·9.4 MB·English

by  Leo Strauss

The
Argument
and the
Action of
Plato's Laws
Leo Strauss
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 1975 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1975
Paperback edition 1977
Printed in the United States of America
02 0I 00 99 98 3 4 5 6 7
ISBN: 0-226-77698-0
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Strauss, Leo.
The argument and the action of Plato's Laws.
\. Plato. Leges. I. Plato. Leges. 1975.
II. Title.
JC7\.P264S86 321'.07 74-16680
8The paper used inthis publication meets the minimum
requirements of theAmerican National Standard for
Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed
Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
Contents
The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws 1
Book One 3
Book Two 22
Book Three 38
Book Four 54
Book Five 66
Book Six 82
Book Seven 100
Book Eight 116
Book Nine 126
Book Ten 140
Book Eleven 157
Book Twelve 169
Foreword
Professor Strauss completed this study, his last major work, in the
autumn of 1971, two years before his death. He wrote it with a
lifetime of reflection on Plato behind him, and with a particular
interest in the Laws that cannot have become intense more recently
than the winter of 1959, when he gave a seminar on the dialogue
at the University of Chicago. As the reader will perceive, this book)
acquires much of its inner character from its being the work of a\
scholar whose acquaintance with the Platonic corpus had ripened!
to familiarityj just as it acquires much of its external character from;
its being a commentary that follows its text with persistent fidelity.
I
Coming after its author's long and serious meditation on Plato, t~
book will engage the attention of those who continue to entertain
the question whether the Laws is not a~~E:eping recantation that
expresses Plato's ~~l1escentdisenchantment withgerfection. The epi-
graph to this volume suggests rather that the Laws differs from the
Republic not in its sovereign conception but in its decisive if tacit
theme.
The account of the dialogue that is offered in the following pages
has three conspicuous characteristics. First, the commentary has to
a high degree the appearance of a mere retelling of the discourse.
This appearance will be dispelled by comparison of the commentary
with the text. In the second place, the commentary emulates faith-
fully the reticence of the text while striving nevertheless to elucidate
Plato's thought. Finally, the language of the commentary is not
always prepossessing but, on the contrary, sometimes grates. Char-
acteristically, the reason for this is that the retelling of the discourse
incorporates literal renditions of the speeches. Abruptness, some
inelegance, occasional ambiguity in the commentary can be traced
typically through the act of translation. The transliteration of names,
except where the name of a man has been given to a dialogue, ad-
heres as closely as possible to the Greek orthography, with the result
that the reader will encounter "Apollon," "Bakchic," "Kyklopes,"
and "Lykourgos," among others, where he would perhaps have ex-
pected Apollo, Bacchic, Cyclops, and Lycurgus. The intention was
to keep to a minimum, even in little things, the distance between
the reader and the text.
Professor Strauss had both the opportunity and the capacity to
make any changes in the manuscript that he desired. The study as
it now appears is in the state in which it existed at the time of his
death in October 1973, except in one particular. Against the author-
ity of the manuscript, I have introduced on page 174 a negative,
enclosed in brackets, because the sense of the passage apparently
requires it. The relevant place in the Laws is the first sentence of
951b.
My thanks are due to Professor Ralph Lerner, who shared equally
with me in the reading of proof. We are grateful to the Earhart
Foundation for the support that provided us with assistance in that
task.

" ... the treatment of prophecy and the Divine law
is contained in ... the Laws."
-Avicenna, On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences
In the traditional order of the Platonic dialogues the Laws is pre-
ceded by the Minos, the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates
raises the question What is law? It appears that not all laws are good
or, at any rate equally good. The Cretan laws were given by Minos,
who was _~y a son of Zeus but the only hero educated by
Zeus; no~as eyer celebrated.~>_high4r...b¥ HOUl!~E..•i!.,QsL~
a~os. 'We are thus led to believe that the Cretan laws, and next
to them the Spartan laws, are the best laws. Minos was indeed
regarded by the Athenians as savage and unjust, but for no other
reason than that Minos had waged victorious war against Athens.!
The best legislator was an enemy of Athens. The most ancient good
legislator was the most ancient enemy of Athens. The quest for the
best laws seems to compel the Athenians to transcend the laws of
Athens and to become the pupils of an enemy of Athens-to act in
a way which could appear to be unpatriotic.
The Laws is the most political work of Plato. One may even say
that it is his only political work, for in it the chief character, the
Athenian stranger, elaborates a code for a city about to be founded,
i.e., he engages in political activity. In the Republic Socrates founds
a city in speech, i.e., not in deed; accordingly the Republic does not
in fact present the best political order but rather brings to light the
limitations, the limits, and therewith the nature of politics (Cicero,
Republic II 52). The emphatically political character of the Laws
would seem to explain why that work is the only Platonic dialogue
in which Socrates does not participate, for Socrates was prevented
by his daimonion from engaging in political activity (Apology of
Socrates 31c3-32a3). The absence of Socrates from the Laws is
thus not sufficiently explained by the fact that that dialogue takes
place somewhere on Crete.
When Aristotle discusses the Laws in his Politics, he takes it for
granted that the speaker in the work is the same as the speaker in
the Republic: Socrates. Aristotle, at any rate, saw no difference
between the Athenian stranger and Socrates. Plato's Crito may help
us to understand this. Kriton tried to persuade Socrates to escape
stealthily from prison and thus to save his life. In order to refute
Kriton's proposal, Socrates uses as a subsidiary argument the con-
sideration that if he left Athens he would go either to one of the
well-governed cities nearby, where he would be utterly discredited
by his unlawful escape, or to Thessaly, which is utterly lawless. He
does not discuss what would happen to him if he went to a well-
governed city far away like Sparta or the still more remote Crete;
he had mentioned both shortly before (Crito 53b4-6 and d2-4,
52e5-6). It thus suggests itself to us that if Socrates had escaped
from prison, he would have gone to Crete, where he was wholly
unknown and would have come to sight only as an Athenian stran-
ger. In the circumstances of which his old age was no mean part,
it was indeed impossible for him to act on Kriton's advice. But Plato
was not bound by what is possible simply or qualifiedly. It suffices
to refer to the Menexenus, in which his Socrates rehearses a funeral
speech in honor of fallen soldiers-a speech that was allegedly elab-
orated by Aspasia and which celebrates the great deeds performed
by Athens until about twelve years after Socrates' death. Plato
invented with ease Socratic and other stories.
The only Platonic dialogue apart from the Laws which is located
outside of Athens is the Phaedrus. The peculiar theme of the Phaed-
rus may be said to be writings. The laws proposed in the Laws are
written.
The Laws opens with the word "god"; there is no other Platonic
dialogue that opens in this manner. The Laws is Plato's most pious
work. There is one Platonic dialogue whose last word is "god": the
Apology of Socrates. In the Apology of Socrates Socrates defends
himself against the charge of impiety, of not believing in the gods
in whom the city believes. In the Laws the Athenian stranger devises
a law against impiety which would have been more favorable to
Socrates than the corresponding Athenian law.
BookOne
At the beginning of the Laws the Athenian stranger asks his two
interlocutors, the Cretan Kleinias and the Spartan Megillos, whether
a god or some human being is responsible for the disposition of their
laws. The Cretan replies: a god, stranger, a god to give what is at
any rate the most just answer; with us it is Zeus-with the Spartans,
they say, I believe, that it is Apollon. The most just answer is not
necessarily the most true answer. Is Zeus' having been responsible
for the Cretan laws known only through what the Cretans say? Are
the Cretans infallible? Is their veracity beyond doubt? Be this as it
may, precisely if we are entirely unsuspicious, we can imagine that
the Athenian stranger has come to Crete looking for the best laws.
For if the good is the old, the best is the oldest; but in order to be
simply superior to what is of later origin, the oldest must be super-
human, divine; the Cretan laws, however, are the work not only of
a god but of the highest god, and they are apparently the only laws
of this description. Accordingly the dialogue opens with the Athenian
stranger inquiring with an old Cretan about the old Cretan laws.
More precisely, he inquires with an old Cretan and an old Spartan
about the origin of the laws of their communities: the Cretan laws
are not so unqualifiedly superior to the Spartan as not to need sup-
plementing in some way by the latter; the oldest, even if it is the
work of the highest god, is not simply the best. The Athenian is
silent about the claim raised by the Spartans on behalf of their laws.
This claim is not supported, as the Cretan claim to some extent is,
by the authority of the most ancient poet. Homer makes clear that
if Zeus gave the Cretans their laws, he gave them through the inter-
mediacy of Minos, although neither Homer nor the Cretans vouch
for Minos' justice (d. 706a7ff.).
The Athenian does not question the divine origin of the Cretan
laws. On the contrary, he infers from the fact that his two inter-
locutors have been brought up in habits bred by laws of this kind,
that they would like to discuss governments and laws while walking
from Knosos to the cave and sanctuary of Zeus, i.e., while walking,
as Minos had done, to the place where he had received his instruc-
tion from Zeus; they ascend to the origins of the Cretan laws; their
going to the cave of Zeus is an ascent. Because of the summer heat
they will seek the shade afforded by the trees and make frequent
stops. Since, in addition, they will converse with one another (which
Minos did not do), their walk will be agreeable despite its length.
The Athenian now approaches the question of the divine character
of the Cretan laws from a different angle: if those laws are divine,
their end must be the proper end. The Athenian asks Kleinias with
a view to what has the Cretan law established certain institutions.
According to Kleinias the Cretan legislator has established all Cretan
institutions with a view to war, while considering of course the
nature of the land. The Cretan legislator, not blinded by a vulgar
error, had seen that all cities are engaged, as long as they are, in a
continuous war against all other cities; peace is only a word; univer-
sal war is according to nature; men possess nothing good if they are
not superior in war, for all good things belonging to the vanquished
become the possession of the victors. As we see, Kleinias asserts
spontaneously and without any preparation what the Athenian am-
bassadors on Melos assert after having ascended from the discussion
of the case at hand to their fundamental premise. Megillos agrees
with Kleinias at least up to the point that a well-ordered city is
characterized by its ability to vanquish the other cities in war.
The Athenian attempts to refute the Cretan by ~howing that if
being victorious over other cities is the best for the city, being
victorious over his fellow citizens would be best for the individual.
When Kleinias agrees without hesitation, the Athenian, considering
that each man is not simply one, asks Kleinias whether victory will
not also be best in the relations between the parts of each man. To
the Athenian's surprise, Kleinias enthusiastically agrees: the indi-
vidual is indeed the proper starting point for the understanding of
the city; enmity, war, is supreme even within each man; how else
could victory over oneself be the first and best victory? Descending
at the Athenian's suggestion from the individual to the city, the
Cretan observes that a city in which the better people vanquish the
multitude, i.e., the inferior people, is superior to itself and most
justly praised on account of that very victory. But when the Athenian
thereupon suggests that if the unjust majority of the citizens over-
comes and subdues a just minority, the city is inferior to itself or