The Anglo-American Special Relationship and the Decolonisation of the Federation of Rhodesia ...

245 Pages·2016·1.93 MB·English

by  Claire Melland

The Anglo-American Special Relationship and the
Decolonisation of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland 1957-1963

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester

by
Claire Paula Melland
School of History
University of Leicester

October 2015
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to use the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to
examine the way in which the Anglo-American special relationship functioned away
from a crisis and on an issue over which the British were, uniquely the controlling
power. Africa became a Cold War battleground in the sense that both the Americans
and the Soviets wanted saw this vast area as a potential gain. For Britain the issue was
how to appease both the white settler and African native populations, under the
scrutiny of both new African nations and the UN while pushing forward with their
decolonisation policy. This pressure, coupled with the desire to establish a new world
role through helped to create a unique situation for Anglo-American relations as it
gave the two nations an issue they could work together to solve, without a crisis to
guide or influence them.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the staff at the University of Leicester Library and the University
of Birmingham Library, as well as the staff at the Library of Birmingham (formally
Birmingham Central Library). I would also like to thank Leicester University and The
Royal Society for their assistance in funding trips to archives and Libraries in the United
States. I would like to thank the staff at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,
the John F Kennedy Presidential Library and the National Archives II. This appreciation
is extended to the local community of Abilene Kansas who made me feel very
welcome. I would also like to thank the staff at the National Archives Kew and the
various archives and libraries located in Oxford. Many thanks also to Dr Chris Upton for
his belief in all his students and his infectious passion for history. I would also to
express my gratitude to the staff at the University of Leicester School of History,
particularly my supervisor Dr. Andrew Johnstone. Finally I would like to thank my
family, especially Brian Melland, John Peate and Megan Rowley.
Contents

Introduction 1
Chapter One: Suez and Decolonisation. 23
Chapter Two: Ike and Mac: Anglo-American Relations and Decolonisation. 43
Chapter Three: State of Emergency: Nyasaland and the Devlin Report. 73
Chapter Four: 1960: The Monckton Report, Banda's Release and African
Nationalism. 100
Chapter Five: Kennedy and Africa: The 1960 Election Campaign and Taking the
Lead on Africa. 130
Chapter Six: 1960-1962: African Constitutions and American Controversy. 155
Chapter Seven: Welensky's 'Betrayal': The End of Federation and the
Failure of the Experiment. 187
Conclusion 210
Bibliography 215
Abbreviations

Within the Text
UFP – United Federal Party, led by Sir Roy Welensky.
ZAPU – Zimbabwe African Peoples Party, led by Joshua Nkomo.

Within The Footnotes
CAB - Cabinet Office, The National Archive.
DO - Dominion Office, The National Archive.
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The National Archive.
FO - Foreign Office, The National Archive.
PREM - Prime Minister's Office, The National Archive.
CPA COB - Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
MS Macmillan - Papers of Harold Macmillan Department of Special Collections and
Western Manuscripts, Weston Library, Oxford University.
MS Mac - Macmillan Diaries, Department of Special Collections and Western
Manuscripts, Weston Library, Oxford University.
MSS Welensky - Papers of Sir Roy Welensky, Rhodes House, Oxford University.
HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationary Office.
RG 59 - Records of the Department of State, National Archives II, College Park.
DDE - Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
JFKL - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
OH - Oral History Project Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Africa Volume XIV.
Introduction

The Anglo-American special relationship is a contentious issue amongst
historians, politicians, and political commentators. The relationship has been used by
politicians to either justify or deride interaction with their transatlantic partners and
the very existence of it has been questioned by historians and journalists. Its highest
and lowest points have been mapped in a quest to explain its existence and its
relevance; to show it at its best and at its worst. The main conclusions reached
principally fall into three categories, the first being that while the relationship exists, it
is unequal and not as special as some politicians, particularly the British, would have
the public believe.1 The second category is that the relationship is special and exists
due to the unique and close bonds forged by a close personal relations and most
importantly, mutually shared aims.2 The final category is that the special relationship
was simply an illusion perpetuated by the British in an attempt to disguise their
declining world status.3 This thesis will argue that the special relationship did exist and
is in fact a hybrid of all three conclusions, and that while personal relations are
essential for the relationship to work, it is mutual aims and benefits that truly define it.
Strong personal relationships between an American President and a British
Prime Minister can be seen numerous times during the twentieth century and beyond;
Roosevelt and Churchill, Reagan and Thatcher and Bush and Blair are prime examples
of when this personal relations and the special relationship were at their highest

1 David Reynolds, 'A 'special relationship?' America, Britain and the international order since the second
world war', International Affairs, 62 (Winter, 1985-86); Ernest May and Gregory Treverton, 'Defence
Relationships: American Perspectives', in Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds) The Special Relationship:
Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.181
2John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War to Iraq (2nd Edition)
(Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.56; Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan: A Biography (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p.368; John Young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century
(London; Arnold, 1997), p.176.
3 Corelli Barnett, Verdict of Peace: Britain between her Yesterday and the Future (London: Macmillan,
2001), pp.515-6.
1
points.4 In 2012, during a visit by Prime Minister David Cameron, Barack Obama stated
that the two met 'to reaffirm one of the greatest alliances the world has ever known.'5
In 2013, journalist Nile Gardiner, in response to an apparent split between
Barack Obama and David Cameron over issues in Syria noted that 'whatever the pro-
French rhetoric coming from the White House and State Department, the fact remains
that Britain is, and will still remain, America’s closest friend and ally. The defense,
intelligence, cultural, educational and economic ties between Great Britain and the
United States are so deeply rooted that the special relationship will survive regardless
of the split over Syria.'6 The relationship between Cameron and Obama has not
enjoyed the same highpoints that Macmillan enjoyed with either Eisenhower or
Kennedy. Indeed, in early 2016 comments made by Obama about the failures of
operations in Libya were interpreted in the British Media as an attack on both
Cameron and the special relationship.7
However, in spite of this, support and belief in the special relationship still
seems to exist.8 This perhaps speaks to the idea that Britain is still suffering under the
illusion that it is still a world power, or perhaps it speaks to the belief and the
knowledge that, based on the fact that Britain and America all too often find
themselves with mutually agreeable aims, the special relationship will exist again the
future. This sentiment is expressed in a note to Eisenhower regarding the Bermuda
meeting in March 1957:

4 Nigel Ashton, 'Managing Transition: Macmillan and the Utility of the Anglo American Relations' in
Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee, (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1996), p.242.
5 Nicholas Watt, The Guardian, 14 March 2012, Barack Obama Pays Glowing Tribute to Special
Relationship 15 April 2016 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/barack-obama-special-
relationship
6 Nile Gardiner, The Telegraph, US Politics Blog,31 August 2013, The Special Relationship will long outlive
Obama's Anti-British, Pro-French Presidency, 17 June 2015.
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100233540/the-special-relationship-will-long-outlive-
obamas-anti-british-pro-french-presidency/.
7 Tim Walker, Nigel Morris, The Independent, 10 March 2016, Barack Obama says David Cameron
allowed Libya to Become a 'S**t Show' 15 April 2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/barack-obama-says-david-cameron-allowed-libya-to-
become-a-s-show-a6923976.html; Matt Dathan, Martin Robinson, The Daily Mail, 11 March 2016,
Britain's 'Special Relationship' with the US come under threat as Ex-Cabinet Minister hits back at Obama
over his 'unfair' attack on Cameron's Libya 'S**t Show'...and takes a swipe at US Presidents record in
Syria, 15 April 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3487124/Barack-Obama-rushes-repair-
Special-Relationship-David-Cameron-hours-accusing-PM-free-riding-defence-causing-s-Libya.html
8 Gardner, The Special Relationship will long outlive Obama's Anti-British, Pro-French Presidency.
2
'The US needs the alliance for much the same reason as does
Britain. We rely on British help…material and psychological, to
implement our policies towards he Commonwealth, Eastern
Europe, South Asia and some areas of the Far East. We recognise
the two acting in concert, with the aid of the Commonwealth, form
a more persuasive combination that the US acting alone. In
addition, we rely heavily on Britain in the military field. Their
contribution next to our own…forms the largest national
component in NATO and UK territory afford essential bases for US
forces in the British Isle, Caribbean and other areas.'9
What was remarkable was that Macmillan managed to forge such close bonds
with not one but two different American Presidents.10 Despite not only change of
administration but also political party on the American side, Macmillan was able to
establish a strong personal relationship with Kennedy after enjoyed similar with
Eisenhower.11 This was due in part to Macmillan's political abilities but also because,
despite alterations within American politics, foreign aims were still aligned. While
nothing changed in terms of the way in which the two nations could work together,
the evolution of independence across Africa, as well as Cold War interpretations,
forced the hand of both the British and the Americans. Thus, what was perceived as
policy transformation was in fact policy progression.
Geelhoed and Edmonds contend that Macmillan and Eisenhower achieved a
great amount as political leaders, citing the fact that they helped to strengthen NATO

9 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Country Files, Box 9, Folders - Bermuda Meeting, 21-23 March, 1957,
For the President (1) (undated), in Martin, Laurence and John C. Garnett (eds.), British Foreign Policy:
Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-First Century, (London: Pinter, 1997), pp.119-120.
10 Horne, Alistair, 'The Macmillan Years and Afterwards', in Louis and Bull, The Special Relationship p.97;
Howard, Michael, 'Afterward: The "Special Relationship"', in Louis and Bull, Ibid, p.389.
11 Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.558; Michael O'Brien, John F
Kennedy (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2005), p.888; Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations, in The
Twentieth Century: The Politics and Diplomacy of Friendly Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995),
p,131; Nigel Ashton, 'Harold Macmillan and "The Golden Days" of the Anglo-American Relations
Revisited', 1957-63, Diplomatic History 9, No.4, (2005), p.691; David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An
Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London: Vintage
Books, 1988), p.244; Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p.56; Young, Britain and the World, p.176; Bruce
Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957-1961 Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.152-153.
3
and that they moved away from an era of confrontation towards one of negotiation.12
However, what is more interesting is their assertion that 'they did not succeed in
bringing any peaceful resolution to the issues that divided the East and West nor did
they abandon their predecessors' policy of containment vis-à-vis the communist world.
Nevertheless, neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan was satisfied with pursuing a foreign
policy characterized only by endless recrimination, mistrust, and hostility toward their
adversaries.'13
Christopher Sandford states that Kennedy and Macmillan, 'were almost
comically mismatched, and yet no other Atlantic partnership since the days of
Roosevelt and Churchill have given each other more practical co-operation on matters
of mutual interest....One major sign of the success of the Kennedy-Macmillan axis is
the number of times they met, or spoke, and the relative speed with which they made
their relative decisions.’14 While crisis management seemed to bring the two leaders,
and therefore the two nations, closer together, the way in which they tackled the
problems of African nationalism and decolonisation without the impetuous of crisis,
allows study of the relationship to take on a completely new dimension. If the
relationship was able to bring constructive and thoughtful progress on a difficult and
potentially critical issue, it would infer that the relationship ran much deeper and was
far more important than had been previously believed.
Eisenhower himself often spoke extremely favourably and warmly of his
association with both Britain and Macmillan. Although the personal relationships are
important, another aspect is how the two Presidents felt towards Britain as a nation.
Eisenhower often spoke highly of the country itself, possibly stemming from his close
relations with British personnel during his time as Allied Supreme Commander during
the Second World War. Similarly, Kennedy felt some affinity with the British due to his
experience of the nation during his stay in Britain during his father's appointment as
Ambassador to the United Kingdom. However, the fact that Kennedy wrote the critical
book 'While England Slept' about the beginnings of the war and his Irish ancestry gave
Macmillan cause for concern when he became President.

12 Ibid, p.155.
13 Ibid, pp.155-6.
14 Christopher Sandford, Harold and Jack: The Remarkable friendship of Prime Minister Macmillan and
President Kennedy (New York: Prometheus Books, 2014), pp.277-288.
4
However, Dominic Sandbrook asserts that 'contrary to myth, Kennedy and
Macmillan had an uneasy relationship.'15 He goes on to claim in his notes that archival
material supports this assertion but fails to specify exact examples. However, after
following the trail from the citation Sandbrook does use it seems that there is no
archival evidence in fact offered by the original source.16 Although, past biographers
and historians may have exaggerated the closeness of Macmillan and Kennedy, and
while there were moments in which they did not agree, close examination of the
archival evidence does not seem to suggest that the relationship between the two
men was in any way a myth. What it does suggest is that, despite moments where the
two men disagreed there was a friendly communication between them and a sense of
friendship.
The connection between Macmillan and both Presidents is the cornerstone of
the Anglo-American special relationship during this period. However this is only part of
a much bigger picture; while close and amicable relations between the leaders was a
solid starting point the real basis of the relationship was the basic fact the Britain and
America were trying to achieve similar if not identical political aims. This simple idea is
the true root of the special relationship and can be clearly seen not only in the way the
British government communicated the problems they faced and the wider political
issues that could affect the handling Central African Federation to the Americans, but
in the way that the Americans themselves were able to understand and empathise.
This thesis will illustrate that the Americans clearly understood the British point of
view, right up until the end of Federation and the Americans had their own ideas of
what they would like to see accomplished in the Federation they were keenly aware of
the problems Britain faced, acknowledging the fact that there were no easy answers.
This thesis therefore, examines the relationship at work, not its rescue from a crisis.

15 Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had it So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles (London:
Abacus, 2005), p.245.
16 Ibid; Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), p.339,
p.342; Sorenson, Kennedy, p.558; Ian Clarke, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's
Deterrent and America 1957-1962 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1994), p.13.
5