Table Of ContentThe Alliance That Lost Its Way
The Alliance That Lost Its Way
A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress
by Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis
A Twentieth Century Fund Study
Chicago
Quadrangle Books
1970
THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST ITS WAY.
Copyright © 1970 by The Twentieth
Century Fund, Inc. All rights reserved,
including the right to reproduce this book
or portions thereof in any form. For
information, address: Quadrangle Books,
Inc., 12 East Delaware Place, Chicago
60611. Manufactured in the United States
of America. Published simultaneously in
Canada by Bums and MacEachem Ltd.,
Toronto.
Library of Congress Catalog Card
Number: 76-125481
SBN 8120-0151-7
The Twentieth Century Fund is a research
foundation that undertakes timely, critical,
and analytical studies of major economic,
political, and social institutions and issues.
Nonprofit and nonpartisan, the Fund was
founded in 1919 and endowed by
Edward A. Filene.
Board of Trustees:
Morris B. Abram
Adolf A. Berle, Chairman
Jonathan B. Bingham
Arthur F. Bums (on leave)
Erwin D. Canham
Hodding Carter III
Evans Clark
Benjamin V. Cohen
J. Kenneth Galbraith
Patricia Roberts Harris
August Heckscher
David E. Lilienthal
Georges-Henri Martin
Lawrence K. Miller
Luis Muñoz Marín
Don K. Price
James Rowe, Vice-Chairman
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
H. Chr. Sonne
Herman W. Steinkraus, Treasurer
Charles P. Taft
David B. Truman
M. J. Rossant, Director
FOREWORD
When the trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund first con
sidered sponsoring a critical study of the Alliance for Progress,
the United States public seemed almost oblivious of events in
Latin America. This lack of interest was understandable. The
public was then, as now, preoccupied with the war in Vietnam,
the urban crisis, and other domestic issues; those concerned
about foreign affairs were too absorbed by the aftermath of the
near revolution in France, the intervention of the Soviet Union
in Czechoslovakia, and the bloodletting in Nigeria to follow
developments in the republics of the Alliance.
But the Fund’s trustees, many of whom have frequently dem
onstrated prescience in selecting subjects for study and some of
whom had actually participated in the creation of the Alliance,
felt it would be a mistake to ignore Latin America simply be
cause it was relatively quiet. Sensing that this quiet was only
relative and only superficial, they called for a review of the
Alliance’s performance and of the problems involved in speed
ing economic and social development in Latin America while
strengthening and expanding participation in democratic in
stitutions.
The size of Latin America, the variety within it, and the broad
scope of the Alliance made such an assignment extremely com
plex. It proved manageable, however, thanks to the successful
collaboration forged between Jerome I. Levinson and Juan de
Onis. Mr. Levinson had worked for the Agency for Interna
tional Development, first as assistant director of the United
States AID mission in Brazil and later as deputy director of the
Office of Capital Development of AID’S Latin American bu
reau (which had overall responsibility for AID lending in
Latin America). Mr. de Onis, a skilled journalist, had had long
service in Latin America, first with the United Press and then
with the New York Times. Both men had been involved with
the Alliance from its beginnings, one as a dedicated participant
and the other as a professional observer. Their different van
tage points and varied experience proved invaluable resources,
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the essential raw materials for a comprehensive and detailed
account of the Alliance's impact.
While Messrs, de Onis and Levinson were engaged in this
effort, the fragile and uneasy calm in Latin America was shat
tered by upheavals in a number of countries, culminating in the
tumultuous reception accorded Governor Nelson Rockefeller
of New York during his mission on behalf of the Nixon ad
ministration. This unrest did not derail the project, for the
Fund’s research directors, like its trustees, had anticipated tur
bulence in Latin America. With this awareness they managed
to produce what may be the fullest review of the Alliance’s ac
complishments and failures over the decade of its existence.
Unquestionably their findings and their recommendations are
controversial and sobering. Almost any serious comment on
the Alliance is bound to be, whether it comes from North
America or Latin America. But the special merit of the
De Onis-Levinson effort is that it reflects a profound commit
ment to democratic development of the Americas. This com
mitment has motivated an uncompromisingly objective, critical
appraisal of the Alliance and its influence on the Latin Ameri
can economies, political systems, and social structures. It has
led the authors to clarify a great many issues previously dis
torted or obscured by both detractors and supporters of the
Alliance.
As in all Fund projects, the authors enjoyed complete inde
pendence. Their views are their own, not the Fund’s.
Their account conclusively demonstrates that the Alliance has
not lived up to its initial promise. But the record cannot be
considered a complete failure. It reveals the successes as well
as the setbacks, and tangible as well as intangible changes
wrought by the Alliance. The authors feel that the credit for
accomplishments as well as the blame for mistakes must be
shared equally between the donors and the recipients of aid.
And in identifying the weaknesses and errors of the Alliance,
the authors express their deep conviction that this experiment
in development must not be abandoned, but must be begun
afresh.
M. J. Rossant, Director
The Twentieth Century Fund
March 1970
PREFACE
The ambitious and complex venture known as the Alliance for
Progress has involved the United States for the better part of
a decade in an effort to advance the economic, social, and po
litical development of Latin America. It served two Demo
cratic administrations as the main channel of inter-American
relations. But the problems that gave rise to the Alliance in
1961 have not been resolved, and now they face a Republican
administration in Washington.
Latin America is on the threshold of a new decade in which
pressures for economic growth and social change will sorely
test the political strength of the inter-American relationship. At
this time a history of the Alliance would be premature, for its
tasks are far from finished. But a critical assessment is due. A
stocktaking of the Alliance’s successes and failures may con
tribute to the formulation of a more effective program for the
future. This book seeks to provide such a critique and audit.
Our opinions and judgments grow out of personal association
with the Alliance. We have watched it from two complementary
vantage points: that of a United States foreign aid official, in
volved in the operations of the Alliance in both Latin America
and Washington; and that of a correspondent for the New
York Times in Latin America, for whom reporting on the
Alliance has been a continuous assignment.
In these capacities we actually witnessed a number of key in
cidents and we have included some quotations, paraphrases,
and descriptions that cannot be documented because they have
never before been recorded. We have also included quotations
from our interviews with U.S. and Latin American govern
ment officials, businessmen, and other participants in or ob
servers of events concerning the Alliance. Some of these people
have asked to remain anonymous. Otherwise, wherever appro
priate, we have identified them and the documents, published
and unpublished, to which we have referred in our research for
this book.
We have judged the Alliance by its own standards and stated
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objectives, measuring these against its performance in the set
ting of the relevant events in both Latin America and the United
States which influenced its development. We do not pretend
to give a full account of inter-American relations in the past
decade. Of necessity we have been selective, paying particular
attention to the national and regional experiences that we felt
were most characteristic of development problems in the area.
The individual characteristics of the Latin American countries
make it dangerous to generalize, but we felt that we could not
record the particular experience of each and every country
without losing our critical focus.
The Alliance experience in Brazil is a recurrent theme in the
book, partly because in our respective capacities we both had
extended tours in that country. But more important, Brazil is
by far the largest country in Latin America; its ninety million
people present within one national framework the full range of
problems that brought the Alliance into being. We consider
Brazil’s performance a fundamental test of the Alliance.
We have also drawn heavily on the experiences of Chile, Co
lombia, Venezuela, and Peru because they provide what we
feel are the best illustrations of particular aspects of the Alli
ance, and have given only passing attention to certain other
important countries because they appeared to stand apart from
the mainstream.
Argentina and Mexico have had only a marginal relationship
to the Alliance in domestic terms, but we do examine the im
portance of their potential role in the achievement of a major
Alliance objective, the creation of a Latin American common
market. Central America and the Caribbean countries offer
fascinating examples of the problems of small-country devel
opment, but their special features fall outside a general study
of the Alliance.
This study deals at some length with the significance of the
United States in Latin American development. We feel that the
Alliance experience shows that the United States does not
possess a foolproof blueprint for modern development in Latin
America. Even if it did, the United States could not take over
the responsibility for sovereign political decisions that Latin
American leaders alone can make in circumstances that they
understand better than any outsider. Moreover, U.S. policy in
Latin America lacks domestic support and shifts under the
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Preface
