Table Of ContentTHE ADVENT OF WAR 1939-40
Also kY Ro_y Douglas
LAW FOR TECHNOLOGISTS
THE HISTORY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY 1895-1970
LAND, PEOPLE AND POLITICS: The Land Question in the
United Kingdom 1878-1952
IN THE YEAR OF MUNICH
NEW ALLIANCES 1940-41
FROM WAR TO COLD WAR 1942-48
1939: A Retrospect Forty Years After (editor)
THE ADVENT OF WAR
1939-40
Roy Douglas
Reader, General Studies
University f!f Surrey
MACMILLAN PRESS
LONDON
© Roy Douglas 1978
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1978 978-0-333-23299-6
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
First edition 19 78
Reprinted 1983
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Douglas, Roy, b.l924
The advent of war 1939-40
1. World War, 1939-45
I. Title
940.53 D743
ISBN 978-1-349-16026-6 ISBN 978-1-349-16024-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-16024-2
Contents
List of Plates Vll
Preface IX
Acknowledgements Xlll
I THE DIE IS CAST v
2 REAPPRAISALS I4
3 RUSSIA: STAGE ONE 2I
4 RUSSIA: STAGE TWO 34
5 HOPES FORLORN 47
6 ADJUSTMENTS TO WAR 59
7 NORTHERN LIGHTS 76
8 FROM ONE WAR TO ANOTHER 9I
9 THINGS FALL APART ... I04
Io POLITICAL CRISIS I2I
I I RETROSPECT I36
Notes I49
Abbreviations and Bibliographical Note I6I
Index I63
v
List of Plates
Ia. Colonel Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, in London
1b . Conscripts at King's Cross
2a. Molotov and the Fiihrer discussing the Russo-German Non
Aggression Pact
2b. German officers and soldiers in Poland, 1939
3a. German loot secured by the rout of the Polish army round
Andrzejewe
3b. Fixing the meeting point of the new boundaries ofGermany,
Russia and Lithuania, 1939
4· The War Cabinet
5a. Soviet transport cars captured by Finnish troops
5b. Russian prisoners after the annihilation of the Soviet 44th
Division at Suomussalmi
6a. Honour among thieves?
6b. The Bus-'Hi! Driver! Wake up'
7· The Altmark hiding in Josling Fjord
8. Attlee, Bonnet, Daladier, Dalton, Gamelin and Mannerheim
VII
Preface
By the spring of 1939, most thinking people in Britain had probably
decided that a major European war, involving their own country,
was likely to arise in the next year or so. There were some aspects of
that war which they doubtless guessed: that the allies on one side
would include Britain, France and Poland; that the powers ranged
against them would eventually include Germany and Italy. Yet
there are many features of the early phases of that conflict which few
people anticipated. Who imagined that the prelude to war would be
an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union-countries
which were generally regarded on all sides as implacable enemies?
Who thought that the first winter of war would see practically no
fighting on land which involved Britain, Germany, France or
Poland-but instead a great struggle between Russia and Finland?
Who anticipated that, after six months of war, Italy, Romania and
Yugoslavia would still be, technically, at peace? Who could have
guessed the roles which Churchill or Lloyd George or Stalin would
play?
In the last few years, many documents have become available for
study, which make the events and personalities appear in an
unfamiliar light. If we are to attempt a new look at the period in the
light of evidence which was not available to historians a decade or so
ago, then it is wise to exclude from our minds the interpretations
which seemed reasonable enough to contemporaries who, by the
nature of things, could not possibly have known all the facts.
When-to take but one example-the British Government 'guaran
teed' Poland at the end of March 1939, some apparently well
informed critics were astonished that the guarantee had been issued
at that time, and in that manner. Why did the British Government
not delay a few weeks, until it could announce that a great eastern
alliance had been formed, incorporating not only Poland but also
the Soviet Union and Romania? Why did that eastern alliance
never come into being? Innumerable explanations have been given,
which set varying shares of blame on Britain, France, Poland and
the Soviet Union; but until the primary documents became
IX
Preface
X
available, conclusions were largely conjectural, and doubtless much
influenced by the political bias of the commentators.
It is true that a large number of papers from the period were
printed a few years after the war in the monumental Documents on
British Foreign Policy. These documents, however, are only a
selection-the tip of an iceberg. A great many diplomatic papers
were not then available for inspection. Some were in private
collections, to which the editors of the series did not have access.
Other papers the editors may well have decided to exclude for other
reasons: they contained, for example, possible libels on people still
living; or the material was dangerous from the aspect of current
diplomacy. Some very important papers are still sealed today; but
at least it now seems that the great bulk of British material which has
survived is currently available for study.
Much that was said or written about events shortly after they
occurred made little pretence at objectivity. It was designed to
guide behaviour in the future, rather than to provide a balanced
record of the past. An element of polemics or apology persisted in
many accounts which were written long afterwards. Some were
composed by men who participated in the events and who
naturally enough-sought to defend their own actions; others by
people who sought to derive a current political moral. Churchill,
Attlee and Eden-to name but three-all wrote their own records of
the period. All were major figures at the outbreak of war, and all
were still at the centre of politics far into the 1950s. Even after the
principal actors of the pre-war period had retired, men who had
been closely associated with them still remained active in politics
and there was reason to think that the wisdom or unwisdom of
principals might have rubbed off on juniors. Today, however, the
great majority of men who played any significant part in events
about the time of the outbreak of war are either dead or have retired
from active politics. There is little political mileage to be made now
by any review of 1939-40, however radical. That statement was not
true fifteen-perhaps not ten -years ago.
The present author has concentrated on information which was
available to British people at the time. Not all individuals had access
to the same information, and if we wish to understand how they
behaved it is well to remember that fact. When people in Britain
needed to consider the aspirations, motives and policies of foreign
countries-even of Allied countries-they could never do much
more than make inspired guesses.
Preface XI
Before we praise or blame, we should try to understand. In order
to do that, it is perhaps useful to start from the presumption that the
measure of wisdom or unwisdom, of altruism or selfishness, or of
most other moral properties, did not vary very greatly among the
British individuals and groups which come under study. What did
differ very greatly was their factual information, their past ex
periences and prejudices, and their current preoccupation.
