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Terrorism
Organized
and
Hate Crime
Intelligence Gathering, Analysis,
and Investigations
Second Edition
Michael R. Ronczkowski
Boca Raton London New York
CRC Press is an imprint of the
Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
7829_C000.fm Page ii Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM
CRC Press
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© 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
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International Standard Book Number-10: 0-8493-7829-X (Hardcover)
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ronczkowski, Michael.
Terrorism and organized hate crime : intelligence gathering, analysis, and
investigations / Michael Ronczkowski. -- 2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8493-7850-8 (alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-8493-7850-8 (alk. paper)
1. Hate crime investigation--United States. 2. Hate crime investigation. 3.
Terrorism--United States--Prevention. 4. Terrorism--Prevention. I. Title.
HV8079.H38R66 2006
363.325’165--dc22 2006018580
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at
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Dedication
For my family, and all the hardworking men and women in law
enforcement, both sworn and nonsworn, and the armed forces who
make sacrifices every day in honor of their country. Keep up the fight!
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Foreword to First Edition
As I write this foreword, the entire world is focused on the Middle East and
the continuing threat of more terrorist attacks against Americans, both here
and abroad. And while the military continues its deployment of troops and
equipment to address the possibility of war, law enforcement personnel in
this country scurry to hire and train analytical specialists — individuals
essential to our ability to address matters of homeland security.
The present-day practice with regard to the hiring and use of analytical
specialists in law enforcement agencies is in stark contrast to the common
practices in 1965 when I began my law enforcement career with the Miami-
Dade Police Department (MDPD) in Miami, Florida. Throughout my
27 years in South Florida, I witnessed first-hand how detectives were forced
to rely on personal contacts and individual practices to gather and analyze
information. I still remember how, as a young General Investigations Unit
lieutenant, I would sit at my desk every morning plotting burglary trends
from the previous day’s crime reports. I would gather the information, try to
put it into some type of usable format, push pins into a district map in the
uniform roll call room, and then provide the data to the uniform lieutenants
for dissemination to their officers. It was the best that we could do at the
district level in the mid-1970s.
What few analysts the department hired were devoted to organized
crime analysis and plotting the relationships among the various organized
crime figures plying their trade in the Miami area. It was, in fact, the com-
bination of the successes enjoyed in the organized crime investigations arena
and the attendant frustration the rest of us were experiencing in analyzing
crime data that finally caused the agency to recognize the need to have
personnel specialized in gathering and analyzing information assigned
throughout the department. I was the deputy director when I left MDPD in
1992. By then, the use of analysts in the agency was much more widespread.
Not only was the intelligence unit beginning to realize the value of having
professionally trained analysts, so were many of the criminal investigative
units both at headquarters and throughout the district.
As police chief in Tampa, Florida, I continued to recognize the need to have
an effective medium in which to gather, analyze, and share information among
agencies. The Tampa Police Department (TPD) had an effective analytical
function. They did a great job of gathering and analyzing information and
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disseminating it to internal units. Unfortunately, and through no fault of the
personnel, they did not do a good job of sharing information as it related to
youth gangs. In spite of the plainly visible graffiti and gang tags on walls
throughout the city, the city administration remained adamant in its position
that there was no youth gang issue in Tampa. Through detailed briefings with
the political structure, I was able to convince those in the administration of
the importance of acknowledging the problem so that we could deal openly
with other local authorities, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies,
and the judiciary. The chief judge for the Circuit convened a summit on youth
gangs, and we were well on our way to confronting this serious issue.
Not only do local agencies have to share among themselves, they must
also share with state and federal agencies. Local law enforcement frequently
possesses information that may be germane to state and federal investiga-
tions, but the conduit to share it is lacking. In fact, many agencies still rely
on personal contacts and friendships among detectives as means for sharing
information. As director of the U.S. Marshal’s Service (USMS) from 1993 to
1999, I observed just how many federal agencies are dependent upon infor-
mation from local, county, and state agencies to address matters of national
security and interests. Terrorism and threats to homeland security have been
major concerns in Washington, D.C. for many years.
As director at USMS, I witnessed first-hand the impact that terrorists,
foreign or domestic, can have on our society and way of life. The 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1998 embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania strained the resources of dedicated federal
investigators. And, while I was not the director during the tragic and violent
1992 incident at Ruby Ridge involving alleged members of the Patriot
movement, I was involved in the subsequent review of the actions of the
deputy marshals. I certainly came to recognize the continuing need to
monitor and comprehend organized hate groups such as the Patriot move-
ment in the United States. There has been a constant need for national
intelligence and analysis after these tragic events, but also a new emphasis
on information that can identify possible future attacks. However, much of
the training and materials available to law enforcement has focused on
preparing and responding.
There has been a training and analytical void in law enforcement on the
full context of the terrorism and organized hate crime issues faced by officers
and analysts. That was, until now.
This book is extremely topical and current. Mike Ronczkowski has spent
over 20 years in law enforcement — 8 years managing and teaching intelli-
gence analysts. He serves as an adjunct professor at a local university, teaching
a course on how to recognize and deal with terrorism. As he worked on his
lesson plans, he came to recognize the need for a book like this. This book
is relevant for law enforcement personnel around the world and, at the same
time, appropriate for students seeking to learn more about one of criminal
justice’s hottest topics.
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Material in this book undoubtedly provides personnel with an under-
standing and approach for gathering intelligence and conducting analysis
on terrorism-related matters. The reader will also find that many of the
concepts are applicable to other law enforcement investigations.
From a management perspective, I believe that hiring and training ana-
lysts is essential. I have seen many agencies promote clerical staff members
into analytical roles and just assume that they would learn on the job. This
is a fallacy. As this book points out, law enforcement managers and policy
makers need accurate and quality intelligence. This will enable them to make
informed decisions if they are to properly address issues. How can this be
achieved without training and an understanding of the topic being analyzed?
I firmly believe that the author’s approach, as detailed in this book, will
greatly aid in addressing the analytical needs faced by agencies, filling in
the gaps and voids that exist today.
In my current role as Commission Secretary for the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), I have witnessed
growth of an emphasis on agencies hiring, training, and even certifying
analytical personnel to address such topics as homeland security, terrorism,
and organized hate crime. The problem has been the lack of materials appli-
cable to law enforcement — that is, until the author wrote this book.
I congratulate him for addressing the needs of so many law enforcement
agencies and for sharing his knowledge and experience with the rest of the
law enforcement community. It has been an honor to review and write the
foreword for this book, and I strongly recommend use of it by law enforce-
ment practitioners, managers, and students.
Eduardo Gonzalez
Director, U.S. Marshal’s Service (1993–1999)
Chief of Police, Tampa, Florida (1992–1993)
Deputy Director, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami, Florida (1965–1992)
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Foreword
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) held a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit in
Alexandria, Virginia, in which participants posited that failures of the intelli-
gence process contributed in no small measure to the events of that tragic
day. They further concluded that the ability of law enforcement agencies —
at all levels — to collect, collate, analyze, disseminate, and share intelligence
was key to fighting the war on terror. The IACP thus proposed the devel-
opment of a federal initiative to enable accomplishment of this objective. In
response to this proposal, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2002 created the Global Intelligence
Working Group (GIWG) and tasked it with the responsibility of developing
what is now known as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. This
plan provides a framework to improve our nation’s ability to develop and
share criminal intelligence information and to bolster the safety and security
of our communities.
A recommendation that IACP Summit participants identified as
core to achieving the goals of the National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan was to “promote intelligence-led policing through
a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its useful-
ness.” Intelligence-led policing is defined as the collection and
analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product
designed to inform law enforcement decision making at both the
tactical and strategic levels. Intelligence-led policing is predicated
on the production and application of intelligence information and
products. For intelligence-led policing to be effective, the process
must be an integral part of an agency’s philosophy, policies, and
strategies and must also be integral in the organization’s mission
and goals.*
Embodied within the term “intelligence-led policing” is the underlying
concept that decisions regarding the delivery of police services should,
* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, The National Criminal Justice Sharing
Plan, October 2003, p. 3–4.
Description:Traditionally, law enforcement agencies react to isolated crimes in insulated jurisdictions. With the rise of terrorism, law enforcement agencies can no longer afford to operate blindly. The only way to maintain an edge on this nebulous and insidious enemy is through proactive intervention. Law enfo