Technology, Transgenics and a Practical Moral Code

271 Pages·2009·3.23 MB·English

by  Dennis R. Cooley

Dennis R. Cooley, The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology,
Technology, Transgenics and a Practical Moral Code, DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3021-
4, © Springer Netherlands 2010
4
The International Library of Ethics, Law
and Technology
Editors-in-Chief
Anthony Mark Cutter, Bert Gordijn, Gary E. Marchant and Alain Pompidou
Series Editors
Ruth Chadwick, Henk ten Have, Søren Holm, George Khushf, Dieter Birnbacher,
Edmund Pellegrino, Graeme Laurie, Bartha Maria Knoppers,
Roger Brownsword, Paul Stephen Dempsey, Justice Michael Kirby,
Rene Oosterlinck, Serge Gutwirth, John Weckert, Michael Froomkin and
David Krieger
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/7761
Dennis R. Cooley
Technology, Transgenics and a Practical
Moral Code
Dennis R. Cooley
P.O.Box 6050 Fargo ND 58108-6050 18 Putnam Hall, USA
[email protected]
ISSN 1875-0044 e-ISSN 1875-0036
ISBN 978-90-481-3020-7 e-ISBN 978-90-481-3021-4
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York
Library of Congress Control Number: 2009935720
© Springer Netherlands 2010
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Printed on acid-free paper
Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Contents
1 Applied Groundwork for a Practical Moral Code
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Definitions
1.3 Professional Moral Codes
1.3.1 Professional Moral Code (ProfMC)
1.4 USDA Study: Methodology and Results
1.4.1 Sample
1.4.2 Interview Instrument
1.4.3 Findings
1.5 Formalization and Evaluation of the USDA Study's Moral Codes
1.6 Formalization of the Combination Moral Code
1.7 Problems for the Combination Moral Code
1.8 Conclusion
2 A Practical Moral Code
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Utilitarianism
2.3 What Is a Reasonable Person?
2.3.1 The Reasonable Person Standard in Tort and Criminal Law
2.3.2 The Reasonable Person's Necessary Characteristics for this Moral Code
2.4 RPU's Benefits
2.5 Respecting Persons
2.6 Working Toward a Plausible Distributive/Social Justice Principle
2.6.1 Problems with Rawls’ Theory
2.6.2 Seven Conditions of Distributive Justice
2.6.3 Distributive Justice Principle
2.7 The Moral Paradigm Test
2.8 Conclusion
3 Are Transgenic Organisms, Biotechnology, and Technology Unnatural?
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Unnatural Is Unethical Argument
3.3 The Weak Definitions
3.3.1 Rejecting the Definition Pairs
3.4 A “Playing God” Argument
3.5 More Complex Meanings of the Unnatural
3.5.1 The Transferring Essence Definition
3.5.2 Changing the End or Telos Definition
3.5.3 The Crossing Species Boundaries Definition
3.6 Arguments from Evolution
3.6.1 Evolution: A Primer
3.6.2 Arguments Against Transgenics
3.6.3 Arguments for Transgenics
3.7 Conclusion
4 A Natural Theory of Value
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Naturalness as Sacredness
4.3 Beginning an Axiology
4.3.1 Nature as a Moral Factor
4.4 The Benefit of the Doubt Principle
4.5 Intrinsically Valuable Things and Their Rankings
4.5.1 Persons
4.5.2 Persons Versus Human Beings
4.5.3 The Intrinsic Value of Persons qua Personhood and Individual Persons
4.5.4 Ranking in Comparison to Other Intrinsically Valuable Things
4.5.5 A Different View of the Intrinsic Value of Persons
4.5.6 Potential Persons
4.5.7 Ranking in Comparison to Other Intrinsically Valuable Things
4.5.8 Sentient Creatures
4.5.9 Ranking in Comparison to Other Intrinsically Valuable Things
4.5.10 Living Organisms/Entities
4.5.11 Ranking in Comparison to Other Intrinsically Valuable Things
4.5.12 The World's Ecosystem (Nature) or the Biosphere as a Whole
4.6 Is Nature or the Biosphere Alive?
4.7 Arguments Against Nature's Intrinsic Value
4.8 Conclusion
4.8.1 Intrinsic Value/Priority Rankings in General
5 Applying PMC to a Few Transgenic Technology Issues
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Practical Moral Code Again
5.3 Transgenics and RPU
5.3.1 Negatives/Risks
5.3.2 Positives/Possible Benefits
5.3.3 Non-transgenic Alternatives
5.4 Transgenics and QCI
5.4.1 Autonomy, Government, and Free Markets
5.4.2 Autonomy, Diversity, and Free Markets
5.4.3 Autonomy and Labeling Argument
5.4.4 A Suggestion
5.5 Legal/Moral Questions
5.6 Conclusion
References
Index
Dennis R. Cooley, The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology,
Technology, Transgenics and a Practical Moral Code, DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3021-
4_1, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
1. Applied Groundwork for a Practical Moral
Code
Dennis R. Cooley1
(1) 18 Putnam Hall, P.O.Box 6050, 58108-6050 Fargo, ND, USA

Dennis R. Cooley
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
We should take seriously Gert and Stevenson’s claim that philosophers in blind pursuit
of their theories and principles are at risk of becoming ineffectual. For example, many
ethics articles are too theoretically academic rather than practical. Generally, the author
chooses a controversial moral topic, and then applies one or more principles to which
she is particularly drawn. As a result, the issue is evaluated in light of the moral codes
that academics, for the most part, have adopted, rather than those the people more
directly involved in the situation would use. Although the articles tend to be well
written, they carry little weight where people are making real world decisions about
what to do.
An earlier version of the practical moral code based on USDA survey results appeared
in Gary Goreham, George Youngs and my ”Practical Moral Codes in the Transgenic
Organism Debate.” It has been extensively updated since that time.
1.1 Introduction
We should take seriously Gert and Stevenson’s claim that philosophers in blind pursuit
of their theories and principles are at risk of becoming ineffectual. For example, many
ethics articles are too theoretically academic rather than practical. Generally, the author
chooses a controversial moral topic, and then applies one or more principles to which
she is particularly drawn. As a result, the issue is evaluated in light of the moral codes
that academics, for the most part, have adopted, rather than those the people more
directly involved in the situation would use. Although the articles tend to be well
written, they carry little weight where people are making real world decisions about
what to do.
A practical moral code based upon the work of ethicists, philosophers, sociologists,
and other social scientists, as well as what thoughtful people believe in and apply in
their lives is a necessity for three important reasons. First, it will be practical in
legitimate decision making that is understandable and justifiable to all reasonable
people. Second, it will be something people are more likely to use. Third, because of its
universal acceptability, it can help lead to social decisions and a better society. I will
address each below.
Moral codes based on how ethics is actually done by individuals and communities
must be practical because they are intended for applied individual decision making.
That is, people use them to figure out what actions they are morally required to perform
or refrain from doing, what type of people they should be, what thoughts they should
have and so on. Impractical theories and principles such as many forms of
consequentialism are impossible for people to utilize. If they are unsure of how to apply
the theory or principle correctly, then it does not help them to choose, much less justify
their choices to others.
Impractical codes also pose a danger to individuals and society. If agents cannot
know with some level of acceptable certainty what is right or wrong in real world
situations, then they might begin asking if there is anything to know in the first place?
In other words, without being able to recognize our actual duties, which actions are
right or wrong, what it is to be a good person, then why should we assume there are any
moral truths of any kind? It is a fundamental fact that rational belief in a proposition
requires some sort of adequate evidence; otherwise belief in something’s existence
seems to be merely an article of faith, or a non-rational or irrational belief. If someone
proposes an impractical moral code that does not allow people to know what to do, then
he will be unable to prove rationally that the moral code classifies one way or another in
any situation. If we want to establish that there is a morally right path in any particular
situation, then we must accept that codes producing unknowable classifications must
not be impractical.
Second, moral codes should be practical because moral debates need resolution for
their own sake and those of the community. Practical codes allow us to use the moral
ideals and reasoning processes all of us share universally to discuss the issue and try to
find consensus at least an understanding that reasonable people can reasonably disagree
will help people live their lives well and create a better society. Issues such as abortion,
euthanasia, technology and transgenic organisms cause a great deal of strife in people’s
lives, groups, and communities. After rigorous discussion, there must be solutions that
can heal and move us to new issues needing the community members’ attention and
energies, otherwise nothing will get done and the community and its citizens cannot
pursue their highest good of flourishing.
Mark Sagoff’s work on local civic engagement in environmental problem solving as
illustrated in his Quincy Library case study serves as one justification for why a
“bottom up” rather than “top down” approach is more appropriate in developing both an
axiology and practical moral code. In Quincy, California, there was a dispute between
environmentalists, local officials, and the timber industry over the dispensation of three
national forests. A desperate deadlocked situation resulted in which each local faction
was fruitlessly expending its resources while tearing apart the community. Resolution
through consensus was achieved only when local citizens realized how bad things had
become, and then worked together without outside provocateurs to find an ethical
solution to their dilemma. The democratic result was a plan in which each side
sacrificed part of its goals at the same time its primary desire was satisfied. Using
arguments and this example, Sagoff proves that a democratic approach to problem
resolution, especially if those engaged are the same individuals who will be directly
affected by the decision, is more practical than having outside agents/experts intervene
(Sagoff 2004, Chapter 9). In fact, when outside factions, such as the Forest Service,
environmental groups, and logging businesses interfered in Quincy’s process to pursue
their own interests, many of which were benefitted by keeping the problem alive, the
community plan was derailed (Sagoff 2004, pp. 225–7). Although external agents and
entities are not always harmful, the damage and distraction they can cause should make
us look for more practical, local venues through which people solve their own problems
using moral codes based upon their universal and local ethical beliefs, values, and
principles.
Many bioethicists promulgate a democratic decision procedure for technology
issues ( Korthals 2002 and 2004; Light 1996 and 2002; Rollin 1996; Thompson 2007).
Rollin argues that governments have an obligation to poll the public for any risks it
perceives, no matter how farfetched the concerns are, which are then addressed by
scientists in terms any layperson can comprehend (Rollin 1996, p. 93). Michiel
Korthals’ applicationism or deliberative ethics, which seems very similar to Andrew
Light’s methodological pragmatism, requires that “all sorts of consultation between
consumers and producers (and other parties, such as governments)” ( Korthals 2004, p.
52). The justification for deliberative ethics is the fact that consumers and producers are
manifestly unable to acquire adequate information or power necessary to protect
autonomously their own interests, while there is a dearth of entities that will do a proper
job of it for them. From being involved in the various decision processes, consumers
can guide technology to a state more conducive to their well-being. By adopting
Korthals’ approach, two chasms can be bridged. The first is the epistemological
distance that has grown between consumers and producers as food production became
more specialized and divorced from the everyday experiences of most consumers (Ibid.,
p. 153). In developed societies, very small numbers of the populace grow or raise the
foodstuffs used by the rest; hence, both have a poor understanding of what the others do
or think. Deliberative ethics overcomes the estrangement by integrating each group into
decision making bodies. The second chasm is a schizophrenic division between
consumers and citizens (Ibid., p. 155). Consumers are defined as individuals active in
markets who act according to their personal preferences, while citizens are individuals
participating in the political arena who act with others according to their common
preferences (Ibid.). Obviously, these disparate foci are incompatible unless sensitively
overcome. Deliberative ethics empowers consumers by allowing them to have greater
control in the market besides merely whether or not to buy a product that is produced by
what can sometimes be viewed as Others.
Deliberative ethics is one aspect of a current revival of pragmatism in technology
and ethics circles. Instead of being concerned about the end results of ethical decision
making, pragmatic ethics focuses upon the decision making itself. In other words, it is
“more process than product oriented” (Keulartz et al. 2002, p. 15). Deliberative ethics
ensures that all affected stakeholders have input in the final result, whatever it may be.
Pragmatic ethics also involves “substantive interventions” that break stagnation and
entrenchment in ethical debates by creating new moral vocabularies, bringing novel
perspectives or ideas, or otherwise moving the process forward through the introduction
of some new element into the debate (Ibid., pp. 15–16). In a partial justification for his
methodological pragmatism, Andrew Light claims that one must be a pragmatist in
order to function well in bioethics – and by extension – technoethics. The reason why is
based upon the assertions that:
1. bioethics is a social activity,
2. the value of ideas is ultimately weighed in terms of their value in practice,
3. the reliance in all approaches on past experience, and
4. bioethics is always aimed ultimately at influencing policy (Light 2002, p.
85).
Using principles or codes that fail to recognize these fundamental facts result in
possibly impressive abstract arguments and conclusions, but does not guarantee that any
problems will be solved in the real world (Gremmen 2002, p. 101). Laying the
groundwork for one way to discover defensible, reasonable solutions to actual problems
– the next chapter’s PMC – is what this work is striving to achieve.
Although I am not at the moment, nor might ever be, ready to adopt a form of
academic pragmatism, it is important to acknowledge its usefulness in various ways.
First, it focuses on solutions to problems using what is real in the world rather than
taking flights of philosophical fancy to complex, non-existent realms. Second, it frames
ethical discussions in more inclusive terms than merely having battles between two or
more conflicting moral principles. “The moral arguments that are used [in academia]
belong to a specific practice and may lead to problems in understanding members of
other practices” (Gremmen 2002, p. 101). The major disagreements between those
opposed or in favor of transgenic organisms, for example, organic and transgenic
producers, can be understood in terms of how each group practices animal husbandry or
farming. Once the various involved practices are appreciated, then it will be easier to
obtain some form of consensus on fitting solutions. These two benefits of pragmatism
are considerable and cannot be readily dismissed or minimized.
There are several severe drawbacks to pragmatism that will give anyone pause.
First, without some sort of fundamental principle to evaluate a practice’s moral
legitimacy, then how can one practice be set aside in favor of another? The issue is not
generally clear in the pragmatists’ writings for the examples they use to support
pragmatism tend to be all morally legitimate. Gremmen talks about clashing views over
how horses are treated as a conflict between practices people have for pets and those
they have for natural resource management (Gremmen 2002, p. 101). Either practice is
acceptable to reasonable people because we as reasonable people allow either in our
societies. Since both views are morally permissible to hold, it does not ethically matter
which one a person adopts.
However, in more difficult dilemma cases, the inherent defect with pragmatism
becomes apparent. Suppose the incompatible practices have different moral statuses. In
the case of societies that condone women’s abuse, reasonable people want to adopt an
ethical practice, and reject and condemn an unethical practice, but there is neither
incentive nor justification for doing so. For example, in May 2008, 15 women in
western Kenya were burned to death by a rampaging mob on the grounds that the
women were witches. Although the conflict between the mob’s superstition based
practice and the evidence and equality practices of any reasonable person should be
resolved in favor of the latter, with pragmatism, there is no mechanism that can be used
to support such a decision as there is in consequentialism, Kantianism, or another