Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaigns

442 Pages·2015·9.92 MB·English

by  Robert S. Ehlers Jr.

Targeting the Third Reich
modern war studies
Theodore A. Wilson
General Editor
Raymond A. Callahan
J. Garry Clifford
Jacob W. Kipp
Allan R. Millett
Dennis Showalter
David R. Stone
Series Editors
Targeting the
Third Reich
Air Intelligence and the Allied
Bombing Campaigns
Robert S. Ehlers Jr.
University Press of Kansas
©2009 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was
organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State
University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State Univer-
sity, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ehlers, Robert.
Targeting the Third Reich : air intelligence and the Allied bombing campaigns /
Robert S. Ehlers, Jr.
p. cm. — (Modern war studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN978-0-7006-2144-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. World War, 1939–1945—Military intelligence. 2. Military intelligence—Europe—
History—20th century. 3. Aerial reconnaissance—Europe—History—20th century.
4. Bombing, Aerial—Europe—History—20th century. 5. World War, 1939–1945—
Aerial operations, American. 6. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, British.
7. United States. Army Air Forces—History—World War, 1939–1945. 8. Great Britain.
Royal Air Force—History—World War, 1939–1945. 9. World War, 1939–1945—
Campaigns—Europe. 10. Germany—History—1933–1945. I. Title.
D810.S7E395 2009
940.54'86—dc22 2009021981
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The paper used in this publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer
waste. It is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National
Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.
TO DR. JOHN F. GUILMARTIN JR.
DECORATED COMBAT VETERAN, SCHOLAR,
MENTOR, FRIEND
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one
Contents
Preface ix
List of Abbreviations xiii
chapter one
Air Intelligence in Its Historical Context 1
chapter two
The Great War and the Beginnings of Air Intelligence 14
chapter three
Lessons Learned, Unlearned, and Forgotten: Analyses of Aerial
Bombardment in World War I and Their Consequences 32
chapter four
Retrenchment and Advance: Air Intelligence Developments
in the Early Interwar Period, 1919–1933 41
chapter five
The Pace Quickens: Air Intelligence Developments in the Late
Interwar Period, 1933–1941 62
chapter six
Air Intelligence Grows to Adolescence: British Developments,
1939–1941 86
chapter seven
The Shift to Night Area Bombing: Air Intelligence, Doctrinal
Evolution, and Operational Change, 1941–1942 112
chapter eight
Air Intelligence Reaches Maturity, January 1943–January 1944
141
chapter nine
Transportation Campaigns: Bombing, Air Intelligence, and the
Defeat of German Armies in France, 1944 182
viii Contents
chapter ten
The Attack on Oil, April–December 1944: Air Intelligence,
Bombing, and the Acceleration of German Defeat
in the Field 245
chapter eleven
Endgame, November 1944–May 1945: Air Intelligence, the Final
Destruction of Oil and Transportation Assets, and the Defeat of
the Wehrmacht 295
chapter twelve
Retrospective 338
Notes 351
Bibliography 399
Index 407
one
preface
Twice during the past century, first on a modest scale in 1914–1918 and then
on a massive one in 1939–1945, the Anglo-American Allies unleashed aer-
ial bombardment on their German opponents. Although the 1914–1918
effort proved limited in its effects, it nonetheless put in place the first oper-
ations and intelligence capabilities related to the employment of bombing an
enemy’s industrial and other war-making capabilities. It served, in a sense,
as a dress rehearsal for the huge heavy-bomber campaigns against the Third
Reich. These played a pivotal role in Allied victory by shortening both casu-
alty lists and the war in Europe. Recently discovered primary sources from
German, British, and American archives have prompted a reappraisal of the
heavy-bomber campaigns’ effects on Germany’s war effort. Although previ-
ously seen as important, they were in fact absolutely central to the speed and
decisiveness of the Grand Alliance’s victory. One of the most startling things
about these developments was the degree to which bombing succeeded or
failed in its stated aims based on the relative efficacy of air intelligence inputs.
The Anglo-American bombing campaigns against Germany relied heavily on
air intelligence for targeting information and bomb damage assessment
reports. These gave airmen key insights on bombing’s individual effects and
its aggregate effectiveness in support of grand and military strategy.
Air intelligence had already emerged as a new specialty during the Great
War, but by 1918, an intellectual infrastructurewith organizational and tech-
nological components had developed in the British and American air arms.
The organizational elements encompassed air staffs with intelligence spe-
cialists assigned and unit-level intelligence sections to assess the effects of
individual bombing raids. Technologies included reconnaissance aircraft and
cameras to collect photographs on the effects of bombing raids. Although
these intelligence capabilities, much like bombers and ideas about their
proper use, remained embryonic during the Great War, they set a precedent
for World War II. Surprisingly, both the operations and intelligence halves
of this crucial formative capability survived during the interwar period,
despite organizational retrenchment. The emergence of a strategic bombing
doctrine and a four-engine bomber, the Boeing B-17, in the United States her-
alded the arrival of a mature bombing capability, while the threat of war
ix