Table Of ContentOFFENSIVE SPENDING: TACTICS AND PROCUREMENT
IN THE HABSBURG MILITARY, 1866-1918
by
JOHN ANTHONY DREDGER
B.A., St. Mary’s College, 1993
M.A., University of Kansas, 1996
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
2013
Abstract
This manuscript reveals the primary causes of Habsburg defeat both in 1866 and in 1914-
1918. The choice of offensive strategy and tactics against an enemy possessing superior
weaponry in the Austro-Prussian War and opponents with superior numbers and weapons in the
First World War resulted in catastrophe. The inferiority of the Habsburg forces in both wars
stemmed from imprudent spending decisions during peacetime rather than conservatism or
parliamentary stinginess. The desire to restore the sunken prestige of Austria-Hungary and prove
Habsburg great power status drove the military to waste money on an expensive fleet and choose
offensive tactics to win great victories. This study shows the civil-military interaction in regard
to funding and procurement decisions as well as the deep intellectual debates within the army,
which refute the idea that the Habsburg military remained opposed to technology or progress.
OFFENSIVE SPENDING: TACTICS AND PROCUREMENT
IN THE HABSBURG MILITARY, 1866-1918
by
JOHN ANTHONY DREDGER
B.A., St. Mary’s College, 1993
M.A., University of Kansas, 1996
A DISSERTATION
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History
College of Arts and Sciences
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
2013
Approved by:
Major Professor
David Stone
Abstract
This manuscript reveals the primary causes of Habsburg defeat both in 1866 and in 1914-
1918. The choice of offensive strategy and tactics against an enemy possessing superior
weaponry in the Austro-Prussian War and opponents with superior numbers and weapons in the
First World War resulted in catastrophe. The inferiority of the Habsburg forces in both wars
stemmed from imprudent spending decisions during peacetime rather than conservatism or
parliamentary stinginess. The desire to restore the sunken prestige of Austria-Hungary and prove
Habsburg great power status drove the military to waste money on an expensive fleet and choose
offensive tactics to win great victories. This study shows the civil-military interaction in regard
to funding and procurement decisions as well as the deep intellectual debates within the army,
which refute the idea that the Habsburg military remained opposed to technology or progress.
Copyright
JOHN A. DREDGER
2013
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………vii
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………...ix
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….x
Chapter 1 - The Problems of 1866: Tactics, Weapons, and Money….…………………………...1
Chapter 2 - 1866-1876: First Steps Towards Progress…………………………………………..39
Chapter 3 - Success in Bosnia-Hercegovina……………………………………………………..97
Chapter 4 - From Progress to Reversion………………………………………………………..133
Chapter 5 - Financial Shock: Conradian Tactics and Wasteful Spending……………………...181
Chapter 6 - The Catastrophe of the Offensive………………………………………………….240
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...289
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………297
vi
Acknowledgements
Many individuals deserve my gratitude for the various ways in which they have made this
manuscript possible. I must first thank Mr. Mark Chapman for funding not only the present
work but also my four years as a full-time student at Kansas State University. Without his
generosity through the Chapman Fellowship, the completion of my writing may never have taken
place. I must also thank the Kansas State University History Department for awarding me the
Colonel Peter Cullen Military History Fellowship, which supported my research trip to Vienna. I
am grateful as well to my father, Oliver Dredger, who generously helped me financially with my
Viennese sojourn.
The members of my committee have been of inestimable value during my writing. All
have shown themselves always willing to provide answers covering the spectrum of academic
queries. Professor Brent Maner has constantly offered helpful criticism while trying to keep me
on track as I wandered off into the details. Similarly, Professor David Stone has repeatedly
guided me to see the forest when I was lost in the trees. Professor Marsha Frey’s continually
positive and amazingly quick feedback encouraged me during the arduous writing and revising
process. Professor Derek Hillard inspired me to improve my German skills, a most useful and
necessary ability as I learned in Vienna while poring over the cryptic scribblings of Austro-
Hungarian officers.
While in Vienna, the staff at the Kriegsarchiv performed the impossible by supplying me
with inaccessible boxes during the remodeling of the archive holdings. I must especially thank
Dr. Jerko who offered his help when I was lost and led me to sources which I had no idea
existed. In addition, I wish to thank Miha Simac for befriending me and alleviating the tedium
vii
of leafing through seemingly endless documents. My thanks must also go to my brother,
William Dredger, and my friend Patrick Maguire as well as my niece, Pauline Dredger, for
always expressing interest in my writing while reading, discussing, and commenting on my
dissertation chapters.
My gratitude would not be complete without an immense thank-you to my wife Vanessa
and our children Margaret, Kathleen, Patricia, Cecilia, Anthony, Elizabeth, and Raymond.
Vanessa endured the long hours of loneliness and boredom that the writer’s spouse must tolerate
in addition to achieving the task of keeping the household in a state of relative quiet for me to
work. Supporting me with words of encouragement while putting up with my fits of frustration,
she continued to supply me with the consolation of not only her presence but also her mouth-
watering brownies. Our children suffered through days, weeks, and months of Daddy being too
busy to spend much time with them as they heard too often such words as, “Not right now,” and,
“Just wait until I’m done with this chapter.”
Finally, I must thank those no longer here, especially Brother Sidonius Lepsi, OCSC, for
the inspiration of his immense historical knowledge, Mr. Eugene Dinet, for his friendship and
linguistic skills, and in particular my mother, Elizabeth Dredger, who helped me more than
anyone could know.
viii
Dedication
To my wife Vanessa
ix
Introduction
In 1866 a Habsburg staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Eduard Bartels, in his book
Österreich und sein Heer, commented on the dismal results suffered by the Austrian military
whenever it confronted a major power: “The history of the Austrian army is a history of defeats.
Every time it fights alone against another European great power, it loses. This permanent
misfortune must have its reasons.”1 This comment came in the wake of the disastrous defeat of
the Habsburg army against the Prussians at Königgrätz in the Austro-Prussian War, also called
the Seven Weeks’ War, denoting how quickly the Austrian army collapsed in the face of an
aggressive enemy.
In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian army embarked on its final failure, World War I. Though
this time the Habsburg forces held out for over four years, the result resembled previous losses
except for the finality of 1918 for the monarchy and the dismemberment of the empire. As in
1866, poorly trained troops led by incompetent commanders, who refused to adapt to the effects
of new technology on the battlefield, met disaster. Surely a state so large and populated as the
Austro-Hungarian Empire should have better provided the means of military victory than history
relates.
The causes for these failures stemmed primarily from flawed offensive strategy and
tactics as well as imprudent spending decisions that resulted from the desire maintain great
power status and restore the prestige of the Habsburg Empire. Both during the Austro-Prussian
War and the First World War Habsburg troops charged headlong into enemies bearing superior
1 Eduard Bartels. Österreich und sein Heer (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1866), 1, 28-29.
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Description:This manuscript reveals the primary causes of Habsburg defeat both in 1866 and in 1914-. 1918. The choice of offensive strategy and tactics against an enemy possessing superior weaponry in the Austro-Prussian War and opponents with superior numbers and weapons in the. First World War resulted
