Tactical Airlift

24 Pages·2007·2.98 MB·English

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Tactical Airlift
by
RAY L. BOWERS
. .
OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON.D.C.. 1983
Paperback Imprint
. 1999.
AIR
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PROGRAM
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BowelS,RayL
TacIicalAirlift.
(The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia)
BibYography
.Includes index.
1.Vietnamese Conflic:t. 1961-1975-Aerial operations, American. 2. United States.
Air Forco-lf'lStory-VictDamcse Conftict. 1961-1975. 3. Airlift, MilitarY. L TItle..
It Series.
DS558.8.B68 1982 959.704'348 82-14256
Papelback Imprint 1999
For sale by the Superintendent' of Documents, U.s. Govemment Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. 20402
I
The Author
RayBowerswrotetfUshistoryduring1969-1977wbiIeassignedto
theOJIiceof Air ForceHistory.WashingtonD. .C.,whoRlhe servedas
supervisoryhistorian of the SpecialHistoricsBnmch. He holds a B.S.
degreefrom the U.S. Naval Academy(1950) and an M.A. in history
fromtheUniversityofWisconsin,Madison(1960). From 1960to 1967,
be was a memberof the history department,U.S.Air FoICCAcademy,
where he directediDstmctionin the militaryhistory program. His Air
Force:flyingcareerincludeddutyaschiefnavigator,34SthTacticalAirlift
Squadron(C-130) in 1967-1968,whereheparticipatedin majorSouth-
eastAsianoperationssuchastheiCheSanhandtheTetOffensiveresupply
efforts.He has written or editedmany pubJicationsin militaryhistory,
and he presented"Air Powerin SoutheastAsia, A TentativeAppraisal"
at the 1978 militaryhistorysymposiumat the Air Force Academy.He
retiredfromactivedutyas acolonelin 1977,and nowservesaspublica-
tionsofficerwiththeCarnegieInstitutionofWashington.
iii
Contents
Page
TheAuthor. iii
Foreword . v
PrefaCe. . vii
xv
Photojraphs
. .xxiii
Maps and Charts
PartOne:TheCounterinsurgencyYears,
1946-1964
. . . . . 3
L The French War in Indochina.
25
H. TheTroopCarrierIdea, 1954-1961. . . .
47
HI. FarmGateandtheAirCommandoTradition.
IV. TheDirtyThittyandtheVietnameseAirForce
TranspoArtrm. . . . . . 67
V. MuleTrain-The F'mtYear. . 83
. . 115
VI. Tho Airlift System, 1963-1964
vn. AirSupplyofSpecialForces. . . 149
PartTwo:TheYearsoftheOffensive,
1965-1968
.
VIII. The Entry of the C-130, 1965-1966. . . 169
IX. SearchandDestroy.. . . . . . . .203
X The Airlift System in Growth, 1966-1967 . . 241 \
XI. JunctionCityand the Battlesof 1967. . 269
}
.XU. The Khe Sanh Campaign. .295
. . . .
xm. TetandtheBattlesof1968: . 317
XIV. TheAirForceCan'bous.. . . . . . 353 t
. . Part Three: Other Applications
XV.-The'AUXiliarRyoles. . .- . .379
I
XVI. AirliftinIrregularWarfare. . . . . . 417 ,
xvn. The Warfor Laos. . .. . . 439 1
~
,i
Part Four: The Years ofWithdrawal.
1969-1975
xvm. TheAirliftSystem,1969-191i. - . _467
XIX. TheCampaignosf1969-1971C, ambodia
andthe Panhandle.' . . . . . . 493
xiii
,
Page
xx. TheCan'bouFon:e.1969-1972. . . . . . . . 521
XXI. TbeEasterOffeusivo-The BattleofAnLac. . . .539
XXll. The Easter Offensivo-The CountrywideResponse. .559
xxm.
TheAdvisoryRoleandtheVietnameseA: irForce
. 581
AirliftArm. '" .....
.605
XXIV. Returnto ColdWarinSoutheastAsia.
. 631
XXV. The 1975Denouement.
.649
XXVI. Reflections..........
Appendices
. . . . .663
1. 2dAirDMsionOrganizationJ,uly1963.
.665
2. 315thAirDivisionOrganizationJ,une1964. . . .
.667
3. PacificAirJiftOrgauizationM, arch1968. . . . .
. .669
4. PeakTheaterAirliftFon:ePosture.March31, 1968
S. TheaterAirliftForcePosture,March31, 1972. . . .671
6, AgreementbetweenChiefofStaft.U.s.ArmyandChiefof
. . . . . .673
Staff,U.s. Air Force, 6 Apri11966.
.675
7. Workload,USAFAirliftForcesinVietnam. . . . .
8. Workload.CombinedForcesinViebtam,1965-1972
.683
(CargoOnly,MonthlyAverageTonnages). . . .
.685
9. Workload,PACAFForcesin WesternPacific,1969-1972.
10. Workload.315thAir Division,1965-1968. . . . . . .687
11. USAFTransportsLostinSEA(ExcludesRescueAircraft) . .689
. .691
12. HistoricTheater Airlifts(PassengexsandCargo)
Notes. . . .693
Glossary.. .807
.829
BibliographicNote
.lndex. " . ., .835
. .
xiv
I
xv. The AuxiliaryRoles
Versatility made the transport airplanes useful in numerous auxiliary
rotes in Southeast Asia. Some of these were specialized airlifts, medical
evacua'1ion.civicaction hauling, overwater transport, and air logistics serv-
ico'in 'Thailand. Others, which required only slight changes to the basic
places. included ftareship work, leaflet operations, and explosive, in-
cendiary, or chemical drops. Ships and crews of the 315th and 83~th Air
Divisions flew these missions as part of the theatet airlift effort. Other
applications of transport planes included gunshiP, spray, command and
control, rescue, and reconnaiSsance roles, all of wlricbrequired major air-
craft modifications and were performed by special units dedicateCito theSe
purposes. These activities are not included in this study. Auxiliary applica-
tions, including the use of uansports and helicopters in irregular warfare
activities, reduced the number of ships, crews, and dying hours available
fortheprimary mission oftactical airliftinSouthVietnam.
The four-enginetransportsof the 315th Air Divisioncontinuedto
performthe overwaterairliftrolewhichhad beentheir principalactivity
before1965.The abilityofthe C-130 HerculesandC-124 Globemaster
to carryfifteen-tonpayloadsweDoverfifteenhundredttlilcsnonstop,al-
lowedrapid deliveriesfrom the Philippines,Okinawa,and Japan to the
major b~ iri Vietnam.Cargo feUinto fiveprincipal categories: (1)
offshore-procureditems,suchas junglebootsfrom Koreaand electrical
gearfromJapan andTaiwan,(2) U.S.Anny andMarineequipmentfrom
Okinawa, (3) support materiel for Air Force units, (4) explosive
ordnancemoyedbyairfromthePhilippinesbecauseofseaportandstorage
limitationsin VIetnam,and (5) itemstrarisloadedfromoffshorestrategic
airliftbecauseof airfieldlimitationsinVietnam.Airliftthussupplemented
surfaceshipping,helped overcomesevereseaportbottlenecksduringthe
Americanbuildup,andcut downdeliveryandhandlingtimefor essential
parts andeqwpment.AlthoughresponsibiJitieswithinVietnamrapidlyin-
creasedfor the offshoretransports. the overwaterworkload (cargo.and
passengers)alsoincreaseduntillate 1966:1 .
319
AUXlUARY ROLES
SntaUin comparisonwith that of MilitaryAirliftCommand.. By 1963
MAC IQilitaryand contract transports WCICh.auling 150.000passengers
and :45,000tons of cargomonthlyto and from SoutheastAsia.At first
MACtransportstoVietnamIandedregularlyonlyptTanSonNhnt.Dec:t!S-
sitatingconsiderabletpnssbipmentwithinVietnambytheCoJJUJ1OSnerv-
ice AirtiftSystem.Newairports opcriedat Da Nq and Cam.Raub in
January 1966,and latm"at PJeiku,BienHoa. and Phu Cat. reducingthe
needforredistn"bution.MajorunitmOvementsbyMACaii-craft~ the
United Statesusuallyrequired further airliftsto operatiilgareas by in-
COUftUytransports. Intro4uction of the C-5 Galaxy transport in tbe
summerof 1970 creatednew problemsof in-c:o~try ~bution, si~
C-S deliveriesweremassivean4 initiallythe planescould land only at
CamRaubBay.Eventually,how~. C-5s coulduploadatTanSoDNb1U
and etSewhe.re.9
The interisland use of MAC transports in the western PadIU; ~
theissueofpossibleduplicationofeffort.~ Martin,in19~, judged
that activitiesof tbePacifictransportforcesand )fAC were~1eJnf;n-
tary and that coordinationwas g~ The ov~rlapping~tings. Martio
concluded,gaveausefulfkJtibBityinapportioningtasks.To~t ~
useoftheaterC-130s in Vietnam,MAC~ September1966in~ jts
interisl~ndlIauUnginthewesternPacificbyan amountequalto thework
of twoC-130 squadrons.Shortlyafterwards,CIN(::PACdirecte.daUsub-
ordinateconunands19~ makingxCquestsdim:t1y~ MAC,~stCadto
fprwardall airliftrequirementsto WTO for apportionmentof tasks be-
tweenMACandthe theate~transports.Alsom 1966.contracttransports
(!.tM~~ ~~
tookoverairliftsof American~ps from Vii:tnamto offshorecitiesfor
~c.- t ~~-(O ~ ~ rest and recuperation visits.This R.&Rprogram, firstauthorized jn
April 1962,~ad been exclusivelyservedby 31Sth AirDivisionC-J3~
~~"J 7016. andAirForceC-S4sandC-118s.10
The eritical.needfor C-130 lift in Vietn3IDduring 1968 brQught
further Ip~ to reduce use.of theseplaacs in ovcnrater work. On
Febmary 13ClNCPAC directed suboralDatecoJipnandsto limit airlift
requeststoQirectsupportforoperationsinKoreaandVietnam.OnAprilS
~ . .
O\IWJf"WJer theDeputy$ecretaryofDef~se orde~ ~e useofC-13OSforcwerwaler
ftigbudtscOniinUedM. ACgraduallyundertookthiswoikIoadand opened
C-l
~O ~f5f><'r'" numerous pew routes in ~e western Pacific:during the neXttwelvo
..f.-OM 1""8- l~' 2(1) months.ll . .
~~ .crY'Q..~. ThepossibleuseofMACtransportsforshipments~tween pointsin
Vietnamwasstudiedby the ~th AirForce in ~y 1968.TheJoint
-The Military Air Tnmsport Service became the Military Air~ Command
011January I, J966. At the same time, the ~ Troop Carrier Squadron became t11e
22d Militaly Airlift Squadron aDdiu parent I5!J3d'Trabspon Group became ~
65th MiUwy Airlift Group. ".
383
TACfJCAL AIRLIFf
The allied air and ground forces ofJoirit Task Force 116that entered
upcountry Thailand in May 1962 depended heavily upon airtraDsport as a
logistics,lint to the principal Sea and airport at Bangkok. ~ting in
Thailand during the deployment were twoAUStralianC-130s, several Brit-
ish transports, three Bristol freighters of the New Zealand Air Force. and
four U.S. Air Force C-123s. Tbe-C-J23 detaclunont was part of a squad-
ron.from TAC, which arrived in Thailand on June Ii. The 1238 were
ex~ed to remain, at least until arrival of a Can'bou company recently
ordered toThailand from theUnited States.
JI$
. The C-1238 operated from Bangkok's Don Muang Ah-port under
miSsion control of the joint task force headquarters and its Air Force
component command. Most niissions were between Don Muang and the
principal upcountty~ (Takhli, Korat. Chiang Mai, Ubon,lind Udom),
eacb with ample runways of at least seven thousand feet. Only Don Muang
had ground controJled approach, VHF omnirange. and tacai1equipment,
but each of the other fields possessed at least a control tower with VHF
radio and a low frequency radii>beacon. The Jnain operating problems
were the tra1Iicand parking congestion at Don Muang and the limited fuel
suppliesattheupcountrybases.69
, .
The diplomatic settlement at Geneva in july paved the.way for with-
drawal of,theaUieiIforce. Looking to the possibility of futUrebuildups in
northern Thailand. however. and seeking to reduce dependence on airlift.
the Americans acted to improve roads and nul lines across Thailand and
increase stocks of military equipment. At NaklionPbanom, in extreme
northeast. Thailand, a six thousand-foot airfield was constructed capable
of rec:eivingmajor troop units. Planners realized that another and larger
bwldup would require use of Air Force four-engine transports for cross-
Thailand lift.80
The Air Force transports remained at Don Muang despite the with-
.drawal of the.joint task force. Their number was rednced to two 1235by
early 1963 but increased to five in July 1964. Aircraft and crews were
rotated from units inVietnam for two-week tours. Ground crewmen found
the routine difficult since most maintenance work was done at night to
. . prepare tbe ships for moming nnssions, and flight-line noise made daytime
rest difficult..For the aircrews, howeyer, d~ in Thailand was a pleasure.
Most tIyingwasdone inthedaytime, and the long runways, Batterrain, and
absence of enemyfiremade the misSionseasy.The 1235made dailyruns to
the American depot at Korat and regularly visited some eight other up-
country fields. Crewsparticularly enjoyed the custom of hauling ice cream
back from Korat to treat the Thai children waiting in line at Bangkok for
the retUrn of the "Good Humor" ship. E~tions to"~ ~ed effort
weremissions into the tempoary strip at Nakhon Phanom ihSUpport'ofthe
large construction effort. One shjp was de$troyed while attempting a land-
ing at an upcountry strip, mistaken for Roi Et. Thai scheduling and m.is-
408
AUXILIARYROLES
sian control atDollMuangwereentirelyseparatefrom activitiesInSouth
Vietnam.-1
The expansion of U.8. Air Force strike aircraft in Thailand during
and after 1965 greatly increased cross-Thailand transportation require-
ments.Tbe C-123 detachment at Don Muang. nowgrownto sixaircraft
was,'in September 1965, replaced by four C-130Bs from Mactan Isle
AirfieldinthePhilippines.C-130As took over in early 1966 andwerein
turn replaced by C-I3OEs flom ChingCbuan Kang in September 1967.
CQmparcdtoadaByftyingrateof4.4hoursdailyperplane fortheA- and
B-modets, the six C-130Es in June 1968 logged 7.8 hour$ daily per
plane.Monthlyairliftedtonnagerosefromsixtten hundredtons (inc1uding
three thonsand passengers) in late 1965 to more than fivethousand tons
per IIIOntbthreeyears later. C-124s passingthrough Thailand sometimes
made one or twoin-countryflightsto hauJcargo too bigfor theC-130s.
Improvementsinroad, rail.II1'Idpipelinecommunicationsmeanwhilemade
an increase in air transport unnc:cessary,and the airlift rolebecame pri-
marilyto move men,mail, spare parts, and emergencymunitions, where
speedwasimportant.U
Reorganized in April 1965, the Don Muang Transport movement
control was reestablishedas Detachment 4, 31Stb Air Division, and in-
cludeda maintenancestaffaswellascontrolpersonnel. Aircraftitineraries
gencraUyfollowedthemonthlysdmduJessetup bythe315thAirDivision,
withmovementcontrolpublishingsupplementarydailyordersasnecessary.
Since the heavy ftyini rate made it difficult to cope with emergencies,
additional C-130s were sometim,esbrought in for temporary needs. The
C-130 operation in Thailand was thtrefore a ptoject of the 315tb Air
Division,whollydistinctfrom thecontrol or surveillanceofthe 834th Air
DivisioninVietnam.8I
AnewaerialportsquadronwasestablishedinThailand inApril 1965
.and was~~ the6th AerialPort Squadron in July. It replaced the
formerdetachmentofthe8thSquadrOn.Theport workloadatDon Muang
wasmainlyto~ cargo andpassengersnewlyarrived in Bangkokfor
further airlift to upcountry destinations. Detachments of the parent unit
'tJrftf.,~
functionedupcountry. The busiest (in order of activity) werethe detach-
mmIs at KQrat,Udom, Ubon, TakhH, and Nathan Phanom. Growing
Kt,fll-t (depO{)-bus~50t painsintheThaiiIandport systemtesembled".thoseexperiencedin Vietnam
andwerecausedbytheinexperienceofnewlyassignedpersonnel,frequent
breakdownof materiel-handlinaequipment"shortagesof protectedstorage
$pace,and unreliable radios whichmade exchangeof trafficinformation
difficult By mid-1966. however, the worst of these headacbes had been
mrmoulltJ!d. Of
LiketheC-123 crewmenearlier, 0.-130 aircmvs found theBangkok
shuttle a welcome mange from the more difficuh iying in Vietnam.
Nearly all loadings were passeng.ersor palleti%edcargo, relatively easy
TACfICAL AIRLIFT
work for the loadmasters. The rigors of field or tactical operations
were seldom experienced. Passenger missions were usually round-robin
circuits linking Don Muang and the upcountry bases. An aircrew's
seventeen-day cycle at Don Muang usually involved morc flyingthan did a
duty cycle in Vietnam. However, most crewmen felt more than compen-
sated by the opportunities for sightseeing and shopping in Bangkok, the
excellent arrangements for hotel billeting, transportation, and the rogWarity
ofmissionsflow.
.
A detachment of U.S. Army aircraft. mostly U-21s, also operated
from Don Muang managed by the airiift support branch of the MiJitaIy
Assistance Command, Thailand. Two Army Canoous bcga'nworking with
thedetachment in 1964, rotating from companies inVietnam. When theAir
Force took over the Can1>ousin 1967, itcontinued the Don Muang shuttle.
Canoou missions usually flewone of three preplanned routes to U.S. Spe-
cial Forces detachments that were inaccessiblc to the C-130s. Afteri a
reorganization in 1971, the Army flight detachment included seven U-21s
and two UH-l helicopters, now managed by the Army Support 'Com-
mand, Thailand. Given thesmall scale of theArmy detachment'sc-capability
(less than tcn percent of the C-130 tonnage workload), tbe separation of
the Army and the Caribou transports from activities was in practice. a
harmless deviation from theprinciple ofcentralized management."
Transportation patterns shifted away from Don Muang in.1970, ."..
ducing irritation at d1e American presence at Bangkok and easing
air traffic congestion. The C-130s moved to U-Tapao on the Gulf.-of
ThailaDd'in May 1970, and the main terminal of the 6th"Aerial Port
Squadron folJowed in JqJy..1iuiog'0DIya-port detachment/at J)iOn;<Muang.
MAC began airlifting.diiCdly toU-Tapiw, and by year's end most oHhe
depot storage activities fOrmerlyat Bangkok had been moved.'Schedwing
of theC-130s wastbereafterdoae by the airtiftcontrol cemer at.U~Tapao.
-functioning under the PACAF airlift directorate. A Thai decisfon:tO"allow
direct entxy of Americ:anpersonnel into the upcountry bases in late .1~71
ised to ~.the C-130 trans-ThaiJand.,wor]doad and l'C!!!!itwith-
the C-130 detachment from U-Tapao. For the itQt
months. two C-130s ftew.cdally in Thailand. taJdngoff each.morning
fromTan SodNhut.Several130sretUrnedto U-Ta ao . .
"res .~bombing'of
~..
ietoam.Andin 1 3theenlargedU-Tapao forcebecametbeso1e
C-;l30airJift contingentinSoutheastAsia,withmissionresponsibilitics'in
ThaUandC,ambodiaa,ndSouthVietnam.. __
e Air Force trans-Thailand effort was only a side endeavor"to the
much larger and more challenging operation in Vietnam. Thailand mis-
sions, mainly to major airfields with no threat of enemy fire, resembled the
operations of a civilian airUne.:rhe crews from the Pacific adapted 'easily.
and attained impressive flyinghour and workload statistics. The:rotational
410