Systematicity: The Nature of Science

304 Pages·2013·1.888 MB·English

by  Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Systematicity

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OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
General Editor
Paul Humphreys, University of Virginia
Advisory Board
Anouk Barberousse (European Editor)
Jeremy Butterfi eld
Peter Galison
Philip Kitcher
James Woodward
Th e Book of Evidence
Peter Achinstein
Science, Truth, and Democracy
Philip Kitcher
Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical
Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics
Mathias Frisch
Th e Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation,
Reduction, and Emergence
Robert W. Batterman
Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models
and Scientifi c Reasoning
Newton C.A. da Costa and Steven French
Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientifi c Progress
Hasok Chang
Th e Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915–1925
Th omas Ryckman
Making Th ings Happen
James Woodward
Mathematics and Scientifi c Representation
Christopher Pincock
Systematicity: Th e Nature of Science
P aul Hoyningen-Huene
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Systematicity
The Nature of Science
Paul Hoyningen-Huene

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3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 1946–
Systematicity : the nature of science / Paul Hoyningen-Huene.
p. cm.—(Oxford studies in philosophy of science)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).
ISBN 978–0–19–998505–0 (hardback : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–19–998506–7
(updf) 1. Science—Philosophy. 2. Philosophy. I. Title.
Q175.H8825 2013
501—dc23
2012034682

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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Contents
Preface ix
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Historical Remarks 1
1.2 Th e Question “What Is Science?” in Focus 8
2. Th e Main Th esis 1 4
2.1 Science and Systematicity 14
2.1.1 A Little History 1 4
2.1.2 Preliminary Remarks 2 1
2.2 Th e Concept of Systematicity 25
2.3 Th e Structure of the Argument 30
3. Th e Systematicity of Science Unfolded 35
3.1 Descriptions 37
3 .1.1 S ome Preliminaries 3 7
3.1.2 Axiomatization 41
3.1.3 Classifi cation, Taxonomy, and Nomenclature 4 2
3.1.4 Periodization 4 3
3.1.5 Quantifi cation 4 5
3.1.6 Empirical Generalizations 47
3.1.7 Historical Descriptions 4 9
3.2 Explanations 53
3.2.1 Some Preliminaries 5 3
3.2.2 Explanations Using Empirical Generalizations 5 6
3.2.3 Explanations Using Th eories 5 9
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vi Contents
3.2.4 Explanations of Human Actions 6 2
3.2.5 Reductive Explanations 6 3
3.2.6 Historical Explanations 6 8
3.2.7 Explanation and Understanding in the Humanities in
General 71
3.2.8 Explanations in the Study of Literature 7 5
3.3 Predictions 78
3 .3.1 S ome Preliminaries 7 8
3.3.2 Predictions Based on Empirical Regularities of the Data in
Question 80
3.3.3 Predictions Based on Correlations with Other Data Sets 8 2
3.3.4 Predictions Based on (Fundamental) Th eories or Laws 8 3
3.3.5 Predictions Based on Models 8 5
3.3.6 Predictions Based on Delphi Methods 8 7
3.4 Th e Defense of Knowledge Claims 88
3.4.1 S ome Preliminaries 8 8
3.4.2 Nonevidential Considerations 92
3.4.3 Empirical Generalizations, Models, and Th eories 9 4
3.4.4 Causal Infl uence 9 8
3.4.5 Th e Verum Factum Principle 1 02
3.4.6 Th e Role of Mathematics in the Sciences 1 03
3.4.7 Historical Sciences 1 07
3.5 Critical Discourse 108
3.5.1 Some Preliminaries 1 08
3.5.2 Norms and Institutions 1 10
3.5.3 Practices in Science Fostering Critical Discourse 1 11
3.6 Epistemic Connectedness 113
3.6.1 Preliminaries: Th e Problem 1 13
3.6.2 Failing Answers 116
3.6.3 Th e Concept of Epistemic Connectedness 1 18
3.6.4 Revisiting the Examples 1 21
3.7 Th e Ideal of Completeness 124
3 .7.1 S ome Preliminaries 1 24
3.7.2 Examples 1 26
3.8 Th e Generation of New Knowledge 132
3.8.1 Some Preliminaries 1 32
3.8.2 Data Collection 134
3.8.3 Th e Exploitation of Knowledge fr om Other Domains 1 39
3.8.4 Th e Generation of New Knowledge as an Autocatalytic Process 1 41
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Contents vii
3.9 Th e Representation of Knowledge 141
3.9.1 Some Preliminaries 1 41
3.9.2 Examples 1 42
4. Comparison with Other Positions 148
4.1 Aristotle 150
4.1.1 Th e Position 1 50
4.1.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 51
4.2 Ren é Descartes 152
4.2.1 Th e Position 152
4.2.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 54
4.3 Immanuel Kant 155
4.3.1 Th e Position 1 55
4.3.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 58
4.4 Logical Empiricism 159
4.4.1 Th e Position 159
4.4.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 60
4.5 Karl R. Popper 161
4.5.1 Th e Position 1 61
4.5.2 C omparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 62
4.6 Th omas S. Kuhn 163
4.6.1 Th e Position 1 63
4.6.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 64
4.7 Paul K. Feyerabend 165
4.7.1 Th e Position 1 66
4.7.2 Comparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 68
4.8 Nicholas Rescher 170
4.8.1 Th e Position 1 70
4.8.2 C omparison with Systematicity Th eory 1 73
5. Consequences for Scientifi c Knowledge 1 76
5.1 Th e Genesis and Dynamics of Science 176
5.1.1 Conceptual Clarifi cations 1 77
5.1.2 Th e Genesis of a Science 1 80
5.1.3 Th e Dynamics of Science 1 83
5.2 Science and Common Sense 187
5.2.1 Th e Preservation of Common Sense 1 87
5.2.2 Th e Deviations fr om Common Sense 1 90
5.2.3 Additional Remarks 1 93
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viii Contents
5.3 Normative Consequences 196
5.4 Demarcation from Pseudoscience 199
5.4.1 A Little History 2 00
5.4.2 Systematicity Th eory’s Demarcation Criterion 2 03
6. Conclusion 208

Notes 213
Literature Cited 259
Index 279

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Preface
In this book, I will explicate and argue for the following thesis: key to understand-
ing what makes scientifi c knowledge special is the notion of systematicity. More to
the point, I will argue that the essential diff erence between scientifi c knowledge
and other forms of knowledge consists of the higher degree of systematicity of the
former. Th is particularly applies to the relationship between scientifi c knowledge
and everyday knowledge. At fi rst, it is necessary, however, to explain what is meant
by stating that scientifi c knowledge is more systematic than other forms of knowl-
edge because the notion of systematicity is far from clear; in fact, it is vague and
ambiguous. Arguing for the thesis will be systematic in itself, as I will attempt to
provide backing for every aspect that is involved. Part of the overall argument for
the thesis will also consist of a comparison with other attempts to describe the char-
acteristics of scientifi c knowledge. Eventually, these alternative attempts should be
contained in my thesis. In other words, they are not false, but rather single-sided. As
opposed to many attempts in the twentieth century that dealt with questions about
the specifi city of science, I will not start with the presumed opposition between sci-
ence proper and pseudoscience or metaphysics. By contrast, I will compare everyday
knowledge with scientifi c knowledge. Only aft er full development of this compari-
son will I be able to meaningfully comment on the so-called demarcation criterion.
Th is criterion aims at articulating and explicating the diff erence between science on
the one hand and pseudoscience and metaphysics on the other.
My work on this subject dates back to four years into my professional beginnings
in philosophy. In 1979, I was asked by members of the Institute of Geography at
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